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Proposal for Demilitarisation of the Tibetan Plateau
Vinod Saighal
The ecological and political interests of Eurasia require a systematic, coordinated effort to demilitarise the Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayan region. This implies the creation of an economic, strategic and cultural partnership between India and China so that Tibet may become once again a bridge between them and Central Asia.
In the context of the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau it becomes necessary, at the very outset, to discuss the role of the international community in the area of environment. It needs to be conceded, however, that the enormous ecological destruction that has taken place in Tibet has also taken place in other parts of the world since the end of the Second World War. However, in the case of Tibet it becomes unique on account of the role that the Tibetan Plateau plays in the weather patterns of the whole planet and its direct influence on the well being of the populations of China, East Asia and South Asia. The situation is also unique because one single country, namely China can contribute effectively to reversing the global ecological decline by implementing restoration measures in such a vast region and could become a leader in the ecological revival of the planet in the twenty-first century.
The demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau has now become an ecological imperative, where no further delay can be tolerated. Continued militarisation of the Tibetan plateau, and the attendant militarisation of the eastern Himalayas as a direct consequence thereof, would not only affect the indigenous Tibetan population, but entire communities all the way from the Indus in the West to the Yellow River in the East. As a matter of fact such demilitarisation, to be meaningful, will have to encompass the demilitarisation of the region, or at least the Himalayas forming part of the Indo-Tibetan border.
Militarisation of any region takes place on account of perceived security threats to that region. In the second half of the twentieth century the Chinese rapidly militarised Tibet to consolidate their grip on the conquered territory. In addition to the internal unrest caused by the occupation they might have had misgivings regarding the intentions of India and/or the USA. Mention is made of only these two countries because no other nation or community of nations had, or would be likely to have in the foreseeable future, the direct interest or the military wherewithal to mount any credible challenge to continued Chinese occupation of Tibet. Today the world at large and certainly the USA and India are fully reconciled to the Chinese presence in Tibet. The misgivings that China may have entertained in the twentieth century, if at all, of being militarily challenged in Tibet do not hold good at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Therefore, since no country seriously questions the status quo, China can safely undertake the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau without any qualms. The raison d'etre of the militarisation of Tibet having disappeared altogether in the new millennium it is a good time for the international community to urge the Chinese to undertake the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau.
In the new era of enlightenment, Tibet can be deemed to have shed its traditional role of a buffer state between India and China. Instead, Tibet could become a bridge:
between China and India
between China and the West
between peace loving people around the world.
In fact, if the issue is examined with any degree of objectivity the term 'buffer' loses its relevance in the context of the massive eco-destruction that has taken place. The moment one sheds the twentieth century mindset, as being totally inadequate, the realisation dawns that the simple issue of the recognition of the Dalai Lama has assumed such an extraordinary military dimension that one is hard put to find any parallel in recent times. The scale of the military build-up in Tibet is just not commensurate to the challenge that the Dalai Lama poses. How on earth can a handful of followers of an itinerant monk militarily challenge the might of the People's Republic of China. The very notion is absurd. The threat, if any, that the Dalai Lama and his small band of faithful could conceivably pose would be a spiritual one—only to the extent that the Chinese consider the Dalai Lama as an outsider; which he is not and can never be, in spite of his prolonged exile.
Whichever way the Chinese look at the problem, the military dimension should not enter into the reckoning unless the Chinese wish to use Tibet as a launch pad for aggression against India at some future date. That assumption too becomes difficult to comprehend in the case of Tibet. In the eyes of the Government of India, except for some surmountable differences on the boundary issue, the Tibetan question has been settled once and for all. The Dalai Lama has not advocated an armed uprising and nor would the Government of India countenance such action from Indian soil. Hence China is very comfortably placed vis-á-vis Tibet at the dawn of the twenty-first century. By not demilitarising Tibet, China is forcing India to militarise the eastern Himalayas. Should over-militarisation again erupt into a major conflagration the 'settled' Tibetan question would automatically be reopened, regardless of the outcome. The rest of the world acquiesced in the Chinese conquest of Tibet in the 1950s because India did so. Had India challenged the usurpation, the world without doubt, would have sided with India at that time. India maintained a stoic silence while the genocide in Tibet proceeded apace. Hence, from a geopolitical viewpoint it is vital to China's long-term interests to demilitarise Tibet with concomitant demilitarisation of the eastern Himalayas on the part of India.
