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Conventional Weapons Pose Challenges for U.S. Forces in Afghanistan

By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst and Rhea Myerscough, Research Assistant

SIX YEARS AGO, the United States began its operations in Afghanistan in response to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. At the time, scant attention was paid to the dangers of landmines, unexploded ordnance and small arms that plagued the country. Now, six years later, U.S. and coalition military forces serving in Afghanistan continue to face a variety of dangers, beyond the unfriendly geography and resurgent Taliban forces. Troops supporting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) face additional challenges from landmines, unexploded ordnance, man-portable air defense systems and other small arms.

Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

UN estimates place the number of mines in Afghanistan between 5 million and 10 million. Although the Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS), published in 2006, revealed that the total amount of mine-affected territory in the country was actually 15 percent smaller than previous estimates had indicated, 4.2 million Afghans still live in mine-affected communities. Kabul province is the most affected province in the country, but agricultural areas are also particularly affected, with 71 percent of mine-affected communities reporting that mines have impeded access to and use of pastures, and nearly one-third reporting blocked access to cropland.

Afghanistan does have a robust mine clearance plan for the estimated 714 square kilometers of mine-affected territory. The government of Afghanistan has destroyed over 65,000 landmines in stockpiles around the country since 2002. In 2003, the government's mine action program succeeded in clearing 30 square kilometers of mine-affected terrain and the ALIS estimates that in five to 10 years, Afghanistan could reach the goal of clearing 315 square kilometers, which would drastically reduce injuries and deaths from mines and allow major development projects to proceed.

(Continued on p. 2)

SPECIAL ISSUE:



THE FORGOTTEN WAR

We have followed developments in Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion of the country in 2001. In this special edition of the *Defense Monitor*, our staff considers some of the most pressing issues, including the difficulties posed to NATO's International Security Assistance Force by the often divergent strategies of its various contributors, the critical area of security sector reform (and the European Union's new role in this), and the increasing incidence of kidnappings. Other issues addressed include the lack of civilian casualty counting mechanisms, the challenges posed by conventional weapons, determining the cost of the war in Afghanistan, and the advent of suicide bombing there.

— Mark Burgess, Director, WSI Brussels

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IN MEMORIAM
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35th
ANNIVERSARY

A look back...

This year's issues of the *Defense Monitor* highlight decades of contributions to U.S. defense policy.


Unexploded ordnance (UXO) also remains a grave danger to Afghan civilians and U.S. and coalition troops. In 2005, over 800,000 UXO were destroyed in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is seeing important progress with regards to landmines and UXO. Overall casualties from landmines are also decreasing. However, increasing numbers of children are being killed or injured as a result of landmines; 18 percent of landmine and ERW casualties are children between the ages of five and 14 years. Afghanistan's environment is still riddled with these weapons and troops and civilians alike must be careful to avoid accidental explosions.

MANPADS

U.S. and coalition forces also must deal with the deadly threat of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) – shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. Ground troops and aircraft

and air forces have been under threat of MANPADS attacks since the beginning of U.S. operations. One particular threat is the use of Stinger missiles, which have a range of 10,000 meters and can shoot down helicopters and low-flying planes, including air-fueling tankers. The United States supplied approximately 1,000 Stinger missiles to Afghanistan during the 1980s to fight the Soviet army, but, following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Stingers remained in the country, and some are believed to be in Taliban hands. The United States has been so concerned about the proliferation of these weapons in South Asia that the CIA has tried to buy back the surplus Stingers. But U.S.-origin MANPADS are not the only missiles of concern in Afghanistan. According to news reports, Russian, Chinese, and Iranian-made missiles also pose risks for air operations in the country.



DOD photo by Keith A. Milks, USM.

Small Arms

Afghanistan has one of the largest supplies of small arms in the world. At the start of U.S. operations in Af-

CDI's efforts bear fruit: U.S. drops objection to treaty raising minimum age for use of children in conflict

ghanistan, UN experts estimated that approximately 10 million small arms were in circulation in Afghanistan. The border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is home to thriving black-market arms bazaars. Machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, hand grenades, and rocket launchers are all readily available. Recent reports indicate that Taliban forces have begun to adopt strategies used by Iraqi insurgents, including more regular use of improvised explosive devices. IEDs are often assembled using a variety of small arms and light weapons munitions. And, convoys are often steered toward hidden IEDs after maneuvering to avoid small arms fire.

