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Editor's Note

Nine pivotal states, or countries "that could not only determine the fate of its region but also affect international stability," in the developing world were identified in January 1996 by Yale professor Paul Kennedy, Robert Chase, and Emily Hill.[1] Pakistan was one of them. One year later, reflecting the economic priorities of the late 1990s, Jeffrey Garten, dean of the Yale School of Management, named ten big emerging markets that held "the key to our economic well-being and to our security in the decades ahead."[2] Pakistan did not make that list. Pakistan's place in global security may have been debatable in the mid- to late 1990s, but any similar effort to identify the key countries to global security strategy after the September 11 attacks cannot exclude Pakistan.

Although Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, as well as Indonesia, Sudan, and Syria, among others, would also likely make the list, Pakistan raises all the concerns about the nexus of nuclear weapons and terrorism simultaneously. It is a declared nuclear state embroiled in a territorial dispute over Kashmir with its nuclear-armed neighbor, India. The two states have militarily clashed as recently as 1999 in Kargil, leading some experts to believe that, even though relations have improved more recently, their bilateral conflict remains the most likely scenario for the world's first nuclear war. Additionally, the mastermind of the recently exposed, transnational nuclear-supplier network that helped at least Libya and North Korea develop their nuclear programs is the father of the Pakistani nuclear program: A. Q. Khan. Meanwhile, the threat of terrorism lurks in recent, and allegedly current, Pakistani support for terrorist activity in Kashmir as well as for the Taliban and its residual elements in Afghanistan. These threats of nuclear conflict, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism are exacerbated by fears of the influence of radical Islamist elements in Pakistan's current government, the potential for the

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Musharraf regime to be overthrown by those elements, or the complete failure of the Pakistani state, all of which are discussed in the three articles that comprise the primary section of this issue.

The second section discusses the practical impact of international norms. These articles do not dwell on how to define norms theoretically, but on what difference they may actually make today. A search for the phrase "international norm" on the White House Web site reveals that even this president has invoked the phrase at least four times in the site's archived press briefings, speeches, remarks, or other documents, including most recently during his February 2004 National Defense University speech announcing new measures to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The three articles in this issue focus not on the nuclear arena, which is more frequently discussed elsewhere, but whether international norms actually exist and matter in the campaign against terrorism, efforts to promote democracy, and attempts to control biological weapons.

Finally, in addition to the array of Provocations that start every issue, five of which are included here, this edition resurrects the research survey, or a bibliographic essay assessing the state of English-language research on contemporary security and strategic policy, to conclude the Winter 2004–2005 edition. The traditional concluding essay, Charlie Cook's analysis of U.S. politics, will return in the spring of 2005 and every proceeding alternate issue. Meanwhile, the first of these surveys focuses on the recent public analytical trends of the role of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Notes

1. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996): 33–51. The authors later edited a more detailed discussion. See *The Pivotal States* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).
2. Jeffrey E. Garten, *The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our Lives* (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), p. xi.