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Map of South America |
CIAO DATE: 04/03
Venezuela Alert: Will Chávez Fall Again?
Miguel Díaz *
Hemisphere Focus: 2001-2002
June 3, 2002
Overview
In May, President Hugo Chávez sought to solidify his hold on power by trying to root out his enemies within the armed forces-the ultimate arbiter of power in Venezuela these days-and by meeting some of the opposition’s early demands. Nevertheless, his hold on the presidency remains tenuous and both constitutional and extra-constitutional efforts to remove him from power are persisting. Concerned about the possibility of a bigger outbreak of violence than that witnessed in mid-April and ultimately about their own political future, members of Chávez’s Movement for the Fifth Republic (MVR) party and Vice President Vicente Rangel are counseling the president to resign and call for new elections. Some of the above also believe that, given the current division within the opposition, Chávez could win an election and in so doing, recoup his prestige and the political momentum. The opposition, meanwhile, has again taken to the streets to ask this time for the resignation of Attorney General Isaias Rodriguez, a Chávez ally, so that his removalcan clear the way for an indictment of Chávez for alleged numerous misdeeds.
For his part, Chávez insists that he is sincere about starting over and achieving national reconciliation, something that polls indicate is now more difficult to do because of the increased polarization of the country. To his credit, Chávez has backed up his words with deeds. For one, he has removed many of the hardliners within his cabinet and replaced them with less controversial figures, including for the positions of vice president and heads of the Ministries of Planning, Finance, Production and Commerce, and most recently Foreign Affairs. Moreover, Chávez has persuaded his congressional supporters to subscribe to the opposition initiative to radically change, or eliminate, 17 of 49 laws introduced last fall by decree that greatly disconcerted the private sector and that the Supreme Court recently ruled to be unconstitutional. This is all well and good, the opposition claims, but it is not enough. They claim that Chávez must still disarm the Bolivarian Circles, for the opposition cannot be expected to enter into a meaningful dialogue with the government with a gun pointed at its head. Chávez claims that the Bolivarian Circles-modeled after Cuba’s neighborhood committees-are not the paramilitary groups the opposition pictures them to be and do good works. Some within the civil society opposition have refused to partake in any dialogue with Chávez under any circumstance. Most Venezuelans also have not bought into Chávez’s accusations that Washington was behind the mid-April coup and see the claims as an attempt by Chávez to shift the focus away from domestic problems he has created. Meanwhile, the economy continues to deteriorate. One Wall Street investment bank estimates that Venezuela’s economy will contract by 1.7 percent this year, yearly inflation will balloon from 12.3 percent last year to about 32 percent, and the 2002 fiscal gap will reach close to U.S.$9.8 billion, or 8.3 percent of GDP.
While trying to buy time and support from the public, Chávez is purging his enemies within the armed forces, the institution that relieved him of power on April 11, put him back in power on April 14, and many believe still holds the fate of Chávez’s future in its hands. Telling friend from foe, however, is not easy and all eyes are focused on what will happen on July 5, the day designated for military promotions. Allegedly, more than 60 officers already have been relieved of their duties because of their role in the mid-April coup. In a somewhat related development, Pedro Carmona-the businessman who was the interim president in mid-April-sought and received asylum from Colombia last week.
Commentary: The situation in Venezuela is fluid and the odds of another attempt to oust Chávez unconstitutionally are quite high. Despite his efforts, Chávez will likely fall short of gaining the support of the military, as his opposition with the rank-and-file is deep. Reportedly, a group within the armed forces of mid-ranking officers named the Comacates, after the colonels, majors, and captains who comprise it, will determine how the armed forces will respond. How Chávez manages the request of disarming the Bolivarian Circles, a group that many in the military post-mid-April now see as a threat to their monopoly on the use of armed force, is key. The civil and political opposition is generally disposed to another ouster attempt, whether through legal or illegal means-including another military coup. Despite paying lip service to a commitment to constitutional resolution to the crisis, these groups are more concerned with getting rid of Chávez. The one factor standing in the way of another ouster attempt is military concern over the international (especially U.S.) response to any illegal usurpation of authority. The United States has publicly warned against the repercussions of another coup. Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning Richard Haass was the latest to warn against an illegal overthrow of Chávez during a late May visit to Venezuela. Nevertheless, the dynamics within the military are not in Chávez’s favor and the hopes of many who fear a bigger outbreak of violence than the one in mid-April is that Chávez will resign or that constitutional initiatives to remove him from power will pan out, none of which is likely to happen. A planned march on June 11 of active and retired military officers may well be the catalyst for the next violent episode in the Venezuela drama.
Endnotes
Note *: Miguel Díaz directs the CSIS South America Project, which focuses on advising U.S. policymakers and the private sector on political and economic developments primarily through the U.S.-Mercosur Study Group (a bipartisan group in the U.S. Congress). The project also provides briefings for the Washington policy community and private sector. Díaz brings nearly 10 years of investment banking experience to CSIS, having worked most recently as the senior Latin American economist/strategist for Nikko Securities Inc. in New York City. In the early 1990’s, Díaz worked as an economist for the Central Intelligence Agency and as a strategic market analyst for Eaton Corporation. Díaz has worked as a consultant and journalist, and remains a regular columnist for the Economist Intelligence Unit and other publications focusing on Latin American financial issues. He holds an M.A. degree in Latin American studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a B.A. degree in political science from Hobart College. Born and raised in New York City, Díaz has also lived in Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. Back.
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