

# THE DEFENSE MONITOR

*The Newsletter of the Center for Defense Information*

## F-22: Still Among the Undead

WINSLOW T. WHEELER, DIRECTOR, CDI STRAUS MILITARY REFORM PROJECT



U.S. Air Force/Senior Airman Garrett Hothan

Last July, a majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), led by Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R-Ga., tried to reverse Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' decision to stop production of the F-22. After Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the White House lobbied long and hard against the emissaries from Lockheed, the F-22 lost in a somewhat lopsided vote of 58 to 40. Game over. Right?

Anyone who thinks so does not appreciate the staying power of Congress' porkers.

It is not that the F-22 devotees feel honor bound to bravely press on for their cause and to challenge Gates and Obama to another open fight. That is not how they operate. Having met serious opposition, they lurk in the shadows looking for an opportunity to sneak something by – just as they do with most congressional pork: pretending their earmarks are just what the troops at war need and

concealing the obscene way they pay for their pork (by raiding money for support for the troops in the field).

If it were substantive arguments that really mattered, the F-22 – and a whole lot more – never would have gotten out of the Pentagon's incubator for bad ideas.

It's credit back home for bringing home the bacon and grubbing for contributions from manufacturers that motivate many on Capitol Hill. Thus, they prefer to press on - but only indirectly.

The new gambit is foreign sales. Perhaps Japan can be convinced that the flying \$355 million contraption is something they need. Australia, just now bringing to a close a four-decade-long nightmare with an earlier fiasco bought from the U.S. at great cost (the F-111), might also – inexplicably – be interested.

The 2010 defense policy ("authorization") bill from the House and Senate Armed Services Committee is

just now becoming law. It contains a new provision to permit foreign sales of the F-22, and it also requires that F-22 tooling and production facilities be indefinitely preserved to make future production possible.

We can now expect manufacturer and congressional delegations to wing across the Pacific to lobby Japan. If they succeed, the F-22 production line – now scheduled to close in 2011 – will remain open. Expect then a renewed lobbying effort to sell more to the U.S. Air Force.

It is sad that the Pentagon's aviation bureaucracy has given the taxpayers such a costly disappointment for our Air Force. The F-22 solves none of our problems; in fact, it makes them all worse, and some want to perpetuate that deterioration and spread it to our allies.

To prevent this undying vampire from sucking more lifeblood out of our defenses, we should get out the wooden stakes. ■

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# The Defense Industry's Secret Weapon

WINSLOW T. WHEELER, DIRECTOR, CDI STRAUS MILITARY REFORM PROJECT

PIERRE M. SPREY, ADVISOR, CDI STRAUS MILITARY REFORM PROJECT

*This article was first published in the August issue of Mother Jones.*

**IN JULY, TO GREAT FANFARE,** the Obama administration finally killed the F-22 fighter jet – an underperforming, overpriced Cold War relic that has never flown a combat mission over Iraq or Afghanistan. But all the breathless talk of Defense Secretary Robert Gates' "sweeping reforms" obscures an unpleasant truth. While the rare defeat of congressional porkmongers offers a ray of hope, real reform will require a far more ambitious, persistent effort. Standing in the way is the Pentagon's No. 2 civilian official, handpicked by Gates and coming directly from a lobbying job for the giant defense contractor Raytheon.

William J. Lynn III, after Gates, is the most powerful person in the Defense Department, responsible for managing the entire building, includ-

ing weapons acquisitions. His opposition to reform is well documented. During the Clinton administration, he rose to be the Pentagon's comptroller, in charge of a system that was completely unable to account for the hundreds of billions it spent every year. Faced with this mess, Lynn's major contribution during his tenure was to block fiscal accountability rather than promote it. In public testimony to a federal accounting board, Lynn successfully requested that the Pentagon be exempt from a crucial part of the Chief Financial Officers' Act of 1990, a reform requiring all federal departments to comply with accepted financial integrity standards. Next, he advocated for a notorious bill-paying system referred to by critics as "pay and chase," under which the Pentagon hands a contrac-

tor a quick payout for bills and later tries to figure out what the money was for. Today's financial chaos and lack of accountability at the DOD stem in part from Lynn's handiwork.

After Lynn left the Pentagon, he accepted a plush position in 2003 as chief lobbyist for Raytheon, the DOD's fifth-largest defense contractor. Lynn spent the next five years pushing Raytheon moneymakers such as computers for the F-22 and the electronics for the Navy's preposterously overpriced Zumwalt destroyer.

