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CIAO DATE: 08/06
Understanding Nuclear Pakistan: Global, Regional and Domestic Dimensions
Pakistan is an exceptional case on the international map of nuclear military politics. The only Muslim nation to boast atomic weapons and the world’s biggest proliferator, it manifestly acquired the Bomb with the covert approval of the USA even though the state is ruled by a military dispensation and threatened by radical Islamic elements. All this makes the future of the country highly unpredictable.
- Artem Rudnitsky
Nuclear non-proliferation, initiated in the 1960s and developed in the 1970s, survived through the cloudy and precarious 1980s to meet the end of the Cold War. It seemed that the 1990s were opening somewhat bright and promising perspectives for non-proliferation and the world was moving towards a new order devoid of the old threats and challenges. Alas! hopes for a better future were ‘slightly exaggerated’, and currently the international situation is getting more unstable and unsafe with the non-proliferation system falling to pieces.
Introductory Remarks
Many countries contributed to the said process, including the P-5 powers obviously reluctant to part with their nuclear arsenals. They have taken steps to design and produce new nuclear warheads, stressing the role of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in their defence doctrines. This corresponded with the increased interest of other nations in possession of nuclear arms, considered as an effective instrument for pursuing political objectives either in domestic or in international affairs. Most illustrative are the activities of Israel, India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, which could be called the countries of the ‘second nuclear echelon’.
Naturally, they are not all alike in terms of their nuclear-related experience, which—in spite of certain common trends—is rather country-specific. Pakistan’s nuclear/missile programme and policies have been chosen as a subject for this article for several reasons:
Until recently Pakistan had been the most active and successful ‘proliferator’. Neither New Delhi, nor Tel Aviv nor Pyongyang could boast of the same ‘service record’ in this field.
Pakistan is the only Muslim country having nuclear weapons, which gives it additional regional and global influence;
Pakistan represents the only military regime (actually ruling the country) possessing nuclear weapons;
Within the bounds of the ‘second echelon’ Pakistan is definitely the country with the highest level of terrorist activities emanating from its territory.
All these considerations make nuclear Pakistan a ‘special case’ deserving intent and profound analysis.
After its defeat in the Second Pakistan-India War (1971) and the successful testing of India’s nuclear device (1974) Islamabad set out to acquire nuclear weapons as soon as possible. Since then hundreds of books and articles have been written on the very fashionable theme of Pakistan’s Bomb. However, certain issues related to the nature of the atomic arms of Islamabad and to regional and global repercussions of “Pakistan going nuclear” have not received sufficient coverage Although the nuclear preparations of India are not the subject of the proposed research, some references to the policies of New Delhi have to be made considering the close interdependence of nuclear developments in the region.
In spite of all the ‘revelations’ made in the media and in political literature, Pakistan’s nuclear/missile programme, to a large degree, remains a ‘thing in itself’—well-guarded and closed to external and domestic observers. Lack of transparency is one of the primary reasons for fears aroused by the ‘Pakistan Bomb’. The Western powers perceive it with the same cautiousness and resentment as the ‘Soviet Bomb’ in the Cold War era. There is a common belief that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could be used in a war against India or fall into the hands of Islamic terrorists.
Certain ideas and suppositions are to be brought forward and substantiated in this article:
Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities remain a factor of international instability aggravating tensions in the South Asian and broader regional environment;
Existing patterns and traditions of Pakistan’s political culture make nuclear weapons an effective tool enabling a national elite to preserve and cultivate the military regime de facto ruling the country;
The international community has failed to elaborate a sound and coherent policy to restrain Pakistan’s nuclear/missile programme. Currently the leading powers either keep themselves aloof from the nuclear imbroglio in South Asia (like Russia) or merely profess their adherence to traditional non-proliferation aims.
Pakistan's Nukes
There is no fool-proof information on the number and quality of nuclear devices Islamabad has at its disposal. It appears Pakistan’s present nuclear/missile arsenal is still rather imperfect. It may consist of up to fifty deadly ‘toys’ based on fission (U235 as a basic material), which could be used in combat operation as landmines or air-bombs delivered by ‘F-16’ fighters (suspended under the belly of the plane, reducing its speed and making it hardly manoeuvrable). Those devices are too heavy and cumbersome to be mounted on missile delivery systems, which are in the possession of Pakistan’s strategic forces. Statements by Islamabad officials that ‘Shaheen’, ‘Ghauri’, ‘Abdali’ or ‘Ghaznavi’ and some other missiles are nuclear-capable (allegedly keeping within their reach a substantial part of Indian territory) raise serious doubts.
