|
|
|
|
World Affairs
Vol. 4, Number 1 (Jan.–Mar. 2000)
Where is Pakistan Heading? Implications of the Coup D´Etat
By Moonis Ahmar
The latest military coup d´etat is different from the preceding ones in so far as Pakistan’s overall pluralist political system has been left intact
The army’s coup in Pakistan on October 12, 1999 led to the dismissal of the civilian government and suspension of its parliament and constitution. The last coup led by General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977 had resulted in a prolonged spell of martial law. The restoration of the democratic process after the death of General Zia in a plane crash on August 17, 1988 witnessed the dismissal of four governments and the continuous fragility of political institutions. The period from 1988 to 1999 saw the holding of four general elections, deepening of economic and political crises, and an upsurge of ethnic and sectarian strife. It was not a matter of surprise, therefore, when there was no domestic political backlash against the suspension of the democratic process after the dismissal of the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 12. On the contrary, people expressed their satisfaction when the army took control and reinstated the process of accountability.
It is not for the first time that Pakistan has experienced military rule. The first was in October 1958 when General Mohammed Ayub Khan imposed martial law, abrogated the constitution and banned political parties. The second time it was imposed by General Yahya Khan in March 1969, and the third by General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977. Given the frequent spells of Martial Law and military’s overt and subtle intervention in civilian affairs, Pakistan is quite prone to the suspension of political process. However, between the death of the last military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 and October 11, 1999, military had not overtly seized power. In fact, based on its unpleasant experience of meddling in civilian affairs, it had vowed never to indulge in political matters.
The coup of October 12 was a deviation from what the military had pledged after the death of General Zia. But unlike the coups in the past, the army has not imposed martial law, banned political parties, or unleashed a reign of terror against its political opponents. Nor has it imposed any restrictions on the media. The October 12 coup is different in that there are neither military courts nor military members in the Federal and Provincial cabinets. The prevailing system of governance is quasi-military because the top slot of chief executive is occupied by the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf whereas the members of the Federal and Provincial Cabinet are civilian. The National Security Council, apart from the three Services chiefs, too is civilian.
We propose to examine five important factors related to the October 12 event, viz:
Pakistan’s road to democracy has always been rocky. Since its inception as an independent country on August 14, 1947 the political process in that country faced numerous challenges from several quarters. It is not only military intervention that has destabilised the democratic process; the responsibility for the failure of democracy also lies with politicians. Ironically, after the death of General Zia when the military decided not to seize power but allowed the civilian government to function despite various crises, the political leaders who ruled the country failed to fulfil the aspirations of the people. However, when the country’s political and economic situation became miserable, and people at the helm of affairs played havoc with political, judicial and administrative institutions, the military as the only organised institution had to step in. One may ask: does the October 12 coup in Pakistan mean the failure of democracy? In fact, it will be interesting to examine whether the elected governments really were democratic in nature or were they only using democracy for the accomplishment of their own vested interests.
I. Civil-Military Relations
Pakistan’s political history is filled with examples of the military’s
intervention in civilian affairs. Because of the power struggle among politicians in the formative phase of Pakistan and their failure to stabilise democratic institutions, the bureaucracy and military assumed significant control in policy-making affairs. Six important factors contributed to the shaping of unpleasant civil-military relations. First, the authoritarian political culture of Pakistan, particularly in its Western aspect, promoted undemocratic practices like dismissal of elected governments (Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin by the then Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad in 1954) and the denial of equality in the affairs of the government (for the Bengalis of East Pakistan). The feeling among the dominant power elite of West Pakistan that the Bengali demographic edge in East Pakistan could only be countered by wrapping up the political process led to the imposition of martial law by General Ayub Khan in October 1958. The denial of majority status to Bengalis who constituted 55 per cent of the total population of Pakistan resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971. Since the bulk of bureaucracy and military belonged to West Pakistan, the martial laws of 1958 and 1969 deepened the feelings of alienation among the Bengalis of East Pakistan. It was largely due to the suppressive policies of the West Pakistan-dominated military and bureaucracy that the Muslim-majority province of East Pakistan seceded and emerged as the independent country of Bangladesh. Furthermore, martial law imposed in July 1977, caused a sharp polarisation in different segments of society on religious, sectarian and ethnic grounds.
