World Policy Journal
Volume XX, No 2, Summer 2003

Seven Principles for Building Peace
Michael Steiner ^*

 

In the euphoria that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, there was much talk of an "outbreak of peace." Today, although the world is no longer menaced by clashing superpowers, the hoped-for peace has proved elusive. What we see now are failed states collapsing into internal ethnic conflict, anarchy, and the war-lordism associated with clan-based or tribal societies. Over the past decade, the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts have exhibited this profile, and their number— 28 a year, on average—is sobering. In our so-called global village, these conflicts inevitably engender terrorism, refugee crises, environmental devastation, trans-border criminal networks, and long-term regional instability.

The international community has responded to this epidemic by becoming increasingly involved in large-scale peace operations— ranging from peacekeeping and peace enforcement to peace building. Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has embarked on 54 such operations. Of these, 41 began after 1988, and 15 are ongoing.

As the representative of the United Nations secretary general in Kosovo, I have had the privilege of presiding over the largest U.N. peace-building enterprise ever mounted. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been given a groundbreaking mandate: to lay the foundations of a lasting peace in the region by creating public institutions from the ground up.

UNMIK was established on June 12, 1999, with the adoption of U.N. Security Council resolution 1244. This followed a 72day NATO air campaign directed at ending massive human rights abuses, including the expulsion of half of Kosovo’s inhabitants, by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

When a multinational military force comprising personnel from 37 countries, dubbed KFOR, rolled into Kosovo that June, it found a society in chaos. There was no government. No police. No law. The physical infrastructure was in a state of collapse. Thousands of houses, bridges, roads, and public facilities had been destroyed. Electricity and telephones were virtually nonexistent. Kosovo’s mining, cement production, and agricultural industries were defunct. KFOR’s first task was to facilitate the return of some 950,000 civilians who had fled from the Serbian security forces. They returned with unprecedented speed, virtually en masse, and UNMIK had to organize food and water supplies, shelter, and rudimentary medical care for these mostly internally displaced persons.

UNMIK’s mandate was three-pronged. First, it had to assume responsibility for running Kosovo’s day-to-day affairs, from policing to operating schools to providing basic utilities. Second, it had to create the institutions and develop the expertise necessary for the people of Kosovo eventually to exercise substantial self-government. Third, it had to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. Resolution 1244 not only left this question unresolved but forbade UNMIK from prejudging it. It soon became apparent that peace building was to be an even greater test of our resolve and ingenuity than achieving a military victory had been.

To cope with the challenge, we built UNMIK on four pillars. ² The first pillar consists of a multinational U.N. police force of about 4,500 officers and the multiethnic Kosovo Police Service, which now numbers over 5,500 and will eventually replace the international police. UNMIK also created a judicial system from the ground up. The second pillar, public administration, manages Kosovo’s public services. UNMIK personnel involved in this pillar increasingly operate in an advisory capacity, the responsibility for providing public services having been transferred to local governments and institutions. The third pillar, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is responsible for building capabilities and institutions in such areas as human rights and rule of law, media development and regulation, democratization, and minority outreach, and for organizing and overseeing democratic elections. The European Union, the fourth pillar, has taken responsibility for rebuilding Kosovo’s physical infrastructure and is helping to create the foundation for a EU-compatible free-market economy through privatization. KFOR, whose personnel now number 23,500 (down from about 40,000), is responsible for maintaining a secure and stable environment. The civil administration would not have been able to carry out its mission without this force.

To fill the administrative vacuum after the war ended, UNMIK first created joint administrative structures in which each government department was jointly headed by one local and one international administrator. This administrative structure would be the basis for the provisional institutions of self-government after the October 2000 elections. UNMIK and representatives of Kosovo’s main political parties collaborated in drafting a constitutional framework for the provisional institutions of self-government.

The first democratic elections—for representatives to municipal assemblies—were held in October 2000, as planned and supervised by the OSCE. In November 2001, the first elections for a Kosovo-wide representative body resulted in a multiethnic assembly, central government, and council of ministers. This led to months of political wrangling until UNMIK stepped in to form a coalition government with ten ministries, including finance, education, health, transport, and social welfare. A second round of local elections in November 2002 led to the establishment of multiethnic municipal assemblies across Kosovo. Thus, UNMIK is well on its way to fulfilling its mandate to equip Kosovo with the institutions it needs to exercise substantial autonomy, as required by U.N. resolution 1244, and to set it on the road toward integration with Europe.