The root of the problem can be found in the decision taken by Pakistan’s government by the end of the 1970s to concentrate efforts on the manufacture of uranium fission devices and neglect the ‘plutonium way’. The latter was advocated by the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) but not completed as it was too costly, technologically complicated and thus inappropriate for a poor developing nation. One of the reasons was that R&D work related to the ‘plutonium way’ was heavily dependent upon Western assistance (particularly French, Canadian and American) which was stopped by the end of the 1970s.
Just at that time Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQK), a talented though unscrupulous and cynical scientist, suggested a method of uranium enrichment taken from the Dutch multinational URENCO where he was employed in the 1970s. According to his statements he made Pakistan the fifth country in the world with uranium enrichment capability and the sixth nuclear power in the world, leaving India ‘far behind’. AQK assured that he could “blow up New Delhi from the Kahuta plant”.
Having persuaded the Pakistan government that the ‘uranium way’ should be given priority, Khan was appointed head of Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) and became a leading figure in the national nuclear/missile complex. This influenced the national nuclear programme in a rather controversial way. On the one hand AQK managed in a very short time to launch the process of uranium enrichment, building the first fission devices by 1983–84. Those were simple but reliable products which won national fame to their creator and gratitude from the authorities. They felt reassured and strong enough to challenge New Delhi in 1988, 1990 and 1999. On the other hand, in course of time, Khan betrayed his inability to further improve upon the uranium explosive devices and delivery means. Having got the “No Dong” medium range missile (known in Pakistan as ‘Ghauri’) from North Korea, Khan failed to convert it into a better rocket—more precise, flying to a longer distance and taking more payload. At last, this caused strong dissatisfaction within the government, and AQK had to retire in April 2001. Some other nuclear scientists tried to breathe a new life into Pakistan’s nuclear/missile research by focusing on the miniaturisation of uranium devices—making them light, compact and easily deliverable. At the same time the ‘plutonium way’ was pushed forward, and the ‘Shaheen’ family of missiles proved to be better and more reliable than ‘Ghauri’.
External and Domestic Factors
Rivalry with India has been a good pretext for the nuclear build-up in Pakistan, but it has not contemplated an aggression against its larger neighbour by using WMD, which could be suicidal: in the course of such a war India could be partially destroyed whereas Pakistan, a relatively small country, would be razed to the ground. Islamabad also tries to avoid a large-scale nuclear arms race as India does have much more resources and abilities to win the competition.
Nevertheless Pakistan’s ruling elite has not acquired enough responsibility and sobriety to handle the nuclear arsenal in the right way, and Islamabad does not exclude using nuclear weapons as a trump card in a hazardous gamble with New Delhi. Under ‘favourable’ circumstances it would not mind enlarging its ‘living space’ through annexation of some parts of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) (‘Indian Held Kashmir’ in Pakistani terminology). When he launched the so-called Kargil operation (April–July 1999) Pervez Musharraf, then the Chief of Army Staff, relied heavily on the nuclear factor. Indeed, it was reckoned that Indians would not dare to launch a major counter-offensive because of fear of a nuclear exchange.
Pakistan (in contrast to India) does not have any written nuclear doctrine, approved by parliament; nonetheless, there is an unofficial code adopted by the country’s military and political leadership. It is based on the principles of ‘strategic restraint’ and ‘minimal nuclear deterrence’ aimed at the achievement of a ‘reasonable’ level of balance between the two countries.
Though this code is proclaimed to be ‘defensive’ and ‘peaceful’, it does not exclude making a first nuclear strike in response to ‘aggressive’ moves by Indians even if the latter used only conventional weapons (New Delhi has gained strong and striking advantage in this sphere). Pakistani nukes could also be used as an answer to such ‘non-war’ challenges as an economic blockade of Karachi. The possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes is assumed too.
The external factor cannot be regarded as the main one behind Pakistan’s nuclear development. Domestic considerations happen to be no less relevant, and no doubt that the nuclear programme has been making a tangible impact on Pakistan’s internal politics. The Bomb proved to be as much a military weapon as a political tool used to strengthen chauvinistic attitudes and to prop up the military authorities.
