Doug Bereuter and John Lis

Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship

For those who have followed U.S.-European relations since the end of the Cold War, transatlantic tensions that erupted prior to the war in Iraq should have come as little surprise. The decade between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the September 11 terrorist attacks saw attitudes across the Atlantic begin to diverge on issues such as national sovereignty, the exercise of military power, defense capabilities, and trade and economic policy. Thus, transatlantic tension in the post–Cold War world is not new. As it brought these issues center stage, however, the run-up to war in Iraq last winter did mark a new level of intensity in transatlantic turmoil.

On both sides, some have concluded from the recent dispute that Europe should define itself in opposition to the United States to constrain U.S. power, only bolstering the case of a few who advocate that the United States obstruct efforts to form a united Europe. Yet, the reality is that common interests—fostering a more open trading order and a more democratic world as well as combating common threats such as global terrorism and weapons proliferation—make transatlantic cooperation as imperative today as it was during the depths of the Cold War. The United States needs a strong European partner to help promote common interests in Europe and the world beyond.

The Gall(ist)

The diplomatic maneuvering that preceded the war in Iraq last winter thrust the question of U.S. interest in a united Europe to the fore, especially

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The Washington Quarterly • 27:1 pp. 147–162.

with increasingly numerous voices in the European Union calling for the EU to become a check on unbridled U.S. power—a counterweight to a hegemonic *hyperpuissance* that seeks to impose its values and culture on the world as it dictates the shape of the international order. In response, some Americans very understandably ask, If a unified Europe would define itself largely in opposition to the United States, why should the United States encourage European unity?

Chirac's desire to define Europe in opposition to the U.S. will never resonate across the continent.

As European opponents of military action in Iraq worked to undermine support for U.S. initiatives, members of Congress and other policymakers tried to understand the motives of our long-standing allies. As early as September 2002, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared that Germany would not contribute to a military operation under any circumstances, even if the United Nations Security Council authorized such force. That stance and Schröder's anti-American rhetoric were clearly intended for domestic political consumption in a tight German election campaign. He did pull out a narrow electoral victory but at great cost to the U.S.-German relationship. His motives were easy to understand, if difficult to forgive, and the active German opposition to U.S. initiatives at the UN served only to reinforce U.S. suspicions that Europe was seeking to act as a counterweight to the United States.

More damaging to the transatlantic relationship was the position of French president Jacques Chirac. Where Schröder opposed one aspect of U.S. policy, Chirac set himself in opposition to the United States itself. True, little was new in Chirac's policy, as an examination of statements he made during his first term in office reveals. In November 1999, he proclaimed his vision for a "multipolar world" in which "the [EU] itself becomes a major pole of international equilibrium," helping to balance the United States.[1] What seemed at the time necessary Gaullist posturing by a Gaullist politician appeared in a new light last winter, as Chirac and his foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, aggressively sought to generate opposition to U.S. policy in the Security Council and globally. Even members of Congress who viewed France favorably as the United States' oldest ally—albeit a perpetually prickly one—began to look at France and French policy in a new light.

In March 2003, the mood on Capitol Hill was perhaps summarized by my own statement in my first hearing as chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House International Relations Committee when I said, "[I]f the French government politically treats [us] as an enemy, they cannot be re-

garded by us as a friendly government."[2] These remarks were neither an effort to bash France nor an endorsement of the attitudes that gave us "freedom fries" in the House cafeteria. Rather, they were a candid assessment of the consequences of an increasingly apparent effort by Chirac to marginalize the role of the United States in Europe and the role of NATO in European security. Despite some occasional, exaggerated rhetoric by a number of U.S. politicians, the language coming from Washington reflected a genuine realization that European politicians such as Chirac were actively working to undermine U.S. influence in the world, all the while professing, "It's a country that I love, that I admire, that I respect."[3]