Just as in Iraq, conventional weapons have often not been adopted into U.S. strategy on the ground in Afghanistan. In order to protect U.S. and coalition troops and facilitate operations within the country, the United States must begin to examine strategies to address weapons proliferation. From better safeguarding of weapons stockpiles to weapons collection and destruction, the United States has many powerful policy tools available to ensure that weapons proliferation will not cost lives nor derail U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. ■

U.S. forces search Afghani men for weapons in their search for arms caches in the country. Afghanistan has one of the largest supplies of small arms in the world.

June 2000

February 2001

September 2001

CDI decries 20 percent growth of U.S. nuclear target list at time of Russian “breakdown”

Moscow office established

Terrorist attack against the United States; CDI launches Terrorism Project; Monitor addresses issue of failed states

Enter EUPOL Afghanistan: Security Sector Reform

Mark Burgess, VSI Brussels Director

ON JUNE 15, 2007, the European Union assumed control of the Afghan police training mission formerly led by Germany. Details are still emerging, but EUPOL Afghanistan, as the new mission is called, will last at least three years and include personnel from at least 16 EU members, with additional contributions from around seven non-EU countries. The mission will eventually comprise 192 police, law enforcement, and justice experts. Of these, 88 will be stationed in Kabul, with 108 based at five regional command posts or with the 25 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) already established throughout Afghanistan.

Police training is but one facet of security sector reform (SSR) – a concept that encompasses much more than a country’s core security actors – such as the armed forces, police and intelligence services. Security management and oversight bodies, both governmental and nongovernmental, must also be involved if such reform is to create an accountable, responsible, and effective security sector that is conducive to development, democracy and poverty reduction. Likewise, justice and law enforcement institutions must also be included in any SSR efforts, as well as non-statutory “unofficial” security forces.

Despite this, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom and Holland, individual EU member state approaches to SSR have focused on single elements instead of being holistic. This is also true of the United States, whose SSR efforts increasingly focus on “hard security” and are often tied to whether recipient states are viewed as allies in the so-called “global war on terrorism.” In Afghanistan, the United States’ SSR initiatives have primarily involved training the Afghan National Army (ANA) while European efforts have centered largely on training Afghanistan’s police.

Thus far, SSR in Afghanistan has been unbalanced and largely unsuccessful. On the political side, the inability of the executive and legislative branches of the Kabul government to adequately exercise control and oversight over the security sector continues. The economic aspect has also been neglected with apparently little thought given to how Afghanistan will be able to maintain any new security sector architecture or reforms should donors cease to provide financial support. Meanwhile, the promotion of civil society that comprises the societal dimension of SSR has been almost totally ignored.

The institutional dimension of



EUPOL officers train the national police force in Afghanistan.

SSR has fared better, with the exception of the Italian-led judicial reform process. This has been under-funded and, some contend, mismanaged, with the Italians conducting strategic planning from Rome to avoid political infighting in the Afghan administration, thereby ensuring that local ownership so critical to the process was absent. Predictably, given the post Sept. 11 focus on hard security, the military and police reform projects have received the most attention and funding. However, while the ANA training initiative has enjoyed some success, the police training program (which has involved the United States as well as Germany) has proven less successful.

Charges have been leveled that, while U.S. methods churn out relatively high numbers of policemen,

U.S. attacks Taliban in Afghanistan

President George W. Bush announces intent to withdraw from the ABM treaty

the quality of their training is low. Germany's police training program has also been viewed as generally unsuccessful. Its decision to work with existing police structures rather than revamp them as the United States did with the ANA has been particularly criticized, although this should be qualified with a recognition of the budgetary constraints under which the Germans were operating. NATO officials have been especially critical of the quality of the new Afghan police graduates, whom they have described as "badly trained, badly paid and subject to bribery and corruption."

Other concerns over EUPOL Afghanistan include its relatively small size and the ability of EU member states to find the promised personnel. Meanwhile, the EUPOL commander resigned in September, casting further doubts over the mission's viability.

