World Affairs
Vol. 3, Number 1 (Jan.–Mar. 1999)

INTERVIEW: Attempts at Regional Cooperation in South Asia

 

In a wide-ranging interview, Nihal Rodrigo, secretary general, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, provides an overview of SAARC’s objectives and evolution, and discusses the particular challenges facing the regional body.

 

World Affairs (WA) : Could you briefly explain the broad framework of SAARC? What does it stand for, and how and in what circumstances was it established?

Nihal Rodrigo (NR) : The possibility of developing some form of mechanism for cooperation among South Asian countries has been considered intermittently since the 1970s. The idea assumed shape from around May 1980. Following initial consultations among the countries concerned—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—a meeting of the foreign secretaries of the seven was held in Colombo in April 1981. More discussions were required to tentatively agree on specific areas of cooperation and in August 1983, foreign ministers of the seven countries met in New Delhi to adopt a Declaration in South Asian Regional Cooperation. This did not formally set up an Association, but identified five relatively non-controversial areas for cooperation, such as Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunications, Meteorology and Health.

The first summit took place two years later in December 1985 and adopted the Charter which established the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as it is presently constituted. In terms of objectives, it stands basically for the promotion of the welfare of the people of South Asia through the acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region. While it promotes self-reliance within the region, it is also committed to strengthening cooperation with other developing countries and organisations which share its aims and purposes.

WA: Why is it that South Asia took much longer to opt for the establishment of a regional body, whereas many other areas of the globe had operationalised and institutionalised regional cooperation much earlier?

NR: It did take five years between a tentative decision and the actual establishment of a regional institution. There are historical and other reasons in South Asia for this.

WA: How would you compare SAARC with other regional organisations like the European Union (EU) in Europe, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Gulf. In particular, how does it compare with ASEAN?

NR: SAARC is the youngest of the regional organisations you have mentioned. The other institutions have had a longer time to mature and develop their present state of operations—both in terms of activities as well as in terms of institutions. You will understand that the European Union started very modestly as far back as the 1950s with cooperation in the coal and steel industries. The concept of ASEAN which was institutionalised as far back as 1967 has evolved into a viable regional organisation with a well-developed institutional framework in the shape of its Secretariat. It has a wide range of activities, including those of a political nature, which over the years has grown to be quite extensive. It is, therefore, difficult to compare ASEAN with SAARC which was established only in 1985. The objectives of SAARC, particularly at its inception, were also modest—it is expanding its scope rather gradually and at its own pace.

WA: How is SAARC constituted in terms of institutions? Apart from periodic summit meetings did the founding fathers establish a permanent body of member states to interact continuously with the Secretariat? For example, the European Union, early on, established the Committee of Political Representatives of member states in Brussels. What about SAARC?

NR: Apart from the Summit meeting and two meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers which take place each year, SAARC also convenes meetings of ministers dealing with specific areas such as commerce, tourism, health, environment, telecommunications and so on. There are also a number of other committees at the official level which report to the political leaders. Focal points in the foreign ministries of each SAARC capital also help in coordination. The SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu is the sole permanent coordinating mechanism for the SAARC process. We do not have the type of formal mechanism for institutionalised interaction between the Secretariat and member states in Kathmandu in the way the European Union has in Brussels. There is a Standing Committee consisting of foreign secretaries of SAARC which interacts with the Secretariat and the political level of the Council of Ministers. South Asian ambassadors in Kathmandu are not formally accredited to the Secretariat although informal interaction certainly does take place. Yes, it is important to build on this.

WA: What role does the SAARC Secretariat play in the process of regional cooperation? In recent years it has been felt that the Secretariat should be accorded enough authority to take initiatives. Over the years has it, indeed, acquired greater power and a greater role in animating the process of regional cooperation?

