The World Today
March 1999

Parachuted Into Power
By: Rosemarie Hollis

 

Jordan’s new king has pledged to maintain the legacy of his father King Hussein. Along with the mystique of his father’s personal qualities, that legacy includes a highly centralised power structure. Rather than carry on in the same vein, therefore, perhaps the biggest contribution King Abdullah could make would be to take forward the process of institution building that would broaden the basis of his authority.

 

By sheer force of personality, King Hussein managed to hold the balance between the disparate elements that inhabit Jordan: the traditional Bedouin community and East Bank establishment including the armed forces, the intellectuals and the businessmen, the latter disproportionately of Palestinian origin, and the Palestinian refugees still living in the camps that date from the 1948 Arab–Israeli war. PalestInians displaced from the West Bank in the 1967 war and others expelled from the Gulf states during the 1990–91 Gulf War have also been accommodated. Latterly, an Iraqi exile community has taken up residence too.

King Hussein’s charisma, accessibility and rhetorical skills were all brought to bear in reaching out to the different sectors of society. Crucially, he would not shrink from tough action in dealing with his opponents and detractors, notably in 1970 when the guerrilla fighters of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) were forcibly expelled from Jordan, putting paid to the emergence of a “state within the state.” This episode was dubbed Black September in the Palestinian political heritage, and mutual suspicion remained ever after between King Hussein and PLO leader Yasser Arafat.

However, inside Jordan King Hussein won the loyalty of many potential dissidents by incorporating them in the system. It was not uncommon for him to imprison an opponent and then not only pardon him but also appoint him to the government.

The unswerving backing of the armed forces and judicious patronage have thus been key components of King Hussein’s authority. His Hashemite lineage, as a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed and member of the family which led the 1916 Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks from the Hi jaz in what is now Saudi Arabia, gave him a special place in the Islamic Arab heritage. At times a sense of his own place in history seems to have fuelled the quest for regional peace.

In any case, he had to live down the loss to Israeli occupation of the Muslim holy sites in East Jerusalem, which had come under Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967. Meanwhile, given that the Saudis had ousted the Hashemites from the Hijaz and taken over custodianship of the two holiest Muslim shrines, Mecca and Medina, King Hussein also had to deal with the residual mistrust and rivalry of the Al Saud.

It was the British who drew Jordan on the map after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. They installed the Hashemites there, in part to atone for Britain’s conflicting promises to King Hussein’s great grandfather Sharif Hussein, to the French and to the Zionists, during World War One. One of the King’s achievements was to shake off British tutelage over his rule in Jordan during the 1950s, though he retained close personal ties with Britain throughout his reign.

In recent years Jordan’s relationship with the United States became of far greater importance. Again, this alignment must be counted as one of the King’s achievements.

When Iraq was accorded the quiet support of Western powers during its eight year war with Iran in the 1980s, Jordan was a key trade link and conduit. The kingdom enjoyed a period of prosperity as a result of this.

This fruitful arrangement was shattered when Iraq invaded Kuwait and the United States led the campaign to drive the Iraqis out. King Hussein incurred Western and regional opprobrium, but enormous popularity at home, by denouncing the coalition war effort.

He predicted enduring damage if not catastrophe for the region and he was right in so far as popular Arab reactions to the fate of Iraq and increased American influence in the region are concerned. However, in the wake of the Gulf War he adapted to the new strategic balance and led Jordan back into Washington’s ambit.

The enthusiasm with which King Hussein pursued peace with Israel in the past few years has not been echoed among his people. It is the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track that is the principal problem. By signing the Oslo accords in 1993, Yasser Arafat broke ranks with the other Arab parties to the peace process and essentially released them from responsibility for the outcome for the Palestinians.

King Hussein took the invitation and signed a bilateral treaty with Israel a year later. In the process he gained Israeli assurances that those Israelis who had wanted to make Jordan into the solution to the Palestine question had either changed their minds or would not prevail. That at least was some comfort for East Bank Jordanian nationalists who want a Palestinian state established in the West Bank and Gaza to reinforce the distinct identity of Jordan. Those of Palestinian origin in Jordan also want a state as recognition of their national right as a people. However; views differ considerably in Jordan, as well as in the Palestinian community across the river, on whether a future Palestinian state should form some sort of federation with Jordan.

All of this is moot, so long as progress is lacking on the Palestinian–Israeli negotiating track. And Jordan cannot be impervious to the consequences because of the implications for all its citizens.