Such considerations notwithstanding, the deployment of EUPOL Afghanistan is a welcome development. Civil military ventures like these are considered well-suited to the EU. Moreover, while corporately the EU has tended to view SSR compartmentally, it may prove the best agent for developing the holistic approach that is needed. Such an approach is crucial. Even the best-trained police force will be insufficient if the other elements of SSR in Afghanistan are neglected. ■

Kidnappings in Afghanistan: Tactical or Strategic Terrorism?

*By Marta Conti, WSI Brussels Research Assistant
(Graph compiled by WSI Brussels Research Assistant Stefanie Wodrig)*


KIDNAPPINGS HAVE BEEN A growth business in many recent conflicts. In Afghanistan they have long been a common way of negotiating favors, obtaining cash, or exacting revenge. However, since 2004 there has been a rapid increase in the number of kidnappings in the country as well as in the number of fatalities among hostages – especially in the least-secure southern region.

According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incident Tracking System, the main targets are Afghans, often police officials or people working for the government in another capacity. The number of kidnappings increased from 30 to 62 between 2005 and 2006, with the number of foreigners taken hostage quadrupling in the same period. WSI Brussels' figures (see chart for an explanation on methodology) for 2007 confirm this trend, with the number of foreigners kidnapped rising from 19 in 2006 to 30 in the first eight months of the year. This further increase in 2007 has been seen by some as the consequence of the Mastrogiacomo case.

Daniele Mastrogiacomo, an Italian journalist, was kidnapped on

March 5, 2007, in Helmand province and later freed in a deal that included the release of five Taliban prisoners. The released prisoners included Shah Mansoor Dadullah, who succeeded his brother Mullah Dadullah as the military chief of the "southern zone" after the latter was killed by coalition forces on May 13. Although it may be too early to talk conclusively of a Mastrogiacomo-effect, the sharp increase in the number of foreigners taken hostage in June and July (a total of 28, including the 23 Koreans kidnapped in Kandahar province on

HOSTAGES TAKEN IN AFGHANISTAN



Sources & Methodology: Figures up to 3/29/2007 were taken from the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (see, <http://wits.nctc.gov>). From June-August 2007 the data was based on various news reports. For the remainder of 2007, projections were based on the WITS figures.

CDI begins project highlighting U.S. military assistance to countries involved in the “war on terror”

Brussels office and Beijing program started

Multi-year series of CDI studies decry congressional pork in defense bills

July 19 – two of whom were murdered by their captors, with the rest subsequently freed) is arguably blow-back from the Italian deal.

During the 1980s, terrorist kidnappings were frequently used as a means of achieving specific objectives, and forcing dialogue with the victims’ countries; however, today’s kidnapers appear much more concerned with their own constituents. The intention often seems to be to put on a show of strength for these supporters (and would-be supporters) – as well as the world at large. Another outcome is to express opposition to the enemy in question while also undermining their credibility and legitimacy where – as is the case with the government and coalition forces in Afghanistan – they are shown to be unable to guarantee country-wide security.

Giandomenico Picco, a former UN hostage negotiator, makes a clear distinction between the tactical terrorism that he faced in negotiating the release of hostages such as U.S. citizen Terry Anderson in the 1980s, and the strategic terrorism that he sees developing in both Afghanistan and Iraq – generally in relation to al-Qaida-like groups – and warns against the dangers of any nexus between the two variants.

The Mastrogiacono case represents just such a development. Precise demands and negotiations led to the liberation of the hostage, while the killing of the two Afghans (one of

whom was supposed to be included in the exchange deal – something the Taliban kidnappers later denied – while the other was killed before Mastrogiacono’s release) contrasted the kidnappers’ strength with the inability of the Afghan government to protect its citizens. Both the shorter term tactical objectives and the longer term strategic ones were achieved: the first, freeing key Taliban members; the second, broadcasting Taliban strength and spreading the sense of instability and insecurity while gaining support and undermining the government’s credibility.