When Barack Obama took office, he introduced sorely needed new ethics rules to close the revolving door between government agencies and the private sector, particularly lobbyists. But within the month, he had waived those rules, specifically to permit Lynn to become deputy secretary of defense. Now that the lobbyist emeritus is back at the Pentagon, it's clear that he hasn't lost his aversion to reform.

In May, Obama proudly signed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009—Congress' answer to the Pentagon's chronic procurement problems. However, the bill was written by the bipartisan leadership of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and not one lawmaker voted against it, which is in itself a suspicious sign that the legislation wouldn't upset the cozy relationship between Congress and the defense industry.

As originally written by Sens. Carl Levin, D-Mich., and John McCain,



DOD/Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison

William J. Lynn III is sworn in as the Obama administration's Deputy Secretary of Defense on Feb. 12, 2009.

R-Ariz., the measure was already disturbingly cosmetic. But according to numerous insiders in Congress, as well as a letter Lynn sent to Levin outlining objections to the bill, Lynn, as the DOD's point person for negotiations with Congress, worked assiduously to further widen the legislation's many loopholes.

For instance, the legislation creates a new, independent Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to replace the Pentagon's existing in-house cost shop. In theory, this cost czar's estimates were supposed to end the DOD's ubiquitous "camel's nose under the tent" stratagem – the use of phony, understated price tags to gain approval for weapon programs in their early stages. Though Lynn failed to eliminate the new position altogether, he did push successfully to kill a House provision mandating the use of the cost czar's estimates in the annual Pentagon budget. The result: DOD's civilian and military decision-makers remain completely free to ignore the new czar, just as they have been ignoring previous independent cost estimates for decades.

The bill also requires the Pentagon to buy competing prototypes of each new weapon. This practice has consistently resulted in better weapons at a lower price on the few occasions that it has been tried. Once again, however, Levin and McCain's tepid wording provided the Pentagon's weapons managers with a get-out-of-jail free pass, permitting them to waive the burdensome competition requirement simply by invoking "critical" but undefined "national security objectives." Dissatisfied with this gaping loophole, Lynn successfully sought another that left program managers free to put up a sub-

system for competition instead of the entire weapon. But if managers declared that contracting for competitive subsystems might increase costs, they could ignore the competition requirement altogether.

And there's more. As originally written in the Senate, the bill actually ended the practice, now rife, of permitting contractors to conduct the Pentagon's official reviews of their own programs. But at Lynn's request, the Senate Armed Services Committee changed the text to allow a defense contractor's subsidiary to do the DOD review of the parent company's programs. As signed, the act instructs the Pentagon to write any contractor self-review regulation it pleases, subject only to the vaguest legislative guidance.

In essence, through waivers and loopholes, the legislation was reduced to a pathetic request for the Defense Department to fix itself. This sorry history holds two lessons: First, the Pentagon's leadership is as hostile as ever to meaningful reform; second, instead of independently overseeing the nation's defenses as required by the Constitution, Congress remains the willing anti-reform ally of the Pentagon.

There are other troubling signs of business as usual in Obama's DOD. When Gates very correctly canceled Lockheed's F-22, he simultaneously endorsed going ahead full speed with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, built by the same company. The F-35 is already overweight, sluggish, behind schedule, and growing in much the same manner as the F-22. But the plan approved by Gates and Lynn commits to more than 500 of them before the first definitive flight test report lands on the secretary's desk. The F-35 program exemplifies

why the Pentagon cannot be trusted to reform itself. By endorsing a program so obviously laden with the same old problems, Gates is ensuring a rerun of the F-22 fiasco.

Each of the other services is nurturing similar time bombs. The Navy has the obscenely expensive Littoral Combat Ship. The Army is busy defending the Future Combat Systems program, a baroque "system of systems" edifice intended to gather so many expensive technologies under one budget roof that it would become "too big to fail." The Marine Corps is falling on its sword to protect the overambitious, technically hopeless Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. As each of these programs approaches its inevitable implosion over the next several years, reform-minded Pentagon and congressional staffers will be pressing for restructuring or cancellation. The traditional coalition of military and industry big-spending advocates, in lockstep with the masters of pork on the Hill, will close ranks to preserve business as usual. William Lynn won't be far away. ■

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Pierre M. Sprey, together with U.S. Air Force fighter pilots John Boyd and Everest Riccioni, brought to fruition the F-16; he also led the design team for the A-10 and helped implement the program. He is one of a very small number of Pentagon insiders who started the military reform movement in the late 1960s.