The key to these achievements was not just the generous resources committed by the European Union—over 3 billion euros in civilian aid—but also the application of principles the United Nations had developed as a result of previous peace-building experiences, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo, we have learned still more, giving us reason to hope that future peace operations will be even more efficient and effective. Bosnia and Kosovo have taught us seven principles that are essential to the success of peace-building efforts anywhere.

Begin with a Clear Mandate
A peace operation has to start with a clear set of objectives. This may seem obvious, but even in recent missions this elementary principle has been ignored. When the international community and the representatives of the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia hammered out the Dayton Agreement in December 1995, their primary aim was to end the fighting in Bosnia and to address the urgent needs of the multiethnic population that had been devastated by the conflict. The creation of the Office of the High Representative there to oversee the implementation of the peace settlement was almost an afterthought. This led to confusion about which of the many international governmental and nongovernmental organizations present was responsible for what. Although the U.N. high representative is clearly the most senior international official in Bosnia, the various international organizations operating there— the United Nations, the OSCE, and the EU, among others—are quasi-autonomous. Especially early on, this led to duplication of effort and inefficiency.

In Kosovo, at the insistence of U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan, UNMIK built a new structure incorporating the lessons learned in Bosnia. Each of Kosovo’s four pillars has a well-defined mandate and all of them are subordinate to the overall authority of the U.N. special representative. This has resulted in a dramatically improved level of coordination among the various international actors active in Kosovo.

A mission’s objectives also have to be realistic, both in terms of what the local population wants and what can actually be achieved. UNMIK’s aim is not nation building; it is not within our mandate to decide on Kosovo’s final status. It is our responsibility to foster institutions that lead to self-government. Kosovo’s progress toward becoming a stable, democratic society is measured against eight benchmarks: the development of functioning democratic institutions; the institutionalization of the rule of law; freedom of movement; the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes and the integration of members of minority communities into all aspects of public life; the development of a market economy; the establishment of property rights; dialogue with Belgrade; and the fulfillment of the Kosovo Protection Corps’ mandate as a civil emergency organization— all based on the principle of multi-ethnicity.

Match the Mandate to the Means
Those who are given a far-reaching mandate must also be given the means to carry it out. This applies both to legal powers and to human and physical resources. First and foremost, it is essential to establish the rule of law. Police must have the authority and resources to enforce the law. Courts must have the authority and resources to dispense justice. U.N. resolution 1244 established UNMIK as the ultimate authority in Kosovo. This meant that the forces under UNMIK’s control could conduct police investigations and had the power of arrest. UNMIK was given the authority to try the accused and to imprison criminals. The crucial difference between the international presence in Bosnia and that in Kosovo, is that UNMIK was given executive, as opposed to advisory, powers.

When UNMIK was handed its enormous mandate, the diplomatic process leading to military intervention had allowed for little thought as to how it was to be paid for. The first special representative of the U.N. secretary general, Bernard Kouchner, the founder of Médecins Sans Frontières, responded to this problem with the creation of the Central Fiscal Authority in November 1999.

Get It Right from the Beginning
The tone of a mission is set in its very first days. Thus, it is critical to begin as you mean to go on, both to establish credibility and because it is much more difficult to change course later on.

The Bosnia mission was given neither the civil mandate nor the means to begin strongly because the international community was reluctant to make Bosnia a protectorate. There were two reasons for this: the ideological legacy of de-colonization and a fear of "mission creep," where temporary aid missions find themselves saddled with all responsibilities for governance. I arrived in Sarajevo in January 1996 as principal deputy high representative to High Representative Carl Bildt. The most pressing problem we faced was the reunification of the city, which was divided between Bosnian Serbs in the suburbs and a Muslim-majority population in the center.

Under the terms of the Dayton Accords, seven areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs were to be returned to Bosnian government control. Though there was fear and confusion on both sides, many Bosnian Serbs were ready to stay in these areas and try to live again with their former neighbors. This posed a direct challenge to Bosnian Serb nationalism. Serbian paramilitaries proceeded to force these Serbs to leave, and they set fire to dozens of buildings. There was looting by both sides. While this was going on, soldiers and police stood aside. Later, the international community had to invest enormous resources to undo the damage inflicted in just a few weeks.