Fortunately for transatlantic relations, Chirac held a weak hand, and he played that weak hand very poorly. In making a bid to lead Europe, Chirac ended up deeply dividing the EU and setting back Franco-German efforts to orchestrate the development of their own self-serving version of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Particularly clumsy were Chirac's efforts to cow central European countries who were incoming and aspirant EU and NATO members into submission, a role that they would never accept after 50 years under the thumb of the Soviet Union. Chirac's bitter remark that "they missed a good opportunity to shut up"[4] when they voiced support for U.S. policy and his rash insinuation that Romania and Bulgaria might have jeopardized their EU aspirations were major errors. The "partially controlled rage"[5] in his outburst may have been the result of a dawning realization that his desire to define Europe in opposition to the United States would never resonate across the continent. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, ascendant countries were angry with Chirac's efforts to intimidate them.

A Strong Europe Is in U.S. Interests

The rift that developed within Europe itself over the issue of support for the United States demonstrated that most Europeans do not want to choose between Europe and the United States,[6] nor should the United States force such a choice on them. As long as Europe is a partner or counterpart to the United States and not a counterweight, a strong, united Europe is in U.S. interests.

Since the inception of the campaign toward European unity in the aftermath of World War II, the United States has actively recognized that a united Europe is a stronger Europe and that a strong Europe is fundamentally in the interests of the United States. Since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 as the first step toward the present-day EU, the United States has strongly supported the process of European integration, based on the rationale that closer cooperation among former foes

would bring stability and economic growth to Europe, greatly reducing the likelihood that the nations of Europe would ever again engage in armed conflict against one another. As Robert Kagan has observed, the EU democracies have realized Kant's "Perpetual Peace" insofar as war among EU members is unthinkable today. As Americans, who twice sent our sons to die on European soil, we should hail this achievement with equal measures of praise and gratitude. The relationship between the United States and the nations of Europe is perhaps the most important relationship the United States has. Thanks in no small part to the greater unity of these once adversarial nations, the United States today can rely on Europe to remain a bastion of stability and a force for democracy in the world.

As long as Europe is not a counterweight, a strong, united Europe is in U.S. interests.

It is true that the EU has become not only a partner for the United States but also a strong competitor. Yet, most Americans will accept fierce competition in trade as long as it is fair, for competition is the essential element in the free market system that is the source of economic well-being. For its own benefit, the EU generally has been a force for economic liberalization in Europe, in part by cracking down on state subsidies to corporations and by facilitating standardization as well as competition across the European market.

At the same time, Americans—and certainly their elected representatives in Congress—are increasingly disturbed by the EU's extreme trade-distorting policies such as its Common Agricultural Policy, which subsidizes inefficient European farmers and rewards overproduction, and by its system of export subsidies. The latter helps European farmers dump the deeply subsidized surpluses on world markets, thereby driving down world prices and undercutting farmers in developing countries. U.S. production subsidies, although smaller, must also be appropriately reduced. In addition, Americans are concerned about the EU's restriction of biotechnology imports on the basis of emotion instead of sound science. The United States must aggressively push the EU to remove such barriers to fair trade—an effort that will contribute to prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic and for developing countries.

Americans welcomed the overdue decision by the EU nations to admit 10 more democracies into its union, eight of which were ruled by Communist dictatorships during the Cold War. Next spring, the EU's zone of prosperity and stability will shift eastward, further erasing the lines of division that were drawn at Yalta. Additional enlargement is envisioned this decade, with

Romania and Bulgaria projected to join in 2007 and with Turkey a candidate for eventual membership. With the unity of much of the continent thus charted, a largely integrated Europe is foreseeable. By enlarging to include most European countries, the EU is expanding the zone of peaceful cooperation on the continent, further reducing the chances that U.S. soldiers will ever again have to fight in a European war. At the same time, the new democracies joining the EU have recent, vivid memories of dictatorship and command economies; their firm commitment to democracy and free markets will reinvigorate Europe's dedication to these core values that are shared on both sides of the Atlantic.