Having spent five years in Pakistan I came across a peculiar phenomenon: nearly the whole nation, workers and peasants, maulavis, white-collars and intellectuals worship the Bomb. There are no monuments to national heroes in Pakistan (Islam does not encourage the portrayal of humans) whereas images of the mountain in the Chagai Range (where six nuclear devices were tested in May 1998) or the models of ‘Shaheen’ and ‘Ghauri’ missiles are a plenty in the squares and streets of Pakistani towns. People perceive the Bomb as a great comforter giving them spiritual strength to endure the hardships of life.
Once I participated in a seminar on Islamic views on nuclear weapons. Nearly all the speakers declared those means of destruction non-Islamic and anti-human, but (there is always a small ‘but’, significantly changing the initial meaning of the statement) practically useful and even indispensable in ‘such a world as ours’. In fact, the nuclear bomb was admired as a symbol of national grandeur. I dared to disagree with this assertion. When Russia, I said, was forced to elaborate and produce nukes, it was just a matter of national survival and it would be ridiculous to be proud of these monstrous arms. I was surprised to observe the negative reaction of the audience, which began to treat to me with a hint of disdain. In their eyes I turned out to be a unpatriotic citizen who “did not feel proud of his country’s nuclear weapons”.
Since 1947, the military, openly or covertly guided the national development in Pakistan. Whatever elections and elected governments the country has had, it has never enjoyed a real democracy. Though some elements of civil society have been developing in Pakistan and Western nations have been increasing their pressure on Islamabad to democratise the country, the military has never missed a chance to slow down those processes. To sustain the traditional ‘double-way’ political system (combination of a quasi-democratic façade with the real power of the generals and feudal clans) the local elite has been persistently filling the national conscience with the idea of the Army as the key element of the society. Some myths and stereotypes have been deeply rooted in the minds: 1) Pakistan is living in a hostile environment (India, Iran and Afghanistan) and the military is the only defender of national independence and sovereignty; 2) the military is honest, unsullied by corruption, unbiased, carrying into life principles of social equality; they care about the people and restrain the insatiable craving for wealth and power of corrupt and egoistic policy-makers and landlords; 3) the military is the organising and moving force of national economics.
Nowadays there is a thaw in Pak-Indian relations, but one should not be too hopeful. As long as Pakistan remains a vivid example of a militarised and authoritarian state, its ruling elites will be interested in maintaining the hostile environment, which justifies the hypertrophied role of the Army with all its assets and arsenals. Any enhancement of the defence capabilities is perceived as a contribution to the glory and well-being of the whole nation. The priority status of the nuclear/missile programme is a natural result of such a situation; conversely the intensified development of this programme contributes to the consolidation of the existing patterns.
If the present political and economic situation remains unchanged, no Pakistani government in the foreseeable future would be inclined to take any measures to curtail this programme. Musharraf ’s leadership is in this sense a case in point. Since coming to power he has been consistently and thoroughly expanding work on the WMD capabilities—at the same time strengthening the foundations of authoritarian power and skillfully convincing the international community that Islamabad has been restoring democracy.
There is an idea ingrained in the contemporary political thinking—that totalitarian and authoritarian regimes should be trusted less than liberal democratic regimes, particularly when it comes to their ability to deal with nuclear and missile weapons. On the face of it this is a rather controversial statement. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state although it handled its WMD with no less responsibility (or irresponsibility) than the USA. Democratic Americans contributed to the nuclear crises to the same degree as totalitarian Russians. The Chinese People’s Republic having obtained the Bomb in the 1960s has handled its nuclear arsenal carefully, despite all the declarations about the necessity of the ‘revolutionary war’. North Korean leaders do not contemplate any practical plans to use nuclear weapons (if they have any), for their objective is mainly to bluff and blackmail the West.
However, things in Pakistan are somewhat different. The military have the WMD at their direct disposal unrestrained by any control from the ruling party and state bureaucracy, as was the case in Communist countries.
