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Philip E. Coyle, III, CDI Senior Advisor, Appointed to Base Realignment and Closure 2005

Victoria Samson, Research Analyst, and Stacie Robinson, Communications Director

The Center for Defense Information is proud to announce that Philip E. Coyle III, a senior advisor at the center, has been appointed by President George W. Bush to serve on the independent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 commission.

Mr. Coyle brings a diverse array of qualifications to his position including: a recent appointment on Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger's BRAC commission in California; director, Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration; associate director at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif.; and principal deputy assistant secretary for Defense Programs in the Department of Energy.

The BRAC commission examines military installations around the country to ensure that they "efficiently and effectively support U.S. forces, increase operational readiness and facilitate new ways of doing business." After visiting each site listed for possible closure by the secretary of defense, the commission presents its recommendations in total. With these closures, the Pentagon is able to eliminate wasteful and unnecessary expenditures on underperforming military sites. The savings created are then reprogrammed to

programs and areas that focus on future threats and security challenges. The most recent round of base closure and realignment occurred in 1995, during which 97

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major bases were closed.

On May 13, 2005, the Pentagon released its list of suggested military facilities to be closed as part of the BRAC process. The 181 facilities are spread out over 46 states and one territory and include 33 major military bases. Additionally, 29 major installations have been proposed to be part of a "realignment," where they would stay open, albeit with much less personnel. This is out of 3,500 domestic military installations.

Having released the list, now the process is turned over to the independent nine-member BRAC commission. At least one commissioner will visit every facility tapped for closure or realignment. They will have at least 15 regional and public hearings in order to gather information and provide a way for the local population to have input in the process.

In previous BRAC rounds, less than 10 percent of the facilities recommended for closure were taken off the list, and the BRAC commissions changed only around 15 percent of the overall list. To recommend that an extra facility be closed, at least two of the commissioners must visit the base in question and seven of the commissioners must authorize the addition. To take a facility off of the BRAC list requires the approval of five of the commissioners. The commission can recommend changes only if it believes that there are facilities

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7

IN THIS ISSUE:

Billions Wasted on N-arms	2
Bush Policy Would Start Arms Race in Space	3
Iran Nuclear Program	5
10 Ways to Fight Small Arms Trafficking	6

Billions Wasted on N-arms

Larry Korb, Senior Advisor

Updated version of a piece which first appeared in the May 1, 2005, edition of The Boston Globe.

When I served as an assistant secretary of defense for President Ronald Reagan, the logic of focusing Pentagon resources on nuclear weapons made sense. The priority of the Cold War was avoiding nuclear war through nuclear deterrence.

We wanted to leave absolutely no doubt in the minds of the Soviets that if they tried to destroy us with nuclear bombs, we would destroy them. Thus, peace prevailed.

But times have changed. Osama bin Laden could care less how many nuclear bombs we have. And stopping terrorism is appropriately the priority of our military today.

Despite this, America still has a nuclear arsenal of about 7,000 active nuclear bombs, spread out on

submarines, land-based missiles, and bombers and ready to fire at a moment's notice. If you add the nuclear warheads in storage, our arsenal totals at least 10,000.

With a few prudent cuts, the cost of nuclear deterrent programs could be decreased without jeopardizing national security.

Not only are these weapons dangerous, but they are expensive. In fact, given the fiscal crisis we face in Washington, it's unaffordable. Here's what I mean.

Today, America spends more than \$27 billion for nuclear deterrence. And what are we getting for this?

President George W. Bush proposes spending a whopping \$11 billion next year on the bombers and land- and sea-based missiles that carry the 7,000 operational nuclear weapons. Another \$6.6 billion would be spent on nuclear weapons research, development, testing, and production, as well as the administration of the nuclear weapons stockpile, which now includes more than 10,000 weapons.

With a few prudent cuts, the cost of nuclear deterrent programs could be decreased without jeopardizing national security.

