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Military Spending: CDI Analysts Take a Close Look at Defense Budgets

Challenging Conventional Threats: FY 06-FY 07 Budgets Show Increase

Rhea Myerscough, Research Assistant

How do Congress and the Bush administration prioritize the issues monitored by the Center for Defense Information's Challenging Conventional Threats project? This examination of the fiscal year (FY) 2006 and 2007 budget appropriations and requests for U.S. government programs involving small arms and light weapons (hereafter referred to as "small arms") and landmines attempts to determine just that.

Small Arms Destruction and Stockpile Management

The U.S. government has two offices dedicated to confronting the worldwide threat of small arms proliferation and misuse: the State Department's Office of Weapons

Removal and Abatement, within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), and the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). PM/WRA provides financial assistance for the destruction of surplus and obsolete weapons. DTRA provides technical assistance and physical security and stockpile management seminars to foreign countries wanting to better handle stockpiles of small arms and, when applicable, works with the State Department's office to establish destruction programs. The Defense Department's office also liaises with U.S. military leaders to identify potential proliferation threats that could put U.S. soldiers in danger or


harm civilians worldwide.

With a shoestring budget, the State Department's office has, to date, destroyed over 18,000 shoulder-launched missiles; 800,000 small arms; and 80 million rounds of small arms ammunition. When the State Department began its small arms destruction efforts in FY 01, it funded destruction programs in just four countries – Albania, Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Lesotho – with a budget of \$2 million. In FY 05, the budget jumped to \$6.9 million, and has continued to increase with approximately \$8.7 million appropriated for FY 06 and another \$8.6 million requested for FY 07.

The State Department's weapons destruction programs receive the majority of their funding from the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account in the foreign operations appropriations

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U.S. State Department Annual Budget
for Small Arms & Light Weapons Destruction, FY 2001-2007




* FY 03 total does not include a supplemental appropriation of \$28 million for small arms destruction in Afghanistan. Chart Sources: Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 03–FY 07, available at: <http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm>

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Military Spending: 2004-2005 Worldwide Expenditures


Compiled by Winslow T. Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project, and Brett Lincoln, Research Assistant



ABOUT THIS CHART:

Most of the data used in the military spending graph shown here was obtained from the most recent edition of the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook (2005)* and depicts an American defense budget that composes nearly half of total worldwide defense expenditures for that year. However, data for the worldwide expenditures and the figure used for U.S. military spending were obtained from the 2005 U.S. Defense Budget calculated by Office of Management and Budget, and these figures do not reflect an additional \$25 billion appropriated to the Defense Department in 2005 for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. With that amount *included*, the total U.S. military spending would exceed the total defense spending by the rest of the world combined.

Comparison in Defense Spending Estimates Among Most Reliable Sources



Compiled by Brett Lincoln, Research Assistant

ABOUT THIS CHART:

Adding to the complexity of accurately estimating defense spending, three primary sources for budgetary information, the *CIA's World Factbook*, the 2005 *SIPRI Yearbook* by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and *Military Balance 2005-2006* by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, all contain several discrepancies in their estimates for 2005. The graph (at left) depicts three instances of how different the estimates can be, which is cause for concern especially when considering the vital international role these nations have.

Congressional "Pork" in the Defense Budget: A Tutorial

Winslow T. Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project

This article first appeared on NiemanWatchdog.org on Feb. 9, 2006.

What do Lewis and Clark Bicentennial activities, breast and prostate cancer research, and the Des Moines Memorial Park and Education Center have to do with U.S. national defense? Unless Osama bin Laden is hiding in Iowa, not much. Yet memorial parks and commemorative celebrations are typical examples of the pork items that are included in this year's defense budget.

How does this happen? A review of the "inside the Beltway" pork process and how to end it, by one who participated in it for years, reveals a system where everybody is satisfied – at least everybody in DOD, Congress, and K Street lobbyists' offices – but that's not saying much for the welfare of our troops.

Locating the "pork" in the defense budget is not hard. With 2,966 examples costing about \$11.1 billion, the "member adds" in the 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, now law, are easy to find. There are some examples in sections of the bill that become public law; however, most can also be found in something called the "Joint Explanatory Statement" (JES) that accompanies the text of the bill as it moves through its final stages of congressional approval.