Winslow T. Wheeler is the Director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information in Washington. He worked on national security issues on Capitol Hill for 31 years for U.S. senators from both political parties and for the Government Accountability Office.

Both Wheeler and Sprey are contributors to CDI's new anthology "America's Defense Melt-down: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress."

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# New U.S. Missile Defense Strategy and Russian Response

## Harbinger of Increased Cooperation?

ERIKA NUTTING, CDI RESEARCH ASSISTANT

**On September 18, President Obama initiated a drastic shift in missile defense policy when he announced that previous defense shield plans for Europe would no longer go into effect.**

With this decision, the administration's plans for radar facilities in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland gave way to new strategies still under negotiation. Critics in both the United States and abroad – particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic – balked at this policy reversal, with some calling the decision an abandonment of long-time allies. Others called it a display of weakness by the United States and viewed the decision as a capitulation to Russian demands.

Yet other government officials from both the United States and Russia praised the policy shift. Despite the heated discussion, a very real positive result has emerged – Russia has announced that it will not place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, its exclave bordering Poland and Lithuania. Not a day after the United States' announcement, Russian military sources declared their response, and several days later, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev officially announced the decision. "At the moment when I voiced this idea, I said that we [Russia] would deploy Iskander missiles in response to the [U.S.] decision on the implementation of the Third Site," said Medvedev after the G20 summit. "Considering that this decision has been cancelled, it is obvious that I have decided not to deploy Iskander missiles in the Russian [Kaliningrad] region." This

latest update turns the situation into a true quid pro quo exchange.

The missile-reduction exchange directly continues last year's precedent. When the United States announced its missile defense plans in November 2008, Medvedev declared that the Iskander missiles would be deployed to Kaliningrad to "neutralize any perceived U.S. threat." Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, specifically stated that his nation would halt the Kaliningrad plan when the United States stopped its missile defense shield. Indeed, the Russians followed through on their word – military officials and Medvedev himself canceled the missiles – thus avoiding a stalemate of missile-posturing that would revive memories of a colder time. Had Russia decided not to respond to the shield, escalation could have halted, but the United States can only expect Russia to act in what it perceives to be its best interest.

Shortly after last year's announcement, an article in the *Guardian* called Kaliningrad the "frontline of the new cold war." Although perhaps hyperbole, the increasingly strained relations between the United States and Russia were not. With announcements to reduce their missile presence in Eastern Europe, the two can focus their energy on common goals – reducing the threat from rogue states.

Because of the new U.S. missile defense plans, something more

beneficial to national security could emerge. A partnership between the United States and Russia very likely will become reality as the nations focus their attention on the actual threat that missile defense would ostensibly deter – Iran. Analyses by the U.S. intelligence community have determined that the "Iranian long-range missile program is progressing too slowly and is not dangerous at the moment, and the more immediate threat comes from Iran's middle and short-range missiles." In focusing on the more immediate threat – the shorter-range missiles – the United States and Russia can better determine how to manage Iran. Any missile defense program that the United States initiates now at least will not have the Iskander missiles – which have "a range of 280 kilometers and constantly change [their] trajectory in flight" – pointed directly at it.

The Secretary General of NATO has even cautiously stated that his organization and Russia might cooperate. "There are some fundamental issues on which NATO and Russia disagree, and they will not disappear overnight," said Anders Fogh Rasmussen in a speech in Brussels shortly after the Russian announcement. "However, I do believe that it is possible for NATO and Russia to make a new beginning – and to enjoy a far more productive relationship in the future." While a partnership may only be in its infancy, the first steps toward cooperation were the changes in U.S. missile defense and Russia's retreat from the Iskander missiles. ■



# Strengthening U.S. Commitment to European Security

JENNY SHIN, CDI RESEARCH ASSISTANT



World Economic Forum

While the Obama administration's new missile defense policy has reaffirmed U.S. commitment to European security, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has also advocated the possibility of linking the U.S., NATO and Russian missile defense systems.

**A EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE** system is still underway in spite of criticism that President Barack Obama has abandoned plans and security commitments to deploy a missile "shield" in Europe. On the contrary, the recently announced "Phased, Adaptive Approach" for a European missile defense system revamps proposals made under George W. Bush to add more flexibility to counter a potential Iranian missile threat and provide more security for U.S. allies in Europe. Not only does Obama's missile defense plan reaffirm U.S. commitment to Europe's security and strengthen ties with European allies beyond the Czech Republic and Poland, but it also allows Europe to take on a bigger role in a comprehensive missile defense plan that will ultimately be developed on its home turf.

