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The World Today
RUSSIA: Military Muscle
By Dov Lynch
| Since the government and financial crisis of August 1998, Russia and its security policy have become turbulent. Economic problems and political instability have combined with threatening external developments to allow the resurgence of the military. The appointment of Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister this August was rapidly followed by Chechen incursions into Dagestan and three bomb explosions in Russian cities, killing almost three hundred people. With parliamentary and presidential elections this month and next June, it is vital to understand the nature and limits of this rise of the military. |
This has been a difficult year in Russian-Western relations, as illustrated by the dash to the Kosovo capital, Pristina, by Russian airborne troops in June while British forces went on standby. One of the reasons for renewed tensions has been the resurgence of the military voice in Moscow.
Operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia confirmed Russian fears about the threat that the Atlantic Alliance posed to Russian security. The NATO air campaign was conducted against an independent sovereign state without the approval of the UN Security Council. NATO’s new Strategic Concept, enshrined at the April summit in Washington, raised the possibility of further out-of-area operations including, in the Russian view, in the former Soviet Union. Combined with US attempts to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, American policy seemed not only reckless but deeply threatening.
Bombings, and the incursion of armed Chechen groups into Dagestan, heightened deep-seated insecurity. Renewed conflict in the North Caucasus raised the spectre of a further weakening of the Russian Federation just as external threats were apparently increasing. As a result, since September, Prime Minister Putin has sought to resolve the Chechen question through a sustained air campaign and a large-scale ground operation. In these circumstances of heightened threat perception and with governmental support, the military high command has resurfaced as a leading actor in security policy-making.
The first Chechen war (1994-1996) left the Russian High Command reeling. Following the 1996 presidential election, Boris Yeltsin finally concentrated on military reform. Between 1996 and 1998, armed force numbers were cut back to 1.2 million and the military reorganised. Increasing civilian leadership in new agencies for policy coordination, helped to sustain reform. The decreasing role of the forces was also reflected in the National Security Concept approved in December 1997. This highlighted non-military views on threats, with a focus on economic, political and social problems. The Concept called for non-military responses—undermining the raison d’être of the military and its status as the primary security source.
Pragmatic policy
During this period, the appointment of Yevgeni Primakov as Foreign Minister bolstered the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after years of decline under Andrei Kozyrev. The Foreign Ministry assumed the lead in key areas of security policy; the result was an increasingly sophisticated and pragmatic foreign policy.
In Europe, Primakov negotiated the Founding Act on Russian-NATO relations, which created a formal basis for a special relationship while the Alliance pursued enlargement eastwards. In the former Soviet Union, the resurgent Foreign Ministry produced progress in relations with Ukraine and the start of force cuts in positions across the region.
Internationally, Primakov’s influence was felt in the pursuit of multipolarity, deepening relations with China and India. Russian foreign policy sought to advance Russian interests abroad while creating a favourable international environment for internal reform.
Louder voice
The recent resurgence of military influence has been reflected in four areas. First, the High Command has taken the lead in deciding the strategic contours in Chechnya. President Yeltsin approved a General Staff ‘plan of specific measures’ on 14 September. After the start of an intensive air bombing campaign on 23 September, a reinforced military group has advanced into Chechnya.
Russian forces have conducted offensive operations beyond the Terek river to eliminate Chechen groups. The air campaign has resulted in large-scale destruction and a massive movement of some 200,000 Chechen people towards neighbouring regions.
Russia’s narrow military strategy has meant abandoning the 1996 Khasavyurt accords which ended the first Chechen conflict and rejecting the government of Aslan Maskhadov. Prime Minister Putin has fully supported this strategy, allowing the military a predominant say in operational decisions on the ground. Justifying their pending move into Chechnya, Putin stated on 30 September that ‘the Russian military will choose their positions any way and any place that is advantageous from a military viewpoint.’
The military viewpoint has dominated strategy with little regard for the political consequences of its actions—the massive movement of the Chechen population towards neighbouring Republics, increasing civilian casualties from the bombings and mounting international pressure on Russia to halt what is seen as disproportionate action in Chechnya.
Threats
Second, military influence has also been reflected in the resurgence of military thinking on threat perceptions. On 5 October, Putin revealed that the Russian Security Council had approved a revised National Security Concept which took into account shifts in international relations since 1997—especially events in the Balkans and international terrorism.
A new draft military doctrine published in Krasnaya Zvezda in October portrayed international affairs as caught between two tendencies. First, attempts by the US to create a unipolar system in which force plays a crucial role; and second, the emergence of a multi-polar world. While accepting that the risk of large-scale conflict had decreased, the draft noted a long list of external threats, ranging from military build-ups near Russian borders to the expansion of hostile alliances and unfriendly media campaigns.
The draft doctrine also highlighted a series of internal threats from religious extremism, separatism and terrorism. In particular, it abandoned the ‘no-first-use’ pledge for nuclear weapons, allowing their use in response to nuclear attacks as well as large-scale conventional operations against Russia and its allies.
The publication of the draft reflected the renewed confidence of the military. After several years of disarray it felt able to ask the government for further resources. This draft also represented an attempt by the High Command to seize the agenda in security policy and advance its own perspective on threats and appropriate responses.