Anyone can perform a simple exercise to find the pork. For example, the text of the 2006 JES for Research and Development is 116 pages. A random page flip will lead the peruser to one of many tables that will show the name of the

programs requested by the president and – importantly – what Congress insists must be added. There will be hundreds, nay thousands, of these additional "congressional interest items." That's the pork.

A group called "Taxpayers for Common Sense" will soon release a study on the pork in the 2006 DOD appropriations bill.

When going through these tables, it is quite easy to pick examples that appear foolish on their own face or that obviously have

A review of the "inside the Beltway" pork process ... reveals a system where everybody is satisfied – everybody in DOD, Congress, and K Street lobbyists' offices - but that's not saying much for the welfare of our troops.

no proper place in the defense budget. However, items that appear to be both defense-related and even useful also occur. Surely, soldiers in the mountains of Afghanistan have a need for "fleece insulated liners." Just as clearly, an additional \$5.5 million for the "Walter Reed [Army Hospital] Amputee Center" would seem both relevant and valuable.

These latter items should still be considered pork. For example, could the \$5.5 million for the Walter Reed Amputee Center actually be for a new cafeteria, or is it for proven-quality wounded veterans' care? You are not likely to find a meaningful answer by reading the JES or, for that matter, any other report from the House or Senate Appropriations Committee. In short, pork is not necessarily bad stuff crammed into

the defense budget by Congress; it is unknown stuff.

A major part of the problem is how these mystery add-ons are inserted into appropriations bills; the vetting process, so to speak.

Each year, senators send the Appropriations and Armed Services committees several thousands of requests for earmarks. And each year only a fraction are approved. How do they get whittled down?


First, the requester must gain approval from the top Republican and Democrat on the Defense Appropriations subcommittee (Sens. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, and Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii). Without their joint ("bipartisan") approval, senators can absolutely-positively forget about their "member request items." When the author worked as a Senate staffer, the top "clerk" on the Defense Appropriations subcommittee for Stevens repeatedly made it quite clear for the supplicants at the staff level: "If your boss helped us, we did our best to help you. If your boss didn't vote for our bill last year, you shouldn't expect much help from us this year." Sound like extortion? It should.

Mid-level Defense Department bureaucrats also play an essential role. Stevens and Inouye do not want to be responsible for saying no too many times; so their staffers on the Senate Defense Appropriations subcommittee simply call DOD staff, in and out of uniform, that oversee specific programs. They ask them if they want the add-on that a particular member has requested. If the DOD contact says no, the item will almost certainly get nothing. If the answer is yes, the item will probably get at least something,

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4

Fiscal Year 2007 Federal Budget Proposal: Combined Mandatory and Discretionary Spending

Compiled by Brett Lincoln, Research Assistant



ABOUT THIS CHART:
This graph depicts the amount of "total" federal spending in Fiscal Year 2007, as proposed by the president. "Total" spending includes both annual appropriations, known as "discretionary" spending and longer term appropriations, known as "entitlements" or "mandatory" spending. Discretionary spending includes programs like foreign aid and the cost of national parks; mandatory spending includes programs like Social Security, Medicare, and interest on the federal debt. Decisions in Congress and the executive branch to make a specific program either discretionary or mandatory are often made for arbitrary or political reasons. Any characterization of "federal" spending should include both.

CONTINUED FROM PG. 3 - PORK

assuming the sponsor passes the Stevens/Inouye vetting. Notably, all of this is done in DOD without the mid-level bureaucrats conferring with the secretary of defense or even his senior managers.

In short, pork is acquired through an opaque process that seeks to operate in the shadows of government. Items receive little explanation to the public, and there is conscious avoidance of serious, objective review, such as by the Congressional Budget Office for actual cost, or the Government Accountability Office for evaluation of the need or justification.

In the end, what is required is a process where those seeking to advance their vested interests are not

in control of events. The following are guidelines for a solution:

1. Provide an estimate of the cost of all "member request" items from the Congressional Budget Office.

2. Provide an overall evaluation by the Government Accountability Office or a similar reputable entity that performs no DOD contracting.

3. Include in public committee reports a written statement of desirability of the earmark from the relevant manager in DOD (to prevent his circumvention of the DOD/Office of Management and Budget review process).

4. Include a detailed explanation in committee reports of the nature of each earmark and the identity of the requester.

5. Insist that every earmark that makes it through this process can only be awarded to a contractor after a nation-wide contract competition.

