Geoffrey Kemp

Europe's Middle East Challenges

Europe must stop fretting about the dominant role of the United States in the Middle East and start asserting European interests in Europe's backyard. Toward this end, confrontation with Washington is not required. Rather, closer, more equitable transatlantic cooperation on matters of vital importance to all three regions will benefit everybody.

Both the United States and Europe must do more to challenge the extremism that poisons the Middle East. Although disparate experiences and perspectives will forever preclude completely closing the transatlantic divide, this divide can be narrowed, first and foremost by acknowledging it for what it is. Americans are not from Mars and Europeans from Venus, but Americans are from a single nation, five thousand miles from the Middle East, while Europeans are a composite of different nations and next-door neighbors to more than 230 million Muslims. Just as the United States has unique, direct, and highly political relations with Central America independent of European–Central American relations, Europe's deep involvement with the Middle East will grow and become increasingly political, regardless of what policy the United States pursues in the region. Because of its very proximity, reliance on Middle Eastern energy supplies and resources, and deeply intertwined history, Europe's future is embedded in the Middle East, much more so than that of the United States. This circumstance does not minimize U.S. interests and concerns about the stability of the Persian Gulf, U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the unresolved situation in Afghanistan, but these issues increasingly involve Europe. Therefore, it is essential that the Europeans resolve their own regional policy disputes and work with the United States on key problems.

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A Solid Investment

To the frustration of U.S. policymakers, European politicians are often skittish about taking bold political stands on Middle Eastern issues precisely because of Europe's substantial geographic, energy, and historic stakes in the region. Europe's geographic location, unlike the distant position of the United States, separates it from the Middle East only by the Mediterranean Sea and Turkey and has helped to foster its growing dependence on the region for oil and natural gas. The Strait of Gibraltar, the narrowest point between North Africa and Spain, is just about 16 kilometers wide. Fairly good roads link Syria and Turkey with southeastern Europe. Undersea oil and natural gas pipelines already connect North Africa with Europe, and plans call for building more, especially now that new deep-sea pipe-laying technology has proven effective in the Black Sea. This development could make it possible for pipelines to connect Egypt's gas fields with southern Europe.

Close to 40 percent of Algeria's total gas production is sent via pipeline to Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Slovenia. Libya is North Africa's major oil exporter to Europe, selling 90 percent of its current production to European countries. With oil production currently at about 1.5 million barrels per day (mbd), Libya is looking to increase production to about 2 mbd, which would bring it to the country's 1970s levels, before U.S. and then United Nations sanctions crippled its exports. Persian Gulf oil exports to western Europe averaged about 2.3 mbd in 2002. The United States also imports about 2 mbd from the Middle East, but this amount represents a smaller percentage of its total imports (the United States imports most of its oil from the Americas—Canada, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela). Although oil is a fungible commodity, any major disruption in Middle Eastern oil supplies would affect both the United States and Europe because they would be competing for higher oil prices on the oil market. Europe might have to pay more for oil from the Americas because the transportation costs would be greater. In the future, Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern natural gas is likely to grow and become more critical to its overall energy profile.

In addition to proximity and energy dependence, European decisionmaking on Middle East policy is also influenced by the fact that the major European powers have had long and often traumatic experiences in the region. Recent British history in the Middle East, for example, involves numerous traumatic encounters, including its military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire, its management of the League of Nations mandate in Mesopotamia and Palestine, its World War II campaigns in the western desert, the joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of Persia in 1941, defensive treaties with the Gulf states, the painful experience with Arabs and Jews prior to the creation of the state of

Israel in 1948, the 1951 crisis with Iran over its nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, several crises with Egypt including the Suez disaster in 1956, and the 1971 decision to withdraw military forces from east of the Suez.

Italy's legacy in North Africa is equally tarnished. Libya's Col. Mu'ammar Qadhafi loudly displays the colonial wounds that Italy inflicted on his country with an annual Day of Mourning, during which Libya shuts its doors and shuns the outside world by closing its airports, severing international telephone connections, and demanding financial reparations from Italy.

> Europe's future is embedded in the Middle East, much more so than that of the U.S.

