World Affairs
Vol 2, Number 2 (Apr-Jun 1998)

India-China Relations: Problems and Prospects

By C. V. Ranganathan

After Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988 a process of normalisation began to unfold between the two countries. A number of high-level visits were exchanged, and an array of agreements were concluded. But the differences that divide India and China are considerable, and remain unresolved.

For those of us who have dealt with China in official capacities the transformation of a negative Indian domestic consensus on China in the sixties to a more positive one in the mid-seventies was a welcome development. The reasons for the negative consensus are not far to seek: China’s actions in Tibet leading to the Dalai Lama’s refuge in India, the unfolding of public disputation and armed clashes over territorial questions, domestic developments leading to a disruption of China’s external relations during the last decade and a half of Mao Zedong’s life, the severity of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the erroneous Chinese view that India had joined the Soviet camp. China’s material support to some militant elements in eastern India compounded with opportunistic friendship with Pakistan and the turmoils of the Cultural Revolution worsened an atmosphere vitiated by the 1962 war.

Things changed in the seventies. In 1970, Mao signalled to the then Indian charge d’affaires, B C Mishra, the need for better relations between India and China. In 1976, when Mrs Indira Gandhi was prime minister the decision was taken to end the abnormal state of diplomatic representation. K R Narayanan then Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (now President of India), was sent to Beijing in 1976 as the Indian ambassador. Though Mrs Gandhi had lost her prime ministership, a broad consensus appears to have emerged in 1977 under the Janata Party government of which A B Vajpayee was the foreign minister, to continue in the same direction. The positive consensus in favour of seeking better relations with China has been a constant feature of foreign policy from that time.

One can cite several examples of this. In February 1979, Mr Vajpayee visited China at the invitation of the Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua. It was the first high-level bilateral exchange between the two countries since Zhou Enlai came to India in 1960. At the time India’s concerns were raised in a frank and forthright manner: the deterioration of the boundary situation, Chinese material and arms support to some dissidents in the North-East, China’s position on Sikkim, its declared pro-Pakistan position on Kashmir, etc. It was also during Vajpayee’s visit that the wish was put forward for Indian pilgrims to visit Kailash and Mansarovar. He also had talks with the late Deng Xiaoping and the then premier, Hua Guefeng. In all conversations the need for, and mutual interest in preserving peace and tranquillity along the boundary was stressed. Conditions for this were appropriate as there was no loss of life through enemy fire along the boundary for nearly a decade. The Chinese foreign minister declared that support and assistance to some disaffected elements in India’s north-east was a matter of the past. No evidence has yet come to light of the continuation of material support to these elements since that date. Regarding pilgrimages, the response was that steps would be taken to facilitate these, and the resumption of the ancient pilgrimage route to Kailash foll between India and China. In 1976, when Mrowed within a few years of the visit.

The breaking of the Sino-Indian impasse during the Vajpayee visit was unfortunately overtaken by dramatic developments surrounding the China-Vietnam conflict and its negative fallout on Indian public opinion. However, fairly soon thereafter, when Mrs Gandhi came back to office, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua paid a return visit to India in 1981. This led to the establishment of an annual dialogue at the level of vice-ministers. Annual meetings were thus held from 1981 onwards. Although these meetings did not achieve breakthroughs on the boundary question, they did serve the purpose of building up mutual political confidence in the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the boundary. More substantively, the annual dialogue gave momentum to exchanges at government-sponsored levels of students, cultural troupes, scientists, distinguished academicians and sportspersons. The signing of a Trade Agreement, marked resuscitation of Sino-Indian commerce which was disrupted for nearly two decades. An important achievement of these annual dialogues was the opportunity provided to exchange views on regional and international questions. While similarities in positions with respect to the evolving issues of the day were noted, clear differences of approach vis-á-vis certain issues such as Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, and ex-Soviet Union’s presence in Afghanistan were discussed in a manner to show that India’s policies were not directed against China or that each country’s problems with third countries need not affect the prospects of improvements in Sino-Indian relations. It was unfortunate that for a period of some seven years since Huang Hua’s visit to India in 1981, no Indian foreign minister visited China, although the vice ministerial level dialogue, initiated in 1981, continued over this period.