By eliminating tactical, or battle-field, nuclear weapons in Europe and reducing our strategic arsenal to a maximum of 1,000 as well as forgoing the production of new nuclear weapons, America would save \$10 billion annually, which

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4

HELP US MEET THE CHALLENGE The Straus Military Reform Project

A new, long-term initiative is mobilizing the "credible voices" of retired military officers and other experts toward transforming U.S. national security strategy. It is

- Providing analysis on the fiscal and strategic implications of current defense programs
- Promoting informed oversight of Pentagon activities.

Phil Straus, Jr., a CDI Board of Advisors member, underwrote the launch of this work, and has offered to **match up to \$300,000** of new money, **dollar-for-dollar**, dedicated to the Project. We are about **one-third of the way** toward meeting the match!

If you are interested in supporting this important work, or learning more about current and planned activities, see the information at www.cdi.org/smrp.

Bush Policy Would Start Arms Race in Space

Sean Kay and Theresa Hitchens

This op-ed first appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer on May 25, 2005.

In the coming weeks, President George W. Bush is expected to approve a radical departure from long-standing American policy toward space. Traditionally guided by self-restraint, states have avoided the weaponization of space. However, the forthcoming Bush space doctrine establishes a new American plan for space: war-fighting. The American military has used space for decades. For example, satellites facilitate intelligence, warn of missile launches, ensure compliance with arms treaties, monitor the global environment and facilitate command and control for precision weaponry that can reduce casualties in conflict. However, the Bush administration is completing a new Presidential Decision Directive that would move the United States quickly into the uncharted territory of deploying offensive anti-satellite weapons and space-based weapons for attacking targets on Earth. This decision appears pending in the near complete absence of a public review of the issue and apparent disregard of associated dangers.

America's would-be space warriors have concluded, according to the U.S. Space Command, that: "Just as land dominance, sea control and air superiority have become critical elements of current military strategy, space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield success and future warfare." Pentagon and Air Force

documents have put forward a vision of "space control" to ensure superiority. This vision includes attacking satellites being used, or that might be used, by an adversary.

Additionally, orbiting "death stars" to attack ground targets are being considered. Pete Teets, the former acting secretary of the U.S. Air Force has said: "We haven't reached the point of strafing and

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bombing from space — nonetheless, we are thinking about those possibilities."

If, as expected, the new Bush space policy opens the door for the implementation of space warfare, other states including China, Russia and India might develop similar capabilities — sparking a new, costly, and unnecessary, arms race.

The heavy reliance of modern society and military power on space makes satellites potential targets

for adversaries wanting to hurt the United States. But the answer to protecting U.S. satellites is not space weapons. The deployment of U.S. space weapons is likely to make space assets — including commercial communications and broadcast satellites — even more vulnerable, since no other country is pursuing, let alone deploying, space attack weapons.

However, it is hard to imagine other nations sitting idly by while the United States develops the tools to attack them "in, from and through space" as postulated by the U.S. Air Force. The United States already has near complete dominance in space capacity. The United States is responsible for 95 percent of all military space spending and dominates two-thirds of the commercial space industry. The U.S. budget for military-related space activity was \$18 billion in 2003 and is expected to rise to \$25 billion by 2010. American space-technology industries combined in 2000 to generate \$125 billion in profits, and total American investment in space technology is expected to be \$600 billion by 2010. There is no rush to dramatically alter U.S. space policy because the status quo overwhelmingly favors the United States. And yet this is precisely what the Bush team is doing.

The decision on space use appears to be driven by the desire to begin testing space-based missile defenses. But the U.S. Air Force has

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 3 – SPACE ARMS RACE

much more than that in mind.

For example, there is ongoing research and development on a hypersonic glider with a global strike capability, which would carry munitions or sensors. With a velocity of mach 1-15, this space vehicle would be able to maneuver and avoid flying directly over sensitive locations while having the ability to strike anywhere on the planet within 90 minutes. This program has moved forward with no serious public discussion of the ethical or geostrategic implications of such a capacity – how it might be used, whether it could be deployed against domestic targets in the United States, or what will happen

if other countries are prompted to deploy similar technology.