France, however, has the most bitter memories of the Middle East and especially of North Africa. French troops occupied areas from the Atlas Mountains of Morocco to the plateaus of Syria, where the French implemented their own civil and penal codes, school systems, language, and governmental authority over their protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia. The tragedy of Algeria haunts France to this day. Algeria was part of metropolitan France. The Algerian struggle for independence in the 1940s and 1950s was an exceptionally violent and traumatic experience, in which approximately 250,000 Algerians were killed. The war resulted in the collapse of France's Fourth Republic, the return to power of Gen. Charles de Gaulle, a rebellion and attempted coup d'etat against de Gaulle by dissidents in the French army, and eventual Algerian independence in 1962.

Germany, although it never possessed Middle Eastern colonies, has had strong historic ties with Turkey and Iran. Turkey, under the Ottomans, fought with the Central Powers during World War I. In the 1930s, the shah of Iran established such close ties with Berlin that Great Britain and the Soviet Union felt compelled to invade the country in 1941 to prevent a possible German breakthrough into the Caucasus and then the Persian Gulf. Germany has a unique relationship with Israel and the world's Jewish population as a result of the Holocaust.

As a result of this haunted legacy, the key European countries have been leery of too high a profile in the modern Middle East, except in the commercial arena. In an effort to overcome its history, Europe has engaged in several initiatives to establish independent European policies toward the Middle East. In 1980 the European Economic Community launched an initiative in Venice that called for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. The United States and Israel abruptly rejected this initiative; as a result, it went nowhere. The experience left a bad aftertaste and put a damper on

Europe's willingness to stake out policy positions at odds with Washington. Ironically, the Venice positions on a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have now been endorsed by the Israeli and U.S. governments.

Europeans are aware of their need to establish more stable, mutually beneficial relationships with their Middle Eastern and Mediterranean neighbors. In addition to its proximity to, energy dependence on, and interest in redeeming its legacy in the Middle East, Europe recognizes that the best way to curb the flow of illegal immigration from the greater Middle East into Europe is to encourage economic development and modernization in the region. Europe has taken steps toward this particular goal, but in the end, such efforts have been undermined by those challenges that European policy has not sufficiently addressed thus far.

Key European countries have been leery of too high a profile in the modern Middle East.

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership, for example, launched in Barcelona in November 1995 and known as the Barcelona Process was created with the goal of turning the Euro-Mediterranean basin into a region for dialogue, exchange, and cooperation with the goal of establishing peace, stability, and prosperity. Membership was limited to the 15 members of the European Union, plus 12 neighboring states and entities—Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Palestinian National Authority, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Libya was excluded but permitted to have observer status because it was still under UN sanctions for its complicity in the Lockerbie disaster in 1988. The United States and Russia were technically excluded because they did not meet the geographical or political requirements of membership. What emerged from the process were the so-called Three Pillars:

- A political and security partnership designed to create a framework within which regional stability might be pursued;
- an area of shared prosperity seeking the gradual establishment of a Mediterranean free-trade area by 2010; and
- a social, human, and cultural partnership aimed at developing the human dimension of international relations.

Inevitably, this partnership's grandiose agenda and disparate membership (Israel, for example, is still technically in a state of war with several Arab countries, including Syria and Lebanon) have made substantive progress dif-

ficult to achieve. Absent a final settlement of the key challenges complicating European policy in the Middle East, the prospects for achieving the Barcelona Process's most practical proposal, a free-trade zone, remain elusive. In addition, the broader goals of cooperation and harmony will be difficult to implement if the EU members themselves remain disunited on key unresolved conflicts.

Europe's Principal Challenges

Before Europe can fully complement U.S. power and influence and thus meet European interests in the Middle East, European leaders must address and resolve the following key problems.

Disagreements over Iraq

EU members have reached consensus on a common foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and relations with Iran, but they have yet to develop a common policy toward Iraq. Europe's long-term strategic interests, including a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, are closely tied to the success of the coalition's efforts to stabilize Iraq. If a more humane, representative Iraqi government emerges, it will be a positive force for reform throughout the region, which will serve U.S. and European interests. To believe that a new Iraq will lead to a new Middle East may be wishful thinking, but Europe would certainly prefer to see a new government succeed. Should either anarchy or another despotic regime result, continued violence and bitter social conflict will likely ensue throughout the region and, in turn, stymie economic growth and political reform in the Middle East, thus increasing immigration pressures on Europe.