Second, the security threat from India, particularly over the Indo-Pakistan conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, also justified the assertive role of the military in civilian affairs. The two major wars of 1965 and 1971 between India and Pakistan were fought when the Generals were in power. In fact, the military has always exaggerated threat perceptions from India so as to justify its role in politics and power. The following chart gives the rationale for the imposition of martial law in Pakistan.
Chart One
| Event | Reasons | Implications |
| Limited martial law imposed in Lahore in 1952 | To deal with anti-Ahmadya riots in Punjab | Involvement of army in civilian matters |
| Imposition of martial law in October 1958 by General Ayub Khan | To control political anarchy | Institutionalisation of military’s role in politics |
| Imposition of martial law in March 1969 by General Yahya Khan | The Military’s ambition to capture power in the aftermath of government-opposition tussle | Dismemberment of Pakistan in December 1971 |
| Imposition of martial law in July 1977 by General Zia-ul-Haq | To avoid civil war between the government and the opposition | Longest spell of martial law in the history of Pakistan and the fragmentation of Pakistani society |
Third, the feudal structure of Pakistan denied any effective role to political institutions. Since the majority of the members of parliament and provincial assemblies had feudal backgrounds and were least concerned about basic democratic principles, democratic institutions remained fragile. When the assemblies failed to establish a political culture based on tolerance, rule of law and good governance, the political process became vulnerable to outside intervention. Even when the politicians were in power after the death of General Zia in 1988 till the army’s takeover on October 12, 1999, the military’s role in politics remained subtle. The dismissal of Benazir Bhutto’s government in 1990 and 1996 and the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1993 by the President had the approval of the military. While the governments of Benazir and Nawaz were dismissed on charges of corruption and inefficiency, it was argued that politicians, because of their corrupt practices, were incapable of ruling and the only institution able to govern the country was the military. Ironically, both Benazir and Nawaz, during their tenure as prime ministers, felt insecure from pressures of the "real establishment" i.e., the military. It is indeed striking that no civilian government in Pakistan, except Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-1977) could complete its tenure. While the President under constitutional power dismissed the governments from 1988 to 1996, the army dismissed the government of Nawaz Sharif in 1999. In 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with the support of parliament revoked the controversial eighth amendment in the constitution, which had given wide powers to the President, including the power to dismiss the government.
The following chart spells out the periodic dismissal of governments from 1988 to 1999.
Chart Two
| Governments dismissed | Reasons | Dates |
| Mohammed Khan Junejo | Inefficiency and Corruption | May 29, 1988 |
| Benazir Bhutto | Inefficiency and Corruption | August 6, 1990 |
| Nawaz Sharif | Inefficiency and Corruption | April 18, 1993 |
| Benazir Bhutto | Corruption and Extra-Judicial killings | November 5, 1996 |
| Nawaz Sharif | Corruption | October 12, 1999 |
Fourth, growing illiteracy and backwardness made the people powerless and increased the misuse of power by politicians. No government in Pakistan had ever seriously tried to empower people at the grassroots level. As a result, because of marginal political consciousness among people about their rights and responsibilities democracy could not take off in Pakistan. Fifth, the role of intelligence agencies in weakening the democratic process in Pakistan is also well-known. It is argued that the intelligence agencies like Military Intelligence (MI), Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Intelligence Bureau (IB), having affiliations with the military, made concerted efforts to weaken civilian governments. Politicians having links with intelligence agencies also contributed to discredit democracy in Pakistan.
Finally, the military like other institutions is not accountable. It has directly and indirectly remained in power in Pakistan for more than quarter of a century and did nothing to contribute to the stability and well-being of the country. In fact, the dismemberment of Pakistan took place when the military was in power and the country’s social fabric was destroyed during the longest spell of martial law from July 1977 to December 1985. Therefore, the myth about the military’s ability to deliver goods is questionable. In fact, had the political, judicial and educational institutions in Pakistan been allowed to function on an even keel, democracy would have developed roots in the country. But, the continuous interference of the bureaucracy and military in civilian affairs, their lust for power, and the failure of politicians to fulfil the expectations of the people made it difficult for democracy to function efficaciously.
