

Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support

A consensus among states is emerging, undoubtedly hastened by the September 11 attacks, that terrorism is of universal concern and in direct violation of the principles of the international community. This agreement contrasts markedly with the deep division on the issue immediately following the process of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century. At that time, many newly independent states were reticent to cede the authority over coercive means wholly to state actors, thereby denying legitimacy to future freedom fighters. Today, however, the number of states that have rejected the legitimacy of terrorism has reached critical mass, with holdouts increasingly forced to capitulate (Libya) or to be dealt with as rogue nations (Sudan).¹

A convergence in strategic interests has certainly helped to bridge this divide between the West and the developing world. Significantly, many of the newly independent states of the 1950s and 1960s now face terrorism problems of their own. The governments of still other states seem to manipulate the global war on terrorism to provide the necessary pretext for cracking down on long-standing domestic opposition movements. The decreasing likelihood of states debating the merits of terrorism, however, is also at least partly attributable to efforts to propagate international norms.

Studies of terrorism frequently address the concept of target audiences, groups generally defined as those whom terrorists seek to intimidate or influence through violence. However, it is also important to understand terrorists' other target audience—the aggrieved populations that they purport to represent. This latter group, not to be confused with terrorists' actual cadres, extends to a broader, less radicalized population that has the power

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The Washington Quarterly • 28:1 pp. 131–145.

to confer a degree of legitimacy on the terrorists simply by responding positively to their tactics. In the case of Al Qaeda, this group consists of diffuse or very loosely aligned supporters who welcome the news of a new terrorist attack or do not make an effort to distance themselves from Al Qaeda's claim to represent their cause. Denying terrorists the support of these constituents is a crucial component in the war on terrorism and requires approaches that go beyond the standard strategies employed in the current campaign. Marshaling international norms to stigmatize terrorism further stands as one such initiative that would deny terrorists the approval of these populations, pushing the terrorists' tactics farther toward the margins.

What's in a Norm?

Norms are generally defined as "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity."² A "standard" is thus meant to imply a behavioral regularity.³ "Appropriate," on the other hand, alludes to a subjective understanding of what is "proper," or how one "ought" to behave.⁴ Simply put, from the perspective of norm proponents, there are no such things as bad norms.⁵ Moreover, in the context of the war on terrorism, norms are not simply abstract moral guidelines, but powerful ordering principles with very practical implications.

In the life cycle of norms, norm entrepreneurs⁶ play a crucial role as catalysts in the earliest stages of development. They are the community leaders who through persuasion, mobilization, and activism begin to create the initial momentum that, if sustained, can lead to general acceptance and eventually institutionalization of these ideas.⁷ Operationalizing the norm, however, requires the constructive engagement of holdouts that continue to reject its relevance. Appeals can be tailored either to the universality of the concept or to its compatibility with the violators' own value system if it too obligates the prescribed behavior. In effect, norm entrepreneurs provide the information and publicity that can be leveraged to convince or shame norm violators into compliance.

The Helsinki Process is a good example of an initiative designed to provoke this type of cognitive dissonance. These negotiations between the West and the Soviet bloc, which were eventually codified in a series of principles that committed the signatories to mutual respect of territorial sovereignty and basic human rights, drew attention to the incompatibility between the former Soviet Union's self-professed commitment to the rights of individuals and individuals' obligations to the party as well as the state under Communist rule.⁸ Although the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975 did not establish any real enforcement body, the agreement provided a foundation for future negotiation

and, importantly, a convenient platform for the West to promote its own view of the respective obligations of individuals and society, an area in which the West had a clear stake in resolving in favor of personal liberties.⁹

DEFINING STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR

The establishment of legal codes defining states' rights and restraints regarding the use of force is a crucial first step in creating the conditions for accountability. Subsequently, rewarding compliant behavior and sanctioning noncompliant behavior creates the necessary incentives to spread the norm through a process of socialization.

The Geneva conventions are probably the most notable instance of an effort to codify limits on states' use of force. Although their precise application is sometimes disputed, the conventions provide a powerful reference for the treatment of noncombatants in wartime. In addition, the international community has endorsed a number of terrorism-specific initiatives such as the Hague Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979); and, more recently, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which criminalizes a host of activities that have been used to support or provide a haven for terrorist organizations. The acceptance and eventual internalization of an emerging norm demands passage of a series of litmus tests, most critically the norm's durability in the face of challenges.¹⁰ The first step, however, must be the clear communication of a standard or expectation of behavior. The aforementioned agreements help to provide this framework.