Consequently, it is imperative for the EU to find common ground among its key members on Iraq policy. This task will not be easy in light of the bitter infighting before the war, especially between France and Britain, but there is too much now at stake to permit past disagreements to imperil future interests. The EU itself must reach a consensus and then coordinate its activities with NATO and the United States. This winning trio could go a long way toward assuring success in Iraq as well as setting a precedent for future policymaking on the Middle East. Fortunately, a new UN resolution for the management of postwar Iraq was passed unanimously in mid-October 2003, which should make it easier for Europe to coordinate Iraq policy. The resolution calls for the establishment of a multinational force led by the United States and for UN members to provide troops and money for Iraq's reconstruction.

Strained Relations with Israel

Although the United States and Europe have reached a common position on ways to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the transatlantic gap on attitudes toward Israel remains wide, especially in terms of public opinion. The fact that Americans are far more supportive and protective of Israel than Europeans has far-reaching ramifications and is a clear obstacle to better cooperation. Despite the fact that the EU is Israel's largest trading partner, political relations between the two are bad—a relatively recent phenomenon.

The transatlantic gap on attitudes toward Israel remains wide.

At the time of the Six-Day War in June 1967, the majority of the European elite empathized with the Jewish state, in part because of their hostility toward key Arab governments. For Britain and France, Egypt and its demagogic leader Gamal Abdel Nasser were especially reviled. Egypt had actively backed the insurgents in Algeria, and both Britain and France remembered the humiliation they experienced during the Suez crisis in 1956. Most Europeans perceived that the Arabs were ganging up on Israel with the intention of destroying the state. Furthermore, a strong Cold War element persisted: the Soviet Union was actively and mischievously promoting conflict by arming and siding with the radical Arab states and, in the case of the Six-Day War, providing Egypt with misinformation about Israel's military activities, thus driving Nasser to the brink of war.

At that time, Europeans did not see Israel as a regional superpower but as a state that was vulnerable to the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Arabs. The Israelis themselves were far from confident in their chances for succeeding in the 1967 conflict; Israelis dug burial trenches in Tel Aviv parks to prepare for large numbers of expected civilian casualties caused by Egypt's powerful long-range Russian bombers, including the awesome Tupolev-16.[1] The belief that the Israelis could be literally pushed into the sea was real.

When war came, it was swift, decisive, and heroic. European admiration for Israel's performance was widespread. France's aircraft designers and manufacturers preened in delight at the performance of their Mirage aircraft, which had provided the cutting edge of the Israeli air force's preemptive strike on June 5. British foreign secretary George Brown chuckled with glee at the Egyptian army's poor performance. Most European newspapers featured photographs of the liberation of East Jerusalem, in particular scenes at the Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall. With the exception of de Gaulle, who chose this moment to impose an arms embargo on Israel, Euro-

peans by and large shared the United States' delight in the defeat of the Arabs and their Soviet benefactors.

A very different atmosphere pervades Europe today. Most European leaders and much of the public believe that the Israeli government is as much to blame for the failure to solve the Palestinian problem as the Arabs are. The majority of Europeans believe that the politics of the Sharon government are themselves partly responsible for the failure to reach an agreement with the Palestinians. Europe has no equivalent to the powerful support for Israel found in the U.S. Congress among the American Jewish community and evangelical Christians who, for both ideological and theological reasons, support the concept of a "Greater Israel," which for years has been the ideology of the Likud Party. Europeans believe that it is myopic for the United States to adopt a soft-line response to Israeli activities, especially continued settlements and land appropriations. Although European officials do not evoke any moral equivalency between Israeli behavior and Palestinian support for terrorist activities, European public opinion is less forgiving. Public opinion polls show that Israel's popularity in Europe has fallen significantly over the years.[2] Most seriously, Israel can no longer take for granted the political support from Germany as a result of World War II, on which it has relied.