 

Rajiv Gandhi Visit to China — A Major Landmark

Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to China is a major landmark in Sino-Indian relations. It marked the emergence of a strong perception among the Chinese that a turning point had indeed been reached in the new on-going process of normalisation between the two countries. Chinese scholars often remarked that the interlude of disrupted relations ended after Rajiv Gandhi’s visit. It was also not uncommon to hear more euphoric remarks about both peoples striving for friendship which would surpass the friendship of the bhai-bhai period.

Viewed from the Indian perspective, it may look different. It may look as if the new international environment had contributed to the benign atmosphere in Sino-Indian relations. However, it would be counter-productive to India’s interest not to acknowledge the several specific achievements of Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit.

• Though symbolic, the visit was nonetheless a very tangible signal, and so necessary in the Chinese context. The Chinese became convinced of India’s wish to mitigate, if not solve, old pending problems, while imparting momentum to an all-round development of relations between the two countries.
• A Joint Working Group (JWG) at the level of vice-ministers for negotiations on the boundary question and for strengthening the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the boundary was formed. This latter aspect assumed importance in view of the emergence of a mini-dispute over the presence of each side’s armed personnel near the McMahon line in the Kameng region (Sumdorung). The situation attracted wide publicity in the summer of 1987, recalling to those with long memories the events of 1961-1962. However, the handling of the episode by both the governments clearly reflected a measure of sobriety and confidence in mutual intentions and the altered international scenario since the mid-eighties. Even at the height of inter-governmental exchanges relating to the situation, official spokesmen of both sides denied Western media reports of armed clashes having taken place in 1987 in this area. Neither side consulted the other on the issue of denials but were quick to scotch fanciful speculation. Through the meetings of the Joint Working Group this particular episode has been appropriately dealt with in a manner that has added to military confidence-building along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The institution of the JWG laid the ground work for the avoidance of tensions along the LAC and for the drawing-up of specific confidence-building measures, which came in 1993 and 1996.
• Three Agreements were signed on cooperation in the field of science and technology, civil aviation, and cultural exchanges.
• Another Joint Working Group was set up to promote trade and investment relations. This group meets annually at the level of ministers.
• Discussions were held with Deng Xiaoping and other top state and party leaders, including Zhu Rongji, who is now the prime minister of China. A common refrain in these high-level talks from the Chinese side was that both, India and China, needed a peaceful environment since they had the common responsibility of promoting the social and economic development of their vast populations, of safeguarding regional and global peace, and of cooperating in establishing a fair and rational world order for which the old Five Principles, formulated jointly by the leaders of the two countries in the fifties, could still provide the commonsense basis. Deng stated emphatically that if India and China did not achieve development, talk of the 21st century being an Asian Century would not have any meaning.

Rajiv Gandhi’s visit was followed by further exchanges at prime ministerial levels in 1991 and 1993. Former President of India, R Venkataraman and former Vice-President, K R Narayanan visited China, as also former defence minister, Sharad Pawar. A reciprocal momentum has been kept up by the Chinese that culminated in the visit of the President of China and the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin, in November 1996. A fact not recognised in the Indian media is that, as of date, at least four of the top five-member Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party have visited India in the nineties as have others from the Politburo. Jiang’s visit marked the diplomatic culmination to the series of negotiations which were initiated in 1988, with an impact on the eventual solution of the boundary question, as well as other aspects of the relationship.

The Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in the military field along the LAC in the India-China border areas, signed during the visit between former external affairs minister, I K Gujral and Chinese vice-premier and foreign minister, Qian Qichen, is indeed an important political commitment by both sides. Earlier mutual assurances contained in the 1993 conceptual agreement, (concluded during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to China,) not to use or to threaten the use of force against the other, has been expanded into a categorical avowal that neither side will use its military capability against the other side. The Agreement contains various provisions relating to the conduct of exercises, reduction of force in a manner which would be in conformity with the principle of mutual and equal security, of withdrawal of force to mutually agreed geographical zones, reduction of certain categories of armaments deployed along the LAC to mutually agreed ceilings, notification of overflight of combat aircrafts in areas near the LAC, meetings of local commanders, upgrading military-level communications and exchange of information. The Agreement also envisages the exchange of maps on each side’s perception of the LAC and seeking the assistance of a sub-group composed of each side’s military and other experts by the JWG. The full implementation of the Agreement which waits detailed working out on the ground would go a long way to remove the lingering impact of the events of the 1962 Chinese attack.

Three other Agreements with the Indian Consulate General in Hong Kong, on cooperation for combating illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and other crimes, and on maritime transport, were also concluded during Jiang’s visit. Since 1991 direct and regular contacts between the defence establishments of the two countries involving exchanges of visits by defence ministers, Army and Naval chiefs, and groups of high-ranked generals and personnel from defence and security-related establishements have taken place. These symbolise serious attempts by the governments to allay suspicions inherited from the past, to build up trust and confidence in each other’s intentions, to create mutual understanding of the broader directions of military preparedness in each country and, at professional levels, to enable the exchange of experience and technical knowledge. Such direct communications at senior professional levels of the armed forces are invaluable inputs to the process of bringing about stable political relations between the two countries. A network of separate agreements or memoranda of understanding from the early nineties for example, on the resumption of border trade involving Tibet and India, on cooperation in the peaceful application of outer space science and technology, on cooperation in the field of agriculture, on avoidance of double taxation, on the opening and maintenance of Consulate Generals in Shanghai and Mumbai, etc, provide a sound basis for the further growth of all-round relations. The fact that all these agreements have alternated between Congress and Opposition party-led Governments in India have impressed the Chinese, with the prevailing consensus in India embracing political parties from the widest spectrum. From the mid-nineties the Chinese Communist Party has established working relations with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and delegation visits have been exchanged.

The setting-in of a large measure of maturity in Sino-Indian relations has been accompanied by impressive growth in trade relations. In 1996 there was an appreciable increase of Indian exports to China leading to a favourable balance of trade for India. The gross figure in 1997 of two-way direct trade between India and China is expected to touch approximately US $1.5 billion. If one included re-exports of Indian goods through Hong Kong to China, the figure would be almost US $4 billion. It is a very good sign that it is recognised by both governments and trading communities that this figure does not reflect the potential inherent in Sino-Indian economic relations. From India’s viewpoint it is a good sign that export growth is no longer generated by iron ore and steel exports alone, but has spread over several other products occupying nearly 50 per cent of the trade basket. Considering that in the early nineties trade between India and China was only a few hundred million dollars both ways, the increases over a five-year period since economic reforms in India in 1991, give room for optimism.

 

India and China in South and South-East Asia

The challenge in India-China relations is to graduate to a level where it would be beneficial to the peoples of the two countries, to neighbouring areas and to the world at large. Unlike China’s relations with the USA, Japan, some European countries and South East Asian countries, with whom a strong network of interests has been forged, few networks exist in Sino-Indian relations. To add momentum and substance to such a relationship, some corrections would have to be made.

In the diverse plural society that is India, how do we forge a unified and common approach that would have a useful impact on our national interests vis-á-vis China? To begin with, we should appreciate the fact that the role of China in Asia has vastly altered with its opening-up since the early eighties. When domestic economic reforms gathered momentum its social, cultural and economic interlinkages with societies across its borders, in South and East Asia, were greatly facilitated. This fact should be acknowledged as one of the great political events of the last years of this century. In fact trans-border trade and economic relations ameliorating political relations have also come into existence, along the lengthy land boundaries of China with Russia and the Central Asian states. Constant attention to a few individual issues and the interplay of relations between the major powers, USA-Japan-Russia-China and the South East Asian states, ignores the dynamics of the bigger picture in the Asian-Pacific region underpinned by the convergence of the interests of these powers in ensuring a stable and peaceful environment.

