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ISSN # 0195-6450 - Volume XXXIV, Number 4 - July/August 2005

Give Iraqis a Government Worth Dying For

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There is a principle of engineering that says that when what you're doing isn't working, and trying harder makes the situation worse, you may be solving the wrong problem. With the attacks on London proving that occupying Iraq is not making the world safer, it is time for a radically new approach.

Neoconservative commentators are crowing that Iraq's economy has now returned to prewar levels. In other words, after two years of reconstruction, Iraq as a whole has reached the level of an economy decimated by 12 years of UN sanctions and Ba'athist corruption. And even much of this progress is artificial since it reflects an enormous temporary infusion of American dollars.

There are varying estimates of what the Iraq operation will cost. Under one scenario, according to a February 2005 Congressional Budget Office report, costs could total an additional \$458 billion over the 2005-2015 time frame.

By way of comparison, the Korean War cost \$430 billion and the Vietnam War \$600 billion, measured in today's dollars, according to a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments report, "Fiscal Year 2005 Funding for Military Operations," published April 11.

Sadly, little of this money seems to be trickling down to improve the lives of ordinary Iraqis. Saddam's Iraq was a brutal police state where you kept your mouth shut or you

The only ones dying for this regime seem to be poor Iraqis who are risking their lives to take the only paying jobs in town, and losing.

got hurt. But we've managed to make it look pretty good. People had jobs. There was electricity for air conditioners in the summer. There was running water. You could drive across Baghdad without encountering anything more serious than a shakedown from the local police.

In the prewar days, a person could have a beer without worrying about getting his or her head chopped off. A woman could teach in a university without religious nutcases blowing her brains out, as has already happened to three female professors at the University of Mosul in northern Iraq. Ah, for the good old days of secular, fascist dictatorship.

What the Iraqis so obviously need is a government worth fighting for. The elections turned out to be a census: Kurds voted for Kurdish independence, which they will not get. The Shi'a largely voted for Shi'ite theocracy, which they will get. The Sunnis didn't play. The only ones dying for this regime seem to be poor Iraqis who are risking their lives to take the only paying jobs in town, and losing.

The administration claims that there are 160,000 Iraqi troops equipped, trained and ready to go. But the only question that counts is: whom will they fight for? It's worth remembering that perhaps half a million were willing to die

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE:

A Bad Deal with India	2
Army Recruits	2
Location of U.S. Military Personnel	4
Trans-Atlantic Exchange	5
The IRA Statement: The End of the Beginning?	6
Terrorist Incidents in Middle-East (1990–2005)	6
War Funding	7

A Bad Deal with India

The Hon. Lawrence Korb, Senior Advisor, and Peter Ogden, Center for American Progress

A version of this piece apeared in the Washington Post, *Aug.* 3, 2005

Many of the people who are made uncomfortable by President George W. Bush's ideologically driven foreign policy have been pleasantly surprised by his recent decision to supply India with nuclear energy technology. This diplomatic agreement, its admirers eagerly point out, is not rooted in "freedom" or "values" but in a strategic calculation: that providing India with such technology will help balance China's power in the region.

This does appear to be the case. But what they fail to note is that the administration's inexperience with such strategic, nonideological calculations has caused it to mishandle the negotiations themselves and, in so doing, to damage one of our country's most strategic, effective and "realistic" agreements: the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). First, the Bush administration made two amateurish mistakes in the way it brought this agreement to the world's attention. One was announcing the agreement just days before the resumption of sixparty talks over the fate of North Korea's nuclear arsenal. For the past few years, the United States has struggled to convince China that North Korea, its ally, should be punished for violating the NPT. Yet just before the six-party talks began, the Bush administration

	Army (active duty)		Army Reserve*		Army National Guard	
	2004	through June 2005	2004	through June 2005	2004	through June 2005
Goal	77,000	54,935	32,275	19,753	56,002	44,989
Actual	77,586	47,121	32,710	15,540	48,793	34,589
Percent of goal met	101%	86%	101%	79%	82%	77%
Maximum enlistment bonus	\$15,000	\$20,000	\$5,000	\$6,000	\$8,000	\$10,000
Maximum college scholarship	\$50,000	\$70,000			\$10,000	\$20,000
Number of recruiters	5,065	6,030				

MILITARY INFORMATION FYI

* Goals are for both recruitment of new personnel and retention of existing personnel. Sources: Department of Defense, Government Accountability Office. declared that our ally India would not be punished for its refusal to join the NPT. This clearly undermines our ability to secure China's much-needed cooperation in denuclearizing North Korea.