As long as this persists, Israel will continue to respond negatively to European initiatives.

Undercurrents of what some fear might signal a rise in anti-Semitism among European elites are most blatantly manifested in the open hostility shown to Israel, such as calls for banning Israeli scholars (including members of the Israeli peace camp) from participating in academic exchanges with European universities; the shrill, incessant claims that the Sharon government is turning Israel into another South Africa; and the drumbeat of hostile stories in Europe's left-of-center newspapers. Europeans are especially sensitive to the charge that anti-Semitism is on the rise. Not only does the accusation touch on raw nerves over past European cruelty toward Europe's Jewish population, but it also assures further criticism from the United States, especially from its Jewish community, Congress, and Christian evangelical supporters.

Thoughtful Europeans find these developments disturbing. The fact that the perpetrators of most of the violence against Jews and Jewish institutions are Arabs points to the social crisis Europe faces because of its inability to integrate Arab populations into the mainstream of European societies. These fears are linked to concerns about terrorism in Europe and the fact

that so many members of the Al Qaeda organization have lived and worked in Europe for years and have established numerous sleeper cells that could spring into action at any time. This issue is linked to the challenges to Europe posed by legal and illegal immigration from the Muslim world, especially from North Africa.

What is troubling to Israelis and to much of the U.S. public are the seemingly callous attitudes of the European press and elite toward Muslim suicide-bombing attacks against Israeli civilians. Israel's occupation policies and draconian retaliatory measures merely compound the problem, of course, but one wonders how Europeans would behave were they subject to a similar level of violence. From September 2000 through February 2003, more than 370 Israelis were killed and 2,800 were wounded in major suicide attacks.[3] As a proportionate parallel, imagine if approximately 3,700 French residents were killed and 28,000 wounded within a 30-month period (Israel's population of 6.34 million is roughly one-tenth the size of France's 59.27 million). Were France to have encountered such attacks from suicide bombers in North Africa or from within France's Muslim population, the French response surely would have been awesome and ruthless.

Such European sentiment has prompted a general Israeli distrust of Europe, and as long as this persists, Israel will continue to respond negatively to European initiatives, even seemingly sensible ones. This reaction weakens European efforts to establish credibility in the Middle East and in Washington. It is essential that relations improve because Europe has a great deal to offer Israel. The United States may have more emotional involvement in Israel and the need to resolve the Palestinian conflict, but in the end, Europe, not the United States, will suffer most if the conflict persists.

The best way for Europe to reconcile relations with Israel is for Europe to convince that country that it cares about Israel's physical and economic security and that, should a final peace treaty with the Palestinians be reached, the EU will step up its economic and security commitments to Israel. Improved relations along these lines could eventually mean some closer association for Israel with NATO and the EU. Although not necessarily requiring formal membership at this time, a more tangible relationship certainly might help persuade a very skeptical Israeli public that giving up most of the occupied territories, although a clear security risk, has compensations.

Europe's Islamic Problem

Despite antagonism toward Israel, Europe is not soft on Islam. According to the German Marshall Fund's latest survey of transatlantic trends, Europeans share the American public's belief that international terrorism is the most serious threat to their security. Moreover, according to the same survey, Eu-

ropeans rate the threat of Islamic fundamentalism slightly higher than Americans do.[4] Europe may not have been victim to the September 11 attacks, but Europeans have rounded up Al Qaeda cells in their own cities, and European citizens have been killed in Islamic terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Tunisia, and Indonesia.

Currently, an estimated 15 million Muslims reside in EU member countries. France and Germany have more than 10 million Muslims and only 700,000 Jews, a figure that helps explain the relative attention paid to each group's needs.[5] Each European country has to cope with a different set of Islamic issues. Great Britain's sizable Muslim population comes primarily from South Asia, while in Germany, Muslims are mostly from Turkey with a large Kurdish component and in smaller numbers from Bosnia. French Muslims come primarily from francophone Africa, especially Algeria and Morocco. In Spain and Italy, the key problems relate to illegal Muslim immigrants swarming into their cities from North Africa and the Middle East. Each of the smaller European countries—Belgium, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, and Austria—all have Muslim communities; and political problems, riots, and violence have broken out often for seemingly trivial reasons, indicating an underlying discontent.