NR: The functions of the SAARC Secretariat have so far been rather limited. But with the expansion of the range of areas with which SAARC is dealing and their complexity, particularly in the economic and commercial fields, the Secretariat is being called upon to accept greater responsibilities. In fact, at a meeting of SAARC commerce ministers in Dhaka earlier this month, the ministers appreciated the role being played by the Secretariat and noted the additional responsibilities it is being called upon to undertake. The Secretariat’s own staff is now being augmented with technical expertise. Databases are being developed and expanded to assess economic developments within the region (in respect of intra-regional trade-liberalisation) as well as at the multilateral and international level. But the Secretariat’s formal powers remain unchanged.

WA: What is the level of the Secretariat’s involvement in the meetings that SAARC has with similar bodies of other regions? Who organises such meetings, the Secretariat or the Council of Ministers?

NR: It is the Council of Ministers or the Summit, which decides on the nature and extent of SAARC’s involvement with similar bodies in other regions. For example, the SAARC Council of Ministers met the European Troika at the United Nations in New York last year for the first time, I believe, and identified broad areas of potential for economic and social cooperation. Thereafter, based on the conclusions reached at the political level, I had exploratory discussions with the European Commission in Brussels in January this year on the modalities for advancing mutually beneficial interaction. This will now be taken up at the Council of Ministers. A similar process with ASEAN is also underway. The organisation of meetings between SAARC and other regional organisations including the agenda is worked out between the Secretariats concerned in consultation with member states. Secretariat to Secretariat contact goes on. Its contents could be developed and improved.

WA: Have transnational non-governmental institutions and interest groups emerged that are proponents of regional cooperation. Are they acting as pressure groups to accelerate the whole process? How would you evaluate the effectiveness of people-to-people contacts?

NR: I personally do not believe that SAARC was meant to be an exclusively statist association. Contacts between people of South Asia at the non-governmental levels are being encouraged. There are a number of non-governmental institutions and groups in South Asia which are, what you call, proponents of regional cooperation. SAARC has two South Asian apex bodies—SAARCLAW and the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI). SAARCLAW brings the South Asian legal community together, developing law as a catalyst for social change. The SCCI is an Association of National Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The SCCI is very active in promoting interests of the business community of South Asia and regional economic cooperation in general. In early February this year at Dhaka, the SCCI interacted closely with SAARC commerce ministers. The SCCI made a pitch that a Treaty for the South Asian Free Trade Asia be ready by the year 2000 and has volunteered to present the SAARC Secretariat with a model draft by April 1999. This is of course well ahead of the SAARC deadline which is to have the text of the Treaty finalised by 2001. SAARC requires time for complex preparatory work including the Terms of References, etc, for the eventual Free Trade Area. The SCCI, therefore, is certainly stepping on the accelerator pedal.

To the extent that the SCCI represents the many South Asian commercial and industrial Chambers, its advice and views will have an impact on governments. SCCI appreciates the need for and advocates joint ventures, intra-regional investment flows, business arbitration council and more effective regional arrangements for road, rail, shipping and air links. Governments can basically facilitate, encourage and provide the regulatory framework for all this. Yet it is the private sector which can actually provide the bulk of these services. SCCI can help in promoting private sector engagement to bring about all these pre-conditions for a successful Free Trade Area.

In addition to the Apex Bodies of SAARCLAW and SCCI, other SAARC contacts are developing including interaction among professional bodies recognised by SAARC—architects, university women, accountants, town planners, and parliamentarians. In a new category, election commissioners of India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka met in Kathmandu in February to exchange views on how democratic processes in their countries can be strengthened. They are looking at the possibility of institutionalising and regularising these contacts although at the moment this is not a SAARC Apex Body like the SAARCLAW and the SCCI.

WA: It has been argued that regional cooperation becomes problematic when one member state is disproportionately dimensional and more advanced than the others. In other words, do you think India creates a problem within SAARC?

