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Map of South America |
CIAO DATE: 04/03
At the Starting Gate
William Perry *
Hemisphere Focus: 2001-2002
February 25, 2002
Overview
An apparent brightening of Brazil’s economic prospects has accompanied the dawn of 2002. Despite all of Brazil’s difficulties last year, its rate of growth during that period turned out to be nearly two percent-not bad in comparison with regional neighbors and much of the rest of the world. Moreover, the country’s electric energy crisis is now seemingly over. And even Argentina’s descent into genuine crisis conditions has not damaged the inveterate optimism of Brazilians. In fact, with global financial markets and investors seemingly at long last able to distinguish between these two South American neighbors, both the real and Bovespa stock index have risen in value through December and into January-as the adverse impact anticipated from Argentina’s devaluation/default simply failed to materialize. Government analysts now foresee growth gradually accelerating as the world economy shakes off the effects of its present recession-although the truth is that too many domestic and international unknowns remain to make any such predictions with total assurance (something of which 2001 should eternally remind us).
This development naturally warms the political hopes of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration supporters, as the mist also begins to clear at the starting line of this year’s general election campaign. The leftist opposition still has Lula da Silva (PT) leading other presidential hopefuls in all public opinion polls. But he seems stuck at about 30 percent-only slightly in excess of the figure that the disciplined ranks of his party have always assured him of on the first round of balloting on October 6. Meanwhile, the other two main critics of Cardoso’s liberalizing policies, who had been the principal runners-up through most of 2001-former Ceará governor, Ciro Gomes (PPS), and Minas Gerais incumbent chief executive Itamar Franco (PMDB)-have seen their standings fall during recent months.
This reflects what may be a temporary decline in the percentage of Brazilian voters demanding radical change from the course pursued during the past eight years-which appeared to stand at more than two-thirds of the electorate through much of last year. The principal beneficiaries from this trend have been Maranhao’s PFL governor, Roseana Sarney (now with support in the 20 percent range), and, more recently, her counterpart in Rio de Janeiro, Anthony Garotinho (PSB). Sarney-a self-proclaimed centrist-has demonstrated an appeal to broader constituencies because she is a woman from the northeast-as well as a fresh face on the national political scene. Garotinho, in contrast, possesses roots in the leftist opposition-evident from past allegiance to the PTD and present party affiliation-but has governed Rio so moderately as to spark a break with his former populist patron, Leonel Brizola. Meanwhile, Health Minister José Serra, of Cardoso’s PSDB, also formally declared his long-anticipated candidacy at the beginning of January. A number of lesser aspirants also still remain in the field.
However, the parties will only be actually nominating their candidates between now and the beginning of April (by which time all of them must leave any federal or state executive branch positions they now occupy). Moreover, the combination of Brazil’s extreme multiparty political environment with its two-stage, runoff system of presidential balloting means that a great deal depends on the coalitions that emerge by that time. Much can-and undoubtedly will-happen between April and October’s balloting. The precise matchup in the decisive second round is also bound to have a significant impact on the ultimate outcome of this campaign.
Lula still seems virtually assured of getting into that final act, as he did in 1989, 1994, and 1998. His chronic problem has been that almost all parties of the center and non-Marxist left coalesced against him in the end. This time around, he is hoping that the acute dissatisfaction with free-market economic policies evident in some sectors of Brazilian opinion, and a moderating image on the part of the PT, will produce a different result. As extra insurance, some of the party’s more pragmatic strategists (reportedly to include Lula, himself) are now considering the possibility of breaking its historic aversion to explicit alliances-even to the point of accepting a non-PT vice presidential candidate. It remains to be seen, however, whether the party’s more sectarian ideological factions-which historically have generated a great part of the PT’s problem with the general electorate-will tolerate such a concession to conventional Brazilian politics.
In the other principal camp, the rather surprising rise of Roseana Sarney to a position in the polls broadly competitive with that of Lula (actually surpassing him in some second-round simulations) would seem to be a great boon to supporters of the incumbent government-who previously lacked an obvious standard-bearer. Yet it also complicates the process of assembling a coalition of their three principal parties-the PSDB, PFL, and PMDB because Cardoso’s PSDB and its now almost certain nominee, Jose Serra, refuse to consider anything but the top of a ticket. Serra, however, has not been doing that well in public opinion surveys and, as a quintessential representative of his party’s powerful Sao Paulo wing, seems to have particularly little appeal in smaller states (from which the PFL and PMDB draw the bulk of their support).
All things being equal, the PFL might again content itself with playing second fiddle around the Planalto (as Vice President Marco Maciel has done vis-a-vis Cardoso)-for a promise of ministries and key congressional posts in the event of victory. With Roseana Sarney at three or four times Serra’s standing in the polls, however, this is a very hard pill to swallow. Moreover, many PFL chiefs have come to the conclusion that Serra just cannot prevail in this year’s presidential race. Meanwhile, the PMDB’s leadership seems to be effectively fighting off Itamar Franco’s faltering efforts to secure its nomination and pull that party out of the governmentista coalition. It has no other figure with much of a national following, however-and will ultimately adhere to whatever non-Lula ticket seems most likely to win, on the best terms that can be obtained-whether by April or October. Thus, unless Serra can now soar in the polls or something terrible happens to Roseana’s image during the next couple of months, it looks as if there will be two major government party candidates during the campaign season and into the first round.
For most of last year, Gomes or Franco also seemed to have a fair chance at edging out a government standard-bearer in the first round and confronting Lula in the subsequent runoff. Their prospects have dimmed considerably, however-with the former’s support level eroding steadily from the low 20s to barely double digits and Itamar’s similarly declining poll numbers (once in the mid-teens; now, high single digits) depriving him of much hope for sparking a rebellion within the PMDB. Meanwhile, Garotinho has elbowed his way into third place according to most recent polls (at about 15 percent). Yet the standing of all these entrants can be expected to continue to fluctuate considerably over time. Indeed, abrupt and sometimes very surprising reversals of fortune have been the rule, rather than the exception, in every competitive election year under the New Republic.
With Lula enjoying a 25-30 percent support base and looking for ways to increase this level, the name of the game for all other aspirants is to outpace everyone else in this crowded field-and then try to rally their supporters in the second round. Ciro Gomes seemed to enjoy the best prospect in this regard for much of last year-although at least one government party-backed candidate was sure to emerge at some point. Presently, Roseana Sarney has the advantage. And, in the future, it could be her, Garotinho, Serra, or-for that matter-Gomes again, depending on the coalitions they are able to form during the next two months and their ability to maintain a personal standing with the Brazilian public during a long campaign season.
Endnotes
Note *: William Perry is a senior associate of the CSIS Americas Program and president of the Institute for the Study of the Americas and William Perry and Associates. Mr. Perry has an extensive track record of involvement in Colombian, Venezuelan, Argentine, Brazilian, and Southern Cone affairs and the analysis of elections there and in other Latin American countries. He has also served as a senior Latin American specialist for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and director of Latin American affairs at the National Security Council. Back.
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