A transatlantic agreement must be reached on the issue of Palestinian leadership.

Over the past decade, anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments and incidents have increased in many European countries, although the trend became increasingly palpable after September 11, 2001. The EU consequently established a regional system to monitor and report on these developments. In May 2002, the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia published a report that cites a growth in verbal abuse against Muslims as well as physical assaults on property owned or used by Muslims, particularly mosques and community centers, throughout European countries.[6] Some of Europe's anti-Islamic behavior can be traced to Islamic activities in Europe, including a number of anti-Western, anti-Israeli, and anti-Semitic protests and attacks organized by Muslim extremists. These incidents have emerged partly in protest of Israeli policies in Palestine, U.S. policies toward Iraq, and the war on terrorism. Europe's Islam problem goes both ways, however, as many Jewish and other European citizens increasingly see Muslims as an internal security danger and threat to their cultural identities and as Europe's Muslim populations feel threatened by rising discrimination and intolerance.

The noted French scholar Olivier Roy describes two types of radicalization taking place among the Muslim diaspora in Europe. The first, less common

form is generally nationalistic, with its goals, identity, and ideology defined by and intricately linked to each group's country of origin. The second, and an increasingly popular trend of Islamist radicalism, envisions a transnational *umma*—a religious identification beyond national borders—and a universalist conception of Islam. Roy characterizes the emergence and spread of the latter as a modern reaction to Western culture and society and argues that a proper understanding of the nature of radical Islam's threat to Europe requires a thorough examination of the reasons why Muslim immigrants are increasingly appealing to transnational visions of Islam rather than assimilating or integrating into European society.[7]

The EU must outlaw all terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that European politicians increasingly have to take into account the Muslim factor when sounding forth on controversial questions relating to the Middle East, immigration, political asylum, welfare benefits, and race relations. Jack Straw, Great Britain's foreign secretary, represents the parliamentary constituency of Blackburn, Lancashire, with a population of 25,000 Muslims and 23 mosques, making the registered voters more than 15 percent Muslim. More than two million Muslims are French citizens, who vote in French elections, while in Belgium, second-generation Muslims are demanding more and more concessions from the state. One radical leader, Dyab Abu Jahjah, has advocated that Arabic be accepted as one of Belgium's official languages, along with Flemish, French, and German.

In sum, Europe's Islamic problem has political, economic, sociological, and security implications. Unlike the United States, which has a history of absorbing immigrant groups into the melting pot, Europe's Muslim communities generally feel alienated from the cultures in which they find themselves. When coupled with economic discrimination and unresolved tensions over the Arab-Israeli conflict, this is a sure recipe for further turmoil. One must distinguish between the different problems faced by very different Islamic groups within Europe. Despite its antagonism toward many Muslims, however, Europe remains an economic magnet. For this reason, immigration, legal and illegal, will grow, especially if the situation in the Middle East further deteriorates.

Turkey's Application for EU Membership

In dealing with its Islamic problem, Europe has yet to provide a specific date for beginning formal negotiations with Turkey regarding EU membership. Although allusions were made to a tentative date during the December 2002 EU

summit, obstacles that could derail the process remain, including lingering basic differences over Cyprus. The importance of Turkey's membership in the EU relates not only to Europe's relations with the Middle East but also to the broader role of Islam in the modern world, as Turkey's ascension into the EU would have a positive impact on modernization of the Middle East.

Fortunately, Turkey's application for EU membership is being taken much more seriously now as a result of reforms instituted by the Turkish government over the past year on a range of political issues that further qualify Turkey to meet EU membership requirements. According to the decisions made at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, future countries applying for EU membership would have to satisfy a set of political and economic criteria for accession that later became known as the Copenhagen Criteria. In sum:

> Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the [u]nion. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.[8]

Should this very specific blueprint be implemented in Turkey, it could have more radical implications for the Muslim world than the hoped-for developments in Iraq. For instance, Iranian intellectuals realize that it will be easier to achieve their own democratic reform efforts if Turkey belongs to the EU. Iran will then be a direct neighbor of Europe. Were Iran and Iraq eventually to emerge with institutions that resembled Turkey's, it would only be a matter of time before the more retrograde Arab states would have to rethink their own system for governance. Increasingly democratic Middle Eastern governments, together with the economic improvement that would likely result from improved ties with Western economies, would be the most productive way to stem the appeal of Islamic radicalism and the parallel poverty and despair on which radicalism thrives in Europe's backyard.