The Obama administration's Eu-

ropean missile defense plan sets aside the Bush-era plans of deploying 10 Ground-based Interceptors (GBI) and building a radar site in the Czech Republic. This initial plan was based on the notion that Iran's long-range ballistic missile capabilities were far more advanced and developing at a faster rate than was actually the case. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "the intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles ... is developing more rapidly than previously projected" and "the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles capabilities has been slower to develop than was estimated in 2006."

Moreover, the initial proposal was focused on countering intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), or long-

range missiles. This left little room for flexibility in dealing with Iran's existing short- to medium-range ballistic missiles and adapting to Iran's technologically evolving threat over time. The fixed interceptors in Poland also would not have provided coverage for all of Europe, leaving some NATO allies unprotected, namely Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey. Without the ability to fill in these missing gaps, especially in a situation that would require a quick adjustment to a changing threat, the Bush administration's proposal would not have been as effective in providing security for Europe and the United States, especially in the near term.

The recently announced plan by the Obama administration fills in the missing pieces by introducing a four-stage phased strategy of deploying missile defense components over the span of 10 years. The benefit of the phased approach is it provides the United States and NATO allies with more defensive firepower sooner and allows the system to adapt to changes in Iran's threat assessment during the 10-year timeframe. The four-stage plan distributes a combination of fixed and relocatable Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors and radars throughout Europe that focuses on deploying existing missile defense components closer to the threat in the near term. Over time, more advanced SM-3 Block IIA and IIB interceptors will be deployed in the event that Iran develops longer-range missiles that can reach all of Europe. Currently, Iran does not have any missiles with this capability. As a hedge against either technical difficulties with SM-3 Block II development or new developments in Iranian long-range missiles, the Obama plan also continues the development of GBIs, ten of

which were to be originally deployed in Poland under the Bush plan.

An additional benefit of the phased approach is it allows the United States and its European allies to roughly measure the deterrent effect of missile defense on Iran. As each phase of the plan is implemented, the United States and NATO can track the progression of Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and simultaneously pay close attention to Iran's reaction as the United States and NATO phase in advanced missile defense technology. While external factors affecting Iran's pace of missile developments should be duly noted, the assessment could potentially provide a more concrete evaluation of the effectiveness of missile defense to deter rogue nations. The 10-year time

*“Both NATO and Russia have a wealth of experience in missile defense. We should now work to combine this experience to our mutual benefit.”*

span to implement the four stages of Obama's plan provides ample room for improving methods of evaluating missile defense deterrence on Iran. However, it should be cautiously approached since any assessment will still be limited in the sense that deterrence theory assumes Iran will be a rational player. Iran may very well retaliate by building up its offensive forces and countermeasures to overwhelm the defenses.

Fortunately, the “phased, adaptive approach” emphasizes an important element to the European missile defense architecture that the Bush-era plans lacked – the role of European allies in the framework of missile defense plans. The administration's European missile defense policy aims to engage allies and NATO members

more closely by integrating multilateralism in place of the individual bilateral agreements between the United States and Poland and the Czech Republic respectively. Furthermore, it incorporates NATO's existing technologies and missile defense capabilities into a more comprehensive defense structure. Secretary Gates recently stated during the Defense Department's news briefing on Sept. 17, 2009, “One of our guiding principles for missile defense remains the involvement and support of our allies and partners. We will continue to rely on our allies and work with them to develop a system that most effectively defends against very real and growing threats.” NATO's involvement will surely provide added value to the system. However, in the

long run, it is the bulwark of aligned European countries with the United States that will pose a stronger deterrent than the physical missile defense systems themselves. If Iran attempts to launch a missile at a NATO ally, it will face the consequences of its actions not from one country but from all NATO members.

Adding to this renewed alliance is Russia's possible participation in the revised missile defense plan. NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, recently stated in his first major speech as the Secretary General: “We should explore the potential of linking the U.S., NATO and Russian missile defense systems at an appropriate time ... Both NATO and Russia have a wealth of experience in missile defense. We should now work

to combine this experience to our mutual benefit.” The Secretary General voiced his hopes of reviving the NATO-Russia Council where common security concerns could be discussed and further cooperation between NATO and Russia could be enhanced. Missile defense, among other security concerns, can play a role in bringing the two parties together as Iran is a concern for both NATO and Russia. The Secretary General's speech also sends the right tone to Moscow, which has been skeptical of U.S. missile defense in Europe. In the near future, the NATO-Russia Council should reconvene through a forum where NATO and Russia can engage in open dialogue on existing and future missile defense technologies that can contribute to the overall missile defense architecture in Europe. Welcoming Russia's cooperation will help to further strengthen the defenses, and moreover, send a stronger message to Iran that the United States does not stand alone in this endeavor to curb Iran's rogue activities.

