World Policy Journal
Volume XX, No 3, Fall 2003

Post-9/11: A Brazilian View
Rubens A. Barbosa ^*

 

The events of September 11, 2001, have been commonly described as a turning point in international relations, creating a new world order that to a large extent is dominated by the United States. Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether September 11 did in fact constitute a watershed in world politics. My answer would be a qualified "no," in the sense that although these events marked an important change in the international agenda, they did not, per se, transform the global system of international relations.

An analysis of the issues raised by September 11 suggests that, as with any other major phenomenon, they contain elements of both disruption and continuity. The post-9/ 11 world order has changed not so much as a result of the specific acts of terrorists, but rather due to the demonstration of power by the United States. This did not begin with September 11. It was implicit in the campaign speeches of George W. Bush and was evident from the beginning of his administration. To an extent, Osama bin Laden’s terrorists simply made more visible what was already developing before 9/11.

The terrorist attacks occurred at a moment when the United States, having prevailed in the Cold War and buoyed by ten years of economic boom, had reached a level of strength so dominant that it could only be compared to Imperial Rome. In Império, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe the nature and reach of U.S. power today, contending that the United States views itself as the ultimate authority in promoting globalization and a new world order. ¹ By "empire," they mean a global economic system, which should not be confused with the threadbare concept of "imperialism." ² This "empire" does not have defined territorial boundaries, since it is in itself a process of "deterritorialization" that is gradually incorporating the entire world within its open borders. The power exercised by this "empire" has no limits since it is not born out of conquest, but rather represents the only plausible route to growth and prosperity today. ³

The United States, in the words of the Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye "the most powerful country since Rome," forms the dynamic central nervous system of the new economic order. 4 Being a privileged actor, it is the United States that "imposes order" and "rules" the empire, extracting from it the greatest dividends. It is therefore natural that the United States, as the sole superpower, has achieved a position of incomparable superiority in all areas: economic, technological, cultural, and military. Political dominion, which is the exercise of this superiority, is a direct and natural result of this situation—and something the United States will strive to maintain by any and all means. ⁵

The United States is distinguished from earlier empires by the fact that it did not achieve its current position through clear design. As a result, Americans differ about Washington’s global role. This diversity of opinion contributes to an unwillingness to pay the full costs of maintaining primacy. (Iraq is a good example of this: the costs of reconstructing the country and the increasing number of fatalities among U.S. troops has forced Washington to ask the United Nations for help.) Moreover, since the United States is also a country rooted in certain ethical and religious values, its leaders must respond to the popular belief that U.S. conduct abroad should be consistent with these core values. However, there seems to be a growing domestic awareness of the "imperial" status of the United States and therefore a relative softening of demands that its conduct abroad be fully consistent with the values proclaimed by American society as a whole.

From the economic perspective, U.S. hegemony is clearly evident in the relative strength of the main global actors. The United States currently accounts for about 31 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (more than the combined GDP of Japan, Germany, England, and France). The United States is also the world’s leading importer and exporter (18 percent of global imports of goods and 13 percent of services, and 12 percent of global exports of goods and 18 percent of services in 2001), the largest producer of industrial products (about 25 percent of global manufactured production), the largest source of direct investment in other countries and the largest recipient of such investment, and by far the main producer and exporter of movies and television programs in the world.

The technological and military superiority of the United States is equally evident. The U.S. military budget ($399 billion requested for 2004) is greater than the sum of the military budgets of the next 20 nations combined, counting both allies and strategic competitors. The contrast between the military strength of the United States and the relative weakness of its strategic competitors is due not only to U.S. economic and technological advantages but to a superior mode of military management, which has been able to maximize productivity gains through the innovative virtues of the "new economy" (based on information, communications, and digital processing) as applied to new weapons. This disparity— which is not simply quantitative but may be deemed "structural"—is historically unprecedented since the era of the Pax Romana. The maritime power of the Royal Navy during the golden years of the Pax Britannica was but a pale reflection of the current incomparable prowess of the armed forces of the United States.

The reasons for the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the symbolic nerve centers of U.S. power, are to be found in the realm of those who are excluded from the "empire"—among, in the novelist Jean-Christophe Rufin’s memorable phrase, the "new barbarians." ⁶ The motivations for these attacks can be discerned, in one form or another, in the exclusion of a large part of the world from the empire’s wealth; in the resistance to globalization arising from the "clash of civilizations" and the principles of Islamic fundamentalism; and in the reaction to unchallenged power (notably, the exercise of U.S. power throughout the Middle East).

The 9/11 attacks—directed against the very essence of the American "being"—provoked an immediate and unilateral reaction by the United States. The worldwide solidarity that rapidly formed was not summoned by the United States, but it was seen as natural. In this sense, the alliances that developed in response to the events of September 11 were viewed by Washington as corroborating the American value system. However, they were not seen as necessary to legitimize action against America’s attackers.