NR: (Laughs) It is not India which creates a problem within SAARC but the asymmetries within South Asia and the varied stages of development at which member states find themselves. That the asymmetries are acknowledged and are being engaged seriously and rationally certainly is a beginning. Let us look at trade liberalisation in South Asia (a negotiating process called SAPTA) and its envisaged progression eventually into a South Asian Free Trade Asia (SAFTA). The Least Developed Countries and small economies are very conscious that the road to SAFTA needs to be tread carefully, bearing in mind the asymmetries and disparities in development among member states. These concerns need to, and are being taken into account, so that free trade will not be to the disadvantage of any state. The Colombo Summit in July 1998 thus set in motion a detailed discussion of Terms of Reference for a comprehensive treaty regime to set up a free trade area. The text of the Treaty or Agreement is to be ready by 2001. At Colombo, heads of State/Government were quite categorical that such a Treaty should incorporate, inter alia, binding time-frames for free trade including intra-regional investment; provisions to ensure equitable distribution of the benefits of trade to all states especially smaller and Least Developed Countries; and other requirements such as mechanisms for compensation of revenue loss. In addition, I have been requested to appoint a consultant to conduct an in-depth study on the full implications for member states of the progression from SAPTA to SAFTA.

WA: Will the so-called Gujral doctrine of unilateralism without reciprocity help in accelerating the process of cooperation?

NR: The so-called Gujral Doctrine, when propounded, signalled an acknowledgment by India that, given the acute asymmetries within the region, with India’s prepoderant economic strength on the one hand and other varying levels of development in the neighbouring countries on the other hand, insistence by India on strict reciprocity from its neighbours would hardly contribute towards balanced regional economic development. Indeed, the essence of the so-called Gujral Doctrine rests on the premise that India recognises that it is only when the benefits of regional interaction are equitably shared that South Asia would prosper. I personally believe that India is conscious that it needs to give more to its smaller neighbours than they are able to give to her, if overall balanced growth is to take place. In such a situation, the process of cooperation will accelerate.

WA: What about the establishment of sub-regional geo-economic groups like the one composed of North Eastern India, Bhutan, Nepal and parts of Bangladesh—the so-called “growth quadrangle”? Will it accelerate cooperation or will it create problems? Is it within the framework of SAARC?

NR: There were initially some reservations, indeed strong ones, that sub-regional economic activities which included only some SAARC states could distort the overall efforts of SAARC as a regional association. For example, would SAARC’s time and resources be disproportionately allocated and would those excluded from growth areas be neglected? What was the precise relationship of these growth areas to SAARC as a whole? These matters were frankly discussed at the summit in Male in 1997 when heads of State/Government reiterated their determination to reinforce the unity and cohesion of SAARC. With the objective of enhancing regional solidarity and promoting overall development within SAARC, they saw no fundamental problem in encouraging the development of specific projects which were relevant to the special individual needs of three or more member states. This was well within the framework of SAARC, particularly Charter Articles which permit the formation of action committees to deal with areas of activity in which all members may not have equal interest. Thus it is quite in order and, in fact, to be encouraged if, say Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh embark on projects dealing with sea erosion. It would have no relevance for Bhutan and Nepal who need not feel unhappy about not being involved.

WA: Would it be correct to say that real hope for effective cooperation began with the Eighth SAARC summit meeting in Delhi when the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) came into force?

NR: Each summit contributes incrementally to progress in different areas of SAARC activity. SAPTA which you mention, signalled the entry of SAARC into core areas of economic cooperation, grew out of a pioneer study completed in 1991 on Trade, Manufactures and Services initiated at the Summit in Islamabad. The Colombo Summit (1991) declared a commitment to trade liberalisation through a step-by-step approach through which all countries in the region could share benefits equitably. A draft Agreement was prepared and subsequently signed in Dhaka in April 1993 by foreign ministers during the Seventh SAARC Summit. The SAPTA Agreement itself entered into force in December 1995 after completion of legal formalities by all member countries. This was not long after the New Delhi Summit which was in May of that year.