The challenge is not only to understand how to tackle this hybrid tactical and strategic terrorism in the short term – and thereby free hostages or prevent them from being kidnapped at all – but also to formulate a counter-strategy to avoid it spreading regionally and globally. While Seoul denies payment of any ransom for the freed South Korean hostages, there are rumors that \$20 million may have been paid for their release. Whatever its terms, a deal of some sort seems to have been struck. More kidnappings are, therefore, expected. ■



DOD photo by SSG Marcus J. Quarterman

Afghan National Army soldiers provide security while coalition forces search for suspected Taliban members. The Taliban, along with al-Qaida and other local militias and gangs, have been responsible for an increase in kidnappings of journalists, aid workers and other civilians in Afghanistan.

March 2002

January 2003

March 2003

Gens. McCaffrey and Wilhelm visit Cuba with CDI group; meet with top Cuban officials, including Castro

CDI begins training U.S. Marine Corps on confronting child soldiers

U.S. and allied invasion of Iraq begins

Profiling Discord: Suicide Bombings in the Insurgent Campaign

By Monica Czwarno, Research Assistant and Ana Marte, Research Associate

ONE OF THE MOST NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN Afghanistan over the past two years has been the dramatic increase in the use of suicide bombings as a strategic and tactical tool by the Taliban and al-Qaida. Although such bombings were not previously unheard of in Afghanistan's wars (Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud was killed by one on Sept. 9, 2001) it is a phenomenon that was not as common to them as it was to those in the Middle East or Sri Lanka.

During the Afghan-Soviet war suicide bombings never occurred partly because they were, and are, largely perceived in Afghanistan as un-Islamic and considered a deep social taboo by most Afghans. However, as others have noted, the war in Afghanistan is undergoing a process of "Iraqification," with insurgents importing tactics and strategies that have worked well in Iraq. Suicide bombings affect the local populace and international forces alike and need to be mitigated by adopting a holistic array of policies and strategic initiatives.

Two groups are responsible for suicide attacks in Afghanistan: foreign fighters and indigenous Pashtuns. According to academic expert Brian Glyn Williams most suicide bombings were initially attributed to foreign fighters associated with al-Qaida. However, the trend has significantly shifted and a greater number of bombings are now thought to be

orchestrated by native Pashtuns. A significant number of these Pashtun suicide bombers are from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, where they are trained in radical Madrassas before being sent across the border. Williams estimates that suicide attacks have been largely carried out by the uneducated, poor and easily manipulated. Many are swayed by the prospect of having their families receive martyrdom payments to alleviate their dire financial circumstances.

Suicide bombings serve a number of strategic goals. In Afghanistan, they primarily highlight the inability of the Karzai government and the militarily superior international forces to ensure the safety and security of the Afghan people. This perception of weakness and constant worry of another attack generates fear throughout the local population as well as a strong disaffection for international military forces. The rationale

generated in the minds of Afghans is that the suicide bombings will cease if coalition and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) withdraw from Afghanistan. Similarly, the suicide bombing campaign has also frayed the nerves of ISAF and coalition forces, forcing them to alter their strategies and tactics, in turn impacting their public diplomacy initiatives. Lightly armored vehicles, and forays into villages to interact with the public, have been replaced by more heavily armored ones, which are able to withstand suicide attacks but create a barrier between international military forces and the civilian population.

In this respect the insurgents have made significant gains – they have effectively disrupted ISAF's and the international coalition's battle for hearts and minds and, as a consequence, have helped to isolate them from the populace. For example, on March 4, 2007, U.S. Marine Special Forces opened fire on civilians in the Nangahar province shortly after a minivan packed with explosives crashed into their convoy. As a result, the unit of 120 Marines was pulled out of Afghanistan because of the irrevocable damage done to relations with the local population.

In order to counter the insurgents'



CDI releases major study on Bush administration efforts to weaken the U.S. arms export regime

Monitor warns of “heavy-handed and ineffectual” actions in Iraq

Former CENTCOM Commander and CDI Advisor Gen. Anthony Zinni (Ret.) gives widely-reported talk critical of Iraq war

suicide campaign, the precursors that allow it to flourish must be removed. A holistic approach to ending suicide bombing in Afghanistan will better serve to ameliorate the situation. Such policies should include fostering economic development in Afghanistan and the surrounding region so that the allure of martyrdom payment diminishes. Minimizing civilian collateral damage from ISAF bombing campaigns and operations would also decrease support and recruit-

ing for insurgent suicide operations. Lastly, putting pressure on Islamabad to make significant strides in the situation within the FATA region – which is ripe with extremism and used as a recruiting and training ground for suicide bombers – is crucial.