Iran's recent missile tests show how real and unpredictable the threat can be. This points to the need for a more practical approach to missile defense that will be flexible and capable of dealing with evolving missile threats in the near- and the longer-term. With the unanimous support from Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Obama administration's proposal for Europe moves missile defense in the right direction and takes measured steps to integrate advanced technologies over time; adapt to new threats through flexibility and phasing in of new technologies; and incorporate European allies and Russia's involvement to bolster the defenses and strengthen U.S. commitment to Europe's security. ■

# Another “Stealth” Fiasco

## JASSM Chasm in Design, Quality, Cost

LEE GAILLARD, ADVISOR, CDI STRAUS MILITARY REFORM PROJECT

**AFTER 13 LONG YEARS** in development, the \$7.1 billion Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) was reported still to be missing its target 40 percent of the time in early 2009 testing.

This problematic program was in jeopardy two years ago, and at the 2007 Paris Air Show, the head of U.S. Air Force procurement was evaluating Europe’s Taurus and Storm Shadow cruise missiles as possible JASSM replacements.

JASSM’s test failure rate since December 2006 had been 42 percent, along with cost overruns reported to Congress. Of roughly 600 JASSMs then fielded, more than 500 were estimated to have flaws lurking in their GPS guidance systems. JASSM barely survived cancellation by Congress in 2008.

Fast forward to 2009: The Air Force is withholding production funding pending the results of last month’s scheduled Lot 6 testing, which has now been delayed to allow for replacement of still more faulty components.

We’ve been there before: Problems two years ago included engine, warhead, power, electrical and other systems, and detonation failure. In a UPI Internet Outside View Webcast on Oct. 25, 2007, Steven Barnoske, Lockheed Martin’s JASSM program director, promised that “technical teams have dissected data from test failures, identified root causes and developed corrective action plans that we have validated in a series of laboratory and field tests.”

But since then, 50 percent of Lot 5 testing failures has stemmed from poor quality signal cabling, with another 25 percent from more faulty fuses. During one of the most recent tests, a JASSM well into its strike profile suddenly departed controlled flight and crashed.

“We have been unable to duplicate [the anomaly] at this time,” said Col. Steve Demers, the Air Force’s JASSM program manager, in an interview in the July 27 issue of *Aviation Week & Space Technology*.

Now, consider that a missile originally expected to cost roughly

# 40%

**JASSM failure rate, down just two percent since 2007.**

\$400,000 is currently going for almost \$1 million apiece, despite its dismal performance. Over the last two years, the diminution in failure rate has been a minuscule 2 percentage points, from 42 percent in 2007 to 40 percent in 2009. Meanwhile, the total program cost has risen from \$5.8 billion estimated in 2007 to \$7.1 billion in 2009. For what? For more promises, and a growing stockpile of faulty missiles that are already obsolete.

Obsolete? Barnoske asserted, “It is ... the only cruise missile in the world to incorporate state-of-the-art stealth technologies.”

While JASSM may have some stealth qualities, it cruises at Mach 0.8 and can be acquired visually. In one test flight, according to the July 2000 issue of *Armed Forces Journal International*, it took 22 minutes to cover 210 miles. It would have been an easy target for layered, networked, multi-sensor air defense systems employing Russian-made S-300PMU, SA-10D surface-to-air missiles and their SA-N-6 ship-based counterparts. These and more advanced point-defense systems are now deployed by Russia, China, Iran and others. ■

Lee Gaillard writes articles and book reviews on aviation and defense issues.

This is an excerpt of an article first published by *Defense News*.



The AGM-158 JASSM, an air-to-ground missile designed for Air Force and Navy jet fighters, is pictured above being launched by a B-2 Spirit bomber.

U.S. Air Force



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# THE DEFENSE MONITOR

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
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[globalzero.org](http://globalzero.org)



Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., on the left, was one of the featured speakers at the Georgetown University Global Zero chapter launch on Sept. 24, 2009. The goal of WSI's Global Zero initiative is to create a world without nuclear weapons, through the phased, verified and proportionate reduction of all nuclear weapons to zero.

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