Old Demons, New Priorities
The unopposed strength of the United States after the Cold War entrenched the feeling at home that America was invulnerable to the violence that had been growing elsewhere. That is one of the reasons why the impact of September 11 on the U.S. psyche was so palpable. Two years later, the official declarations speaking of "a nation at war" and "the long and ongoing struggle to eradicate terrorism wherever it is found" remain part of the national lexicon.

The terrorist attacks naturally led to comparisons with Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The comparison is questionable because the Pearl Harbor attack was a military operation carried out by a sovereign opponent against a military target in the context of a world war. The September 11 attack was expressly a reaction against allegedly "profane" aspects of U.S. foreign policy, against the U.S. "occupation" of the "holy land" (Saudi Arabia) and its support for the perceived enemies of Islam (Israel).

The U.S. response included elements that were equally ideological. The terrorist acts were described as attacks by evil against good (a simplification that is "fundamentalist" in nature). There was little or no discussion of their deeper sources, such as opposition to U.S. foreign policy or the absence of democracy in Islamic countries.

Washington’s emphasis on the war against terrorism had an immediate effect on the U.S. economy and domestic policy, and America’s new priorities, terrorism and security, will henceforth greatly influence its relationships with other actors in the international system.

From the economic perspective, there were concerns that the recessionary slump that had begun to weaken the U.S. economy in early 2001 would be aggravated by the crisis the terrorist attacks caused in such industries as air transport, tourism, insurance, and banking services. In fact, the economic consequences turned out to be less severe and less widespread than originally feared, although there was a significant negative impact on certain sectors of the economy, especially industries and services directly related to New York’s role as the center of international finance.

However, Washington has used the terrorist attacks to justify a quantum increase in military and security-related expenditures, just as in an earlier era President Reagan used the "evil empire" threat to justify huge public spending on arms procurement, which some observers characterized as "military Keynesianism." In the security arena, domestic defense and the surveillance of borders, ports, and airports are being given increasingly prominent attention.

On the domestic front, the main debate in the United States concerns the extent to which intrusive security controls undermine civil liberties, an issue of particular importance in a country proud of not having a national system of identifying individuals and many of whose citizens exhibit an innate mistrust of the federal government. Worth noting as well is the somewhat milder reactions to a national security plan that provided for a Department of Homeland Security and the use of military courts—which considerably reduce the legal mechanisms available to defendants—to try foreigners accused of terrorist crimes, and to the adoption of "special" measures to limit the stays of foreigners in the United States. There are now many cases in which resident foreigners, both legal and often illegal, have been detained and even kept incommunicado for months by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, based on weak evidence of wrongdoing.

On the foreign front, the pressure from the United States to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction has increased significantly, especially since the end of the "first phase" of the war against terrorism in Afghanistan (Operation Anaconda). This issue has gradually been incorporated into the Bush administration’s security policy and has also served as a justification for the military intervention in Iraq.

The terrorist attacks have once again pushed foreign policy topics to the top of the U.S. agenda. The domestic debate has largely been between two opposing camps: those who advocate unilateralist self-sufficiency (who tend to prevail) and those who advocate multilateralism and acceptance of the rules of the international community. The actions of the current administration reflect this ambivalence and demonstrate an increasingly unilateral trend tempered by the pursuit of "à la carte" agreements and alliances. ⁷ Relations between the United States and multilateral institutions have thus been attended by growing conflict. The Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in the face of widespread disapproval abroad is only the most recent example of this trend. Other noteworthy examples include Washington’s rejection of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol, its foot dragging with respect to the verification mechanism of the Biological Weapons Convention, and its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Last year, the administration succeeded in its attempt to remove José Maurício Bustani, a Brazilian diplomat, from his post as director general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The administration also successfully sought the ouster of the president of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Mary Robinson, the former president of Ireland, refused to accept a second term as U.N. high commissioner for human rights due to alleged interference from the United States.

Against this background of increasing unilateralism, mitigated by selective multilateralism, the fact that the U.S. government initially agreed to take on nation-building tasks (in the case of Afghanistan) and also considered increasing official development aid (to help ameliorate the extreme poverty that can breed volunteers for political terrorism) are concessions that do not alter the main thrust of U.S. foreign policy. This has been true with respect to postwar Iraq.

In the military realm, the most important post-9/11 development was the (not officially declared) U.S. strategic doctrine concerning the use of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration has moved from the principle of retaliatory deterrence to the principle of offensive deterrence, which does not exclude the possibility of being the first party to use nuclear weapons. Such might be the case even if there were not a clear nuclear threat from another country or group of countries, provided there was the possibility of other types of weapons of mass destruction being used. ⁸ The potential danger this new principle poses for global security and stability is obvious, since possible opponents include not just "rogue states" but also great powers such as Russia and China.