Spending
The third area is military spending. On 6 October, Putin stated that a consensus had emerged in Moscow on the ‘strengthening of the force component of the state.’2 The draft budget for next year stood at 803 billion roubles, with military expenditure planned at 110 billion roubles. Putin has now pledged to increase the military share by 26 billion—approximately 1 billion US dollars. According to the Prime Minister, the increase would bolster orders for conventional weapons and equipment, which have been neglected since 1989.
Finally, the High Command has felt confident enough to try to influence foreign policy. NATO actions in Kosovo resulted in the suspension of the Founding Act in Russian-NATO relations. Since March, hard-line military figures have sought to prevent any rapprochement. The first Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Valery Manilov, argued in late October that the Act had been discarded because of NATO actions. In his view, relations with the Alliance could only be revived on a ‘fundamentally new basis’. The Defence Ministry has also seized on the US proposals to alter the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty as a justification for shifts in strategic offensive plans to develop ‘counter-measures’.
Fragile unity
Present military influence is based on a brief moment of unity between popular concerns, government imperatives and military thinking. The bombings increased public anxiety, popular backing for a forceful anti-terrorist campaign and a crack-down on Islamic fundamentalist groups in Chechnya. The Prime Minister seized upon these circumstances to bolster public support for his new government and himself in the elections. However, this moment of unity is fragile. As the conflict continues, it may fade altogether.
For the time being, military influence has been restricted to internal issues of military strategy. Wider Russian foreign policy remains unaffected by developments in Chechnya. While under assault, the pragmatic foreign policy framework established by Primakov when he was Foreign Minister, still stands.
The Foreign Ministry has not been eclipsed and Igor Ivanov has continued to pursue more pragmatic approaches further afield. He has stressed Russia’s desire for a stable Caucasus, linking the conflicts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh with the second Chechen war. The Foreign Minister has also reaffirmed the possibility of renewing contacts with NATO next year. In contrast to Valery Manilov’s view, Ivanov argued on 16 October that ‘the Founding Act exists.’
Limited Resources
Russian military disengagement has carried on throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States—the continuation of a long-term trend started during the first Chechen war. This highlights the new government’s recognition of deeply limited military resources. As the war escalates, the army’s needs in the North Caucasus will accelerate withdrawals from abroad.
While a consensus has emerged in Moscow on increasing military spending, all major politicians have publicly set limits on possible increases. Even Putin has reminded the High Command that resources are very limited. As the war continues, the promise of increased spending may dissipate. The government will be forced to focus on daily operational needs and salaries—and not weapons procurement.
The rise of military influence has highlighted deep divisions within the High Command over the direction of military development, mainly between Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev and the Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin. After the first Chechen war, many officers stressed the desirability of rebuilding conventional strength. With finite resources, the Defence Minister and others have sought to prevent any redirecting of funds from strategic missile forces. The divisions are reflected in the draft Military Doctrine’s Janus-faced focus on both internal and external threats. The lack of a common approach has weakened the military’s ability to consolidate its influence in Moscow.
Resistance
The advance of Russian forces towards Grozny has highlighted disagreements over the strategic direction. Reports in the Russian press have noted Yeltsin and Sergeyev’s reluctance to push beyond the Terek river, while Kvashnin, commanders on the ground and other officers in the Defence Ministry, have tried to retain the strategic initiative through further advances. This underlines the most fundamental constraint on the rise of military influence. So far, Russian forces have met little Chechen resistance. It is only a matter of time before Chechen fighters, far better prepared than in 1994, respond with counter-offensives.
As the Chechens hit back, all the weaknesses of the Russian armed forces will be revealed—poor communications, obsolete equipment, ill-trained conscripts and the absence of reserve troops. Casualties will increase as it becomes apparent that Russia has not learnt the strategic lesson of the first war—that massive force has little utility in such asymmetrical conflicts. The fragile consensus in the government and State Duma on military actions has already started to erode. As the campaign falters, this consensus, and popular support, will be fatally undermined.
With mounting Russian casualties, the consensus between the Russian people, the government and the armed forces will pass. The result will be an increasingly frustrated military, decreasing political support for ground operations and increasing public disenchantment.
As elections loom, any further acts of terror inside Russia might re-establish unity. Prime Minister Putin has benefited from the military operations with increasing popular support, however, the presidential elections are seven months away. It is likely that his popularity will decline. Public opinion may shift against Putin, as the failure of his strategy of law and order is highlighted with increasing casualties in Chechnya and the possibility of more civilian deaths in Russia. As the campaign falters and international pressure increases, Putin may decide to negotiate in Chechnya. However, the military may not listen and may continue the conflict to avoid a second humiliation.
While unlikely to affect the December parliamentary elections, the rise of the men in uniform may influence the presidential race by forcing potential candidates to seek support from the armed forces. This may lead to much more significant military influence in wider Russian foreign policy and the emergence of a real ‘Cold Peace’.
Dr Dov Lynch is Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London. His book on Russian Peacekeeping Strategies towards the CIS has recently been published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Macmillan.