Norms are powerful ordering principles with very practical implications.

In effect, terrorists disregard two fundamental prohibitions. First, violence is not a legitimate means of solving political disputes, particularly when the aggressors are nonstate actors. This transcends Max Weber's well-known formulation that states have a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. A critical legitimizing condition when considering the use of force is that the agent in question is a sovereign power. Even in the language of those who assert Muslims' fundamental right to physical jihad, historical precedents suggest that resort to force requires authorization from some higher authority, particularly when the battle is for the expansion of Islam rather than the collective defense of the *ummah*.

The second norm essential to delegitimizing the strategy of terrorism is the belief that noncombatants are entitled to immunity and should not be subject to attack. Although terrorists often attempt to circumscribe this re-

straint by stressing their adversaries' own record of civilian casualties, the fact that this argument is made at all is a tacit recognition of the relevance of proportionality.

Importantly, these two norms are more than just theoretical constructs; their practical implications have long been debated both in Western and Islamic traditions. The Western discourses of *jus in bello* (what type of force is justified) and *jus ad bellum* (when force is justified) have led to the development of formal and informal codes regulating belligerents' responsibilities and obligations in wartime. Although the specific manifestations of these traditions have, of course, varied according to the particular historical context, general trends can be identified. Whether one speaks of the Hebraic, Roman, early Christian, or Germanic conceptions of war, each included provisions outlining justifications for war as well as treatments of the distinction between combatant and noncombatant.¹¹ Gradually, these notions have coalesced, developing into a Western consensus prohibiting tactics that are indiscriminate or disproportionate in scope and limiting the use of force to instances of self-defense.¹² Thus, although these rules are still contravened, their *de jure* acceptance does provide states with important normative referents that help order expectations and behavior.

Similarly, Arab culture and Islamic thought have a parallel tradition of theorizing on the definition of just war. Islamic interpretations also vary widely depending on the particular temporal, social, and political context. The Koran may be ubiquitous in the Muslim world, but its precise application and the interpretation of it and other essential texts differ considerably.¹³ Nevertheless, overriding themes emerge regulating force based on obligations both to God and to fellow man, Muslim or otherwise. Fred Donner, a scholar of the Islamic tradition, notes "examples of injunctions against killing women, children, and other noncombatants; similarly, [juristic literature] bars attacks on the enemy without first inviting them to embrace Islam, discusses the problem of 'double effect' (e.g., unintended deaths of noncombatants during a nighttime assault), and so on."¹⁴ Stepping back from the polarizing and largely misunderstood concept of jihad, a great deal of common ground actually exists on the restrictions applied to the use of force. What remains is the search for a mechanism to institutionalize these restrictions at the state and community level that would significantly help to undermine popular support for terrorist organizations.

ENFORCING COMPLIANCE

Once they are defined and recognized, the second step is to enforce adherence to a norm. The U.S. decision to publish its list of active state sponsors of terrorism—and in the process shame nations such as Cuba, Libya, Iran,

Sudan, and Syria, all of which have been suspected of aiding terrorist organizations or being slow to recognize the emerging norm against terrorism—is one example of how Washington seeks to enforce the international norm against terrorism. The Financial Aid Task Force (FATF), which publishes a list of “Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories,” uses a similar strategy in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financiers. Punishing states with military action or economic sanctions, such as the sanctions regime against Libya imposed in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, the cruise missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 in the aftermath of Al Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and the present Syria Accountability Act predicated in part on Damascus’ continued support of terrorist organizations, stands as an even more coercive approach. In short, the United States has long appealed to norms to build coalitions against terrorism.

The list of active state sponsors of terrorism is one way to enforce the norm.

Norm adherence should not be confused with or even imply voluntary agreement absent coercion. For example, compellence, or “acquiescence through fear,”¹⁵ is one of several means to secure adherence to a norm. What matters most is the expectation that actors comply with a code of behavior. At least initially, their rationale for compliance may be and often is self-interest or fear, but their adherence reinforces the pressure on others to follow suit. Over time, habitual compliance lends the norm a “taken-for-granted quality,”¹⁶ relieving norm proponents from the need to police its enforcement. A good example is the norm that developed against the slave trade, a case in which Britain, throughout the nineteenth century, employed its naval resources and credible threats of force to ensure the success of its antislavery campaign.¹⁷ Other norms even compel states to use force, such as the emerging norm for states to intervene in the case of genocide or other humanitarian disasters.¹⁸ In short, the propagation of a norm is not an abstract exercise in consensus building; it often involves a good bit of arm-twisting, and depending on the nature of the enforcement regime, the emerging norms may come with sharp teeth.