Promote Common Interests Globally

The greatest change in the nature of the transatlantic relationship in the past few years has been the broadening of shared U.S. and European interests. During the Cold War and the 1990s, U.S.-European relations generally focused on the Euro-Atlantic space. The post–September 11 security environment and the growing role of the EU as an economic superpower have forced both sides to look beyond their common space to the challenges and opportunities in the world beyond. Most of these challenges and opportunities are shared; by working together in the following key areas where cooperation already has been established, the United States and Europe can advance each side's security and prosperity as well as contribute to global well-being.

Liberalizing Trade

The United States and the EU have been the driving forces behind the World Trade Organization's (WTO) 2001 Doha Round, which is aimed at issues such as market access for developing countries, enhanced trade in services and agricultural products, and intellectual property rights. Although serious tensions in the transatlantic trade relationship still exist in areas such as agricultural and steel production subsidies, biotechnology, and export subsidies, these should not deter the United States and the EU from working together toward a more open global trading system. This would help competitive businesses in Europe and North America gain access to international markets while saving consumers money by facilitating imports of competitively priced products. In addition, that system should aim to make it easier for developing countries to grow economically through trade, especially by providing reasonable market access in key areas such as agriculture and textiles. Unfortunately, the collapse of the September 2003 Cancun

WTO ministerial meeting has set back this effort. The EU and United States must work with the developing countries to get the Doha Round back on track, and that will require each to act conscientiously on the legitimate concerns of developing countries in exchange for the reductions in tariffs and increased market access that we demand.

With U.S. investment in Europe exceeding $3 trillion and European investment in the United States on a similar scale,[7] Dan Hamilton, director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, notes that regulatory policy, traditionally a domestic policy field, is becoming a transatlantic concern.[8] As the two largest economic actors in the world, the United States and the EU enact regulations that alternatively become the de facto starting point for regulators elsewhere in the world. If potential differences between U.S. and EU regulations can be identified and addressed early in the regulatory process, we may be able to reduce some of the barriers for U.S. and European companies doing business overseas. For example, since Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley financial reform legislation in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom debacles, European financial institutions doing business in the United States have experienced substantial difficulties in complying with new U.S. regulations. Likewise, U.S. chemical companies are concerned about the possible effect that proposed EU regulations may have on their ability to do business in Europe. Better consultation, cooperation, and coordination is needed between the Congress and the European Parliament on regulatory legislation. By working together when cooperation is in our mutual interest, both legislatures could help facilitate the ability of our companies to operate in each other's markets.

Promoting Democracy

The United States and Europe also share an interest in spreading democracy around the world. EU history provides a great example of how the spread of democratic values can lead to the kind of international cooperation that, in turn, produces greater security and prosperity. Europe and North America should continue working to spread democracy to countries that border the Euro-Atlantic community.

Legislators have a particular competence and an ideological, even moral, responsibility to aid their counterparts in emerging democracies. For example, the authors are currently working with Representative David Price (D-N.C.) to revive the approach of the Frost task force, which offered infrastructure and expert assistance directly from the House of Representatives to parliaments in European countries emerging from communism during the 1990s. Such a program could again help parliaments in emerging democracies become what they should be: essential elements of functioning democ-

racies. The goal is to enable those parliaments to exercise effective government oversight and enjoy democratic legitimacy. European parliaments could work with Congress in this effort, which now might move beyond Europe to assist parliaments in other emerging democracies throughout the world. Just as democratization in the EU countries has created a Kantian zone of "perpetual peace," further democratization holds the promise of expanding that peace to the rest of Europe and beyond.

Americans are increasingly disturbed by the EU's extreme trade-distorting policies.

Foreign Policy

In the field of foreign policy, the EU is a participant along with the United States, the UN, and Russia in the Quartet, working to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is an excellent example of the EU using its Common Foreign and Security Policy to play a constructive role in resolving a conflict outside of Europe that creates great instability in the Middle East as well as the broader Islamic world and that threatens the security of Europe and North America. The June 2003 visit to the House by Javier Solana, the EU high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, to discuss the road map for Middle East peace was marked by a lively debate with members of Congress who questioned aspects of EU policy, including the damaging effect of the EU foreign ministers meeting with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, which undermined the authority of then-Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, and the EU's reluctance to brand the civilian wing of Hamas as a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, few in Congress fundamentally challenged the legitimacy of the EU's role in the Middle East peace process.