While many of the leaders of the most militarised nations still regard the military dimension as all-pervasive, for the majority of the world's people it has become abundantly clear that today, at the dawn of the new millennium:
"The dangers that we face from eco-destruction dwarf the mere problems of national security".
The subject of demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau should not be tackled hereafter solely from a political perspective, where it remained intractable for over four decades. It is now suggested that the issue be tackled on a plane where no system, political entity or group of people need to feel alienated or excluded from the process. It would then become possible to rationalise exchanges (between China and India) that could lead to an enlarged Tibetan cultural space as a prelude to the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau. These could be viewed as:
Demilitarisation of the Himalayas.
India-China geostrategic realignment.
Sino-Indian cultural rapprochement.
Spiritual renaissance in China, especially in rural areas.
A manifold increase in trade between the two countries.
Similarly looking at the 'global' trends that could expand the Tibetan cultural space one could tabulate these as:
The gradual development of a planetary consciousness.
The need across the globe for the eco revival of the planet.
The growing clamour for nuclear disarmament.
The perceived need for demilitarisation of the planet.
Since China remains the most important actor, who can single-handedly initiate the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau it would be worth looking at the new developments within China that could have a bearing on the future of Tibet:
The slow but sure loosening of the grip of the monolithic communist party. (The inherent contradiction between the underlying philosophy of communism and the accommodations that have to be made in a free market economy).
Growing income disparity.
Emergence of a new class of bureaucratic capitalists.
Withdrawal of the state social security net.
The long-term effects of the assimilation of Hong Kong—political, cultural, economic, linguistic etc.
Post-Tiananmen effects—physical as well as psychological.
The rise of a new class of technocrats to positions of authority.
Urban privatisation leading to decentralisation of powers at all levels.
More and more grassroots (local) elections which are taking place. (On the face of it the process appears to be irreversible).
Pulls of financial centralism opposed to local entrepreneurship.
Rise in the number of foreign trained students and specialists.
Advent of the internet.
The emergence of neo-Buddhist sects like Falungong.
The changing pattern of relationship with overseas Chinese.
The growing schism between the eastern or coastal regions and central and western China.
Because the decision to commence the demilitarisation process will have to be taken by the political leaders of China one needs to examine the reasons which cause the Chinese leadership to feel insecure:
US attempts to force the pace of democratisation;
An unstated fear of the great military disparity with USA, in real terms.
Bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, in 1999 perceived by the Chinese not as a mistake but a deliberate provocation.
Security pacts in East Asia (and possibly Australia) having assumed an unmistakable anti-China bias.
Armed with the above background it should be possible to discern the course that the international community can pursue to accommodate Chinese concerns in order to move towards the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau. It has already been brought out that China does not face, nor is likely to face, a credible military threat in the region. Linked with this is the fact that, unless the eco-restoration of Tibet is undertaken on a war footing, all countries in the region would have to face serious consequences. At that stage—not too far down the line in terms of years—it would hardly matter whether Tibet was over-militarised or demilitarised.
European Union Initiative: The EU could initiate a dialogue with China to elicit its views on the demilitarisation proposal. Representatives of the Dalai Lama would have an observer status should the Chinese government not accept their presence as full dialogue partners. A permanent secretariat could be set up in Paris, Strasbourg, Luxembourg or The Hague for the purpose. The dialogue would look at the proposal de novo without any prejudice or pre-conditions. India could participate or be present as an observer till the outlines of the demilitarisation agreement have been agreed to in principle.
US-China Initiative: Along the lines spelled out for the EU-China dialogue. It needs to be mentioned here that bilateral talks with major global entities which could influence the dialogue because of their burgeoning trade relations with China would seem to be a better proposition as compared to a multilateral initiative, which the Chinese government might be averse to. The US-China dialogue for working out the modalities of the demilitarisation would be attractive from the viewpoint of China because of the ability of the USA to provide cast-iron guarantees to China that the superpower would not attempt to derive advantage from the demilitarisation process.
Model Sino-Indian Accord: An accord between India and China for a lasting settlement, necessitated not by the geopolitics but the ecopolitics of the region, would be the best answer to threats emerging due to the thoughtless eco-savagery perpetrated by the earlier generations in Tibet and the Himalayan region as a whole. An accord of this nature would not only bury past misunderstandings, but would lay the framework for a full-scale eco-restoration protocol spanning the next hundred years. When both parties actually sit down to take note of the scale of the damage that has taken place the relatively insignificant boundary problems would no longer appear to be issues worth grappling over. The Herculean task of ecological revival of the region would tax the ingenuity of both the nations.