Deepening the Norm against Terrorism

To enforce the norm against state-supported terrorism, a top-down approach has largely been successful, with fewer states (with some notable exceptions, including Syria and Iran) now willing openly to flaunt the prohibitions against

supporting terrorist organizations. To what extent these norms have diffused to the general population, however, is an open question. It is also a critical one, in that today's most dangerous terrorist threat, Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups, has attained a surprisingly wide base of support throughout the Muslim world. Indeed, a study by the Pew Research Institute in June 2003 found that "solid majorities in the Palestinian Authority, Indonesia, and Jordan—and nearly half of those in Morocco and Pakistan—say they have some confidence in Osama bin Laden 'to do the right thing regarding world affairs.'"¹⁹

The creation of norms goes to the heart of this issue and stands as one means of addressing the gulf between the values to which states and their respective populations subscribe. Can the emerging consensus from the top-down effort spread to Muslim populations more generally, or must a second initiative be undertaken to coalesce support for restraints on violence at a grassroots level? In what ways would such a bottom-up approach differ from the experience of state-driven initiatives?

THE TOP-DOWN AGENDA

The international community undoubtedly should continue its efforts to delegitimize state-supported terrorism. Both UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and the FATF Eight Special Recommendations, which criminalizes the financial support of terrorist organizations, stand as important recent initiatives. Additionally, the international community should push to elicit unequivocal denunciations of terrorism from regional bodies such as the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Both of these organizations have ratified antiterrorism conventions, but in an attempt to satisfy the international community without delegitimizing the Palestinian struggle in the process, they define terrorism in such a way as to render their commitment less forceful. One caveat in the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, for example, states, "All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as a [terrorist] offence. This provision shall not apply to any act prejudicing the territorial integrity of any Arab State."²⁰ Thus according to this provision, liberation movements, unless they threaten a member state of the Arab League, may be exempt from the terrorist label.

Work also must be done to reinforce and broaden prohibitions against the funding of terrorist organizations, particularly those with multiple personalities such as the military, political, and social welfare wings of Hamas. Increasingly, terrorist groups are compartmentalizing their operations in order

to bypass existing regulations. This not only serves to reopen avenues to outside funding but also provides a convenient veneer of legitimacy for the terrorists. Whether or not these groups do good social work is in many ways beside the point.²¹ Their ties to terrorism and the benefit this relationship bestows on the parent organization is the critical question. For example, that Hamas provides much needed social services in Gaza is not disputed. The possible diversion of financing meant for these humanitarian projects to terrorist operations, however, is problematic. Indeed, the social welfare arm of Hamas has legitimized the less noble tactics of the organization, allowing Hamas to promote itself as something other than a strictly terrorist organization. Not until September of last year did the European Union finally accede to U.S. pressure to cut off funding to affiliate groups of Hamas. The difficulty in reaching consensus on this issue points to the need to define support for terrorism more broadly.

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Additionally, the definition of state culpability must be expanded to include other indirect support to terrorists, such as willful neglect in securing borders or a failure to crack down on activities such as the narcotics trade that may facilitate terrorist activities by providing access to hard currency, transnational networks, etc. Thus far, the propagation of norms has appropriately focused on direct support for terrorists, but holding states accountable to some minimum level of effort in deterring terrorists from using their territory as a base of operations or policing criminal networks that have natural linkages with terrorist organizations is a logical next step. In sum, to sustain momentum, the international community should raise the bar to reflect an expectation that states not just passively accept their obligations to refrain from supporting terrorist organizations, but also proactively take steps to eliminate them.

Finally, the depoliticization of efforts to strengthen international norms is necessary to create objective metrics for judging state commitments to the war on terrorism as well as an effective enforcement regime. Rather than the current sliding scale that defines state support of terrorism differently based on political considerations, standards should be harmonized. Whether the case in question is Pakistan's support for Kashmiri groups or Iran's arming of Hizballah, inconsistently applying standards does not aid efforts to eliminate terrorism. Similarly, although defining terrorism is notoriously difficult, terrorist organizations should be classified based on the tactics they use rather than a *quid pro quo* whereby, for example, states make their co-

operation in the global war on terrorism contingent upon defining bothersome opposition movements in their own country as terrorist organizations.