The Bush administration's second error was announcing its agreement before having secured the necessary congressional approval. The initial reaction from Capitol Hill has not been encouraging: members of the energy conference committee in the House have already approved a measure that would make it illegal for the United States to export nuclear technology to India, and Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., has cautiously remarked, "We're going to have a lot of conversations."

Such conversations ought to have taken place before the agreement was made public. The instant we announced our willingness to disregard the NPT, we forever undermined its coercive power. But we will not receive any of the strategic benefits of a strengthened India without congressional approval. Thus, we could end up paying the cost for the agreement without reaping any of its rewards.

Most significant, however, is this: the Bush administration is wrong to believe that the agreement with India will serve our strategic interests better than the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it threatens to render all but obsolete.

The Bush administration has demonstrated over the past five years that it does not believe the treaty to be worth preserving. In May 2005, it expressed its disdain by dispatching a low-level State Department official to the important NPT Review Conference. And last year the administration torpedoed a crucial verification provision of a treaty, one that would have reinforced the NPT by banning production of uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons.

The NPT — which is founded on a simple but powerful agreement that nuclear states will provide ac-

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cess to peaceful nuclear technology to countries that forgo such weapons — has served the U.S. national interest since it was signed in 1970. When it came into effect, there were five nuclear weapons states, and it was estimated that the number would grow to 25 by the end of the century. Thanks in large part to the NPT, the actual number of nuclear powers in the year 2005 is just nine.

According to Mohamed El-Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, more than 40 countries have peaceful nuclear programs that could be retooled to produce weapons. That so many of them have not done so is testimony to the effectiveness of the carrots and sticks in the NPT.

If Congress accepts the logic of the Bush administration and allows our government to help build nuclear energy plants in India on the grounds that it is an ally, what is to stop China from offering the same support to its allies? It is only a matter of days before Pakistan — another country with nuclear weapons that has refused to sign the NPT and thus has been denied certain types of nuclear technology — demands to receive the same special treatment that India has.

The final weakness in these negotiations is that the Bush administration secured so little in return. While we were willing to void the most potent nuclear weapons control treaty of the past three decades, India was not even compelled to stop producing fissile material for further weapons. Apparently, in its concern to balance the power of China, the administration forgot to consider whether putting no limits on India's fissile material production might not prompt Pakistan to continue such production itself. Such a development would certainly increase the risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists.

Ultimately, the Bush administration should be commended for its foray into the realm of geopolitical strategy and diplomatic negotiations. But let us hope that next time it manages to strike an agreement more beneficial to the United States.

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1 - GIVE IRAQIS A GOVERNMENT

for Saddam's regime in the Iran-Iraq War. It's also worth reminding ourselves that we trained millions of South Vietnamese. Ironically, the only Iraqi unit that seems to be in any way effective is the notorious "Wolf Brigade," commanded by ex-Saddamists.

If they need a government to

MILITARY INFORMATION FYI

III's army.

establish justice, ensure domestic

tranquility and secure the bless-

ings of liberty to themselves and their posterity, and if we can't give

it to them, who can? How about

the Iraqis, themselves? After all,

our founding fathers didn't hash

out the U.S. Constitution under

the paternal eyes of King George

LOCATION OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL as of March 31, 2005

-	Prepared by Anna Berthold
UNITED STATES & TERRITORIES	996,837
EUROPE	
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia & Kosovo	2,041
Other	100,798
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	
Japan	31,728
Korea	30,803
Other	13,011
NORTH AFRICA, NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA	
Bahrain	1,666
Egypt	363
Qatar	297
Saudi Arabia	231
United Arab Emirates	123
Operation Iraqi Freedom (estimated troops in or around Iraq inclu Kuwait; includes deployed Reserve/National Guard personnel)	uding 182,500
Operation Enduring Freedom (estimated troops in or around Afglincludes deployed Reserve/National Guard personnel)	nanistan; 21,200
Other	3,992
CENTRAL & SOUTH AMERICA	
Colombia	56
Cuba (Guantanamo)	817
Honduras	458
Other	610
OTHER	
Unspecified	84,047
Other Countries	18,128

Source: Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and By Country, Department of Defense, March 31, 2005.