Three Immediate Tasks for Transatlantic Cooperation

As Europe continues to focus on meeting its own specific challenges, three immediate priorities for transatlantic cooperation that will serve both European and U.S. interests exist. First, European governments must reach an agreement with the United States on the question of Palestinian leadership, specifically what should be done about Yasser Arafat. Consensus exists on

both sides of the Atlantic that Arafat is one of the key obstacles to implementing any further Israeli-Palestinian confidence-building measures. Yet, European ministers and EU officials continue to meet with Arafat, much to the dismay of the U.S. and Israeli governments. The Europeans argue that boycotting Arafat undermines any hope that other Palestinian leaders such as former prime minister Mahmoud Abbas or the designated prime minister, Ahmed Qurai, might have of gaining credibility with the Palestinian people and therefore establishing the authority to confront the extremist Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. As far as the United States is concerned, however, the Bush administration refuses to meet with Arafat because it perceives a meeting as counterproductive yet will not support Israeli proposals to expel or kill him.

The impasse over Arafat must be resolved because, without a common U.S.-EU posture on the Palestinian leadership, no substantive progress on peace negotiations is likely. One way to do so would be for European and U.S. government officials to pressure key Arab leaders, especially those in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, to work with the Palestinians to persuade Arafat to resign or give up control of the security services for the sake of the Palestinian people. This effort will be a hard sell, as the odds that Arafat would agree are not good, but a joint U.S.-EU initiative certainly would have more chance of success than continued transatlantic discord on the issue.

Second, the EU must work with the United States on a common enforcement policy to end all support worldwide for all terrorist groups. The EU must be prepared to outlaw and cut off the global financing of terrorist organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad and stop excusing these groups because they also have political and humanitarian operations that do useful social work. Recent statements by EU foreign ministers indicate a willingness to recommend an outright ban on financial support from institutions in Europe for Hamas, which would be a very positive development and should be backed up by similar policies toward Hizballah.

In the case of Hizballah, this step must be accompanied by a démarche to Syria, Lebanon, and Iran designed to stop their financial and military support for these groups or else face penalties in dealing with the Europeans on economic matters. Europe has more influence with these three countries than the United States has, and despite the differences among these three terrorist organizations—with Hizballah the most difficult to categorize, given its political role in Lebanon—it is important to make the collective effort. The measure will reap great benefits for Europe's relations with Israel as it serves to remind Syria, Lebanon, and Iran that they are playing with fire if they continue to support groups that call for violence against Israel and its citizens and to deny the state's right to exist.

Third, Europe and the United States should continue their cooperative efforts to end Iran's putative nuclear weapons program. The good news is that the EU has finally decided to take Iran's nuclear threat seriously. The visit to Tehran by the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany in late October 2003 had practical results. Iran made a commitment to sign the IAEA's 1993 Additional Protocol and to suspend its uranium enrichment program. In addition, the EU has said that it will link talks about a proposal for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Iran to specific Iranian benchmarks that must be achieved on four separate sets of issues: human rights, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The European Union has finally decided to take Iran's nuclear threat seriously.

European resolve would be further tested should Iran equivocate on these items. At what point will the Europeans be willing to cancel the trade negotiations, which are more valuable to Iran than to Europe? Coming to such a decision would be difficult because it would mean losing leverage, but it would nevertheless send a strong signal to Iran that the United States is not alone in its refusal to accept Iran's emergence as a nuclear power. Undoubtedly, Iran will have to reconsider its nuclear programs if the EU, the United States, Russia, and the IAEA all are united in insisting that Iran meet its treaty obligations.