Security Policy

Although the Soviet threat that bound together Europe and North America has disappeared, the September 11 attacks obviously demonstrated that security challenges remain. The draft EU security strategy prepared by Solana in June is a positive step toward bringing U.S. and European threat perceptions and strategic agendas closer together by explicitly stating that Europe faces three key threats: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and failed states.[9] Because these are multifaceted threats, we must address them through diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and economic means—all areas in which transatlantic cooperation is generally good and improving. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, however,

demonstrate that the military dimension in the war on terrorism is also essential, and the challenge now for Europe and North America is to improve military cooperation and capabilities to meet these new threats.

Strengthen Europe by Bringing in Russia

One of the greatest common challenges for Europe and the United States is to ensure that Russia develops into a prosperous, democratic state. Russia is the most populous country in Europe and a permanent member of the Security Council. Not only does its nuclear arsenal remain formidable, the size of its stockpiles of nuclear waste and weapons far surpasses its ability to handle them safely. Russia's chemical weapons stocks are huge and deteriorating, and its diverse and largely undisclosed biological weapons stockpile constitutes a horrendous threat to the planet. Its very size, its independent foreign policy, and President Vladimir Putin's increasingly autocratic drift mean that Russia's full membership in the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies is not fore-ordained. Yet, because of Russia's importance, the United States and Europe share an interest in having Russia as a strong partner. Thus, both sides must conscientiously strive for an ever better relationship with Russia.

The U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Alexander Vershbow, has called for Russia's relationship with NATO to become "an alliance with the Alliance—a joint venture between two powerful, independent entities in areas of mutual interest."[10] The NATO-Russia Council provides the mechanism for such a relationship to evolve. Given that many of the most important threats to European and U.S. security are also threats to Russian security, particularly terrorism and WMD proliferation, cooperation in these areas should be mutually beneficial. Unfortunately, Russia has not chosen to take full advantage of the opportunities for cooperation that NATO has extended in areas such as counterterrorism, missile defense, and military-to-military relations. As Vershbow said, "Russia still needs to overcome a legacy of mistrust and competition in its dealings with NATO" so that a zero-sum relationship can become "a win-win relationship."[11] NATO must keep its hand extended to Russia, therefore, without compromising its security or its democratic and moral values. In turn, Russia should take advantage of the partnership being offered, which would allow it to enhance its own security by working in tandem with the world's most successful military alliance.

The EU's Common Strategy on Russia is also to be commended, as EU efforts to bring Russia closer to Europe can reduce perceptions among some Russians that the West is a potential adversary. By focusing on specific areas of cooperation such as the environment, organized crime, and illegal immi-

gration while working to reinforce Russia's democratic institutions, the EU is trying to help Russia to become a European democracy. Closer economic cooperation will benefit Russia and the EU, helping to improve the economic situation of ordinary Russians and diminishing the appeal of nationalist politicians who try to poison relations with the West by claiming that the United States and Europe seek to keep Russia impoverished. Although EU membership for Russia is a long way off at best, a stronger association between the EU and the largest country on the continent is a necessary step in creating a Europe whole and free, a goal that is likewise in U.S. interests.

> It is in both European and U.S. interests to have Russia as a strong partner.

Also important are efforts to secure and dismantle nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in Russia and other former Soviet republics. The United States spends about $1 billion a year on such programs, including the Comprehensive Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program. Other members of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations—France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan—pledged in July 2002 collectively to contribute a similar amount—$10 billion during the next 10 years—to this endeavor. The "10+10 over 10" program can demonstrate the kind of global partnership needed to combat the global proliferation threat, but the other G-7 members must back their pledges with actual contributions. At the same time, the non–G-7 EU countries and the EU itself should also assist nonproliferation efforts in Russia, as securing and dismantling Russian WMD stocks enhances European security.