WA: In this ongoing process, the Maldives Summit is viewed as a landmark since it was there that member states finally agreed on the advantage of informal political consultations among the seven members. Has this process really begun?

NR: Yes, the Male Summit can be viewed as a landmark in that the heads of State/Government recognising that the promotion of peace, stability and amity, and accelerated socio-economic cooperation may best be achieved by fostering good-neighbourly relations, relieving tensions and building confidence, agreed that “a process of informal political consultations would prove useful” in this regard. There is of course no formal institutionalised process for discussion of bilateral political disputes among member states within the existing framework of SAARC. The SAARC Charter very clearly precludes discussion of what the Charter describes as bilateral and contentious issues. However, political discussions do take place, including on some bilateral issues, but this is between the countries directly concerned, informally and on the fringes of summits and Council meetings. These discussions are, of course, not part of the Agenda of SAARC meetings and collective discussions of these issues, ie, where all member states formally debate them, do not take place.

Let me give you an example. At the Colombo Summit last year, in the aftermath of the South Asian nuclear tests, there were initial discussions between the leaders of India and Pakistan. These purely bilateral discussions further progressed at the NAM Summit in South Africa as well as the United Nations in New York that year. This process continues in the bilateral discussion on agreed items which is now proceeding. The Colombo Summit last year clearly recognised that informal political consultations would contribute to the appreciation of each other’s problems and perceptions.

WA: Do we know anything more regarding the September 28, 1998 meeting of SAARC foreign ministers in New York where they agreed to consult each other on issues of common interest to South Asia before the meeting of the UN General Assembly? Was this just an ad hoc meeting or has it been institutionalised for all General Assembly sessions?

NR: The foreign ministers have been meeting during the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New York for some time. These interactions have gradually moved from being social occasions, convivial dinners and informal consultations to what was last year a structured meeting with an agreed agenda. That sort of meeting will now be regularised as an annual feature. The Council of Ministers also, under Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, interacted with the European Union Troika and the ASEAN last year in New York on an agreed agenda that helped to structure the meetings and to focus on mutually important areas. Last year’s meetings were in a sense the first of their kind and it is decided that they be regularised in that form for General Assembly sessions hereafter.

WA: In this connection, could you tell us something about the Committee of Representatives of SAARC members in New York in 1998, which is expected not only to liaise regularly on issues of common interests, but is also expected to take joint initiatives? Do you have a similar body in Kathmandu to liaise with the Secretariat?

NR: SAARC has been increasingly conscious that it would need to take informed collective assessment of the rather volatile and not entirely favourable international economic environment in which South Asia is placed. In the past, chairpersons of SAARC have made only rare pronouncements on behalf of the entire group—as was done for example by the Sri Lankan prime minister at the Rio Conference on Environment. Since the last summit in Colombo, this practice has become more regularised. The permanent representatives of SAARC countries at the United Nations in New York meet more regularly and consult informally on issues of common interest. Where possible, common positions are worked out and joint initiatives are taken. It is interesting to note that at the UN even on an issue such as the South Asian nuclear tests that took place last year, it was possible for Sri Lanka, after consultations as current Chairman, to present on behalf of SAARC, certain agreed amendments to a Resolution on the Tests presented by a group of Western countries. In fact, in Geneva, this sort of consultation among permanent representatives has been well structured and is quite effective in that collective positions of SAARC have been projected at the WTO and also to some extent on intellectual property rights and at the WCO in Brussels. In Kathmandu, we do not have a similar process, but SAARC ambassadors do informally consult on SAARC issues in general and are in touch with the Secretariat.

WA: Could you tell us about the SAARC group on customs cooperation? What is their role?

NR: It is now an acknowledged fact that divergent and conflicting customs procedures hinder the flow of goods. The world over, therefore, an attempt is being made to harmonise customs procedures, simplify documentation, intensify consultations and exchange information so as to combat smuggling, commercial fraud, trafficking in illegal drugs and facilitate the smooth movement of bona fide goods.

