World Policy Journal
Volume XVIII, No 3, Fall 2001

 

Not America's War Alone
By The Editors

 

It seems unlikely that Americans young or old will experience a more sobering day than September 11, 2001. The horrific images of Black Tuesday are already indelibly imprinted on our minds. Not since North and South fought at Antietam has more blood been violently shed in one day on American soil, and among the casualties in the rubble was the innocent belief that history is something that happens to other people. Not America's War Alone

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, rarely have so few given so much cause for anger to so many, and it should be America's purpose to harness that passion to civilized ends.

To the editors of this journal it seems evident that the United States will be waging a global war of indefinite duration-a conflict in which the Bush administration's prior foreign policy priorities are morally and strategically irrelevant. Strategically irrelevant because that policy's centerpiece, national missile defense, makes little sense against adversaries whose weapons are commercial jetliners, car bombs, and fishing skiffs loaded with explosives. The policy's strategic inadequacies were evident even before Black Tuesday, as articles in this issue sensibly contend. Yet more damaging are the political and moral inadequacies of a go-it-alone diplomacy because America by itself cannot possibly prevail against an elusive enemy whose scattered foot soldiers are armed with the allure of martyrdom.

In the days following Black Tuesday, the global scope and lethal cunning of the challenge came home. Just before the attack on America, two suicidal assassins, posing as Arab journalists, mortally assaulted Ahmad Shah Masud, leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, the folk hero who controlled a tenth of Afghan territory. The presumed purpose was to deprive Americans of even a toehold in Afghanistan. It was a foretaste of skill at orchestration on the part of a woefully underestimated adversary, known generically to specialists as the "bearded engineer." Osama Bin Laden, the errant son of a Saudi construction magnate, holds a degree in civil engineering. The murderous hijackers on September 11 were also engineers: psychological hybrids, fusing modern technical expertise with a faith rooted in the Crusader age. And their comrades can be found in 30 to 40 countries, so that even a successful strike at their presumed leader would leave an embittered remnant thirsting to die for the cause.

So what can be done? In a prophetic article in this journal, "Terrorism as Warfare: The Lessons of Military History," Caleb Carr maintained five years ago that "the guiding principle of our response to terrorism must be a refusal to submit to its demands." On this score, President George W. Bush cannot be faulted. Very correctly, he and his team have served notice that in this matter allies, neutrals, and rivals would either stand with America, or be counted as against America. Fortunately, Secretary of State Colin Powell is by temper and training a coalition builder, his skills confirmed during the Gulf War. One hopes nevertheless that he recalls Talleyrand's warning to his protuges, "Above all, not too much zeal!" America for the moment holds the moral high ground, which it can forfeit by agreeing too quickly to demands of likely partners to assist in their campaigns against internal adversaries in the name of fighting terrorism. In its understandable impatience to strike back, an untested administration needs steadfastly to resist compromising the values of decency, freedom, and fair play that remain America's most formidable weapon in this global war.