DEVELOPING NORMS FROM THE BOTTOM UP

Although state-driven initiatives have made and continue to make significant progress, such initiatives must be complimented by a parallel bottom-up approach to deny terrorist groups access to their bases of popular support. Top-down initiatives are limited because state diplomacy is often at odds with the value systems of a state's citizenry. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where few regimes can be described as being truly representa-

tive. Moreover, a number of states have charted a decidedly pro-Western course (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey) while significant segments of their populations hold very different political and cultural sensibilities.

Secondly, although states have crucial roles to play in regulating the use of force, terrorism is fundamentally a subnational phenomenon. As such, its elimination will require changing perceptions at the community level.

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To expect state-driven initiatives alone to be commensurate with the task is to assume complete state sovereignty as well as states' unhindered ability to project their authority. This is not always the case, and thus states alone are inadequate to the task; self-policing at the community level is required to deny terrorists the room to operate. Moreover, only refusal by the aggrieved populations that terrorists purport to defend to implicitly justify the violence committed on their behalf—by remaining silent or, worse, acting as the terrorists' cheering section—can weaken terrorists' populist cover.

What makes these bottom-up efforts so difficult is the fundamental difference in their implementation from the state-driven initiatives that have dominated previous efforts. Namely, although a process of coercion, whereby the strong can compel weak states to submit to their will, can expedite the propagation of norms in the international system, norm creation at the subnational level will require either appealing to the community's self-interest or to the inherent legitimacy of the norms themselves.²² Diffuse ideological support for terrorists is simply not subject to the logic of conventional power politics. Therefore, U.S. efforts must rely primarily on persuasion to stigmatize the use of terrorist tactics.

PRACTICAL STEPS FORWARD AT THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL

What then can the United States do to expedite the emergence of norms against violence at the community level? Acknowledging that change is difficult to institute from the top down, the United States should find creative means to support the efforts of local norm entrepreneurs. That said, providing this support is much more complicated than simply identifying members of a society that are sympathetic to the notion that violence is not the preferred means of settling disputes. The (negative) net effect of U.S. backing for Mahmoud Abbas during his brief tenure as the Palestinian prime minister in the summer of 2003 illustrates the potential pitfalls of overtly supporting a norm entrepreneur. The Bush administration's vocal support of Abbas simply undermined his domestic support. In the future, the United States should support norm entrepreneurs in a way that enables their work without also leading to their labeling as a U.S. proxy.

Fortunately, more subtle ways do exist to support norm entrepreneurs without engendering this backlash. However, such efforts will require time and patience. Contributing to the development of local institutions that promote norm convergence with Western values is one method that allows local norm entrepreneurs to receive support while remaining an arms length from its source. U.S./EU support for Birzeit University in Palestine, an institution that is both independent and (relatively) liberal, is an example of this approach. Bringing scholars and students to the West is another potential means to generate the conditions under which norm entrepreneurs may grow as intellectuals and activists. The resulting epistemic communities, or associations based on shared academic training, represent one type of norm entrepreneurship that has had significant success in advancing value-based agendas. Notable examples include loose organizations of natural scientists—coalitions whose members have very different cultural backgrounds but similar professional training—that have succeeded in mobilizing the international community to rethink state obligations toward the environment.²³

The United States also needs to improve its public diplomacy, specifically by communicating the compatibility of U.S. policy and values with the aspirations of those living in the Muslim world. This does not imply a foreign policy driven by global opinion, but the United States should clearly explain the rationale behind its decisions, which in turn should be carried out in a manner that demonstrates respect for the sensibilities and cultural sensitivities of others. Absent this effort, Muslim audiences have no compelling al-

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ternative to the tortured logic of Al Qaeda.²⁴ Better communication will require significant investment in the U.S. capacity to reach audiences in the Middle East, either via mass media or through a buttressed and better-trained Foreign Service.²⁵ The goal of such a process would not be to indoctrinate but rather to engage dissenters and provoke introspection among those prone to supporting terrorism framed as resistance.