Some, probably many, in Congress will oppose these suggestions; clearly they would subvert the intent of members to steer government spending toward selected interests for purposes that may or may not advance national security. However, were there to be in Congress, especially the Senate, members who seek genuine reform, there are tools at their disposal to help them impose their will.

It would likely be an ugly fight, but it would definitely be worth watching. It would help the country separate the real reformers from the rest. ■

Failed States Not a Budget Priority in Fiscal Year 2006: Is There Hope in Fiscal Year 2007?

Rhea Myerscough, Research Assistant

The threats posed by weak, failing, and failed states have been a policy focus of the George W. Bush administration's National Security Strategy, as well as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's doctrine of "transformational diplomacy." The administration has repeatedly stressed that threats such as terrorism, disease pandemics, and uncontrolled weapons proliferation that originate within weak and failed states can now spread more quickly around the globe to endanger the security of the United States and its allies. However, the fiscal year (FY) 2006 congressional appropriations for the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) – an office created in 2004 specifically to address those threats – fell short of expectations. In the words of Amb. Carlos Pascual, former head of S/CRS, the funding situation was, "not as robust a picture as I'd want it to be."¹

Four separate appropriations bills (including the FY 05 Emergency Supplemental) contained budget requests for S/CRS, authorizing more than \$300 million for the new office. However, the final versions of all four bills appropriated barely a third of the original requests. Congress appropriated no money for the Conflict Response Fund, a key component of the S/CRS strategy that deals with potential crises, and requires a "surge capacity" of both funding and civilian personnel. The defense appropriations bill did grant the secretary of defense a one-year authority to transfer up to \$100 million in various services, defense articles, and funding to the secretary of state for the purposes of carrying

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations (\$ in millions)					
	FY 05 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations (H.R. 1268)	FY 06 Foreign Operations Appropriations (H.R. 3057)	FY 06 Defense Appropriations (H.R. 2863)	FY 06 Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations (H.R. 2862)	Totals
Budget Request	\$17.2	\$100.0	\$200.0	\$24.1	\$341.3
Final S/CRS Earmarks	\$7.7	\$0.0	\$100.0	\$0.0	\$107.7

Source: Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, "Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities," CRS Report for Congress, Jan. 26, 2006. Available at: www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL32862.pdf.

out S/CRS missions (effectively serving as an indirect Conflict Response Fund); however, this authority represents only half of what was requested by the administration and Congress appropriated no new funds for this purpose.

The FY 07 financial picture for S/CRS is uncertain. The administration requested no money for the S/CRS operational budget, after receiving none of the \$24 million it requested through Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations in FY 06. In the proposed defense budget, another one-year transfer authority of up to \$100 million is granted to the secretary of state to enhance S/CRS' surge capacity. The administration is also requesting \$75 million for a Conflict Response Fund. However, Congress' track record on the Conflict Response Fund is not good – Congress had denied funding for the same initiative in FY 05, when it was called the "Emergency Fund for Complex Foreign Crises."

Many within the policy community have strongly suggested

that S/CRS be elevated to a Cabinet-level agency, so the office could properly combine and coordinate all the relevant U.S. government offices involved in increasing the capacity of weak and failing states (including, for instance, all of USAID). Despite an inter-agency staff, S/CRS is currently competing for funding with other development and foreign assistance initiatives (such as the Millennium Challenge Account). In the FY 05 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Congress stated, "as costs and programs of these new activities are better identified, the committee will consider any proposed reprogramming of funds." Without a more cooperative and coherent funding strategy, there is a serious risk that combating the threat of failed states through S/CRS will remain a low priority with congressional appropriators. ■

Footnotes

¹ Remarks by Amb. Carlos Pascual at the United States Institute of Peace, Dec. 16, 2005, available at: <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/58474.htm>.

bill. The Defense Department’s budget for small arms management is considerably smaller than the State Department’s budget – approximately \$300,000 was budgeted for these purposes in both FY 06 and FY 07, which amounts to 0.1 percent of the total DTRA budget. DTRA funding is allocated under the Defense-Wide program in the Operation and Maintenance title of the defense appropriations bill. These funds primarily pay for DTRA staff to travel and conduct technical seminars abroad. Since 2000, DTRA has conducted small arms and light weapons operations in 24 different countries.