The convergence of interests has resulted in the freezing of the current geopolitical order in South East and East Asia notwithstanding differences on Korea, Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, Senkaku islands or the Japan-Russian territorial dispute. The current status quo in the region, which includes a US military presence, seems to serve everyone well. The prevailing balance of power, though delicate, prevents flash points from igniting. This enables the US to maintain a dominant position in trade, investment and security matters. Japan is protected by its military alliance with the USA which has removed the pressure for it to consider unilateral options. The balance, it seems, also serves China well, giving it decades of peace in which to achieve economic growth and modernisation. Officially, the Chinese may frown at the US military presence especially when the presence becomes visible during crises in the Taiwan Straits or when elaborations under the USA-Japan military guidelines are ambiguous over Japan’s future role vis-á-vis Taiwan. However, they realise that alternatives involving Japan could be worse, as China pursues its polities of economic and military modernisation.

The realisation of the constraints and realities of the Asia and Pacific region reinforce the logic of maintaining the existing geo-political status quo in the region. For all the public expressions of dissatisfaction with one or the other consequence of American actions towards the region, conscious steps have been taken by the countries of the region to demonstrate how much USA benefits from its variegated relations with Asian countries, as indeed they themselves do from American markets and investments. Conversely performance by US companies in the growing East Asian marketplace will make or break the next generation of US based multinational corporations in their upgradation of technologies and competitiveness. Thus economic relationships, which have steadily increased, become as vital as the security links which the US feels it needs in the East to protect itself and its allies.

In South Asia the realities are different and the links are weak. India’s “look East” policy needs to be developed, if India is to become a more useful partner of the region. Crucial in this regard is a viable and effective relationship with China. When India was invited to become a dialogue partner of the ASEAN as well as its ARF forum, the unspoken premise was that a more open Indian economy with its vast market, has the potential to influence decisions on trade, investment and technology flows, while an India which is not estranged from China has the potential to contribute to Asian political and military stability. The relevance of these conclusions is not challenged by the recent turmoils in the securities and financial markets of South East Asian and East Asian countries. Jiang Zemin’s assurances at the December 1997 Summit of ASEAN leaders with the heads of Japanese, Chinese and South Korean leaders were interpreted by the countries with territorial disputes with China, that China would not take advantage of the weakened ASEAN economies to pursue those disputes.

In this connection it is important to note the views of Cheng Ruisheng, former Chinese Ambassador to India (1991-94) and presently deputy director general of the China Centre for International Studies, a leading think-tank attached to the State Council. ‘As the biggest neighbour of South Asian countries’, he wrote, ‘China’s policy is very important to peace and stability of South Asia. It is noted that with the readjustment of its foreign policy, China is playing a very positive and stabilising role in South Asia. China’s relations with India are not only essential for the two countries, but also important for the security of South Asia. China considers its relations with India very important for realising a favourable and peaceful environment for China’s economic development.’ Elsewhere in the same article (published by the Henary L Stimson Centre, Washington, 1995) the author notes that the South Asian region with three of whom China shares common borders (four if one included PoK), is vital for China’s security.

He also states, ‘It is encouraging to note that China’s relations with India and other South Asian countries are developing in a parallel and separate way. China is in favour of improvement of relations among various South Asian countries. Since both India and Pakistan are China’s neighbours and friends, China sincerely hopes that the Kashmir dispute could be settled in an appropriate way through peaceful negotiations. China has also given its friendly advice to both countries not to raise this question at international forums’. This article was first published in the USA in October 1995. In November 1996 when president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin visited Pakistan after India, he reiterated China’s support for the success of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in an address to the Pakistan Senate. Of specific application in the India-Pakistan context was his advice to look at differences or disputes from a long perspective, seeking a just and reasonable settlement through consultations and negotiations while bearing in mind the larger picture. If certain issues cannot be resolved for the time being, they may be shelved temporarily so that they will not affect normal, state-to-state relations. While this remark is applied to China’s relations with its South Asian neighbours it has relevance for judging the Chinese approach to disputes between the countries of South Asia.