Before the Bush administration unwisely takes the United States down a path toward the weaponization of space, the U.S. Congress should begin a serious investigation into the implications of such a dramatic change in policy. Space has been traditionally treated as a global commons, ideally best left to scientists and commercial industry, and its military use guided by restraint. America's dramatic dominance of space gives us a luxury of time during which President Bush could negotiate an international treaty that locks in the status quo, thus securing our advantage while hedging against other states

moving forward on their own military programs for space.

How we respond to these challenges will set much of the tone of world security for the 21st century. Certainly that deserves more thoughtful consideration than the quick stroke of the presidential pen in the absence of major public scrutiny. ■

Kay, associate professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan University, is a nonresident fellow in foreign and defense policy at the Eisenhower Institute in Washington, D.C. Hitchens is vice president of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C.

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2 – BILLIONS WASTED

could be used on tax cuts, state and local priorities, or broader security concerns, like freeing us from our dependence on Middle East oil.

By scaling back national missile defense, seen as part of our nuclear deterrent posture, America could save an additional \$6 billion. Missile defense, a concept that is still a long way from viability, is also a carryover from the Cold War, and makes little sense in today's geopolitical environment.

There's no reason why our nation could not make these nuclear cuts quickly and unilaterally.

Our nation's continued interest in maintaining our massive nuclear arsenal was part of the reason why the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Confer-

ence failed to make any progress.

At the conference, which takes place every five years, 187 signatory nations gathered at the United Nations in May to review the status of the 1970 treaty, under which states possessing nuclear weapons pledged to reduce and then eliminate their arsenals.

For their part, the signatories to the treaty who do not have nuclear weapons pledged not to produce their own nuclear bombs.

Most of the non-nuclear states have not built nuclear bombs as promised, but because America and the other nuclear states have not lived up to their end of the bargain, the conference deadlocked.

But it's not too late. America should announce an immediate plan to reduce its strategic arsenal

to 1,000 warheads even if Russia, China, and the other nuclear powers do not make an identical pledge, for it matters not from our national security perspective whether they do so. We would still have more than enough nuclear weapons to deter any potential adversary.

Such an announcement would certainly be greeted with great approval from the world's nations. It could come at no better time as we continue to try to work with the world community to share the burden of our war in Iraq.

And, perhaps even more important, it would be welcomed by Congress and the American taxpayers who are spending billions of dollars on useless nuclear weapons at a time when our federal checkbook is seriously misaligned. ■

Iran Nuclear Program: To Suspend or Not to Suspend

Michael Donovan, Ph.D., Research Analyst

Despite ongoing negotiations with the European Union, Iran shows little sign that it is willing to negotiate away the nuclear capabilities it has been covertly developing over the past two decades. Though the Europeans remain hopeful that they can convince Tehran to turn its temporary suspension of uranium enrichment activities into a permanent one, as time passes this appears increasingly unlikely. Iranian negotiators have consistently maintained that Iran's suspension of enrichment activities is a temporary confidence-building measure. In November 2004, Tehran accepted a European demand to suspend enrichment activities. On the same day, chief Iranian negotiator Hassan Rowhani told Iranian state television that suspension was expected to last months, not years. There have been no indications, in the meantime, that Tehran is prepared to give up its enrichment rights as specified under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A chorus of Iranian officials has repeatedly insisted that a permanent enrichment moratorium "was not on the table, will not be on the table, and should not be on the table." Similarly, Iranian negotiators have rejected offers to substitute a light-water research reactor for the heavy-water reactor they hope to complete at Arak.