The debate over the development of small nuclear devices ("usable nukes") has also been revived, and this concept has gained strength since the events of September 11 and the military operations in Afghanistan. The Bush administration has stated that in the event of a serious attack no retaliatory option would be excluded. Defense authorities have been considering the possible use of such weapons. The 2001 Defense Authorization Bill included a provision for studies by the Energy and Defense Departments regarding the use of such weapons.

September 11 and the World Order
It does not appear, however, that September 11 has led to the creation of a new world order. Nothing has changed since September 11 with respect to the relative positions in the international arena of the European Union, Japan, China, and Russia, although the priorities of these actors in their tactical "games" with respect to forming alliances and partnerships have shifted. Even before the United States began its expanded war against terrorism, some changes could be seen. Putin’s Russia, for example, took advantage of the new situation to increase the level of its "cooperation" with NATO. And the priority given to fighting terrorism and the vast American technological superiority in the defense realm (a true apartheid, even within NATO) is bound to force a reevaluation of military thinking, especially within the Atlantic Alliance.

But what has changed since 9/11 is the relationship between the United States and the rest of the world. While Washington still looks to its traditional allies, it has added a number of surprising new "partners" in its war against terrorism, including states in Central Asia that were once part of the Soviet Union and now support the U.S. role. In Afghanistan, they played a supportive, though not decisive, role. With respect to the action in Iraq, neighboring countries, with the exception of Turkey, provided bases, facilities, and airspace access.

The routine game of international politics probably would never have prompted Russia or China to cooperate with the United States in the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as they do now. Similarly, other countries felt that the "prevailing winds" had changed significantly, which led them to adjust their own positions, both regionally and globally, to be better positioned for the new situation.

September 11 and Globalization
It still seems premature to weigh the long-term effects of September 11 on globalization. Despite the apparent success of economic and technological integration, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which arose partly from a rejection of the values associated with globalization, have clearly affected how Washington views the entire process. This is particularly true with respect to U.S. resistance to greater integration in the legal realm.

The global framework of international law springs from the long and arduous efforts of states, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals to replace the law of force with the force of law, to replace the sometimes arbitrary justice imposed by the strong with the peaceful resolution of disputes. But the actions of the United States after September 11 confirm its reluctance, as a matter of principle, to accept any legal commitments that would directly or indirectly result in reducing its freedom of action.

September 11 also added to Washington’s growing ambivalence—in practice, if not in theory—toward one of the fundamentals of globalization, free trade. The cost has been borne by America’s main trading partners, including Brazil. Whether one looks at bilateral or regional policies, or even unilateral actions taken by the United States, there are abundant examples of its efforts to achieve "painless free trade," that is, to make certain that only the most competitive U.S. industries would be subject to trade negotiations and market access agreements. To be sure, the explicit protectionism and granting of subsidies that harm the interests of many developing countries such as Brazil did not begin with the current administration and are likely to continue in the future. Nevertheless, it is also true that the September 11 events encouraged Congress to commit itself even more strongly than in the past to protecting largely uncompetitive sectors of the U.S. economy, such as steel, textiles, and much of agriculture.

The contradictions in trade also extend to the financial sector. It is by no means clear what policies the Bretton Woods institutions— in which the United States plays a crucial role—will follow in the event of future crises. The shift in U.S. priorities has meant that countries deemed as allies in the fight against terrorism are rewarded with special bilateral arrangements, either through the restricted forum of the Paris Club of the main creditor countries, or with contingent credit lines from the International Monetary Fund or the multilateral banks. Even the administration’s recently announced intention to increase lending for development purposes, as well as to turn the loans into grants according to the degree of "good governance" demonstrated by the recipients, conflicts with the best advice of development experts, who argue that the most effective way to promote development is through trade liberalization that gives poor countries access to markets. The new emphasis on grants, in turn, will be detrimental to mid-size powers such as Brazil, which will no longer benefit from concessional loan operations and face restrictions or additional costs on projects that are partially supported by financing from multi-lateral development banks.

Brazil and the New World Order
The impact of the terrorist attacks on Brazil and South America—a region that is to a certain extent peripheral when viewed from the perspective of the current antiterrorism campaign—has been serious, since the North American presence, both political and economic, is even more significant in South America than elsewhere in the world.

Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the Brazilian government not only promptly expressed solidarity with the United States but also invoked the Rio Treaty (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance)—an agreement that preceded and inspired, both formally and substantively, the treaty that created NATO shortly after World War II. The Rio Treaty is rooted in the principles of collective defense and hemispheric solidarity, as spelled out in the agreement signed in Petrópolis, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, in 1947. The Brazilian initiative in invoking the treaty was warmly received by Washington. Brazil also promptly welcomed the post-9/11 resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council and collaborated in the antiterrorism effort through informal mechanisms, including measures to control money flows to criminal organizations.