II. Rationale of Coup
Both the politicians and military have blamed each other for creating conditions for the failure of the democratic process. From the politician’s point of view, the military had never allowed political stability to take root in Pakistan because of its interest to govern, and even during the tenure of civilian governments, the military followed a policy of subtle intervention. The military, on the other hand, argues that it is the inept and corrupt practices of politicians that have forced it to take over.
As far as the rationale for the coup of October 12 is concerned, there are two divergent perceptions. The first is that the army had not planned that coup and was forced to retaliate when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered the forced retirement of the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, and refused permission for his plane to land on his return from an official tour of Sri Lanka. The army reacted to Nawaz Sharif’s actions, particularly to the manner in which he was trying to create a rift in the armed forces. The second argument is that the coup of October 12 had no justification because a legally constituted government was in power and all its organs were functioning smoothly. Most important, by overthrowing a democratically elected government and suspending the constitution, the army had committed an act of treason. Those subscribing to this point of view argue that the army was conspiring to takeover and had used the issue of General Pervez Musharraf’s forced retirement to accomplish its power ambitions. In fact, the US State Department in the third week of September had issued a warning against a possible military takeover.
Justifying the overthrow of Sharif’s government, the Chief Executive General Musharraf stated in an interview to a Karachi-based English magazine that:
"It is because of the government’s own misdoing that the people wanted to throw them out and the military being the only organised, established and credible force had to stabilise the situation. It’s the government itself which always looks up to the army whenever there is a problem, an internal security problem, floods, catastrophes, or any national issue. If there are elections they request the army to help. If there is a census to be held, they approach the army. If they want to check schools and teachers, they look to us. If they want to set the railways right they again come to us. So the army in Pakistan is actually seen as a body that can deliver. It is they themselves who create this environment, and then they suffer from a sense of insecurity.
The following chart spells out the measures which former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif adopted to consolidate his hold over power.
Chart Three
| Measures | Reasons | Implications |
| Annulment of President’s power under the eighth amendment of the constitution to dismiss the government in April 1997 | Fears by the Sharif government that it may become a victim of that power | Erosion of the President’s powers as comparted to the prime minister |
| Removal of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and attack on the building of the Supreme Court in November 1997 to harass senior judiciary | Fear that Sharif may be disqualified in a corruption case by the Supreme Court | Erosion of the judiciary’s power to check the policies of the government |
| Pressure on President Farooq Leghari to resign from office in December 1997. | President had supported the Chief Justice in his tussle with the prime minister | Induction of his trusted man to the office of Presidency |
| Imposition of emergency following the nuclear test of May 1998 | Nuclear tests | coercive measures against opposition |
| Resignation of Chief of Army Staff, Gerneral Jehangir Karamat in October 1998 | General Karmat’s proposal to set up National Security Council | Furth consolidation of Sharif’s power |
| Crackdown on the media May-June 1999 | Publications of corruption stories against Sharif and his colleagues | Setback to the democratic process |
In his first speech on October 17 after taking over power, General Musharraf made it clear that, "he took these responsibilities in very unusual circumstances. It is unbelievable and sad that those at the helm of affairs had conspired to destroy the highest institution of the country, the only institution left in the country. It is a fact that we have only seen, in recent years, a democracy that was democracy only in name. I will not allow the people to go back to the era of a sham democracy. I promise you that we will institute a true democratic system that will enshrine the real spirit of democracy." While refraining from giving a time frame for the restoration of democracy, the Chief Executive unveiled a seven-point agenda as a top priority for his government. The agenda included the following items.
While it is true that the seizure of power by the army is contrary to democratic principles the ground realities on October 12 tend to justify that act. Ironically, governments established as a result of an electoral process failed to resolve basic economic, political and social issues. Their failure to improve the economy, establish the rule of law and create a basic sense of security among people discredited the democratic process and provided an opportunity for a military takeover. The use of force against political opponents, curbs on the media, coercive tactics used against the judiciary and rampant corruption eroded the credibility of politicians.