Among East Bank nationalists there were some who feared that King Hussein might be so driven by his sense of responsibility for the Muslim holy sites in East Jerusalem, that the Israelis could inveigle him into taking responsibility for the Palestinian population of the West Bank as the price of retaining custodianship. Some Palestinians, including in the Palestinian Authority set up under the Oslo formula, harboured similar fears.

Meanwhile, some Jordanians of Palestinian origin had quite different concerns, worrying that the creation of an independent Palestinian state would be used by some East Bank nationalists as an argument for denying them Jordanian citizenship and passports.

 

Disappointing Dividends

This array of concerns will remain to be resolved as and when there is a conclusion to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In the meantime, anger and frustration has increased in Jordan over the lack of progress and the hard-line approach of the government of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu on all aspects of the peace process.

Jordanians resisted following the example of both King Hussein and former Crown Prince Hassan in developing dialogue with the Israelis. While Israeli respect and affection for King Hussein knows almost no bounds, Jordanian professional organisations shunned any suggestion of dealing with Israelis. Trade between Israel and Jordan does exist, but has not burgeoned. In fact, one of the other sources of disillusion with the peace process in Jordan stems from disappointment that the anticipated economic dividends failed to materialise.

 

Limits of Pluralism

Jordanian discontent, coupled with anger about the suffering of Iraqis under the continuing sanctions, and by extension, resentment of the double standards implicit in Western and particularly US policies in the region became pronounced over the past two or three years. To stem the increasingly vocal dissent from the government line on these and other issues, a new law was passed to curtail freedom of the press and Jordan’s experiment with democracy, initiated by King Hussein a decade ago.

The rules under which the latest parliamentary elections were held ensured the return of many members representing local community and tribal interests, rather than national political platforms, and members of the Islamist opposition declined to run. For the time being, at least, the limits of pluralism had been reached.

As King Hussein demonstrated to the last, all power ultimately rests with the monarch. His personal propensity for magnanimity and generosity, not to say wisdom, made his use of that power benign. His strength was also essential in ensuring the survival of the kingdom in the face of many regional threats.

In addition to its vulnerability to developments in Israeli-Palestinian relations, at one time or another Jordan has been subjected to interference in its internal stability from both Syria and Iraq. In the circumstances, it is no surprise that so much emphasis has been placed on the personal attributes of King Abdullah as inheritor of the throne. It is part of the legacy of King Hussein to his country and the region that so much rests on the capabilities of the monarch.

During the thirty-four years that Prince Hassan was heir apparent he was subjected to endless scrutiny and speculation as to his capacity to take over. Prince Hassan’s intellect, his international connections, attention to education in Jordan and his work in interfaith dialogue were all recognised but simultaneously criticised, on the grounds that he was perhaps too much of an intellectual and not comfortable enough with the Bedouin tribes.

lie was also assailed for not having military experience or rapport with the armed forces comparable with his brother. Yet, one of the actions of Prince Hassan as Crown Prince, which apparently so upset King Hussein during his last illness, was his dealings with senior military officers. Conceivably, the Prince was simply extending his authority into the areas where he was perceived to be weak, but ran up against the King’s men. In any case, he did win quiet public plaudits for tackling some aspects of corruption.

 

Chip off the Old Block

As soon as King Hussein made his surprise replacement of Hassan as Crown Prince, it was Abdullah’s turn to be scrutinised. Prince Hassan’s alleged shortcomings were immediately found to be Abdullah’s strengths. He had made his career in the army, he commanded a special forces unit, he shared his father’s taste for fast cars and was dubbed “a chip off the old block.” In sum, if he had the support of the army he could count on one of the key components of power and stability.

That said, of course, it had to be acknowledged that the man who has been parachuted into power lacked experience in politics and needed some training in classical Arabic. In so far as anyone said anything about economics, the theory circulated that because Prince Abdullah had developed friendships among the younger members of the ruling families in the Gulf states, he could probably look to them, as well as the US for economic aid.

What is notable here is that, on the eve of the twenty-first century, the traditional attributes of power in Jordan are deemed the most important. In these terms, King Abdullah does have considerable assets. Added to which, his youth brings the prospect of a new beginning and fresh outlook. Indeed, Jordanians are already talking proudly that they are the first to enter the next generation of leadership in the Arab world. They also talk of their hopes that Prince Hassan will continue to make his contribution.

It is not King Abdullah’s fault if the process of institution building in Jordan was circumscribed under his father. In fact, he has talked of taking democratisation forward. It will be interesting to see if this proves a necessary progression or a problematic option.