The salient features of the millennial Sino-Indian accord would encompass, inter alia:
China
Full demilitarisation of TAR (outer Tibet) in stages by 2006.
Dismantling of the supporting military infrastructure in TAR to be completed by 2010.
Light paramilitary garrisons to man border posts or for dealing with internal unrest.
Irrevocable pledge not to introduce offensive military forces (tanks, chemical weapons, nuclear elements of any sort, aircraft, heavy calibre guns, armed helicopters) into TAR. An instrument to that effect could be placed before the International Court of Justice.
Phased reduction of offensive military forces from Inner Tibet by 2010.
Since the question of nuclear missiles located in Inner Tibet (regions adjacent to China) could be linked to perceived threats from countries other than India, this issue could be put on the backburner for the time being so that it does not interfere with the demilitarisation process in TAR.
Deposition of a pledge before the International Court of Justice and the Security Council not to launch an offensive against India through the demilitarised region of Tibet. A clause could be entered in the deposition to the Security Council that in case of a dispute arising from an Indian complaint of violation of its territory through the demilitarised region the veto of China in all cases relating to such disputes would remain suspended.
Refrain from providing sanctuary or support to any insurgent group operating against India.
India
Demilitarisation of the eastern Himalayas by 2006.
India would pledge not to introduce offensive equipment into Sikkim and other areas along the Indo-Tibetan border.
India would pledge not to allow the Tibetans living in India or any other supporters to undertake any form of military cross-border operations from Indian territory. India would give an undertaking not to introduce nuclear weapons into the eastern Himalayan region.
Both Countries
Pledge to set up joint commissions for the eco-restoration of the demilitarised regions along the border. Non-governmental agencies not linked to any political dispensation could be encouraged to participate in the ecological restoration.
Restoration of trade links through designated routes.
Complete ban on felling of trees in designated areas for fifty years. The decision to be jointly reviewed in 2050.
Notification of biosphere reserves.
Setting up of joint teams for the prevention of smuggling and poaching of endangered species in the Himalayan region or for the passage of such items harvested illegally from other regions.
Easing of travel restrictions.
Internet and the International Community: While government-to-government negotiations for demilitarisation would remain the anchor, there is sufficient scope for the entire international community to take up issue for the Tibeto-Himalayan environment. Non-governmental organisations can use their websites to provide a constant update on the ravages taking place, as satellite data has long been available for commercial use as well. The time may have come for ordinary citizens of the world, concerned with their common future, to get coopted into the epic struggle for restoring ecological balance on the planet. The world has effectively ceded the middle ground to uncaring political hierarchies, the military-industrial complex and the transnational corporations pushing the consumerist agenda and it is time now to take drastic action to resurrect values. Care has to be taken not to politicise the issue. It can no longer be viewed as an issue to be settled between China and the Dalai Lama. Because of its extra-regional dimension it is truly a global issue. The Chinese cannot any longer be viewed as the adversaries. They will have to join hands with the eco-revival forces around the world to try and tackle a problem that has assumed gigantic proportions. We are living in a period where the collective decisions that we take will decide the future course not only for humankind but for all life forms that sustain the viability of the planet.
If nearly forty per cent of the total population of the globe decide to live in peace and harmony the prospect of world peace is immeasurably enhanced. If this large segment of humanity decides to eschew war then mankind itself will be forced to change its course. The military considerations will then no longer be able to overwhelm the other dimensions of human endeavours.
Conclusion
In a way, strong global currents, far stronger than the forces that unleashed war and planet-destroying consumerism on the world, are coming into the ascendance to reshape the destiny of the planet. These stronger, humanity-embracing, currents represent the aspirations of ordinary people around the world.
The peoples of China, India and Tibet are civilisationally the best placed to use these currents, to harness them to their purpose, not only for the resurgence of China, Tibet, India and the region, but for the preservation and welfare of the planet. China is already a major force in world affairs. It might one day narrow the gap with the United States in nuclear and missile weaponry. It faces no regional military threat in the coming century. China could, instead, go under from the contradictions and pressures building up internally. Should its leaders, at the dawn of the new millennium, look at the world through a different lens, they would be the first to realise that a historic compromise with the Dalai Lama would automatically relieve pressure on practically all other fronts—the Western world, Falungong, internal unrest, and even Taiwan. The time has come for a great civilisation to turn a supposed adversary into an ally and thereby usher in a new destiny for the region and for the world of the twenty-first century.