In the past international crises fraught with the threat of nuclear conflict (the Korean War, the Cuban crisis, the Chinese-Soviet confrontation at the end of the 1960s) the military often behaved in an aggressive mode suggesting the use of nuclear weapons while the civilian governments tried to keep them down. The already mentioned Kargil operation, which in fact was a kind of nuclear gamble, was secretly initiated by the Chief of Army Staff and his close aides without informing the civilian government. And it was Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who eventually took a decision to stop the conflict upon the demand of President Bill Clinton and withdraw Pakistan’s forces from the mountain areas of Kashmir.
Having become the Chief Executive and later the President, Pervez Musharraf continued to pressure India by using mujahideen activities in J&K and other parts of India. By the end of 2001 this resulted in another aggravation of tension between the two countries. The new deep crisis brought Pakistan and India on the brink of a nuclear war.
At the moment sound and rational elements seem to prevail in Islamabad’s approach. It has managed to restore normal bilateral relations with New Delhi, making efforts to find solutions to conflictual issues such as Kashmir. The international environment has contributed to this process—the United States, leading European powers as well as Russia have been trying hard to ease Pak-Indian tensions. Both the South Asian powers got involved in the counter-terrorism struggle which made them set aside (at least temporarily) their ‘personal’ disagreements.
However, that does not mean that there will be no more crises in the future. In spite of the current thaw and rapprochement between the two states, the regional situation remains unstable and unpredictable. As I said earlier, until certain fundamental changes in Pakistan’s domestic development occur, providing a foundation for a sustainable democracy, the crises will be repeated on an almost regular basis, raising fears of possible use of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear-Related ThreatsS
Besides the looming danger of a nuclear encounter in South Asia some other potential consequences of the nuclearisation of Pakistan (with the present military regime remaining in power) have to be emphasised:
- the possibility of another Chernobyl-type disaster;
- the capture by terrorists of Pakistan’s nuclear objects or weapons;
- the unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons;
- the possibility that Islamabad might share its nuclear technologies with some other Islamic countries, especially with its closest ally—Saudi Arabia.
Let us consider these prospects.
At the moment there are no serious signs of an impending Chernobyl-type disaster in Pakistan (malfunction of nuclear plants, leakage of nuclear fuel etc). Still such an option has to be taken into account for the simple reason: the majority of Pakistan’s nuclear objects are beyond international control and it is actually impossible to verify the efficiency of safety measures being applied there.
The Pakistani authorities exclude the possibility of terrorists capturing national nuclear assets and nuclear weapons, for the mere reason that the military know how to protect their most valuable property. Nevertheless one should not forget that Pakistan’s armed forces and intelligence bodies have been seriously influenced by Islamic radical ideals which makes them less predictable. That could be dangerous in the country where the location of nuclear arsenals and missile batteries is kept secret even from the members of the government.
Unsanctioned or accidental use of nuclear weapons can only be prevented by the command and control system. In Pakistan this system was established in February 2000 and still remains in the embryonic stage. In fact it has to be a C4+I framework based on modern computer and communication technologies and intelligence data. Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) supervising the system has not advanced much in its development, lacking both the specialists and the necessary ‘hitech’ base.
Command and control in Pakistan has incorporated a large number of top-ranking civil servants but the real influence of the system is negligible and the framework remains practically operated by the military. Denizens of Islamabad’s corridors of power boast that this is the ‘exact reason’ why their C4+I is more efficient and reliable than the Indian one which is dominated by the civilians.
The military enjoying the upper hand in the authoritarian or totalitarian state may provide better control over nuclear assets than the representative institutions in liberal democracies, often hampered by the prolonged and complicated procedures of decision-making. The military may really know better how to safeguard nuclear ‘toys’. But if the military or part of the military in such a country as Pakistan wishes to use WMD, it is doubtful that any civilian national institution would know about it in time and would be able to prevent such a misadventure.
Pakistan’s nuclear/missile programme as such was established as a result of nuclear and missile proliferation and of Islamabad’s vigorous activities on the black market of fissile materials and sensitive technologies. Contacts with countries of Western Europe, Canada, the United States and China have been exposed. Having obtained the Bomb, Pakistan started proliferating its knowhow and various equipments to Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, North Korea and some other Muslim countries. That has been done secretly, through the clandestine network.
