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CIAO DATE: 04/03
Brazil Alert: Presidential Campaign Twists and Turns
William Perry *
Hemisphere Focus: 2001-2002
April 24, 2002
Overview
Brazil’s presidential contest has certainly taken some dramatic turns during the run-up to, and aftermath of, the April 6 deadline for occupants of executive positions to leave office if they want to make the presidential race (or any other) this year. For most of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second term, figures from the leftist opposition–most specifically, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva (Partido dos Trabalhadores–PT), Ciro Gomes (Partido Popular Socialista–PPS) and Itamar Franco (the dissident wing of Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro–PMDB)-had been running one, two, and three in public opinion polls, while the government’s support base (principally Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira–PSDB, Partido da Frente Liberal–PFL, PMDB, and Partido Progressista Brasileiro–PPB) seemed to lack a truly competitive candidate.
However, this situation began to change with the dawn of this general election year, as the economy recovered from its difficulties of 2001 and Brazilians came to feel better about their circumstances, particularly in light of Argentina’s ever-worsening crisis. In this altered environment, the PFL appeared to find a viable contender–Maranhão governor, Roseana Sarney–who surged toward near-parity with the still front-running Lula in the polls and even showed an ability to defeat him in a run-off between them. Consequently, the PSDB’s incumbent health minister, José Serra, felt himself obliged to leave that post in early February–so as to be better able to advance his long-evident interest (as well as that of the party that has held the Palácio do Planalto for the past eight years) in succeeding to the presidency. The problem, of course, is that only one candidate from the ranks of the old Cardoso coalition could make it into the almost certain runoff against Lula during the first round of voting on October 6. Thus, Serra’s tasks were to lower Sarney’s standing and improve his own previously weak poll numbers. Moreover, he had to move quickly, so that other parties would choose the PSDB–rather than the PFL–during the coming months, to form the prime anti-Lula alliance when candidates are officially nominated and the campaign formally begins in June.
As a result, a number of developments occurred during late February and March that give the appearance of the Serra forces using their position within the Cardoso government to Serra’s advantage by striking at the PFL and Sarney’s candidacy. An unexpected decision by Brazil’s electoral tribunal on the rules governing coalition formation at the state and federal levels this year came out in a way favorable to the PSDB. A “random” check on a ranch owned by the PFL’s outspoken leader in the Chamber of Deputies, Inocêncio Oliveira, produced widely publicized allegations of labor irregularities there. And, even more dramatically, a March 1 police raid on the offices of Sarney’s husband uncovered half a million dollars in supposed campaign contributions (that are technically illegal at this stage) and might be something worse, resulting in a firestorm of subsequent controversy.
This perceived assault on PFL’s candidate–against a background of PSDB behavior during the past year that consistently favored the PMDB over the PFL, and an absolute refusal on the part of Serra to consider an all-government-party coalition without him at its head–produced a strong, immediate reaction. The PFL withdrew all its ministers from the government and adopted an attitude within Congress that has complicated prospects for approval of even the most necessary legislation. Moreover, Sarney’s father, ex-president José Sarney, felt impelled to make a dramatic speech on the Senate floor, alleging that Cardoso’s administration had abused its authority in favor of its party’s candidate.
Nevertheless, the strike on Roseana Sarney had its intended affect. Her poll numbers promptly plummeted from the lower 20s to the mid-teens, while Serra’s jumped from high single digits to equal and exceed those of his rival in all public opinion surveys. Moreover, this change in their relative standing encouraged Serra to make an attempt to clinch an alliance with the PMDB by offering it the vice presidential slot on his ticket (in combination with a simultaneous outreach to the PPB).
These developments produced a painful crisis of confidence within the Sarney camp throughout the month of March and into April. On the surface, the leadership of the PFL still seemed to support her presidential aspirations. But it also had to keep a nervous eye on the polls to see if her candidacy had been mortally wounded with the Brazilian public. And, of course, an agonizingly personal decision had to be faced by Sarney as to whether to continue with what promised to be an arduous uphill effort to restore her tarnished image. In the end, she stepped down as governor of Maranhão just before the April 6 deadline and a week later announced the abandonment of her presidential bid (subsequently deciding to run for a virtually assured Senate seat).
This latest turn of Brazil’s political kaleidoscope reveals a new balance among the remaining competitors. In the wake of Sarney’s withdrawal, Serra has become the sole representative of the parties that have supported the Cardoso government and he now stands at nearly 20 percent in the polls. Rio de Janeiro governor, Anthony Garotinho (Partido Socialista Brasileiro–PSB)–remains in the mid-teens. Ciro Gomes (PPS) has picked up a few points, presumably from Sarney’s northeastern constituencies, and now stands in the low teens. Minas Gerais governor, Itamar Franco (PMDB), also abandoned the field to seek re-election to that post–in final recognition of the futility of his quest for that party’s presidential nomination. The principal beneficiary of recent developments has been the PT’s Lula da Silva, who has inched back toward the 30 percent mark in public opinion surveys and, once again, bests all comers in hypothetical run-offs.
These circumstances leave the historically establishment PFL in a strangely isolated, but potentially decisive, position and the party now evidences divisions on how to proceed. A small minority–headed by Paraná governor Jaime Lerner (which may end up defecting)–appears inclined to make the best arrangement still possible with Serra. But the vast majority of its membership has been so offended by what is widely regarded as his complicity in Sarney’s demise that they now favor finding some other contender from among their ranks, running no presidential candidate at all or even supporting Ciro Gomes. At the present time–especially in light of recent confirmation of the court decision requiring state coalitions to be consistent with any entered into at the national level–the PFL seems most likely to eschew a presidential bid this year and concentrate upon electing the largest possible congressional (and gubernatorial) delegation. But the votes of its members will still exercise a potentially decisive influence on who is eventually chosen as Brazil’s chief executive in October.
The truth is that this campaign season has a long way to go and sharp fluctuations of fortune have characterized all competitive presidential elections under the New Republic. Serra has succeeded in elevating himself to real competitiveness in this crowded field and he is now the sole representative of the Cardoso coalition parties. However, his bare-knuckles approach opens him to charges of misuse of government authority and the financial director of his 1998 senate campaign is now facing accusations of irregularities. Moreover, he will now obviously experience great difficulty in sewing together the kind of broad, center/moderate-left coalition that carried Cardoso to the presidency in 1994 and 1998. Indeed, the defection of the PFL has compromised the Cardoso administration’s ability to govern for the remainder of its term.
Sarney’s demise has also helped Garotinho and Gomes, as anti-Lula voters, seek other alternatives to the PT. Gomes can now actually hope for significant official or informal PFL support–obviously not on ideological grounds, but because of his northeastern roots and out of pure rancor against Serra. The prime beneficiary so far of this seemingly irretrievable split in the Cardoso coalition, however, has been Lula. Yet even this PT perennial can expect no easy road during a long campaign season as he seeks to convince the more ideological elements of his own party about the virtues of coalition politics and remembers how supporters of his various opponents ultimately came together to frustrate his three previous tries for Brazil’s presidency.
Endnotes
Note *: William Perry is a senior associate of the CSIS Americas Program and president of the Institute for the Study of the Americas and William Perry and Associates. Mr. Perry has an extensive track record of involvement in Colombian, Venezuelan, Argentine, Brazilian, and Southern Cone affairs and the analysis of elections there and in other Latin American countries. He has also served as a senior Latin American specialist for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and director of Latin American affairs at the National Security Council. Back.
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