In a world which has witnessed exponential changes in the last decade of the 20th century, brought about by the technological revolution in communications and by the international flow of investments, trade and services, the economies of India and China need to do much more than consolidate goodwill and political relations, important as this is. This brings one to the specifics of more intensive relations on the bilateral plane.

For the world at large, as well as for the neighbours of China and India, it is true that the incremental increase of what in China is called “comprehensive national strength” (more marked in the case of China than of India), will cause restructuring in global resource allocations, investment decisions, financial inflows and outflows, technology developments, and may affect the hitherto established power balance. However, as long as these changes happen in an open and better integrated and interdependent multipolar framework, their goal can be achieved. This goal simply put, is to bring into being a peaceful Asian and international environment as a prerequisite for the socio-economic development of their respective populations. For this, the first requirement is that India and China, as the two largest countries in the world, must be open to each other.

After enormous reforms were introduced in the two countries, we need to deepen our understanding of the dynamics of each other’s domestic economic development. There are so many obvious similarities; at the same time we must not lose sight of the long distance our two countries have still to traverse to spread the benefits of economic reforms to vast sections of our populations.

There are many parallels between India and China in the challenges they face in modernising their continental-sized economies, and in adapting themselves to the process of globalisation. Given the prevailing flux in the international economic situation, in the evolving international trade, in technology and financial regimes, the results achieved by the countries of South East Asia, which have not been without setbacks, there is ample room for dialogue and exchange of experience between Indian and Chinese thinkers.

It is common place to recognise that trade and investment between the two countries is below their potential. Many conventional paths are under active exploration to increase interactions between businessmen representing various sectors. The process of increasing trade and mutual investments is slow. Businessmen in both countries are more comfortable dealing with traditional and long established partners, rather than invest the time, energy and money in exploring complementarities between India and China. The two countries therefore need an infusion of fresh ideas to propel economic cooperation in areas, where each country needs the other to supplement its vast indigenous base of home-grown technologies and skills. Each is following parallel paths for the importation of advanced technologies for their infrastructure, industries and services, but there is no effort to look at the other’s rich technological achievements to facilitate commercial interactions. Interactive mechanisms need to be put in place represented by Indian and Chinese experts, which could focus on the indigenous inventions or technological adaptations which each society has achieved.

Both India and China need to take advantage of the factors of geographical contiguity. Hitherto geo-political compulsions have prevailed at the cost of geo-economic objectives. In recent years, China has setup diverse trans-border linkages across China’s borders in all directions. The time has now come to explore possibilities of such linkages between the two countries. While a beginning has been made in border trade between India and the Tibet region of China, more points remain to be opened. To the east of India and to the south-west of China there is a vast populated region, which includes Bangladesh, Myanmar and some countries in ASEAN, where India and China could separately engage in building up infrastructural and communication linkages, trade and investments to the benefit of the area as a whole. The two governments and leaders of trade and industry should open up to the realities of geo-economics in order to bring the needed development to an important area in the neighbourhood of our countries.

Cheng Ruisheng has this to say about China’s outlook on expanding trade and economic cooperation between China and South Asian countries: ‘There is great potential for expansion of trade and economic and technical cooperation between the two countries (India and China). If both countries can take some preferential measures between them, China and India with a vast area in Asia and a total population of 2.1 billion, two-fifth of mankind can together form a de facto economic region. Other South Asian countries and Burma (Myanmar) can also join. In this respect, it is worth studying to build a new continental bridge linking up South West China and South Asia. It can link up and transmit the tide of the economic development of the Pacific area with and to that of the Indian Ocean area.’ We need to generate similar thinking in India.