Change often does come from the bottom up, and overwhelming military force is not always the most effective means of communication. Important

Al Qaeda's statements suggest that the norm is spreading.

historical precedents exist of introspection catalyzing dramatic shifts in thinking as well as policy. The Soviet Union's liberalization and South Africa's rejection of apartheid are two notable examples. Neither took place within a strategic vacuum, but both changes in posture reflected internal unease with the unifying logic of the regime.²⁶ Another example is the U.S. drive in the 1970s to rein in the CIA and to prohibit assassination as a foreign policy tool. At

that time, spreading awareness that the CIA had plotted the murder of a number of foreign leaders under the administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon provoked concerns that the United States was forfeiting any claims to moral leadership.²⁷ The investigating Church Committee's public admonishment was intended in part to recapture some credibility in the international community and to foster a norm against assassination internationally.

Today, Executive Order (EO) 12333, a successor to earlier efforts undertaken during the Ford administration, embodies the code against assassination, with every administration since confirming its expression of self-restraint. Although the order is consistent with the stipulations of the Hague Convention IV (1907), of which the United States is a party, EO 12333 goes a step further in specifying the restrictions as well as including a prohibition against indirect participation in an assassination plot.²⁸ This unilateral expression of U.S. willingness to sanction its own breaches and excesses is the same process of self-reflection that the United States should be promoting elsewhere. Today, the prisoner abuse scandal in Abu Ghraib calls for an even more robust effort at self-policing to salvage some of the credibility that the United States has lost from this episode. The blatant disregard for human rights not only invites backlash, but also cripples U.S. ability to exert moral influence and promote a broader norm against the use of unregulated violence.

Finally, a corresponding effort must be made to address the material conditions under which terrorists prey on the frustrations of the disenfran-

chised. Any attempt to win hearts and minds that simply skirts around root causes dooms itself to failure. Poverty, lack of social mobility, a poor educational infrastructure, and the denial of basic human rights all contribute to the hopelessness that terrorists exploit. Unfortunately, these conditions are widespread in the developing world and, even with enhanced commitment to development initiatives, these issues will persist far into the future. Progress in addressing root causes will help pave the way for broader acceptance of norms against terrorism at the subnational level. The slow and incremental nature of that progress should not deter the West from dramatically increasing its investment and commitment to addressing root causes.

THE FEEDBACK LOOP: NORMS ARE WORKING

In general, the compulsion of norm-breakers to offer ex post facto justifications of their actions provides evidence that a threshold has been crossed and, moreover, that the boundary is becoming more well defined.²⁹ A useful example of this is the U.S. need to rationalize its continued use of antipersonnel landmines in the Korean Demilitarized Zone. In this case, the norm has not yet reached a point where the United States has been forced to cease employing these devices, but it does carry enough weight to compel the United States to explain its position and to adhere to certain limitations, thus signaling a shift in thinking on this issue.³⁰

In the case of terrorism specifically, recent messages attributed to Al Qaeda suggest a consensus growing within the Muslim world against the targeting of noncombatants. Following the bombings in Casablanca, Riyadh, and Istanbul in 2003, operations that amounted essentially to Muslim-on-Muslim violence, Al Qaeda made repeated attempts to justify the indiscriminate nature of their attacks explicitly. For example, on November 17, 2003, members of Al Qaeda sent the following message to the Arabic daily *Al Quds Al Arabi*:

Some claim that we consider most Muslims as non-believers and sanction killing them. How do we go everywhere to protect them and then sanction shedding their blood? This cannot be accepted by sound reason, let alone a Muslim who knows the rulings of God. We have repeatedly warned Muslims against approaching the places of infidels, and we now renew the warning. Moreover, it is impermissible, according to Shari'a ... to mix with those infidels, neither in their homes nor in work places, until they stop their crusading war against Islam and Muslims.³¹

Similarly, attackers described the Muhaya residential compound bombed in Riyadh as "teeming with Arab translators for the U.S. intelligence services."³² These determined efforts to revise the nature of targets are not insignificant; the attackers' evident compulsion to redefine the identity of those killed indi-

cates fear over the implication of killing civilians. In short, Al Qaeda's statements suggest that disregard for the sanctity of noncombatants is no longer without political cost among their constituencies. The norm is spreading.