But Brazil’s support gained it little, as Washington became obsessed with security, and trade and development issues went by the boards. The post-9/11 realities tend to make even more difficult the complex trade negotiations currently underway in regional and multilateral contexts, because the new situation tends to accentuate the U.S. tendency toward unilateralism and relegates to a distant second those issues that are not related, directly or indirectly, to Washington’s new priorities. (It is not by accident that the American government, in trying to rally legislative support for the trade negotiations, has sought to associate them with the war against terrorism.)

While the immediate economic impact of the September 11 attacks on Brazil was not as great as expected, the attacks forced the Brazilian government to place a new emphasis on security. Given Brazil’s extensive land borders with areas in turmoil, such as the Colombian Amazon, we cannot afford to neglect our internal and external security. But this new emphasis inevitably comes at a cost to social and economic development.

The new atmosphere of "a war of good against evil" constitutes a political challenge for Brazil, beginning with the very concept of a sharp division between "friends and foes" of the superpower. Brazil certainly includes itself among the former and is ready to accept its share of responsibility in adopting preventive measures against terrorism. But it also recognizes the differences between the interests and perceptions that motivate the various participants in this war.

As successive presidents of Brazil have urged, the natural sources of violence and terrorism, notably the lack of development, the absence of democratic institutions, the despair and rage over perceived injustice, must be addressed. Promoting global prosperity is not a utopian goal. It is a feasible end that can be initiated by simple and gradual measures, such as opening up agricultural markets and reducing protectionist measures. Brazil lacks the economic resources to give momentum to the "global prosperity" agenda. Nevertheless, it has done its part by opening up its markets while adopting regulatory standards for global transactions involving goods, services, technology, and capital.

Brazil has a strong and secure democracy, albeit one that faces persistent challenges. Brazil’s problems mainly lie in the areas of economic and social development, including the challenge of constructing a modern government less susceptible to corruption and capable of administering justice in an efficient and expeditious manner. The wider challenge for Brazilian domestic and foreign policies is to address social inequities, improve the educational and health systems, fight drug trafficking and violence, and provide assistance to a neglected population destitute of even hope for a better future. For Brazil, these challenges are as daunting as the challenges the United States now faces in dealing with terrorism.

Brazil needs to identify its own national interest in the context of globalization, taking into account the new priorities of the United States. This does not mean merely adopting a passive or reactive posture. Brazil can strengthen its international position by actively playing the influential role in South America for which it is so well suited. The sooner Brazil is perceived as being a key and active interlocutor within the region, the greater its influence in the international arena will be. In the areas of politics, diplomacy, trade, economics, finance, defense and security, Brazil can best perform its role by building consensus rooted in the common interests of the region—open markets, democracy, collective security, economic growth, and social justice. •

Notes

I am grateful to my colleagues at the Brazilian embassy in Washington, Carlos da Fonseca, Marcos Galvão, Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Roberto Jaguaribe, and Julio Bitelli, for their valuable contributions to the preparation of the paper from which this essay is drawn. I am also grateful to Bob Feron, Marcia C. Loureiro, and Antonio Luz for the translation of the original text into English. The opinions expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.

1. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Império (São Paulo/Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2001).

2. "The empire can only be conceived as a universal republic, a network of powers and counterbalancing powers structured within an inclusive and limitless framework. This imperial expansion has nothing to do with imperialism, but is related to those State-controlled entities used for the purpose of conquest, looting, genocide or racism" (Hardt and Negri, Império, p. 185).

3. See Hardt and Negri, Império, pp. 183–98.

4. Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,"The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians," The Economist, March 23, 2002.

5. See Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order," The New Yorker, April 1, 2002.

6. See Jean-Christophe Rufin, L’Empire et les nouveaux barbares (Paris: Editions JC Lattès, 1991).

7. In November 2001, Richard Haass, then director of the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, spoke in favor of "à la carte multilateralism," in a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.: "The Bush Administration is forging a hard-headed multilateralism suited to the demands of this global era, one that will both promote our values and interests now and help structure an international environment to sustain them well into the future.... As we know from our own history, majorities are not always right: we also cannot forget that the United States has unique global responsibilities and if we are to meet them effectively, we may not always be able to go along with measures that many or even most others support.... We have moreover demonstrated that we can and will act alone when necessary. A commitment to multilateralism need not constrain our options."

8. The Defense Department sent the 50-page confidential Nuclear Posture Review to Congress in January 2002. Its contents were described in an article in the Los Angeles Times on March 9, 2002. The report identified situations in which the United States might be led to use nuclear weapons and listed countries most likely to be targeted, i.e., China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria.

*Rubens A. Barbosa is the ambassador of Brazil to the United States. This essay was drawn from a paper originally presented at the National Forum in Rio de Janiero in May 2002.