The World Today
March 1999

Deterrence: The Last Weapon
By: John Moberly

 

The world is once again wondering what to do about Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction. Despite air strikes, Saddam Hussein is still in power and his people suffer under sanctions. Is this the moment for a touch of old-fashioned deterrence? Might a firm UN resolution regain the initiative and make life safer for all?

 

Despite the december US/UK bombing campaign against Iraq and subsequent strikes on missile sites, Saddam Hussein continues to pose a threat to his neighbours and beyond He remains in charge, apparently in full control of the government except in those areas in the North and East where the Kurds maintain a precarious autonomy protected by the no-fly zones imposed by the US, Britain and initially France.

With Saddam’s persistence before the December attacks in avoiding full co-operation with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) it has become increasingly clear that he regards the retention of a capability in biological and chemical weaponry as fundamental for the achievement of his ambitions, notably his wish to be accepted by the Arabs as their great leader for the present age.

The containment of the threat posed by Saddam’s continued possession of these weapons will remain a high priority for the international community so long as there is no substantial change in Iraq, or assurance of the total elimination of the weapons. It is timely, therefore, to consider ways to restore the international consensus, particularly in the Security Council, that is essential for the effective containment of the threat in the longer term.

It is too early to say how far, if at all, Saddam’s hold on power was weakened by the bombing. US and British reports refer to serious damage to the installations, equipment and communications of the Republican Guard and the various intelligence organisations on which Saddam Hussein relies to maintain control, though the personnel are likely to have been dispersed before the attacks.

In assessing the situation after the bombing it has to be borne in mind that Saddam maintains the backing of his core supporters by ensuring that whoever in Iraq suffers from material deprivation, it is not they. He also makes those on whom he depends to stay in power accomplices in his own excesses, so that they have nothing to hope for and everything to fear from any internal change.

The perception of the many Iraqis who would dearly like to see Saddam gone will be that the air attacks, like the continuing sanctions, will make life more difficult for the population at large without bringing his removal appreciably nearer. Some are in any case worried that Saddam’s going could lead to civil war and anarchy, making it even harder to keep their children fed and healthy.

Air attacks, and indeed inspections on the ground, are unlikely ever to be able to eliminate altogether stocks of chemical and biological weapons, which are easily produced, moved and hidden. But the December bombing may have had the important result of destroying some of Iraq’s means for delivering such weapons beyond its borders.

The numbers of civilian casualties suffered during the US and British air operations in December have not been revealed. But it is clear they were nowhere near the levels predicted in some quarters hostile to the further use of military force. But any Iraqi civilian casualties are greatly to be deplored, both for the tragedy they represent for the people concerned, and for the bitterness to which they contribute among wider Arab and Islamic populations. The resentment of many Iraqis of all generations and backgrounds against the US and Britain is likely to remain a potent factor for some time.

 

Option of Last Resort

After the December bombing it is highly unlikely that Saddam Hussein will ever again agree to the return of UN inspection and monitoring teams. Certainly he will not do so unless the teams are so circumscribed as to be ineffective in uncovering any remaining production and storage for chemical and biological weapon. From now on the international community will have to rely on deterrence to restrain Saddam from using biological, chemical or any other weapons of mass destruction.

Deterrence has a good record this century in preventing the use of horrifying weapons. During World War Two Hitler was deterred from using chemicals by the knowledge that similar weapons were available to the allies. During the Cold War deterrence prevented either side from resorting to the nuclear option.

Also, we now know that at the time of the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam Hussein probably had the capability to attach chemical or biological warheads to missiles. He was deterred from doing so presumably because he feared that the use of those weapons would provoke a response that could put his own hold on power at risk.

But for deterrence to work effectively it is desirable, if not essential, that it should operate in a framework acceptable to the broadest possible international consensus and that this should include all five permanent members of the Security Council.

 

Consensus Break Down

Since the liberation of Kuwait one of Saddam Hussein’s principal objectives has been gradually to break the cohesion of the international coalition which confronted him in 1991 under the aegis of the UN. This has been the aim of the constant probing by Iraq which has achieved a significant degree of success, including the split among the permanent members of the Security Council.

There is now also a growing international questioning of a containment strategy that seems to rely on the possibility of further military strikes without any clear balancing political initiative. Without this there could be an increasing reluctance on the part of a number of countries, not only in the Arab and Islamic world, to go on applying at all rigorously the sanctions imposed by the UN on their trade with Iraq.

Some uneasiness has also been expressed in Turkey about providing airbase facilities for US operations enforcing the northern no-fly zone. In Gulf Cooperation Council countries, governments understand the role of Saddam in bringing about the misfortunes of Iraq and its people, but they are concerned about the continued sufferings of ordinary Iraqis. They may also in some cases be inhibited in what they say and do by a wariness in handling their own Islamic extremists, who are often particularly critical of governments in the region providing facilities for Western forces carrying out air attacks on Iraq.

A political initiative could help restore international consensus, revive the authority of the Security Council and underpin the deterrence on which the effective containment of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons depends.

The aim of a political initiative would in the first place be to tackle the widespread international unease about the operation of the sanctions regime while retaining the essential element of it — the UN’s ban on the supply of weapons and militarily related equipment and materials to Iraq. This could be achieved within the Security Council’s earlier offer of a comprehensive review of the operation of sanctions arrangements. The US and Britain could make it clear that are prepared to support a speedy review without waiting for a restoration of UN inspections and monitoring inside Iraq.

The objective of the review, besides looking at the operation of sanctions, would be to recommend ways of freeing international trade with Iraq in items not regarded by the Security Council as being of critical significance for rearmament and for the development and production of weapons of mass destruction.

Some ideas for a radical restructuring of the sanctions regime have been put forward by France and Saudi Arabia. These may not be satisfactory, but they should be carefully studied and not rejected out of hand. Other possibilities should also be looked at.

 

Ending Isolation

Another aspect of a political initiative might be some reconsideration of the isolation of Iraq. If direct dialogue with political representatives of the Iraqi government is regarded as going too far, there could be advantage in encouraging exchanges between academics, doctors and engineers where professional links between Britain and Iraq have previously been close and productive.

It is entirely possible that Saddam Hussein might reject any revised system of sanctions that continues to restrict purchases of military equipment and that he might turn down opportunities for non-governmental contacts. But Security Council approval for stern measures would surely come more easily if they followed a rejection by Saddam of a political initiative aimed at a substantial alleviation of the sanctions burden.

 

Reinforcing Deterrence

Political initiatives may be only partially successful or fail altogether. In these circumstances the effectiveness of deterrence will remain of fundamental importance for the security of the Gulf region, the wider Middle East and beyond so long as Saddam Hussein retains his chemical and biological weapons. Effective deterrence could stem only from overwhelmingly strong, mobile and technically superior US forces.

In this context the suggested radical review of sanctions policy by the Security Council could have a significance beyond its own merits. The fact that such an initiative has been put forward could, whether it is successful or not, help to bring the whole process of containing Iraq back under a UN umbrella agreed by the five permanent members of the Council. The best support for the deterrence, on which the effective containment of Iraq now depends, would be that the Council should agree to a resolution spelling out that any use of chemical or biological weapons, or any other weapons of mass destruction, by Iraq would be met by overwhelming force with its full backing.

Is it too fanciful to suppose that in the aftermath of a political initiative aimed at alleviating the pressures of sanctions on the people of Iraq a Security Council resolution on these lines might be accepted by the permanent five and the rest of the members?