The Neoconservative Persuasion

By Irving Kristol

Since its origin among disillusioned liberal intellectuals in the 1970s, neoconservatism has been an intellectual undercurrent that surfaces only intermittently and one whose meaning is glimpsed only in retrospect. It has flowered again of late, and President George W. Bush and his administration seem to be at home in the political environment created by neoconservatism’s renaissance.

What exactly is neoconservatism? Journalists, and now even presidential candidates, speak with an enviable confidence on who or what is “neoconservative” and seem to assume the meaning is fully revealed in the name. Those of us who are designated as “necons” are amused, flattered, or dismissive, depending on the context. It is reasonable to wonder: is there any “there” there?

Even I, frequently referred to as the “godfather” of all those neocons, have had my moments of wonderment. A few years ago I said (and, alas, wrote) that neoconservatism had had its own distinctive qualities in its early years, but by now had been absorbed into the mainstream of American conservatism. I was wrong, and the reason I was wrong is that, ever since its origin among disillusioned liberal intellectuals in the 1970s, what we call neoconservatism has been one of those intellectual undercurrents that surface only intermittently. It is not a “movement,” as the conspiratorial critics would have it. Neoconservatism is what the late historian of Jacksonian America, Marvin Meyers, called a persuasion,” one that manifests itself over time, but erratically, and one whose meaning we clearly glimpse only in retrospect.

With the “American Grain”

Viewed in this way, one can say that the historical task and political purpose of neoconservatism would seem to be this: to convert the Republican Party, and American conservatism in general, against their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy. That this new conservative politics is distinctly American is beyond doubt. There is nothing like neoconservatism in Europe, and most European conservatives are highly skeptical of its legitimacy. The fact that conservatism in the United States is so much healthier than in Europe, so much more politically effective, surely has something to do with the existence of neoconservatism. But Europeans, who think it absurd to look to the United States for lessons in political innovation, resolutely refuse to consider this possibility.

Neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the “American grain.” It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic. Its twentieth-century heroes tend to be Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan. Such Republican and conservative worthies as Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Barry Goldwater are politely overlooked. Of course, those worthies are in no way overlooked.

by a large, probably the largest, segment of the Republican Party, with the result that most Republican politicians know nothing and could not care less about neoconservatism. Nevertheless, they cannot be blind to the fact that neoconservative policies, reaching out beyond the traditional political and financial base, have helped make the very idea of political conservatism more acceptable to a majority of American voters. Nor has it passed official notice that it is the neoconservative public policies, not the traditional Republican ones, that result in popular Republican presidencies.

One of these policies, most visible and controversial, is cutting tax rates in order to stimulate steady economic growth. This policy was not invented by neocons, and it was not the particularities of tax cuts that interested them, but rather the steady focus on economic growth. Neocons are familiar with intellectual history and aware that it is only in the last two centuries that democracy has become a respectable option among political thinkers. In earlier times, democracy meant an inherently turbulent political regime, with the “have-nots” and the “haves” engaged in a perpetual and utterly destructive class struggle. It was only the prospect of economic growth in which everyone prospered, if not equally or simultaneously, that gave modern democracies their legitimacy and durability.

The cost of this emphasis on economic growth has been an attitude toward public finance that is far less risk averse than is the case among more traditional conservatives. Neocons would prefer not to have large budget deficits, but it is in the nature of democracy—because it seems to be in the nature of human nature—that political demagogy will frequently result in economic recklessness, so that one sometimes must shoulder budgetary deficits as the cost (temporary, one hopes) of pursuing economic growth. It is a basic assumption of neoconservatism that, as a consequence of the spread of affluence among all classes, a property-owning and tax-paying population will, in time, become less vulnerable to egalitarian illusions and demagogic appeals and more sensible about the fundamentals of economic reckoning.