Suicide bombing levels the playing field between a conventional, militarily superior force and insurgent fighters. By identifying the root causes of this rising trend in Afghanistan, as well as the damage caused by

not only the suicide bombings themselves but the resultant changes in coalition and ISAF strategy and tactics, forces may better be able counter what has become a potent tool in the insurgents’ arsenal. It is crucial to reverse the upward trend toward suicide bombing before it significantly degrades the public’s perception of the security situation in Afghanistan and erodes ISAF’s and the coalition’s ability to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. ■

ANNUAL OVERALL CIVILIAN CASUALTY ESTIMATES IN AFGHANISTAN (2001-2007)

	2001-2005	2006	2007
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	unknown	unknown	540
Afghanistan NGO Safety Office	no estimate	no estimate	452
Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief	unknown	unknown	unknown
Amnesty International	no estimate	1,000	no estimate
Associated Press	no estimate	no estimate	381
British Afghanistan Agencies Group	no estimate	1,000	400-500
Human Rights Watch	no estimate	899	no estimate
International Committee of the Red Cross	no estimate	no estimate	593
International Security Assistance Force	no estimate	no estimate	no estimate
United Nations	no estimate	no estimate	593
U.S. Department of Defense	no estimate	no estimate	no estimate

Though the Department of Defense and the British Ministry of Defense do not keep records of Afghan civilian casualties, U.S. and NATO-led forces appear to be responsible for a growing number of civilian deaths. Throughout the war there has been little attention paid to the toll of the war on Afghan civilians, but recently, a handful of nongovernmental organizations have begun to collect data on Afghan civilian casualties due to both coalition and insurgency forces. These figures – which can vary greatly depending on the source – are shown here. A full report, “In-attention to Detail: Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan,” by Elise Szabo, can be found at the Straus Military Reform Project website: <http://www.cdi.org/smrp>.
- By Elise Szabo

2005

September 2005

2006

CDI identifies DOD anti-satellite laser funding, sparking debate of space weapons

CDI reorganizes as the World Security Institute with CDI as its research "division"

Cairo office founded

Divided We Stand: Divergent Strategic Visions in Afghanistan

By Monica Czwarno, Research Assistant

WHEN FACING COMBAT it is important to have a clear mission and strategic plan; yet in Afghanistan, NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is using conflicting tactics to reach a shared goal. Some NATO members counter the insurgency in Afghanistan with a focus on reconstruction and stabilization, referred to as the "development" approach. Others, like the United States and a few allies, prefer the so-called "defense" approach –

ghanistan. Many European nations follow a development model, preferring to focus on helping to rebuild critical infrastructures such as dams and wells, rebuilding schools and providing humanitarian assistance in the form of building clinics and hospitals. For example, Holland claims to follow the "3D" approach, composed of development, diplomacy and defense. However, (like the Germans and French) they prefer to focus heavily on the development aspect.

ity to this mindset, it fails to realize the importance of filling any vacuum with reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

While ISAF and U.S.-led coalition contributors who ascribe to a more offensive approach and those who favor development models both employ apparently mutually supportive tactics, the sum of these is often less than the total of their parts. ISAF contingents are responsible for an area of operations in which they implement their strategy of choice, leading to a different situation on the ground from area to area.

Areas that focus on development risk becoming perceived "safe havens," from which insurgents can prepare and conduct offensive operations. For example, Herat, a relatively peaceful city in western Afghanistan with 700 Spanish and Italian soldiers, has seen a rise in Taliban activity as a NATO offensive in the south sees enemy forces move to less hostile areas. Furthermore, focusing on development without ensuring security can waste resources as insurgents will target development projects and critical infrastructure to give the perception that ISAF are not strong enough to protect them.

"If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame."