The longer we stay in Iraq, the more the various parties there will react to us. Instead of working out their problems, even through civil war, as we once did, they will focus on gaming Uncle Sam and his thousands of troops and billions of dollars.

The process of creating new political arrangements may get messy, perhaps worse than whatever Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had in mind when he made his observations on democracy. But what's going on there is now horrible and does not seem to be leading to solutions that are any better than what Saddam offered.

It is not difficult to understand how we got ourselves into this: we plunged a Western, largely Christian army into the gut of the Muslim Middle East, left it there, and now wonder why people are attacking it. Even if surgery is necessary, you don't leave the scalpel in and expect the patient to heal. Rather than do any more damage to ourselves or to the Iraqis, and rather than train any more terrorist cells that will attack our cities, it is time to leave, and leave quickly.

Although withdrawal may seem cruel, it is the sort of tough love that Iraq needs right now. These are intelligent people, and left to themselves they are more than capable of solving their own problems. As an alternative to spending another \$400 billion on killing Iraqis, we can make it clear that once they have a government that truly does represent the aspirations of Iraqis of every stripe, or have instituted any other arrangement they find acceptable, we will generously channel that money into funding their renaissance.

Trans-Atlantic Exchange

During two days of lively debates and discussions on June 8-9, 2005, nine CDI experts engaged foreign policy makers, diplomats and analysts on a wide range of security topics. The setting for the meetings, Brussels, Belgium, allowed for interaction with those working at or with NATO, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.

A number of CDI's Board of Advisors joined in the sessions that covered topics as diverse as:

- The soon-expected U.S. presidential directive on space weapons and its likely contribution to a global space arms race;
- The specific steps the United States could take to promote nuclear nonproliferation;
- The unintended consequences for trans-Atlantic relations of Europe and America's differing policies on arms sales to China;
- Europe's large Muslim communities and its different approach to fighting terrorism.

The meetings took place against the backdrop of several heated trans-Atlantic security debates. Several member states of the European Union (EU) proposed the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China, a step which the United States actively opposes (and which had recently been put on hold, due in part to U.S. pressure). A similar scenario may now be unfolding in space. The EU is developing an ambitious security agenda which relies heavily on space assets. The



Dr. Lawrence Korb, CDI Senior Advisor (left), Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO Assistant Deputy Secretary General for External Relations (center), and Tomas Valasek, WSI Brussels Director (right).

Lawrence Korb: "Among other things, to promote nuclear nonproliferation the United States could unilaterally reduce its strategic nuclear weapons to 1,000, implement the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and increase the amount of money in the Nunn-Lugar program and use the additional funds to buy nuclear material from countries besides Russia."

EU's cooperation with China on space, however, raised some worries about advanced technology potentially being used against U.S. forces. CDI is working with members of the European institutions to craft a set of confidence-building measures aimed at preventing new trans-Atlantic tensions over EU space programs.

More recently, the EU has also taken the lead on seeking to stop Iran from developing nuclear technology with potential weapons use. The talks, conducted with support from and in coordination with the United States, were halted in August 2005 for lack of cooperation from Iran, but the negotiations did produce new goodwill between the United States and Europe, and a renewed desire to cooperate on global security problems.

Eric Hagt: "Europe and the United States, China's number 1 and number 2 trade partners, need to develop a coordinated policy on the arms embargo."

The IRA Statement: The End of the Beginning?

