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U.S. Missile Defenses in Europe: The Putin Alternative

By Hon. Philip E. Coyle, III, Senior Advisor

A version of this analysis first appeared in Neiman Watchdog on June 11, 2007.

At the G-8 Summit in early June, the difficulties and complexities of proposed U.S. missile defenses in Europe were on full display. In the weeks preceding the G-8 Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin had set the Bush administration – and the world – back on its heels with talk of Russian missiles aimed at Europe in retaliation for proposed U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. This set the stage for what the Bush administration thought might be a G-8 confrontation over its proposed missile defense system. Then, on June 7, Putin proposed a smart missile defense technical and policy solution that the Pentagon should have thought of first: establishing a missile defense radar site at the existing Qabala early warning radar station in Azerbaijan.

Russia had done its homework and proposed a site that was better for missile defense from both an American and Russian point of view.

Because of its location farther

south, relative to the original sites proposed by the Bush administration in Poland and the Czech Republic, the Azerbaijan option has several advantages. At that location, the proposed missile defenses can “defend” all of Europe, including Southeast Europe. The Poland/Czech Republic arrangement cannot cover all of Eu-

rope. Also, radar at the Azerbaijan site would not be able to see Russian missile launches going over the pole towards America, which means that it could not be used to defend America from Russia.

The Poland/Czech Republic arrangement has raised questions about who exactly it was defending against.



Secretary of Defense Robert Gates held a press conference with Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov in Moscow, April 23, 2007. Gates was in Russia to meet with Russian officials including President Vladimir Putin to discuss, among other things, missile defense. In the more recent meeting between Gates and Serdyukov on June 15, the placement of an X-band radar installation was apparently not discussed.

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IN MEMORIAM

JOSEPH N. DEBLINGER
COL. JAMES DONOVAN
ADELE STARR

Iraq invades Kuwait

Since the U.S. proposal to locate missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic could not cover all of Europe, many critics raised questions about why the United States would choose to “defend” some European countries and not others.

Also, in an actual missile-vs.-missile battle, the originally proposed sites in Poland and the Czech Republic could result in debris falling on Russia if U.S. missile defense interceptors sent hypothetical Iranian missiles careening off course. The Azerbaijan site would minimize that problem as well.

When discussing the proposed missile defense system for Eastern Europe, it's best to put the word “defend” in quotes. This is because the United States is deploying missile defense hardware in Alaska and California, and is proposing the same for Eastern Europe, that has not demonstrated the capability to defend Europe, let alone the United States, from an attack by Iran (or North Korea

for that matter) under realistic operational conditions. For this reason, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has “dumbed down” the supposed threat from Iran (and North Korea) to just one or two missiles with no decoys or countermeasures. And yet still the MDA has not been able to demonstrate the effective capability to stop even that idealized threat under realistic operational conditions. Six of the 12 flight intercept tests conducted with the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense system have resulted in successful intercepts, but six have failed for one reason or another. Surely the Russian military and scientific establishment know this. After all, Russia has also tried to develop missile defenses and knows how truly difficult it is. (Russia has so many ICBMs it can overwhelm even the most futuristic missile defenses the United States can imagine, which is why the U.S. Congress voted to shut down the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile system in the 1970s, just one day after it was declared operational.)


By putting forward his proposal to locate U.S. missile defenses in Azerbaijan, Putin questioned the efficacy of the proposed sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, and justified recent cuts by Congress in the budget for construction at these sites. Congress has been skeptical anyway, and Putin showed that they had reason to be.

At the G-8 Summit, Putin also proposed locating the U.S. missile defense systems in Turkey, Iraq, or even on sea-based platforms, but this had the effect of undermining his original proposal. The initial reaction from Iraqi officials noted that a U.S. missile defense site in Iraq could provide a new target, and new motivations, for insurgents.

Immediately following Putin's surprise proposals, the question was how the Bush administration would react. The Bush administration had reached agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic that the proposed missile defense sites, if located there, would essentially be sovereign U.S. territory, like an embassy. The current arrangement with Russia at the Qabala radar station in Azerbaijan is a 10-year lease which expires in 2012, but



Russian President Vladimir Putin envisions placing a land-based X-band radar, similar to the sea-based radar shown in this photograph, in Azerbaijan; U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says he'd rather place the new radar installation in the Czech Republic.



Prior to the allies' attack, Monitor notes: "fighting a war is often easier than dealing with the aftermath"

with an option for renewal.

Also, the Pentagon could worry that Azerbaijan is too close to Russia from a military standpoint. And Putin's references to the existing Azerbaijan radar site may have meant that Putin intended for it to be a Russian-managed or -controlled site.