– Sun Tzu

conducting raids, ambushes and using close air support offensively. Unless used holistically, these conflicting strategies undermine the unity of command, weakening the chances of success and driving a wedge between NATO allies.

ISAF comprises approximately 36,000 troops from 37 countries; however, the strategic visions of its contributors diverge with regard to how best to approach the situation in Af-

Meanwhile, the U.S. approach in Afghanistan is dominated by offensive military operations. The United States' like-minded allies such as Canada (who also subscribes to the 3D approach, but currently emphasizes defense), the United Kingdom, and Australia prefer to identify and attack Taliban, al-Qaida and other forces, believing that in the absence of such spoilers, Afghanistan will prosper. While there is some valid-

CDI's Straus Military Reform Project releases reports on expensive and flawed F-22 and V-22 aircraft

NATO forces begin replacing U.S. troops in Afghanistan

Top-selling DVD, *Lord of War*, a feature film depicting arms trade, includes documentary with CDI experts' commentary



DOD photo by Msgt. Jim Varhegyi

U.S. Army soldiers secure the NATO flag at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. NATO members have used conflicting tactics to reach a shared goal in the country, decreasing the likelihood of success.

The benefits of purely offensive or developmental operations, unless conducted in tandem, are doubtful. Meanwhile, NATO member states who operate under national caveats that prevent them from engag-

ing militants force that burden onto the shoulders of others. Admittedly, some national caveats have been relaxed, with progress made in this regard at the 2006 NATO Riga summit in Latvia. Still, some reports contend

that those developments were not enough and, to quote the UK House of Commons Defense Committee, caveats still "risk impairing the effectiveness of the ISAF mission."

Conversely, on their own, offensive operations are just as detrimental. Continued attacks in Afghanistan have seen increasing numbers of civilians killed by insurgent and NATO forces. Moreover, Afghans hold NATO to a higher standard than they do the insurgents and expect ISAF to act in accordance with the human rights traditions that Western societies espouse. Furthermore, the conditions that support insurgency – poverty, porous borders and illicit economies – are not being addressed when NATO forces are preoccupied with force protect or with where to carry out their next attack.

Failure to address the very conditions that support the insurgency dooms NATO to a Sisyphean struggle in Afghanistan. To avoid this, ISAF needs to reassess its divergent strategies and then, under the principle of "Unity of Command," develop a balanced, and workable strategy that can be employed through unified tactics. This will see the insurgency run into a unified wall of NATO member states that can be the foundation on which the future of Afghanistan will be built. ■

The author would like to thank previous CDI staff for their generous contributions to this article.

CDI experts' reports, op-eds, and congressional testimony address ways to head off space arms race

Multi-year project launched toward nuclear abolition goal; 2010 Summit planned

The Afghan War: Which Side is DOD On?

Winslow T. Wheeler, Straus Military Reform Project Director

TELLING US HOW MANY DOLLARS have been spent on the war in Afghanistan is fundamental to the Department of Defense's (DOD) effort to garner public and congressional support for prosecution of the war. It should also be a simple question. It is not.

The Department of Defense testified to Congress on July 31, 2007, that the war in Afghanistan had cost \$78.1 billion. The seeming precision of the decimal point notwithstanding, the number is laughably inaccurate. Here's why:

The \$78.1 billion is DOD "obligations" as of May 2007. Obligations are neither Congress's appropriations nor the amount DOD has actually spent. Instead, DOD describes them as "orders placed, contracts awarded, services received, or similar transactions ... that will require payments ..." In short, obligations are what DOD thinks it might spend. For DOD's obligations for Afghanistan going as far back as 2001, there has been no effort by the department to document what was actually spent.

The obligations declared by DOD for Afghanistan are not just for Afghanistan, they are for Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes Afghanistan but also DOD operations in the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and "elsewhere" (DOD's term).

DOD has not informed the public, or apparently even Congress, how those costs break down.

DOD's obligations also do not include transfers of funds from regular, annual appropriations from the non-war part of the DOD budget. These may be as much as \$7 billion for both Iraq and Afghanistan. There is also an additional \$5.5 billion that analysts at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) believe was made available for expenditure in Iraq and Afghanistan but which no one has been able to track.