Mark Burgess, Research Analyst


A version of this first appeared in the Global Beat Syndicate, Aug. 1, 2005

BELFAST, Northern Ireland — The Irish Republican Army's (IRA) statement of July 28, 2005 ordering the end of its decades-long terrorist campaign has been hailed as "historic" by many commentators. Everyone hopes that this statement signifies the end of the beginning in Ireland's quest for peace. But it may not pass the most crucial litmus test: the trust of the majority of Northern Ireland's citizens who want it to remain part of the United Kingdom. Many of these unionists are disillusioned by what they see as the IRA's failure to follow through on

Many of these unionists are disillusioned by what they see as the IRA's failure to follow through on earlier pledges to disarm.

earlier pledges to disarm. There is also concern about a statement that, for all its apparent lack of ambiguity, employs a symbolism that — in the internecine and paranoid politics of Northern Ireland — could be divisive. Such worries notwithstanding, other recent events suggest that, at the moment, the IRA could not use its weaponry if it wanted to.

Like their unionist counterparts, those who drafted the latest IRA statement come from a tradition steeped in symbolism. Their choice of spokesperson to deliver the statement was significant: Seanna Walsh once shared a cell with Bobby Sands, an IRA member who died on hunger strike in 1981



Source: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, www.tkb.org

and is an IRA saint and a unionist villain. Sinn Fein, the republican political party, and the IRA must court their own constituents: choosing Walsh as spokesman helps assuage those who worry that movement away from the armed struggle is a sellout.

The IRA's restatement of its commitment to a united Ireland, and its expressed belief that an alternative means toward that end now exists, will both calm and stoke fears. The IRA's contention that its campaign was "entirely legitimate" may also strain crosscommunity relations, and, in the run-up to the statement's release, the British government's freeing from prison of Sean Kelly, an IRA bomber convicted of killing nine civilians in a Unionist area, will also do little to foster trust.

Negative reactions would not be calamitous for Sinn Fein. Indeed true peace — reconciliation between the people in the north of Ireland — would not benefit Sinn Fein or the IRA. Both parties are essentially rejectionists who have no interest in maintaining or reinstating the status quo in NorthernIreland.Intheirthinking, if such reconciliation were to occur the impetus behind their drive for a united Ireland might wane. People who are happy with

In the current political environment, the IRA's arsenal is all but useless. Ireland's best hope for peace does not come from the July 28 IRA statement — it comes from the recent London suicide bombing attacks.

their lot in life do not agitate for change. Hence, peace and stability are antithetical to Sinn Fein and the IRA's strategy. Some here say that if past performance is anything to go by, unionists are again likely to take on the role of patsy, while Sinn Fein members then throw their hands in the air, playing the willing but frustrated peacemakers.

Ironically, unionists' worst fears

MILITARY	INFORMATION FYI
	— Prepared by David Brody
WAR FUNDING	Fiscal Years 2001-05 billions of dollars
Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Enduring Freedom (A TOTAL:	Afghanistan) 252
As of April 2005. Source: Center for Strategic & Budget	ary Assessments.

may prove largely hollow. In the current political environment, the IRA's arsenal is all but useless. Ireland's best hope for peace does not come from the July 28 IRA statement — it comes from the recent London suicide bombing attacks.

Right now, "freedom fighting" is not what it used to be, and a wave of IRA bombings any time soon would gain the Irish group little but condemnation and censure. Importantly, in the post-Sept. 11, 2001, world, it would find it difficult to sustain the support of Irish-Americans. This has been important to them morally, politically, financially and militarily. Sinn Fein's number two, Martin McGuiness, flew to the United States before the latest IRA statement was issued.

Coming on the heels of the controversy over the IRA murder of Robert McCartney in Belfast in January 2005, and the group's alleged involvement in a \$51 million Belfast bank robbery last December, the London bombings underscore that those who want peace in Northern Ireland have little cause to fear an IRA return to violence in the near future. For now, that would be poor tactics. This is cold comfort to the many in Ireland who have suffered at the hands of Western Europe's most bloodily effective terrorist group. Some here say the IRA statement is not so much a "farewell" as an "au revoir" to arms. Time will tell. As will deeds, which always speak louder than any words - "historic" or otherwise.



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