Within a week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates quashed Putin's ideas, saying that the Azerbaijan radar site could complement but not replace the proposed site in the Czech Republic.

Gates did, however, commit to work with Russia on optimizing the coverage of Europe from short-range missiles, although the arrangements for a U.S.-Russia experts meeting and other forums to further explore the U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation could take months. Ever since President Ronald Reagan, the United States has been saying it wants to cooperate with Russia on missile defense – Bush pledged cooperation with Russia on missile defenses five years ago – but it hasn't happened. If Russia is not an enemy, as Bush says, he should be willing to support serious U.S.-Russian cooperation.

Russia got the message immediately and Gates reported on June 15 that in his meeting with Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, the subject didn't even come up.

If the United States had accepted the Putin proposal, it probably would have derailed the establishment of U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe beyond the time remaining for the Bush administration, saving U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. It has taken MDA two years of efforts with Poland and the Czech Republic to obtain their cooperation, and yet questions still remain with only 18 months left in the Bush administration.

This would leave it up to the next U.S. president to decide whether to establish U.S. missile defenses in Europe, but the Bush administration wants to get concrete poured before its term is up.

To complicate the picture further, on June 17, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini said that Russian officials had indicated to Tehran that

Monitor critical of planned purchase of 75 B-2 bombers (Air Force eventually purchases 21)

Putin did not intend for his Azerbaijan proposal to provoke Iran.

"It seems Russia does not plan to make decisions that may cause instability and insecurity in the region, where it (Russia) is located," Hosseini said, reminding all concerned that Azerbaijan shares borders with both Russia to the north and Iran to the south.

"Russia had done its homework and proposed a site that was better for missile defense from both an American and Russian point of view."

Putin understands there is no rush to deploy U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe to defend against an Iranian threat, and if there were, the U.S. missile defenses that could be established in the near term would not be effective under realistic operational conditions anyway. (As an aside, MDA says that one or two missiles from Iran, with no decoys or countermeasures, are the supposed threat. This raises the question: Why would Iran attack Europe, or the United States, with a single missile and then sit back and wait for the consequences?)

Perhaps Russia and the United States will cooperate on missile defenses, but if they acknowledge that these missile defenses are not effective under realistic operational conditions, then the real benefit would be to show that Russia and the United States can cooperate closely on a difficult matter, not to actually defend Europe.

And if the MDA will not acknowledge that missile defenses are not effective under realistic operational conditions, pretending that U.S. missile defenses actually might work in an all-out war, then they are also pretending that those U.S. missile defenses might work against Russian missiles. If those defenses are located where they might be effective against Russia, this is something which Russia cannot accept. ■

1991

1993

1994

Soviet Union dissolves

Monitor outlines why the U.S. does not need nuclear weapons

"Media and Images of War" explored on America's Defense Monitor TV series




LOGCAP Only Gets Worse

By Rich May, CDI Scoville Fellow

As the United States continues to slog through the misadventure known as the "global war on terror," the method the U.S. military uses to address logistical shortages is finally changing. After years of public outcry about the fiscally-abusive Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the U.S. Army has decided to revamp its embattled program through a reorganization of its processes and procedures. While this change was intended to improve and streamline the previously corrupt program, it has only highlighted and exasperated the problems surrounding this inefficient tool.

The LOGCAP program intends



U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Trey Jones fills out paperwork to drop off his laundry at the Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) laundry facility at Camp Fallujah, Iraq, March 21, 2007. Under LOGCAP III, KBR was the sole vendor receiving contracts from the U.S. Army to meet logistical shortfalls.

to meet logistical shortfalls that the military might experience during the execution of operations, including base support, construction and dining services. LOGCAP, formally called LOGCAP III, has begun its transition to LOGCAP IV, bringing about clear changes in the way that program procedures are implemented. Under LOGCAP III, the vendor that was awarded the LOGCAP contract (Kellogg, Brown and Root, or KBR) was the sole contracted entity and required auditing and management oversight from the U.S. Army, which has been flawed and undermanned.

To remedy these problems and

UPCOMING STRAUS PROJECT PUBLICATIONS

FUNDING INSTABILITY: How the Use of Private Contractors Undermines the U.S. Military's Mission

(Forthcoming, September/
October 2007)

Poverty, unemployment, and the dissolution of civil society and infrastructure are main factors that have led to the chaos in Iraq. Yet, since the invasion, the United States has spent much on U.S. contractors but little to get the Iraqi economy standing on its own two feet. CDI Scoville Fellow Richard May is writing a monograph that addresses this very issue.