Until recently Pakistan’s leaders (military and civilian) denied engaging in such cooperation. Only at the end of 2003, after indisputable evidence was presented, did they admit certain facts. However, Islamabad alleged that these illegal transactions were conducted by certain nuclear scientists of their own accord without the knowledge of the authorities. The Western powers, considering the usefulness of Pakistan as an ally in the counter-terrorist coalition, pretended to believe this utterly unconvincing statement. The nuclear/missile programme in Pakistan from the very beginning has been regulated by the military, in all details and aspects. It is hard to believe that any scientist or even top-ranking manager (like AQK) could carry out those illegal activities without the de facto approval of the authorities.
It was not surprising that Abdul Qadeer Khan and other nuclear physicists from the KRL were chosen as scapegoats. By the end of 2003 the “Father of the Bomb” was regarded by Musharraf as a compromised figure, who had to be sacrificed. As for the Kahuta Laboratories on the whole, its role in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile industrial complex has been somewhat reduced with other enterprises gaining greater weight, such as the National Engineering and Scientific Commission’s (NESC) National Industrial Complex.
President Musharraf has assured the world that Pakistan would not continue its proliferation activities and Islamabad is trying to clean its image in the eyes of the international community. Yet, before the end of 2003, the same statesman was making numerous statements denying the existence of nuclear collaboration between Islamabad and recipients of its “nuclear assistance” such as the governments in Pyongyang, Teheran and Tripoli.
The International Community and Nuclear Pakistan
The international community while condemning Pakistan’s nuclear/missile programme in words, does little to restrain it. Combined multilateral efforts initiated after the 1998 tests had been reduced to minimum by the end of 1999, when the US refused to ratify the CTBT, and quietly died away after September 2001. The nuclear sanctions imposed on Pakistan in 1998 have since been revoked.
Washington which seems to be the main actor on the non-proliferation scene, in fact follows a unilateral approach towards Pakistan. The aim is not to ‘de-nuclearise’ this country but to bring its nuclear arsenals, fissile materials and technologies under American control. The US demands from Islamabad the adoption of adequate measures preventing illegal traffic of fissile materials and nuclear technologies, as well as access for inspection teams to Pakistan’s nuclear objects. Counter-proliferation strategy (particularly the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), obviously a unilateral project despite its multilateral trapping) could be applied to make Pakistan more tractable.
It is worth mentioning that policy-makers in Islamabad prefer this approach to the broad non-proliferation front, which existed a few years ago. The new US policy does not call into question Pakistan’s right to have nukes of its own, and Pakistan is bargaining with the US in the hope that it can gain time to strengthen its nuclear capabilities. It is expected that with every passing day the nuclear/missile programme will get more sustainable and less vulnerable to external pressures. Once Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri said privately, “we should be in a hurry to bring our nuclear weapons to such level where anyone would be powerless to dismantle them”.
At the same time Islamabad is pursuing the objective of international legitimisation of its nuclear status. Pakistan’s government does not exclude signing the NPT but in a revised version admitting that the number of ‘official’ nuclear powers will be extended to include Pakistan and India. New Delhi has a similar objective. Islamabad promises to become a reliable member of the ‘nuclear club’ observing an effective regime of nuclear safety and export controls. In the opinion of Pakistan’s decision-makers this should facilitate its external trade connections to supply the country with equipment and technologies necessary for further development of the nuclear/missile programme.
Some experts and political scientists support the international recognition of Pakistan’s status through the ‘revised’ NPT or in ‘some other way’. This was suggested in particular by the authors of the paper ‘Nuclear Weapons in South Asia’ presented at a seminar in the Carnegie Moscow Center on September 28, 2004. This recognition should be accompanied by reciprocal steps between Pakistan and India: their mutual obligation not to use nuclear weapons first, withdrawal of military forces (particularly of the ‘nuclear capable’ missile batteries) from the border areas together with the introduction of other confidence-building measures. At the same time there could be no guarantee that those CBMs would become a solid barrier in the way of the arms race in the region, but what is absolutely clear is that both the neighbouring countries will be getting carte blanche to push forward their nuclear programmes. It would also mean that Pakistan despite its robust and harsh nuclear strategic doctrine, will be granted most favourable conditions for the further building of its nuclear WMD.
There should be no doubt about the destabilising effect of nuclear weapons in South Asia. If the international community is helpless to reverse the presently developing negative trends in the region (nuclear/missile build-up, arms race and proliferation), it should at least follow the recommendation: ‘Don’t make it worse’.