The most important reason that contributed to the failure of the government of Nawaz Sharif and the justification for the October 12 coup, is economic. When Nawaz Sharif assumed power for the second time in February 1997 he had pledged to cleanse the economy from corruption and provide good governance to the people. For the first 100 days he focused on accomplishing these objectives but as time passed he reverted back to a state of indifference on the real issues. According to an investigative report, "International bodies and official Government of Pakistan documents indicate that bureaucracy and business sponsor corruption amounting to at least US $ 2 billion a year from the economy. At least US$ 4.2 billion is missing from the government’s financial institutions and there are 483,094 documented bank defaulters in the country. According to a conservative estimate, taxes and duties worth US$ 3.2 billion is evaded every year while the number of taxpayers in a country of 140 million stands at 1.6 million. According to the State Bank of Pakistan source, a major portion of defaulted loans is stuck with 250 leading businessmen and members of the political elite of the country. On the external front, because of the law and order situation and other problems, foreign investment in Pakistan in 1998 declined to US$ 360 million from an average of US$ 2 billion from 1994-95 to 1997-98. It is believed that overseas and local Pakistanis have kept US$50 billion in foreign banks overseas. In addition to this, remittances of overseas Pakistanis registered a decline of 43 per cent during the first two months of current fiscal year (1998-99) aggravating the problem of balance of payments. The decision of Sharif’s government to freeze foreign currency accounts and its confrontation with the Independent Power Projects (IPP) shattered the confidence of the business community and foreign investors. Although sanctions imposed on Pakistan in the aftermath of its nuclear tests in May 1998 caused damage to the economy, the government did little to broaden the tax base and plug corruption holes.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when the October 12 coup toppled the government of Nawaz Sharif there was very little condemnation. Having lost contact with the people and having failed to reform the system, Sharif could not mobilise popular support against the coup. General Musharraf’s assertion that the army’s takeover was the result of the mess created by the politicians appears logical. Twice Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif got an opportunity to rule and on both occasions they failed miserably, to alleviate the plight of the people and provide good governance. Due to their authoritarian approach and poor performance, as well as the low credibility of Benazir and Nawaz while dealing with the opposition, the democratic process in Pakistan has suffered irreparable damage.
III. Opinions
At the domestic level, the overthrow of Sharif’s government was met with no resistance. But, an international wave of condemnation against the October 12 coup led to the isolation of Pakistan’s military regime.
Four different opinions emerged about the coup. First, the coup was unconstitutional and hence undemocratic in nature. There was no need to overthrow a democratically elected government because there was no threat to the country’s security and all state institutions were working smoothly. By dismissing an elected government, the army has violated the constitution. Those who subscribe to this opinion are members of the former ruling party and its allies. They demand an immediate restoration of the constitution, government and parliament. Second, the coup was legitimate because of the acts of the Sharif government. While arguing in favour of the coup, supporters of this opinion demand an early restoration of political process and the holding of elections. Those belonging to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and other allied political parties are in favour of immediate polls. They argue that the military is not in a position to clean society because its main task is to protect the boundaries of the state. Therefore if the military remains in power for a long duration, its professional capabilities will suffer and it may become corrupt like the politicians.
The third opinion favours a rigorous accountability process and demands that elections should be held once corruption is uprooted and once, as a result of reforms in the electoral process, dishonest and corrupt elements are denied entry into assemblies. People supporting this opinion argue that if elections are held immediately or in the near future, same old corrupt faces will return to power. Therefore, without cleansing the economic and political systems elections should not be held. The seven-point agenda of General Musharraf and his position on restoring the political process is close to the third opinion. The Chief Executive has resisted pressure launched from international and domestic circles to announce a date for the holding of elections. He has made it clear that if the accountability process is not launched with full force and electoral reforms are not introduced, the very purpose of the October 12 coup will evaporate. Those who have lost their trust in the rule of politicians support the third opinion.
Finally, there are people who believe that there is no need to hold elections because, given the low level of literacy rate and the feudalistic culture, the so-called elected government will not attempt to better the socio-economic conditions of people. According to the followers of this opinion, who represent extremist groups, Western style democracy is not suitable for a country like Pakistan where people have little understanding about the power of the vote and are bound to be exploited by dishonest politicians.