THE HISTORY OF MILITARY REFORM

(Forthcoming, Fall/Winter 2007)

This upcoming publication by Straus Military Reform Project Director Winslow Wheeler and CDI Senior Advisor Lawrence Korb will address why the United States needs meaningful military reform, what military reform is and is not, and the history of military reform efforts in the United States since the Revolution.



CDI 2007 MILITARY ALMANAC

(Forthcoming, Fall 2007)

A guidebook for researchers, media, and policy-makers on the relevant data concerning U.S. and global military forces. Compiled by CDI Research Associate Ana Marte and edited by Straus Project Director Winslow Wheeler, the CDI Military Almanac has been a valuable resource since 1995. Pre-order your copy by calling 202.332.0600.

DP-2: THE STORY OF A \$63 MILLION PLANE THAT CAN'T FLY

(Forthcoming, Fall 2007)

Until recently, almost no one outside of the military-industrial complex had heard of the DP-2, a \$63 million vertical take-off plane that never managed to get more than a few feet off of the ground. Now, a painstaking investigation by reporter and Straus Project Adviser Jason Vest is helping make it a case study in Pentagon pork, worthy of congressional hearings and national news.

CDI launches innovative website, gains "Top 5%" rating

many others, LOGCAP IV instead requires five vendors. One vendor is responsible for planning the logistical support operations; three vendors will execute the support operations after an internal bidding process and the remaining vendor will conduct auditing and oversight operations for the LOGCAP program. This re-organization highlights the inherent flaws in the new LOGCAP program:

First, having one company plan operations and develop requirements for another company might create ambiguity or false expectations. This only increases the likelihood that the military will not be as well supported and the logistical shortfalls will not be resolved in a timely fashion.

Second, having three companies

internally compete for contracts contradicts the original logic of LOGCAP, that a competitive process took too much time and was detrimental to the soldiers in the field; these changes undermine this central tenet of the LOGCAP program. If we can force internal competition between three vendors then why not have a competitive process with more than three vendors?

Third, by contracting out the oversight and auditing requirements of the LOGCAP program to another contractor you essentially have the fox guarding the hen house. Having a company audit the program that they are contracted through is the managerial equivalent of the honor system, except with billions of dol-

lars at stake.

Regardless of the negative implications of these three faults, the continued use of civilian contractors for defense logistics undermines the U.S. military's ability to support itself. The military will continue to lose core competencies as more and more logistical functions are contracted out to private companies. These private companies are not bound to the rules and regulations of the military and have proven in Iraq and Afghanistan that fiscal responsibility is not a priority. The United States should not be dependant upon private companies for the support of soldiers, too much is at stake to entrust that responsibility to entities that focus on the invoices, instead of the individuals. ■

Monitor question: "How long did the House debate \$240B military spending bill?" Answer: 22 min., or \$11B per min.

WSI RECENT JOURNALS

ARAB INSIGHT

Quarterly Journal

A groundbreaking, independent diplomacy effort dedicated to bringing diverse Arab voices directly into the political discourse and policy debates in Washington. The journal offers in-depth analyses and commentaries on issues pertinent to the region, including perspectives from individuals in the media, government, civil society and academia, allowing voices in the Middle East to be better represented in the marketplace of ideas and debate in the United States.



CHINA SECURITY

Quarterly Journal

In this current issue, Vol. 3, No. 2, *China Security* explores a number of issues critical to China's stability. These include the rise of social conflict in China's vast rural populace, the aging of China's population and the grave situation of China's coal mining safety and the social and political implications it has for the poorest peasants who work in them.



CAUCASUS CONTEXT

Semi-Annual Journal

A comprehensive and multi-disciplinary journal focused on regional integration and cooperation between the three South Caucasus republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), *Caucasus Context* offers in-depth analyses and commentaries on issues pertinent to the region. The spring 2007 issue includes an analytical piece by the first Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian, an interview with the Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, and a scholarly essay by Medea Kochoradze of Georgia, among others.



Monitor declares 1997 Clinton military budget request at Cold War levels

CDI Director Adm. John Shanahan testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on NATO expansion

CDI Director Theresa Hitchens Testifies on U.S. Space Policy

On May 23, 2007, CDI Director Theresa Hitchens testified on U.S. space policy and space weaponization before the House Oversight and Government Affairs Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. An excerpt is provided below; her full testimony can be found at <http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/HitchensTestimony.pdf>.

[T]he specter of warfare in space ... would endanger all space operations, civil, commercial and military. As the world's preeminent space power, the United States would have the most to lose in a world bristling with space armaments and thus it is in U.S. national interests that space not be weaponized. The U.S. position as the leading space actor at the same time behooves the U.S. government to take a positive leadership role in seeking to ensure future access to and use of the space environment for all. Unfortunately, U.S. space policy and posture is heading in the opposite direction: toward embracing space weaponization and away from international diplomacy that could dampen future threats to space assets. ...