With the SAPTA Agreement it was felt that closer cooperation is required between the customs administration of South Asia to facilitate the flow of ligitimate goods. The SAARC Group on Customs Cooperation (GCC) has met three times already and its fourth meeting will be held in Kathmandu later this year.

The GCC has adopted a comprehensive Action Plan which details a series of activities for cooperation, uniformity and harmony in customs administrations in the member states. The Meeting of SAARC Secretaries of Commerce in Dhaka in February authorised the Secretary General to appoint a consultant who would assess the requirements and current customs procedures in the different member states with a view to identifying clear-cut steps for the harmonisation process.

WA: What, in your view, are the most important developments in regional cooperation since SAARC’s establishment?

NR: SAARC is a process which is in a constant state of development. When it first came into being, the focus was essentially on social and often soft issues. Indeed, it was only in the 1990s that economic issues were identified as a possible area of cooperation. Since then there has been accelerated dialogue and interaction, and I believe introduction of the “economic theme” is perhaps one of the most important developments in regional cooperation since SAARC’s establishment.

Most regions are characterised by asymmetries. SAARC is no exception. This asymmetry can either act as a stumbling block to further cooperation or can be converted into a building block. Indeed, once the immense possibilities of regional economic cooperation were appreciated by the member states, there was increased recognition that the region could in fact “grow together”. The SAPTA Agreement clearly enshrines this by making it incumbent that the interests and special situation of the Least Developed Countries would be protected and ensured. The possible danger of being swamped or overwhelmed is realised and will be acted on as I have already indicated.

The region has come to realise the immense possibilities of regional economic cooperation and that such a dialogue would not be at the cost of “social” issues but that it would, in fact, lend teeth to and supplement national efforts at responding to the immense challenges of poverty, illiteracy, health and the welfare of our people.

There has also been increased recognition of the fact that government cannot be a provider of all things. Government can only facilitate and act as a catalyst. There needs therefore to be greater dialogue, consultation and coordination between government, industry professionals and the people. Indeed, the thrust of regional economic cooperation has invigorated the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and as I have told you in response to an earlier question, we are today witnessing far greater participation by industry in the development process. This needs to be encouraged. All South Asian governments have determined that the private sector is the engine of development.

Overall, there has definitely been a sense of South Asian identity developing over the years, which, for example, is reflected in the various coordinated positions taken by SAARC in the international fora I have already mentioned.

WA: And what in your view are the major problems in the way of regional cooperation? In the EU model, regional cooperation is a stepping stone to regional integration. Is the goal of regional integration feasible for South Asia?

NR: In answering an earlier question, I pointed to asymmetries in South Asia—differing stages of economic development, technological progress, industrial capacity, infrastructure and so on—which certainly slow down regional economic cooperation, let alone regional integration. Some concerns have been expressed by Least Developed Countries and smaller economies on all this. These concerns are recognised and compensatory measures, as well as other safeguards have been identified, and most important, are being addressed as SAARC moves from preferential trade arrangements to the eventual goal of a free trade area. Regional integration is an ideal advocated by the Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) set up at the summit in Male on a Pakistani initiative to project a vision of SAARC beyond the year 2000. The SCCI also advocates this. The GEP suggests a South Asian Economic Union to be set up by the year 2020 including possibly a single monetary system and a common currency. Naturally, a number of conditions need to be in place for such integration to be feasible. The experience of the European Union where regional cooperation slowly built up to more comprehensive regional integration is attractive but cannot be duplicated exactly, given the particular South Asian context that we are looking at. Regional integration will be feasible for South Asia to the extent that far-reaching, radical transformations in several sectors can be effected. The GEP identified many of these, such as transport, development of natural resources and energy, infrastructure development, joint ventures, industrial development, macro-economic policy coordination and so on. In addition, an ambience of stability and mutual accommodation which goes beyond economic and commercial interaction is a further aspect that is vital for regional integration.