Kosovo’s mandate, in contrast, was frontloaded. But even so, implementation was too slow. The military prepares in advance for crises and NATO, through KFOR, was ready to provide a secure environment. But because of constraints imposed by the diplomatic process leading to UNMIK’s creation, the civil administration in Kosovo had only ten days to prepare. Some of the most difficult problems we still face are the legacy of the mission’s early days, when UNMIK was operating with a skeleton staff. The summer and fall of 1999 brought the most vicious reprisals, both among Kosovo Albanians and by the Albanian majority, primarily against Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo Albanians kidnapped, tortured, and murdered one another in internecine power struggles. And according to local reports, more Kosovo Serbs have been killed since the war ended than were killed during it. Local politicians and former fighters swarmed to fill this power vacuum. The need to dismantle the informal power structures that sprang up in the first six months after the end of the actual fighting delayed the development of legitimate democratic institutions.

Meanwhile, criminal gangs spread their tentacles throughout Kosovo, retarding the development of legitimate businesses and legal institutions. By the beginning of 2001, however, with UNMIK police and the Kosovo Police Service fully operational, the security situation had improved to the extent that law enforcement could shift resources to combating organized crime. The Kosovo Organized Crime Bureau and the Counter-Terrorism Task Force are acquiring increasingly sophisticated means for intelligence gathering and covert operations. They are now working directly with Interpol. The Pristina airport has a new state-of-the-art computer system, Pisces, for tracking people entering and leaving Kosovo. UNMIK’s efforts against organized crime and extremism have resulted in five high-profile convictions, and other trials for serious crimes are ongoing.

Learn as You Go
International peace-building missions need to be "learning organizations." It is critical that we admit to and learn from our mistakes. We must study the environment in which we find ourselves. What is the nature of local political rivalries and alliances? How do the people make a living? What are the stories they tell one another? We need to conduct public opinion surveys and talk to the locals in order to understand how they view their situation.

The ability to change course is essential. To take one example, because U.N. resolution 1244 leaves Kosovo’s final status open, it was not clear in the beginning whether UNMIK should or could initiate privatization efforts. When it became apparent that privatization was essential to Kosovo’s economy, we created the Kosovo Trust Agency. The agency has begun to privatize what were known in the former Yugoslavia as "socially owned enterprises," which were considered to be jointly owned by the people and the workers. Privatization is one of the greatest challenges facing Kosovo. Its success depends on the establishment of the rule of law as well as a coherent fiscal policy 90 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SUMMER 2003.and property rights legislation. Potential investors will have to be convinced that their investments will be secure.

The Lessons Learned Unit in the EU pillar of UNMIK represents an effective insider/ outsider model for integrating a critical feedback mechanism within a peace-building mission. The unit is directed by a non-govermental organization, the European Stability Initiative, which works under the umbrella of the EU, the very organization whose work it is assessing. Being attached to the mission gives it access to information it needs, but as an NGO it has a critical degree of independence.

To learn as it goes, and to ensure the effective cooperation of all involved, a peace-building mission also needs to have a way to measure its achievements and to know when its work is done. UNMIK has established the eight benchmarks I have enumerated and is working with Kosovo’s provisional institutions to draft an action plan for progress in all eight areas.

Finish What You Start
Once a peace-building mission has been established, it has to remain in place until it has created sustainable institutions in a secure environment. Finishing what we start is critically important for two reasons: first, for the credibility of other peace-building missions, and, second, because leaving too soon may lead to worse conditions than the original intervention was meant to address. This seems obvious. But it runs directly counter to how governments operate. The problem is that peace building, although it should not be open-ended, requires a long-term commitment, while the political logic in individual governments is nearly always short-term.

One of the reasons that it is important to have a yardstick by which to measure progress is that it will help us recognize when we should shift our focus from peacekeeping to development strategies. The core of the development stage is consolidating the rule of law and creating the institutions of a regulated market economy. The problem is that post-conflict areas are the domain of specialists in "complex emergencies" and development economists are not brought into the picture soon enough. Yet the timely employment of such expertise is essential if a fragile society is to be integrated into its regional economic system.

The Essential Sequence
Principle six is about the essential sequence, that is, security and the rule of law first, democratization later. The first order of business for any peace-building mission must be to establish order. In Bosnia, we made a mistake by holding elections just six months after the Dayton Accords were signed, before establishing the rule of law, with the result that nationalist political leaders consolidated their grip on power. We agonized over this decision, but we were driven to it by diplomatic pressures to be out of Bosnia within a year.

It is also important that human rights not be overlooked in the effort to create a secure environment. As Sir Gerald Templer, high commissioner of Malaya during the Communist insurgency in 1948, observed, the consistent observance of human rights and the rule of law are essential to a mission’s moral authority. "Any idea," said Templer, "that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly related."