Transform NATO to Meet Today's Threats

Few fallacies are more absurd than the erroneous assertions that NATO is dying and that the United States no longer cares about NATO and Europe. Last spring, as coalition forces moved to oust the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein, experienced observers on each side of the Atlantic rushed to pronounce NATO dead. The French analyst Guillaume Parmentier claimed "NATO is finished"[12] while the U.S. scholar Charles Kupchan proclaimed that "the Atlantic [A]lliance now lies in the rubble of Baghdad."[13] Their conclusions, however, simply are not validated by an examination of the facts. NATO remains the organization that can most effectively defend the nations of Europe and North America against serious threats to their security today. Most of the European members of NATO still regard the Atlantic

Alliance as the best guarantee of their security. NATO is also demonstrably far more effective than the UN in peace enforcement, a field in which the EU is only beginning to gain experience.

To U.S. legislators involved with NATO and Europe, the claim that the United States is preparing to walk away seems especially incredible. Such statements disregard the continued support for, and additional emphasis on NATO by, the Bush administration and Congress. In the run-up to the November 2002 Prague summit, the administration devoted intense and effective effort toward developing and refining ideas such as the NATO Response Force, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and the transformation of NATO's command structure. If implemented, these reforms will enable NATO to undertake timely and successful expeditionary missions anywhere in the world where future threats to the security of the alliance might arise.

The House, by a vote of 358-9 in October 2002, declared that "[NATO] should remain the primary institution through which European and North American allies address security issues of transatlantic concern."[14] In May 2003, the Senate unanimously approved U.S. ratification of NATO enlargement, finding that "NATO enhances the security of the United States" and that U.S. membership in NATO "remains a vital national security interest" because "the United States and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and territorial integrity."[15] Both chambers in July 2003, without opposition, approved amendments calling on President George W. Bush to consider making a formal request for NATO to raise a force for deployment in Iraq.

To be certain, security threats have changed dramatically during the past half century. NATO was founded to deter a Soviet-led military invasion. Today, its members face threats from international terrorism, WMD, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjunction of these challenges: the horrifying prospect of these states providing WMD to terrorist groups to use against our countries and to kill our citizens. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has cited the need for "NATO to play the lead role in addressing the central security challenge of our time."[16] Although recognizing that collective defense remains the core mission of NATO, Lugar wrote: "If we fail to defend our societies from a major terrorist attack involving WMD, the alliance will have failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations."[17]

Meanwhile, many of NATO's doomsayers cite the campaign in Afghanistan as proof of U.S. indifference toward the alliance when, in fact, they do not understand how that war was fought. Although the administration could have made better political use of NATO's Article 5 declaration that the September 11 attacks constituted an attack on the entire alliance, the conventional land combat forces of NATO countries simply were not urgently

required in the type of military campaign conducted. Operation Enduring Freedom relied predominantly on the use of special forces and paramilitary intelligence assets, in effective combination with precision-guided munitions. Several allies, including some NATO countries, that had able special forces did in fact assist the United States, consistent with the invocation of Article 5. Even so, the warfare in Afghanistan made it clear that NATO needed new capabilities to confront some of the gravest and most difficult threats we now face.

Far from closing up shop, NATO, with U.S. leadership, chose at the November 2002 Prague summit to transform itself to meet these challenges. In the Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO members pledged to provide the assets that are most critical for performing alliance missions. These capabilities will enable development of the NATO Response Force, which will give the alliance a rapidly deployable, high-end military capability—precisely the kind of capability that was needed in Afghanistan. Finally, at the defense ministers meeting in June 2003, the alliance approved a new command structure that erases regional designations for territorial defense and emphasizes that NATO must have the ability to quickly deploy and command forces anywhere in the world.

Few fallacies are more absurd than the erroneous assertions that NATO is dying.

This last point was underlined by the North Atlantic Council's decision to have NATO assume command, coordination, and planning of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in August 2003, the first time that NATO has undertaken an operation outside of Europe or North America. This decision also illustrates how NATO can undertake non–Article 5 missions that enhance security and stability on its periphery and thus help address direct or indirect threats to its member nations. Similarly, NATO's decision to provide planning, force generation, logistics, and communications support to the Polish-led multinational force in Iraq was an excellent first step toward a greater alliance role. The Bush administration should now consider whether assuming command of the entire military operation in Iraq would be appropriate for NATO. Of course, as both houses of Congress have recommended, the administration also should request assistance from the UN in civilian fields where it has the expertise needed to stabilize and build a new Iraq.