It seems that the policies so far adopted by the regime of General Musharraf and the reaction of people toward the political change of October 12 tend to confirm the holding of the third opinion. However, it is yet to be seen to what extent the military can resist the pressures of those who want early elections, and those who want to focus on the accountability process. As long as the government does not cross the following lines, it can resist pressure and reform the country. On the other hand, it will be under considerable pressure
Implications
The coup of October 12 will have far-reaching domestic and foreign policy implications. In the post-Cold War era military coups are very rare but the one on October 12 indicates the limits of civil society in developing countries. It also raises questions about the future of democracy in developing and Islamic countries.
Domestic implications
There are four domestic implications of the coup. The first is that the quasi-military regime in Pakistan resembles a "benign dictatorship". For the first time in the history of Pakistan the army’s takeover has not resulted in the imposition of martial law and the adoption of various punitive measures. So far, the regime of General Musharraf has not imposed curbs on political activities and it has launched across the board accountability. Therefore, given the relative tolerance which the government is exercising vis-á-vis its opponents, and its concentration on the devolution of power, it can rightly be termed as a "benign dictatorship". This is the first experience of this type of government in Pakistan’s history or perhaps in the history of the modern world. Second, as a result of the accountability process, one can expect some improvement in administrative machinery. The drive launched by the government to track down loan defaulters and improve work ethics will gradually yield positive results. It is an uphill task but given the seriousness of the government in taking the accountability process to its logical conclusion, one can expect a decline in the rate of corruption. The most important challenge for General Musharraf is to bridge the credibility gap, which exists because of past betrayals by various governments in fulfilling promises.
The third domestic implication of the October 12 coup should be the emergence of a new political leadership. It has been made clear by the new regime that as a result of electoral reforms, people with dubious and corrupt backgrounds will not be allowed to contest elections. This should pave the way for a qualitative change in Pakistani society. Unfortunately, no serious effort was made in the past to deny corrupt people any political position or role. As a result, since 1988 to 1996 four governments were dismissed and each time (except when Prime Minister Junejo was dismissed by General Zia on May 29, 1988) the caretaker administrations pledged to launch the accountability process but always failed because they were not committed to the task of accountability. The following chart spells out the formation of caretaker government after the dismissal of governments.
Chart Four
| Prime Ministers Dismissed | Caretaker Government | Agenda |
| Mohammed Khan Junejo, May 29, 1998 | No caretaker Government was installed | To perpetuate the rule of General Zia |
| Benazir Bhutto, August 6, 1990 | Caretakers Government under Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi | To hold elections within 90 days and start the accountablility process |
| Nawaz Sharif, April 18. 1993 | Caretaker Government under Balkh Sher Mazari | To hold elections within 90 days and start the accountability process |
| Benazir Bhutto, November 5, 1996 | Caretaker Government under Malik Meraj Khalid | To hold elections within 90 days and start the accountability process |
It has yet to be seen how the present regime proposes to improve things, particularly when people have lost trust in elected and military governments. If the new leadership with clean and honest credentials takes over as a sequel to future elections, the credit will go to the present regime. Fourth, one may see some improvement in the quality of life of people as a result of measures adopted by the new regime. General Musharraf has adopted a number of measures to improve state structures, particularly those related to economy and administration. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) established to track down loan defaulters and other corrupt elements has succeeded in inducting a sense of efficiency among those who are responsible for running governmental affairs. It is possible that as a result of rigorous campaign for improving the economy and administration, the country may recover from bad governance and embarks on the road to progress and development.
One negative implication, which may occur in view of measures taken after October 12, is the possible confrontation between the government and the political forces. Since only very few political parties are above corruption, the accountability process will hurt their interests. By launching fair and across-the-board accountability, the government has started antagonizing politicians who fear an end to their career and role if they are tracked down and punished. Therefore, one cannot rule out the possibility of an alliance of politicians against the military regime and the launching of an agitation against its rule. In that eventuality, the government will have to use force leading to the imposition of martial law, complete banning of political activities and curbs on the media. The military government’s confrontation with politicians and vice versa will not be helpful for the betterment of the country and for the future of democracy.