Non-governmental personalities and established trade and industry associations in both countries assisted by inputs from think-tanks could take the lead in some of these matters reflecting the changing structure of our decentralising societies. Policy initiatives and actions at the level of the two governments are required to improve the infrastructure for increasing trade, commerce and exchanges’ between India and China. It is difficult to understand why leading airline corporations from the two sides have yet not given practical effect to the Civil Aviation Agreement between the two governments, signed in 1988. Direct communications between India and China are non-existent. Banks from neither country operate effectively in the other as handmaidens to trade and mutual investments. Shipping links are largely through third parties vessels. On the wider plane there exists a huge lacuna in information and understanding of the potential for cooperation between India and China. The lingering legacy of the sixties in certain circles in both countries, and the awe with which China’s economic growth, (translated into military modernisation) is held in India, are some of the psychological factors which need to be addressed. The reasonable and legitimate interests and concerns of each side need to be perceived by the other side as being sensitively dealt with in a manner which would sustain the public opinion base so necessary to propel relations forward.

 

Facing Old and New Problems Post Pokharan II

Among Indian concerns are the further handling of the boundary dispute, China’s opposition to the integration of Sikkim into India, and the assistance given to Pakistan in the non-conventional military sector. On the other hand, Chinese concerns relate to Tibet and the presence of the Dalai Lama and refugees in India. On the boundary question there are some factors that favour the reaching of understandings and arrangements on the basis of the 1993 and 1996 Agreements. The status quo, along the Line of Actual Control, whereby each side is in full control over areas vital to it, has for example endured over three decades. No significant military attempt has been made by either side to disturb this status quo. The military and logistic capabilities of both sides further more have the capacity to observe as well as deter activities which transgress the Line of Actual Control. Besides, periodic and ad hoc meetings at the ground level between local commanders ensure dialogue and communications between responsible personnel of both sides.

However, faster progress in the implementation of the Agreements is needed to further consolidate the considerable political goodwill already generated, and to see to it that succeeding groups of military and civilian leaders are bound by earlier sensitive Agreements to ensure peace and tranquillity over disputed territory. The tangible psychological value of this exercise is invaluable given the reality of the growing asymmetry of economic and military strength which has accrued in the case of China.

The variety of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) mentioned in the 1996 Agreement are predicated on a mutually agreed definition of the Line of Actual Control. There are a few areas where there are differences between the two sides on where the LAC lies. Since the LAC would become the base line for the series of envisaged CBMs, the task of resolving these differences becomes all the more important. As military and other experts from both sides assist the operations of the JWG such differences are capable of being addressed on a realistic basis, taking into account such criteria as legitimate defence requirements of each side, assured mutual and equal security, mutual withdrawals of forces to geographical zones, limitations on quality and scope of armaments, etc. Through the exercise of political will and constructive use of the various provisions of the 1996 Agreement, peace and tranquillity along the LAC can be ensured. This would be the next breakthrough, giving practical effect to the intention of both governments not to use force or the threat of force for territorial gains.

Looking at this from another angle, both sides are presently engaged in the JWG to clarify an existing status quo, perhaps with a few mutually acceptable adjustments; but they are still far from involving themselves in a final territorial accommodation. This can only come about as result of political decisions backed by any ruling political party to forge the domestic consensus over the give-and-take necessary for a final boundary settlement.

The discrepancy between China’s policy of de facto recognition in the practical conduct of inter-state relations between India and China over Sikkim, and its de jure position of treating it as an entity separate from India needs to be corrected. Such a correction, which is a low-cost unilateral action on its part, is bound to result in the trans-border facilitation of trade and exchanges, which both countries seek to enhance across the Tibetan border.