WA: According to the neo-functionalist theory of regional cooperation—so rampant in the western world—if regional cooperation starts with palpable, mutually useful, micro, non-political issues between members of a regional body, it should eventually facilitate the task of cooperation on macro issues. Do you think that this argumentation is relevant to South Asia too?

NR: I would like to identify two approaches, if not theories, of regional cooperation without being too abstract or academic about them. The first, as you mentioned, argues that regional cooperation must start with micro non-political issues among members of a regional body which would lead on to, not only facilitating cooperation on macro issues, but also political cooperation. The other is that it is only in a functioning ambience of political stability, goodwill and understanding, that cooperation on economic and other macro issues would be possible. It is the chicken and egg situation. However, the approach taken by current SAARC chairperson, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga of Sri Lanka is that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and should not be isolated. Each process should be simultaneously pursued, without letting obstacles in one hold back movement in the other. That makes sense for South Asia. It is practical and I think it will slowly come to pass.

WA: How is the secretary general appointed and what is his role?

NR: The secretary general is appointed by the Council of Ministers following nomination by his country on the principle of alphabetical rotation. Thus the first secretary general was from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka will provide the last secretary general in the first cycle of alphabetical rotation. After me, Bangladesh will nominate one of its nationals to the Council of Ministers for appointment. The secretary general heads the SAARC Secretariat and is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of SAARC activities. He has to arrange for the servicing of SAARC meetings including logistics and necessary documentation. He is the channel of communication between the Association and other international organisations. There are a number of proposals including those proposed by the Group of Eminent Persons mandated at the summit level which have recommended that the secretary general be accorded ministerial status and be given more authority. The secretary general does, however, have even now the possibility of presenting regional cooperation. These require to be approved, of course, at the appropriate level depending on the nature of the proposals being advanced.

WA: What are your ambitions and objectives so far as regional cooperation is concerned? In your view, what should SAARC focus on as a priority as we move into the next millennium?

NR: I do not wish to comment on regional cooperation in terms of what you call my own “ambitions and objectives”! Successive summits have identified specific priorities for SAARC and there is, despite the diversity of these goals, a sort of incremental continuity. At the last summit, the predominant focus was on what the chairperson, the President of Sri Lanka called “the development imperative” when she proposed an economic theme for the summit. This has led to a focus on two broad, very closely related priorities. The first is a regional priority: developing and stabilising mutually beneficial interaction among the seven countries, while realistically taking full measure of the complexities involved. There is also now the clear realisation that however well the region may integrate, South Asia cannot isolate itself from the volatile, even hostile, international economic environment within which we must develop.

The second set of priorities thus includes a hard-headed, informed assessment of the implications of current global economic, social, technological and intellectual developments on South Asia. This involves coordinating South Asian positions and collectively protecting and promoting our interests at multilateral discussions, for example at the WTO and at other forums on financial and monetary issues, intellectual property rights, investment, and so on. It would also involve developing cooperative relations with other regional and UN bodies and with individual countries outside South Asia for mutual benefit.

Social issues, particularly poverty alleviation should not be neglected. SAARC is developing a Social Charter which is a long-term move towards working out regional targets or norms across a broad range of areas including poverty eradication, population stabilisation, the empowerment of women, youth mobilisation, human resources development, promotion of health and nutrition and the protection of children.

The increasing involvement of the non-governmental sector—the business community, professional groups, interest groups, artists, intellectuals etc—in activities which cut across regional boundaries also need to be channelled and facilitated to benefit the people of South Asia.

The institutional dimension is also becoming important and reforms are being called for as SAARC’s range of activities and their complexity broadens. This would include looking at the structure and frequency of Summits including the practice of the Retreat, the functions of the ministerial meetings and the meetings of the ministry secretaries, the proliferating technical and other committees and the Secretariat’s own capacity to contend with increased responsibilities and new challenges.

All these are part of a single ongoing process of development and it is difficult to isolate one aspect completely from another.