This leads to the issue of the role of the state. Neocons do not like the concentration of services in the welfare state and are happy to study alternative ways of delivering these services. But they are impatient with the Hayekian notion that we are on “the road to serfdom.” Neocons do not feel that kind of alarm or anxiety about the growth of the state in the past century, seeing it as natural, indeed inevitable. Because they tend to be more interested in history than economics or sociology, they know that the nineteenth-century idea, so neatly propounded by Herbert Spencer in his The Man versus the State, was a historical eccentricity. People have always preferred strong government to weak government, although they certainly have no liking for anything that smacks of overly intrusive government. Neocons feel at home in today’s America to a degree that more traditional conservatives do not. Though they find much to be critical about, they tend to seek intellectual guidance in the democratic wisdom of Tocqueville, rather than in the Tory nostalgia of, say, Russell Kirk.

But it is only to a degree that neocons are comfortable in modern America. The steady decline in our democratic culture, sinking to new levels of vulgarity, does unite neocons with traditional conservatives—though not with those libertarian conservatives who are conservative in economics but unmindful of the culture. The upshot is a quite unexpected alliance between neocons, who include a fair proportion of secular intellectuals, and religious traditionalists. They are united on issues concerning the quality of education, the relations of church and state, the regulation of pornography, and the like, all of which they regard as proper candidates for the government’s attention. And since the Republican Party now has a substantial base among the religious, this gives neocons a certain influence and even power. Because religious conservatism is so feeble in Europe, the neoconservative potential there is correspondingly weak.

**Foreign Policy**

And then, of course, there is foreign policy, the area of American politics where neoconservatism has recently been the focus of media attention. This is surprising since there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience. (The favorite neoconservative text on foreign affairs, thanks to professors Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago and Donald Kagan of Yale University, is Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War.) These attitudes can be summarized in the following “theses” (as a Marxist would say): First, patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by both private and public institutions. Precisely because we are a nation of immigrants, this is a powerful American sentiment. Second, world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny. International institutions that point to an ultimate world
government should be regarded with the deepest suspi-
cion. Third, statesmen should, above all, have the ability
to distinguish friends from enemies. This is not as easy
as it sounds, as the history of the Cold War revealed.
The number of intelligent men who could not count
the Soviet Union as an enemy, even though this was
its own self-definition, was absolutely astonishing.

Finally, for a great power, the “national interest” is not
a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like
trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation
might appropriately feel that its national interest begins
and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost
always in a defensive mode. A larger nation has more
extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is
ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the
United States of today, inevitably have ideological inter-
est in addition to more material concerns. Barring extra-
ordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged
to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack
from nondemocratic forces, external or internal. That is
why it was in our national interest to come to the defense
of France and Britain in World War II. That is why we
feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is
threatened. No complicated geopolitical calculations of
national interest are necessary.

Behind all this is a fact: the incredible military superi-
ority of the United States vis-à-vis the nations of the rest
of the world, in any imaginable combination. This superi-
ority was planned by no one, and even today there are
many Americans who are in denial. To a large extent, it
all happened as a result of our bad luck. During the fifty
years after World War II, while Europe was at peace and
the Soviet Union largely relied on surrogates to do its
fighting, the United States was involved in a whole series
of wars: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War,
the Kosovo conflict, the Afghan War, and the Iraq War.
The result was that our military spending expanded more
or less in line with our economic growth, while Europe’s
democracies cut back their military spending in favor of
social welfare programs. The Soviet Union spent profusely
but wastefully, so that its military collapsed along with its
economy.

Suddenly, after two decades during which “imperial
decline” and “imperial overstretch” were the academic
and journalistic watchwords, the United States emerged
as uniquely powerful. The “magic” of compound interest
over half a century had its effect on our military budget,
as did the cumulative scientific and technological research
of our armed forces. With power come responsibilities,
whether sought or not, whether welcome or not. And it
is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have,
either you will find opportunities to use it or the world
will discover them for you.

The older, traditional elements in the Republican
Party have difficulty coming to terms with this new
reality in foreign affairs, just as they cannot reconcile
economic conservatism with social and cultural conser-
vatism. But by one of those accidents historians ponder,
our current president and his administration turn out
to be quite at home in this new political environment,
although it is clear they did not anticipate this role any
more than their party as a whole did. As a result, neo-
conservatism began enjoying a second life, at a time
when its obituaries were still being published.