[T]he administration of President George W. Bush released a revised U.S. National Space Policy (NSP) – the first in a decade – in October of last year. The NSP ... supersedes the previous 1996 policy signed by President Bill Clinton. Administration and Pentagon officials consistently

have downplayed the significance of the new NSP as little more than a continuation of the Clinton policy. While it is true that much of the previous policy language was incorporated into the text, the wording of the new NSP is strikingly different in emphasis and tone – changes that aggregate into a much more unilateral and military-focused approach. In seeking to assert unhindered U.S. rights to act in space, including attacks against the space assets of potential adversaries, the new policy at best ignores the rights of other space-faring nations under current international accords and agreements. The document also further distances the United States from international efforts and instruments aimed at establishing collective security in space.

The new NSP stops short of endorsing a strategy of war-fighting “in, from and through” space, and does not overtly authorize development and deployment of anti-satellite or space-based weapons. However, when read in concert with earlier

“In seeking to assert unhindered U.S. rights to act in space, including attacks against the space assets of potential adversaries, the new policy at best ignores the rights of other space-faring nations under current international accords and agreements.”

Theresa Hitchens’ testimony before Congress

military space doctrinal documents and statements by U.S. officials, U.S. intentions to pursue an array of so-called “counterspace” capabilities for targeting satellites as well as space-based weapons technologies seem clear. ...

It is obvious that taken together, these military doctrine documents interpret current National Space Policy as not only endorsing, but requiring, a full-scale space warfare strategy on the part of the United States. This strategy includes possible preemptive action, and possible destruction of satellites using destructive, debris-creating weapons – weapons U.S. Air Force officials repeatedly have rejected in public statements as dangerous because of the indiscriminate threat to all space assets, including those of the United States, posed by space debris. Implementation of this articulated strategy would put the United States



NATO bombing of Yugoslavia

in the position of being the first nation to cross the Rubicon into space weaponization. It is inconceivable that any potential adversary would allow the United States to tread this path unchallenged. Further, such a U.S. move would also clear the way politically for other space-faring nations to adopt similar strategies and seek similar types of weapons capabilities – in other words, break the long-standing norm against the weaponization of space. ...

Whereas the United States currently benefits the most from the status quo in space and has the most to lose from space weaponization, U.S. policy is causing that status quo to crumble with no operational plan and little actual capability to handle the consequences of doing so. ■



President George W. Bush speaking at NASA headquarters in 2004. Bush's new National Space Policy makes several important departures from the previous administration's more collaborative approach to uses of space.

CDI staff visit Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Kosovo, report on conflicts' aftermath

SCHOLAR SPOTLIGHT: David Johnson



Current Position

Editor in Chief, Johnson's Russia List, 1996-Present

Previous Positions

Chief of Research, Center for Defense Information, 1975-1998; staff member for former Rep. Michael Harrington, D-Mass., with the House Armed Services Committee, 1971; military analyst for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, 1970.

In-Depth

As a Cold War-era student of "Soviet Studies," Johnson has had a long-time interest in Russian affairs. Hired as the first full-time employee in 1972, Johnson soon served as chief of research, overseeing projects that related to the military, foreign policy, nuclear issues and the Soviet Union. He directed CDI research and supervised preparation of the *Defense Monitor* for more than 20 years.

In 1996, Johnson established Johnson's Russia List (JRL), an Internet-based newsletter of daily news, analysis and opinion about Russia. Amid the growing controversies in Russia during the Boris Yeltsin era and realizing that the Western media often portrayed a one-sided perspective of the country and its leaders, Johnson decided to use the Internet as a way to distribute a broad range of news and information – from all perspectives available – to Russia-watchers around the world. Nearly 12 years after the start of the publication, JRL has over 7,000 direct subscribers worldwide.

According to a *New York Times* profile of Johnson's Russia List in the late 1990s, JRL has been credited for "changing the nature of academic and political scrutiny of Russia." Everyday, Johnson scans global news from large, English dailies to smaller, Russian news websites and sends a collective report of news about Russia to a substantial list of government officials – including officials in the U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the Kremlin – top-tier journalists, scholars and other experts in the field. Part of Johnson's mission, he has said, is to expose "the diversity of views."

Johnson sees the continued work of JRL as essential to increasing knowledge about Russia and allowing a broad range of views and opinions to enter the discourse and often controversial debate that surrounds Russian politics and U.S.-Russian relations, and has become an indispensable research tool. As Russian expert Michael McFaul recently wrote in the *Washington Post*, "There is no better English-language source than Johnson's Russia List."

To subscribe to JRL, contact David Johnson at davidjohnson@erols.com.



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