Several mutually-reinforcing factors influence Iran's position. As in Israel, Iran's sense of isolation from its Arab neighbors and the international community has

ingrained self-sufficiency as a guiding principle in matters of Iranian national interest. Even if Tehran has no interest in a weapons capability, Iranians — acutely conditioned by 25 years of international hostility — would still value an independent fuel cycle. Iranians remember, too, that their dependence on Western countries for military spare parts cost them

Double standards convince Iranians that international conventions are selectively applied and occasionally used to weaken their country.

dearly when, during the war with Iraq, this equipment was denied them. It is a mistake Tehran is determined to avoid repeating. As Hossein Moussavian, a top Iranian negotiator on the nuclear issue, explained: "the Islamic Republic cannot rely on the fuel the Europeans are offering because they might withdraw it any time there are differences in relations. . . . We need to become independent in providing our own fuel."

Iranians hesitate to rely on the assurances offered by the international community regarding their security. The eight-year war with Iraq was a traumatic and formative experience for Iran: much of the world looked on in silence as Iran suffered most from Saddam's

obsession with chemical weapons. Washington's acceptance of Israel's nuclear arsenal contrasts with its attempts to interdict even peaceful nuclear technology in the case of Iran. America's decision to improve relations with India and Pakistan, two of Iran's nuclear neighbors, has done little to reassure Iran. These apparent double standards convince Iranians that international conventions are selectively applied and occasionally used to weaken their country.

More recent events have helped to accelerate Iran's strategic timetable. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq removed an important rationale for Iran's nuclear program. However, the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq added another in its place by completing Iran's virtual encirclement by American forces. "Operation Iraqi Freedom" concluded a process that began with the 1991 Gulf War whereby the United States overtook Saddam Hussein as Iran's primary strategic challenge. Without a nuclear deterrent, Iran has little hope of ever balancing American military power in the region.

The uneven application of the Bush Doctrine of pre-emption also convinced Iran's clerics that an independent nuclear deterrent may be the only way to guarantee regime survival. The contrast between ongoing negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program and the invasion of Iraq suggested to Tehran that the United

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7

10 Ways to Fight Small Arms Trafficking

By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst

This was taken from "Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms," a piece that first appeared in the Winter/Spring 2005 edition of SAIS Review, http://www.saisreview.org/sr_current_issue.html

Developing policies to address the illicit trafficking in small arms cannot be done in a vacuum, nor can it be done by the United States unilaterally. While the United States has some of the strongest national legislation on arms brokering and export controls, it must also ensure that other countries, on a national, regional, and international level, develop stronger controls on legal sales and must work to increase and enhance international cooperation. In addition, the international community must assess illicit arms trafficking networks and develop comprehensive strategies that take into account the illegal trade in other commodities. This is particularly relevant, as the United Nations will be addressing the small arms issue at the Second Biennial Meeting of States on the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects on July 11-15, 2005, at the United Nations in New York.

First, governments must adhere to regional and international arms embargoes. They must start to punish violators, as contraveners of arms embargoes are now able to act with impunity. The United Nations should develop an arms embargo-monitoring unit in order to provide the infrastructure

to monitor compliance, supervise enforcement, and suggest punitive measures for violations.

Second, there must be a common international system for the marking and tracing of weapons. Under current international law, states may adopt different weapons marking systems, complicating the identification of the country-of-origin of a weapon. An international treaty on marking and tracing would require every country to adopt the same standard. The international community must also create an international clearinghouse, allowing states to identify seized small arms and to verify the legality of the trade.

Third, states should adopt an international treaty, or at the very least common international standards, regarding the practices of arms brokers. Such a treaty would ensure that middlemen cannot move weapons from conflict to conflict without fear of prosecution. International attention is focused on arms brokers, and 23 countries now have some manner of national brokering legislation.

Fourth, an international treaty or agreed-upon common international export criteria is needed in order to prevent arms from getting into the hands of human rights and international humanitarian law abusers. International standards that determine eligibility requirements for arms exports would prevent arms from entering the legal market and falling into the hands of those likely to divert them or use

them for unintended purposes.