The Place for Norms in U.S. Strategy

Promoting respect for the rule of law, both domestically and at the international level, is in the U.S. national interest. Because the United States carries enormous normative weight in the international system, its values exert disproportionate influence in the development of international norms.³³ Free trade is one example of this dynamic whereby the United States and other leading economies have used their leverage to lobby for a more uniform international trade regime and, on the strength of this effort, have created an expectation reducing barriers to trade and reinforcing their own self interest. Thus, norms are not so much about imposing restraints on dominant states as subjecting the entire state system to the rules by which dominant states would prefer to play.³⁴ Moreover, in the specific case of restricting the use of violence, creating some semblance of order benefits the entire international community in that it allows states to pursue other national interests beyond narrow security concerns.

In effect, norms mitigate the need for states to operate assuming the worst of others. Whether or not other states behave as the United States would like, the predictability of their behavior is quite helpful. Subscription to or rejection of a norm stands as an important means for state actors to signal their intentions, reducing the considerable transaction costs of this uncertainty. In this sense, order has intrinsic benefits for all states. Although other methods, including the projection of overwhelming force, can also foster this type of environment, international norms offer a more efficient, cost-effective approach.

Finally, the propagation of norms as a method of combating terrorism need not come at the exclusion of other complimentary approaches. Ideational change is necessarily a long, slow process, and the propagation of norms is unlikely to make the world dramatically safer in the near term. On the other hand, the current mix of preemptive force, counterterrorism, and homeland security strategies are a quick fix. They will not serve as sustainable, long-term solutions without a parallel commitment to strengthening and broadening coalitions against terrorism. Norms have the potential to hold these coalitions together, absent the U.S. ability to affect conformity through coercion.

History is replete with examples of norms developing to limit the use of force. Whether we are speaking of outlawing the assassination of world lead-

ers, prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, or exempting medical personnel from being targeted in wartime, ideas and values have played a key role in limiting the circumstances when violence may be employed legitimately. In all these examples, however, the critical actors were states and the benchmark for compliance was state behavior. With respect to terrorism, the case must be made to publics directly. In short, delegitimizing terrorism requires establishing consensus both at the community and national levels.

The United States and the international community can help to build these norms not with patronizing platitudes, but by patiently articulating a compelling alternative to the logic of terrorism. Notable examples exist of aggrieved populations that chose to reject violence, be it the antiapartheid struggle or the majority of black Americans during the civil rights movement. In each instance, indigenous norm entrepreneurs overcame significant resistance to their causes to effect ideational and structural change. Corollaries exist in the Arab World; the West must find a way to support their efforts.

Propagating norms is a slow process, unlikely to have dramatic near-term effects.

Notes

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3. Christopher Gelpi, "Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 340.
4. Ibid.
5. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 892.
6. Finnemore and Sikkink employ the term "norm entrepreneur" while others prefer "transnational moral entrepreneur." For the latter usage, see Ethan Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," *International Organization* 44, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 485.
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8. Geoffrey Edwards, "Human Rights and Basket III Issues: Areas of Change and Continuity," *International Affairs* 61, no. 4 (Autumn 1985): 632.
9. Ibid.
10. Jeffrey Legro identifies durability, specificity, and concordance as the three benchmarks of a norm's robustness. Jeffrey Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism," *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 34.

11. James Turner Johnson, "Historical Roots and Sources of the Just War Tradition in Western Culture," in *Just War and Jihad*, eds. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991), pp. 7–12; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
12. Johnson, "Historical Roots and Sources of the Just War Tradition in Western Culture," p. 15.
13. These would of course include the Sunna and the Hadith.
14. Fred Donner, "Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War," in *Just War and Jihad*, eds. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991), pp. 31–33.
15. Ian Hurd describes "compellance" in this fashion: "Coercion refers to a relation of asymmetrical physical power among agents, where this asymmetry is applied to changing the behavior of the weaker agent. The operative mechanism is fear or simple 'compellance'; fear produces acquiescence." Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 383. See Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).
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17. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes," p. 492.
18. See Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2003).
19. Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Views of a Changing World," June 2003, p. 3.
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23. Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 52, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 5.
24. Edward P. Djerejian et al., "Changing Minds Winning Peace," *Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World*, October 1, 2003, p. 8.
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30. *Ibid.*

31. Abu Hafs Al Masri Brigades, "A Statement From the Jihad Rule About the Islamic Iron Hammer Operation," November 15, 2003, <http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/Turkey.htm> (accessed October 9, 2004).
32. Ibid.
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34. A more detailed discussion on this phenomenon can be found in Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