The United States and Europe must also be prepared to address Iran's nuclear infrastructure in the case of two other contingencies: in the event that Iran does sign the Additional Protocol and is technically in compliance with its NPT obligations or if, in a fit of nationalist pique, Iran refuses to sign the Additional Protocol and legally withdraws from the NPT. In either case, the United States is likely to push very hard for additional measures against Iran and to demand that Iran abandon its nuclear infrastructure, particularly its uranium-enrichment and heavy-water facilities. Reaching agreement on these broader objectives will be controversial because Iran will put up a strong defense and many Europeans will sympathize with it, especially in the first case, if Iran complies.

Nevertheless, Europe has an interest in seeing Iran become reconciled to U.S. demands and in reaching an agreement with the United States. Until this happens, Iran's enormous energy resources, especially natural gas, cannot be fully developed. Looking at longer-term energy needs, one can make a very strong case that access to Iranian natural gas makes a good deal of sense for the growing European market because Europe does not want to become too dependent on one source, such as Russia. Thus, the most difficult

tasks may well be dealing with the residual Iranian nuclear infrastructure if it comes into compliance with its treaty obligations. Here, the Bush administration itself has divided positions and has not articulated what U.S. policy will be.

Ironically, it may be easier to get the United States and Europe to agree on the more serious case, namely, Iran's withdrawal from the NPT, which would set off alarms throughout the region because it would signal the inevitability of an Iranian bomb and profound consequences for the Middle East as well as Europe. Iran's withdrawal would raise the specter of further nuclear proliferation, leading Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to reconsider their nonnuclear pledges. This step by Iran would force the United States into closer defense relationships with Israel and the smaller Arab countries, including providing further support for their missile defense systems. For all practical purposes, this outcome, coupled with IAEA failures to prevent Iraq and North Korea from violating NPT commitments, would bring an end to the NPT regime, the Rosetta stone of arms control. Thus, a formidable coalition of countries will likely oppose an Iranian bomb to the point where UN-sponsored economic sanctions could be approved. The key to this coalition would be joint U.S.-EU collective action that would send a powerful message to Iran and would probably be supported by Russia and Japan.

Conclusion

For Europe to meet the challenges it faces in the Middle East successfully, its leaders must continue to be tough-minded on the practical matters surrounding terrorism and nuclear proliferation and stop equivocating about the very serious threats to European security, which are bound to multiply if the Middle East remains a cauldron. If Europe continues squabbling about whether to crack down on Hamas or Hizballah or what to do about postwar Iraq and Arafat, its relations with the United States will continue to sour, and it will lose the opportunity to play a key role in the modernization of the Middle East, a development clearly in Europe's vital strategic interest. With the crisis over whether to go to war with Iraq now history, for better or worse, greater cooperation on a range of Middle Eastern issues is more possible. Europe's solid support in Afghanistan, including NATO's assumption of command of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, demonstrates how well the alliance can work outside Europe. One can only hope that the same common agenda and aspirations can be crafted to manage crises that arise closer to Europe's own shores.

Notes

1. Randolph Spencer Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six-Day War* (Heineman: London, 1967), p. 72.
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3. International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, "Incidents and Casualties Database," www.ict.org.il/casualties_project/incidentsearch.cfm (accessed October 12, 2003). See "Casualties of War," *Jerusalem Post*, http://info.jpost.com/C002/Supplements/CasualtiesOfWar/intro.html (accessed October 12, 2003); Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000," www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ia50 (accessed October 9, 2003).
4. See *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, www.transatlantictrends.org/apps/gmf/ttweb.nsf/0/A550833A2BCEE6CE85256D96007F118B/$file/Transatlantic+Trends+Final+Report.pdf (accessed October 12, 2003) (project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo).
5. See Omer Taspinar, "Europe's Muslim Street," *Foreign Policy*, March–April 2003.
6. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, "Islamophobia in the EU After September 11," http://eumc.ec.int (accessed May 22, 2002).
7. Olivier Roy, "Euro-Islam: The Jihad Within?" *National Interest*, spring 2003, pp. 63–74.
8. "Excerpt from the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusion," www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/copenhagen.htm (accessed October 12, 2003).