Fifth, national governments, especially arms-exporting states, must strengthen end-use monitoring (EUM) in order to prevent legal sales from being diverted into the black market. EUM ensures that exported weapons are used properly and that exporters follow all laws, policies, regulations, and procedures to verify that a foreign government or the authorized foreign recipient of defense articles is using and controlling them in accordance with the terms and conditions of a transfer. In addition, a common, international end-user certificate that cannot be easily forged or duplicated must be developed.

Sixth, global small arms stockpiles need adequate security and management. The looting of the al Qaqaa weapons cache in Iraq in 2004 is not a unique example of the dangers of an unsecured weapons cache. States need both systemized infrastructure and protected physical structures to secure weapons. Moreover, law enforcement and military training must equip personnel to prevent theft and mismanagement of stockpiles.

Seventh, countries must begin to destroy surplus and obsolete weapons, particularly in conflict areas, to ensure that these weapons are not diverted to the black market. Many countries already have programs that provide technical and financial destruction assistance to those states eager to destroy their weapons. However, these programs

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6 — ARMS TRAFFICKING

require expansion, additional funding and outside assistance to any country needing help.

Eighth, governments and national, regional, and multi-lateral institutions must enhance their cooperation and information exchanges. These agencies must use intelligence to seize weapons at their points of entry and transshipment and quickly identify false end-user certificates to avoid hold-

ing up legal shipments.

Ninth, governments must strengthen their oversight of weapons issued to individuals — both civilian and military — to avoid the temptation of selling weapons on the black market. Governments must regularly account for military stocks and holdings, and legal small arms owners must report stolen or lost weapons to the proper authorities in a timely manner.

Lastly, states must work to

eliminate craft production from within their borders and prevent these weapons from entering the black market. While the illicit production of small arms may be undertaken on only a small scale, even a small number of weapons can tip the balance of power and destabilize governments and contribute to conflict, violence, and increased crime. ■

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5 — IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

States is prepared to bargain with those who have a strategic deterrent and to invade those who do not. Indeed, the case of North Korea suggests that substantial economic and security gains can be derived from the possession — or possibility — of a nuclear arsenal.

Beyond the immediate threat from the United States, geostrategic shifts in the Gulf offer uncertain prospects for Iran's future security.

Though an Arab Shia majority appears ascendant in Iraq, the degree to which it will identify with its Persian co-religionists in Iran is far from clear. The United States may one day attempt to balance and contain Iranian power in the Gulf by building the new Iraq back into a regional power. The possibility that an American-backed Iraq could once again assert itself in the Gulf will continue to be a cause for concern in Iran and elsewhere

in the region. The nuclear-armed standoff in neighboring South Asia is likely to endure for some time and could spill over into the greater Middle East. From Tehran's perspective then, there are abundant reasons for joining the nuclear club — few of which can be outweighed by the promises of economic benefits Europe has offered if Iran forgoes what it sees as its legitimate nuclear rights. ■

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1 — BRAC

that better fit the criteria used by the Department of Defense to generate the list.

All commission hearings and meetings will be open and transparent throughout the process. As Mr. Coyle noted, "Over the coming months, the commissioners, including myself, will do our utmost to make ourselves available to all interested parties."

The BRAC commission has until Sept. 8, 2005, to give Bush its recommendations for which facili-

ties should be closed or realigned. Bush is allowed to return the list to the commission if he is unhappy with it in order for the commission to make changes, if they wish. However, there is only one iteration between the president and the commission. Bush must make his decision by Sept. 23, 2005, on whether he will accept or reject the list completely: he cannot make any changes to it. In the four prior BRAC rounds, the president has not rejected a list.

After the executive branch has

had its input, Congress is handed the list of recommendations. Again, the legislative branch must accept or reject them as a whole. If Congress does not reject the recommendations, then the list is solidified within 45 days (Nov. 7, 2005) or by the end of the 2005 session of Congress. The recommendations will start to take effect in 2006 and should be completed within six years

For more information, please visit CDI's BRAC webpage on the Straus Military Reform Project website at www.cdi.org/mrp. ■



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