External implications
It is in the area of foreign policy that the regime of General Musharraf is vulnerable and on the defensive. Since the very first day of taking power, the military regime began to face hostile international reactions. The US State Department had issued a warning in September 1999 against a possible military coup in Pakistan and had warned of serious consequences if the democratic process in that country was stopped. However, the US warning was ignored and the military took over on October 12. There are three major external implications of the coup in Pakistan. First, because of the question of legitimacy of General Musharraf’s office, external pressure on him to restore the political process would remain. Pakistan’s membership in the Commonwealth has been suspended and the European Union has condemned the military coup. Although the United States has not taken any concrete action against the new regime, it will continue to call upon Islamabad to hold elections and link the lifting of sanctions to the restoration of the democratic process. However, there is a possibility that because of the military coup, President Clinton during his forthcoming visit to South Asia may not go to Pakistan, though this may prove difficult for Washington. But much depends on the performance of Musharraf’s regime on the domestic front. If he succeeds in cleaning up the economic and administrative mess, international pressure may decline and he may get some form of international legitimacy.
The second external implication of October 12 coup pertains to India. So far New Delhi has not adopted a favourable policy vis-à-vis the new government in Islamabad. Initially the Indian prime minister had expressed his readiness to do normal business with the military regime but some of the steps taken by New Delhi tend to indicate a hostile Indian posture vis-à-vis Pakistan. The postponement of the SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) summit because of the Indian criticism of the military takeover in Pakistan and Vajpayee’s pronouncement that his country would continue its efforts to declare Pakistan a terrorist state is a clear indication of New Delhi’s hostility towards Islamabad. From the Indian point of view, normal ties with General Musharraf may not be possible because he was responsible for launching a mini war with India over Kargil. New Delhi holds the army, particularly General Musharraf and his colleagues, responsible for providing assistance to insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir, for promoting acts of terrorism within India and for being involved in the hijacking of an Indian Airline plane.
Pakistan’s new regime has expressed its willingness to normalise relations with India provided serious talks are held for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. General Musharraf, in his address to the nation on October 18, said that, "at the turn of the century South Asia stands at a crucial juncture of its history. The twentieth century saw our transition to independence but the region has unfortunately remained mired in conflicts and economic deprivation. Together, Pakistan and India can change this scenario. For this objective both must sincerely work towards resolving the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. I take this opportunity to announce a unilateral military de-escalation on our international borders with India and initiate the return of all our forces moved to the borders in the recent past. I hope this step would serve as a meaningful confidence-building measure."
However, sticking to a hard position on Kashmir, General Musharraf made it clear that, "hostility will be met with hostility and peace with peace. If there is any design of India to address issues, other than the Kashmir issue or to sideline the Kashmir issue, I am not going to be a part of it."
The Indian perception of the new regime is divided. One school of thought believes that there is a need to follow a policy of engagement with Pakistan while the second school of thought rejects that option arguing that New Delhi should pursue the policy of isolating the military regime because of its dangerous designs against India.
The first school of thought holds that engaging Pakistan at the best of times is fraught with risks. Dealing with an inscrutable and potentially unscrupulous military regime is even more dangerous. But, on balance, it would be in India’s best interests to articulate a policy that would include the possibility of reviving the dialogue with Islamabad, once it becomes clear that General Musharraf is firmly in control. The second school of thought sees Pakistan as a major threat to India’s security and supports punitive measures against that country. In an interview with the Press Trust of India (PTI) the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, said that "efforts are being made to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state. The decision in this regard was to be taken by the US which has the requisite authority. Incidents of terrorism from across the border have risen after the Kargil crisis and the change in the government in Pakistan is a hurdle in normalisation of relations between the two countries."
Hardliners in India also feel that, "while Taiwan, South Korea, Israel and South Africa have attempted to cultivate peace with their neighbours, turn increasingly democratic and improve their legitimacy, Pakistan has gained notoriety as a nation practising international terrorism, being involved in large-scale narcotics traffic, nurturing Islamic extremism and heading towards the status of a ‘failed state’. Dealing with this schizophrenic Pakistan cannot be done by India alone. It needs the help of other countries such as the US, China, Iran and the Gulf States, which are also affected in different degrees by this unstable and potentially dangerous state situation in a geographically vital area. India should take the initiative to formulate a common strategy to deal with this country and guide it back to normalcy."