DOD's figures also do not include classified intelligence activities. According to CRS, Congress appropriated \$27 billion for intelligence efforts related to both Iraq and Afghanistan. The breakdown between the two is unknown to the public and perhaps to Congress.

DOD's figures also do not include the costs incurred by the State Department for diplomatic operations and reconstruction aid in Afghanistan and it does not include costs to

the Veterans Administration (VA) to care for the wounded coming home from there. The future VA cost to care for Afghan war veterans is only beginning to accrue now; it will be many billions of dollars.

Funding for Iraq and Afghanistan has included huge amounts that have little or no real relationship to the wars. This spending includes piles of money for C-17, C-130J, V-22 and other aircraft that would see the skies over either theater only if the wars are still raging three to five years from now when these aircraft actually come off their production lines. Several billions of dollars have also been requested to fund the Army's reorganization into "modular" brigades – a plan that precedes the wars by several years and that would be funded without them. Despite their weak relationship to the fighting, this and other problematic spending has all appeared in Congress' "emergency" appropriations for the wars and, thus, should be included in the accounting of the funding for them.

DOD has combined whatever records it retains for money spent in Afghanistan with the money spent for all other DOD purposes. As such, the money actually spent for Afghan-

China destroys one of its satellites in weapons test

CDI contributes to major *NBC News* report on whether Pentagon undermined promising, foreign-built anti-RPG system

istan – and Iraq – cannot be separated and identified; it is unknown today, and thanks to DOD’s record keeping it is unknowable for the ages.

Surveying this fiscal junkyard in its May 18 report to Congress, “Global War on Terror: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense,” the Government Accountability Office (GAO) termed DOD’s spending data on the wars “to be of questionable reliability” and “should be considered approximations.” The auditors at GAO are well practiced at understatement on such subjects.

Rather than just curse the darkness, CRS has attempted to sort through the morass to make estimates of what has been available to DOD for Afghanistan under the moniker Operation Enduring Freedom. The latest results, from CRS’ “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Updated July 16, 2007,” are shown in

the table below.

Being a professional and ethical piece of work, the CRS study explains its own limitations and uncertainties. Those include the unknown amounts for Operation Enduring Freedom that are not for Afghanistan but for the Horn of Africa, the Philippines, and “elsewhere.” They also include an apportionment of costs for Congress’ extraneous appropriations for aircraft and other items unlikely ever to be deployed, pre-existing Army reorganizations, and such. Thus, for an accounting of strictly defined war costs in Afghanistan, the CRS study actually is an approximation.

On the other hand, DOD’s assertion of just \$78.1 billion for the Afghan war is so full of holes and misinformation that it has no credibility. Based on the far more complete and transparent CRS analysis, DOD’s numbers are literally about half right.

The Chinese war philosopher Sun Tzu, said:

If you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles;

If you do not know others but know yourself, you win one and lose one;

If you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.

Even with the help of CRS’ analysis, our knowledge of a fundamental element of the war in Afghanistan, its cost, is quite imperfect. Based on Tzu’s prescription, it would appear that one of the biggest impediments to a favorable outcome in Afghanistan is the misinformation to Congress and the nation from the Department of Defense. ■

APPROPRIATIONS ESTIMATED BY CRS FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (\$Billions, Current Dollars, by Fiscal Year)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
DOD	9.0	11.0	14.0	12.4	18.0	17.9	34.7/a	26.0	142.9
Foreign Aid & Diplomatic Operations	0.3	0.5	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	2.1	4.8	14.5
VA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	NA	.1
Total	9.3	11.5	14.7	14.5	20.8	18.9	36.7	30.8	157.4

Note: Figures may not add up to total due to rounding.

The \$17.8 billion increase from 2006 to 2007 reflects a \$5.5 billion increase in the costs to equip and train Afghan security forces (\$1.9 billion in 2006; \$7.4 billion in 2007) and \$510 million for 7,200 additional U.S. troops. CRS was unable to identify a justification for the remaining \$11.8 billion in additional costs.



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CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION**

1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Ste. 615
Washington, D.C. 20036-2109
Tel: (202) 332.0600 / Fax: (202) 462.4559
www.worldsecurityinstitute.org

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