The “Conventional Arms Disarmament Act of 2005” (Title II of S.1949), commonly referred to as the Lugar-Obama initiative, was introduced in November 2005 and proposes to restructure small arms destruction operations within the U.S. government. Cosmetically, the bill renames PM/WRA as the Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction, and joins all conventional weapons stockpile security and destruction programs within the U.S. government under one office. More substantially, the bill authorizes \$20 million dollars of NADR

funding to be specifically earmarked for small arms destruction. However, unless budget requests raise the level of total NADR funding to compensate for the Lugar-Obama earmark, the increase in small arms destruction would have to be funded from the coffers of other NADR-funded programs.

Speaking at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing held in February 2006, Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., expressed a desire to fund stockpile security and destruction programs with, “a budget that is commensurate with the threat posed by these weapons.” With very little money, both the State and Defense departments are making huge strides towards combating the illicit proliferation of small arms. However, additional appropriations could result in the expansion of PM/WRA’s and DTRA’s programs, allowing fewer weapons to find their way onto the black markets and into the hands of violent individuals.



Humanitarian Demining

In addition to its small arms destruction efforts, the United States spends tens of millions of dollars each year ensuring that fewer civilians are killed or injured by anti-

personnel landmines left over from armed conflicts around the world. Humanitarian mine action is coordinated and funded in a similar manner to small arms destruction and likewise involves both the State and Defense departments.

The State Department’s PM/WRA is the lead office for humanitarian demining as well as small arms destruction. Since 1993, the State Department office has conducted demining efforts in nearly 50 countries and, in FY 07 alone, is requesting funding to clear landmines in 19 different countries. PM/WRA’s humanitarian demining operations are three-fold: physically clearing landmines and other unexploded ordnance, conducting educational outreach about the risk of mines in mine-affected areas, and providing support to landmine survivors. Like small arms destruction, the State Department’s demining programs are funded from the NADR account in the foreign operations appropriations bill. Funding for humanitarian mine action has remained consistent, with a moderate increase in FY 05 that was carried into FY 06 appropriations and the FY 07 budget request.

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The State Department is joined in its humanitarian mine action by the Defense Department, which contributes demining training by U.S. Special Operations Forces and research and development towards improved mine-detection technology. The Defense Department's key office for humanitarian demining – the Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action (HA/MA) – is housed within the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. HA/MA manages the funds appropriated by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid account for humanitarian demining. The Defense Department's contributions to demining are similar to the support that it provides for combating small arms proliferation – the majority of the support consists of providing technical expertise and know-how to foreign countries, in order to in-

crease their local demining capacity.

Although the Defense appropriations for demining are financially more modest than the State Department's contributions, these funds are vital to the eradication of the landmines threat. Funding for Defense and State department demining programs has been slowly increasing over the past few years, with total FY 07 requests for State and Defense programs nearing \$100 million. The joint actions of the State and Defense departments have yielded substantial results. The United States began providing mine assistance to Djibouti in 2000. Three million dollars and four years later the country was declared "mine-safe," joining the ranks of other success stories such as Costa Rica, El Salvador, Moldova and Kosovo. In Southeast Asia, the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action program has cleared over 6.5 million square meters of land in Thailand, over 41

million square meters in Laos, and over 122 million square meters in Cambodia.

Conclusion

The United States has been a leader in funding the removal, destruction, and improved safeguarding of small arms and landmines around the world. Funding for small arms destruction and humanitarian demining has been on the increase over the past few years, and FY 06 and FY 07 were no exception. Both the State and Defense departments have established efficient programs through which to appropriately challenge and combat the threats of conventional weapons proliferation. To continue these important programs, the FY 07 requests must be fully met by congressional appropriators and the FY 08 budget must yield equivalent, if not more robust requests. ■

ANNOUNCEMENTS

A Farewell to CDI Emeritus Board Member

It is with great sadness that the Boards of Directors and Advisors note the passing of **James R. Compton** who died on March 18, 2006, in Tiburon, California. Jim and his family were instrumental in the establishment of the Center for Defense Information—originally a project of the Fund for Peace which the Compton family founded. When the Center became an independent organization, he joined our advisory board and served for over 30 years. He gave generously of himself and through his family foundation. We will deeply miss this exceptional man and friend. Donations to CDI in his memory will be acknowledged to you and the Compton family. ■

March/April 2006


CDI Growth Spawns Reorganization

Center for Defense Information



Programs Re-organized

In 2005, the Center for Defense Information re-organized its projects to form the World Security Institute. The Institute was introduced by Dr. Bruce Blair in the September-October issue of the *Defense Monitor*.



CDI Defense Monitor



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