It will take some time for India and Pakistan to resume the normalisation process because, aside from the Kargil affair, the question of the stability of the military regime is considered vital for the Indian rulers. In the past also, New Delhi dealt with Pakistan when the country was under military rule. But for the lowering of tension between the two countries there has to be resumption of dialogue at the highest level. As far as the implications of the coup on nuclear proliferation in South Asia is concerned, General Musharraf has made it clear that his country would follow the policy of maintaining minimum deterrence, both in conventional and non-conventional fields for its security, keeping in mind the developments across the border and considering that India is talking offensively about its nuclear strategy. Regarding the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) the military regime has made it clear that it favours consensus in the country before taking any decision in this regard.
Finally, it is feared that the military coup in Pakistan will be a source of encouragement to ambitious generals in the developing world. Unlike the Cold War years when military takeovers were common, overthrowing a civilian government in the post-Cold War era is considered something serious, particularly by the West. It is on these grounds that the Commonwealth and the European Union have strongly reacted to the military takeover in Pakistan.
V. The Future of Democracy
Will the military takeover in Pakistan be a step backward or a step forward for democracy? Political analysts on Pakistan have observed that because of weak political institutions and because of its feudal structure, the future of democracy looks gloomy. The following reasons justify that contention:
Based on the performance and record of various political governments in Pakistan, the question arises: were such regimes democratic or were they using democracy for the accomplishment of their vested interests? General Musharraf has maintained that under the name of democracy politicians had established a "sham democracy", and that he would take measures to establish true democracy by devolution of power, particularly at the grassroot level. Paradoxically speaking, all military rulers right from General Ayub Khan to General Musharraf have blamed politicians for all troubles and have repeatedly voiced their intentions of implementing reforms so as to provide social justice. But in practice, military dictators did nothing to reform institutions and either used religion or misgovernance by politicians to justify their stay in power.
The leaders of the former ruling party, Muslim League, argue that by dismissing the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and by suspending the political process, the military has damaged the constitution and democracy and that the only way to save Pakistan is by restoring assemblies. On the other hand, General Musharraf believes that the October 12 coup is not a step backward but a step forward for the establishment of real democracy. In his interview with the CNN, he stated that, "I will not like to get into politics. My job is to take the country out of its problems." He further said that he had been forced to end the 31-month rule of Nawaz Sharif’s government because Pakistanis saw darkness around, with no light anywhere in the tunnel. He refused to give any time frame for Pakistan’s return to democratic rule, saying he had certain objectives to achieve like revitalizing the battered economy, ensuring law and order, strengthening inter-provincial harmony, and conducting an across-the-board transparent accountability drive to weed out corruption. Justifying his refusal to give a time frame for the holding of elections he said that whenever a timetable is given, the machinery gets lethargic and people do not perform. So the best thing is not to give a time frame.
To some Pakistanis it seems that the new military regime has come to stay and that it should be given some time because it is too early to test their pledges. Since the people of Pakistan could tolerate the martial law of General Zia for a decade, why cannot they give General Musharraf a chance? In fact, runs the argumentation the "benign dictatorship" of General Musharraf is better than the ruthless martial law of General Zia or the "sham democracy" of Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto.
There are two possibilities as far as the future of democracy in Pakistan is concerned. First, the political process will be restored by the military regime after institutionalizing the accountability drive and reforming the electoral system. Logically, if elections are held without making structural changes in administrative, economic and political systems it will be difficult to stop the return of corrupt people in assemblies and in positions of power. The seven point agenda of Pakistan’s chief executive, General Musharraf is so comprehensive that its execution would require at least four to five years, and elections can only be held once channels of corruption are closed. In the meantime, the government can hold local bodies’ elections so as to empower people at the grassroot level.
It is not only a question of economic issues, but also the possibility of political, ethnic and sectarian fragmentation of Pakistani society that justifies the holding of power by General Musharraf. As long as the present regime continues with impartial and speedy measures of accountability and is above corruption, it will have credibility. However, the moment corruption permeates its rank and file, it will not be able to justify its existence in power. Second, the present regime, given its confrontation with political forces, may impose martial law and stay in power for a long period of time. Past experience shows that no military dictator in Pakistan has left power on his own accord. Either his exit was the result of massive agitation, dismemberment of the country or death. As long as the military regime of General Musharraf sticks to its agenda of reforms, is not corrupt and refrains from unnecessarily prolonging its rule, there is a possibility that the democratic process will be restored after a couple of years.