Once order has been established, the next step is to create an administrative framework built on a regulatory and legal framework. To accomplish this task, it is essential to gain the consent of political leaders and the public by explaining the mission’s policies, engaging in dialogue with local leaders, and encouraging individuals from all sectors of society to take an active part in the process of political transformation. Effective institutions that deliver the key benefits of peace to all elements of the local population are essential for gaining the public’s confidence. Elections are vital but they should not be held until a secure environment has been established, otherwise the possibility of mass intimidation of the electorate will lead to undemocratic results.

Step three is to institutionalize consent for the established order. Peaceful coexistence, democratic decision making, and conflict resolution must become habits. As Rousseau wrote: "The strongest are still never sufficiently strong to ensure them continual mastership, unless they find means of transforming force into right and obedience into duty." This requires ongoing training and the monitoring of fledgling institutions— a long-term process requiring a sustained international commitment.

A peace-building mission’s endgame is to hand over all its responsibilities to local institutions. This is a mission’s most critical— and even volatile—phase. Responsibilities have to be transferred gradually, so that infant institutions are not overburdened. But it is hard to pace this process correctly. The problem is that once the transfer begins, local political leaders harbor unrealistic expectations of a quick transfer of authority. This leads to impatience. Impatience, in turn, leads to friction.

This is where we are now in Kosovo. Four years is a short time to build all of the institutions of society from the ground up, but a long time in human lives. As in South Africa, many people in Kosovo hoped that deliverance from their oppressors would mean immediate improvement on all fronts. We are working with our partners in Kosovo to transfer responsibility in all areas of governance to local authorities as quickly as they are able to handle them. Thousands of political representatives and civil servants are under pressure to learn quickly. For our part, this requires continuous consultation with local leaders and sensitivity to public sentiment.

In this phase, the support of the international community is imperative. In responding to the tensions of the transfer phase, it is vital for the international community to avoid sending mixed signals, to speak with one voice.

Changing Bad Habits
Peace building does not require us to create clones of Western society. But it does require us to work to change bad habits. By this I mean that although various political traditions are consistent with sustainable stability, not all are.

We have to try to change "traditional" attitudes if they are holding a society back. For example, corruption and cronyism may be deeply ingrained, but they retard development and ought to be rooted out. The empowerment of women has been shown to be perhaps the single most reliable predictor of overall social and political development. Yet, in most parts of the world, women have limited access to education and employment. Peace-building missions should not hesitate to try to improve the position of women in society. In Kosovo, the new constitutional framework requires that every third candidate on a party’s electoral list must be a woman, with the result that over a quarter of assembly members are female.

Nor can peace builders remain "neutral" when it comes to the issue of violence. The move toward peace is a struggle in which we have to take sides. We should support those who are for the peace process and oppose those who are against it. In Kosovo, for example, when a group calling itself the Albanian National Army attempted to blow up a railway bridge, I did not hesitate to designate it a terrorist organization.

The willingness to take sides and to challenge bad habits, however, does not mean forcing change on a society. Lasting change can only come about through a dynamic process of mutual learning. Peace builders must also be attentive to the local community’s values and ways of doing things. Nonetheless, peace builders cannot run away from the hard challenges just because bad habits are deeply rooted. Successful peace building requires endurance and political will.

The Art of Letting Go
UNMIK will not be the last international effort to build a peaceful society from the ashes of war. No one can be pleased to see the expanding number of candidates for international intervention. But the good news is that UNMIK has demonstrated that peace building is a manageable human enterprise subject to the determined application of certain basic principles.

Future peace-building missions must be given clear mandates as well as the authority and resources to carry them out. This will allow them to "get it right from the beginning." They must be learning organizations that respond to the local environment. They must first establish order and then promote the rule of law as the framework for democratization. They must be willing to change a society’s bad habits. They must recognize that these tasks require commitment and staying power. And then there is the art of letting go, which is never easy. Yet a peace-building operation can only be said to have been successful when it is able to hand over its responsibilities to local authorities.

We now have a rich store of experience in peace building. Whether we will successfully apply the lessons of that experience in the future is a question of political will. At least we know the way.

Notes

1. "International community" refers to the array of international governmental organizations— the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union— nongovernmental organizations, and the loose groupings of states, such as the Contact Group, that are typically involved in large-scale peace-building operations.

2. The first pillar was originally the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, but this was changed after the refugee crisis abated.

*Michael Steiner was the special representative of the United Nations secretary general in Kosovo from February 2002 to July 2003. This article is adapted from a speech delivered at the London School of Economics in January 2003.