The Pokharan II nuclear tests with their avowed purpose of perfecting weaponisation by India in May 1998, have revived all the old issues and raised many new ones. Rhetoric from highly placed Indian political figures which preceded the tests, and Chinese official and non-official reactions to this, have brought back into dramatic focus the very issues and differences which multi-level dialogue between the two countries, over nearly two decades, had addressed with a fair measure of success. The issues which resurfaced are the boundary disputes, and each country’s self-justification of positions taken in the early sixties regarding this, assistance from China to Pakistan in developing nuclear and missile capabilities, the future shape of China’s response to the situation in the Sino-Pakistan-India triangle, Tibet, and whether India’s action and China’s response would seriously jeopardise the steady achievements of the recent past in the bilateral relationship. On the broader plane, China’s new-found status as an active partner in the US-led anti-proliferation drive consequent to the renewal of the NPT, and the coming into being of the CTBT, raise questions for India on the impact of future Sino-US cooperation vis-á-vis India. India’s compulsions for testing were put across to the public at large and top Western statesmen in China-specific terms, which in turn drew the predictable Chinese charge that India had hegemonistic designs in South Asia. If the atmosphere for improved Sino-Indian relations started with the China visit of A B Vajpayee as foreign minister in 1979, it is ironic that its restoration, post Pokharan II, is one of his biggest challenges as prime minister.

It would seem that in facing this challenge the following elements will need to be seriously addressed by Indian policy-makers. A shift from the traditional India stand, which attaches priority to universal nuclear weapon disarmament measures, to one which attaches priority to South Asian-specific nuclear weapon disarmament measures. Initiatives need to be taken to firmly address the Sino-Pakistan-Indian nuclear weapon syndrome with help from the other four nuclear weapon powers. Secondly, more rapid progress in implementing the CBMs with respect to the Line of Actual Control on which agreements exist from 1993 and 1996 between India and China. Thirdly, Indian initiatives to reciprocate the high level of recent visitors from China to India to reassure China that India attaches the highest priority for improvement of relations of understanding and accommodation with China, and to signal the maintenance of the momentum in bilateral relations in all fields, as was the case before Pokharan II.

The fact that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and recognised as such, not just by India but by governments all over the world, is an unalterable fact in the contemporary situation. Indian leaders’ recent assurances to the Chinese about India’s policy on this question is a reiteration of an old stand which can be traced back to the British colonial period of Indian history and continued since India’s independence. However, the unease with which the Chinese view the growing stature of the Dalai Lama and the international sympathy which the situation of the Tibetans has evoked, leads the Chinese to frequently raise the matter in dialogues with Indian government leaders and officials. As for the Dalai Lama, he has abided by the universally acknowledged norms of shelter in India, which has been granted on humanitarian grounds. He has no support from the government of India in any political activity aimed against China. As for his ardent and numerous followers, the overwhelming majority live in India and are engaged in activities which are open to them in their capacity as refugees. Given India’s democratic system, it is unrealistic to expect that curbs can be put on their ability to assemble and give free rein to expression, provided such activities are within the bounds of Indian laws. Seen in this light, the question of the Tibetan agitation outside Tibet, is not an issue between India and China. As far as India is concerned the best outcome would be if early direct dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities could result in a mutually acceptable solution where Tibetans are enabled to return to Tibet in dignity. The problem between Tibetans and China is not of India’s making. it has not done anything to encourage its escalation into an international issue.

To conclude, fifty years ago when India attained Independence, India’s foreign policy reflected pluralism, democracy, moral values and the search for cooperation with societies with different political systems. Intrinsic to our approach to the world was the fierce struggle to retain independence of judgment and autonomy of action during the height of the ideological Cold War. Without risk of too much contradiction one could assert that this approach served us well over the first decades of our independence. We need the same tradition of independence in thought and action today in the drastically changed international circumstances at the tail end of this century. With regard to China we need to understand better the changed dynamics of her domestic developments, the benefits to her vast population, of her social and economic policies from the eighties, and the problems with which she is still confronted with respect to the world at large. The internet and satellite TV have opened up Asian societies. Domestic situations in India and China involving the social and other rights of their vast populations have become matters of international interest. The manner in which their economy affects international markets for goods, technology, services and finances and in turn are affected by developments in these areas which are increasingly controlled by international regimes, are practical issues. The impact of their rapid growth on the food, energy, health and environment outlook for the globe in the near future is of growing international concern. How India and China cope with the order that is yet to emerge on such issues is another challenge which both countries need to face separately and in cooperation, while striving to qualitatively and substantively improve their bilateral relations.