One can hope that the time also may come to consider whether NATO might have a role to play in helping to monitor a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Although the United States and its NATO allies

certainly have some sharp attitudinal and policy differences on the Middle East, all share a stated commitment to a secure Israel and a democratic Palestinian state. If a NATO peace operation could help alleviate security concerns on both sides in that conflict, our countries surely should consider underpinning a peace agreement with a peace-enforcement mission.

In addition to its military missions, NATO since 1991 has reached out to the former Communist lands of central and eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council have helped these nations work more closely with NATO and have helped many of them establish parliamentary democracies, market-oriented economies, and civilian control over their militaries. Europe and North America must continue to work with these states to expand the zone of security and prosperity enjoyed by NATO members. With the same goals in mind, NATO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly should enhance their ongoing dialogues with the states of North Africa and the Middle East.

As long as threats remain to the security of Europe and North America, NATO will be the primary institution through which its members provide for their common defense. At the same time, its external partnerships and peace operations enhance security for its members and partners.

Ensure that ESDP Complements NATO

Although NATO has become the preeminent, most trusted organization for conducting peace-enforcement operations, it of course is not primarily a peacekeeping organization. The United States and the North Atlantic alliance had this role thrust on them in the mid-1990s because of European and UN inadequacies.

Only NATO, backed by U.S. power, had the military capability and credibility to guarantee the Dayton peace accords that ended the four-year, genocidal Bosnian war. The peace operations in which NATO is currently engaged—Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan—contribute positively to the security of its members. Recognizing that such operations do not constitute the core mission of the alliance, they nevertheless should be undertaken when they are in the interest of NATO members and when NATO is the organization best equipped to perform them effectively.

When the EU nations in 1999 initiated efforts to create the long-sought European defense pillar within the EU instead of NATO, Washington was surprised. From a U.S. perspective, the EU had little reason to move into the defense field, given that most EU members are also members of NATO. Reluctant U.S. acceptance came when it became clear that our European allies

supported the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). European leaders offered assurances that ESDP would not compete with NATO. Today, the Bush administration and congressional leaders have come to support ESDP conditionally if it works closely with NATO to undertake crisis management operations in and around Europe in those situations when NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged.

Yet, the United States must view with great concern any efforts to turn ESDP into a collective defense organization that duplicates the role of NATO, a concern that is, daresay, shared by most European members of NATO. The inclusion of a "mutual defense" provision in the draft constitution for Europe is therefore disturbing. An effort to create a collective defense commitment in the EU is troubling because it would undoubtedly undermine the commitment of European nations to NATO while adding no additional military capability to Europe's defense, which might lead some Americans to question the U.S. commitment to the alliance. Although the draft language suggests that an EU mutual defense commitment would be optional, it would permit unnecessary duplication. It also would draw resources and attention away from an ESDP that otherwise could complement NATO and contribute meaningfully to European defense. NATO remains the best guarantee of the security of its European members, and an ESDP that complements NATO will enhance transatlantic security.

An effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies.

The EU would do better to focus its efforts on creating its Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 troops with complementary air and naval assets that could be rapidly deployed and sustained for one year for crisis management, peacekeeping, rescue, or humanitarian operations. If the RRF becomes fully operational, the EU will be the logical institution to assume peacekeeping in the Balkans from NATO, as some EU countries have proposed. An effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies, such as the EU's work to build civil institutions, its economic and infrastructure assistance, and its deployable pool of civilian police officers. In that fashion, the ESDP can be an important part of a comprehensive spectrum of capabilities for crisis management in Europe.

An important step toward a peaceful Europe came in June 2003 when the European Council declared that the EU is open to membership by the countries of the western Balkans, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and

Montenegro. Ultimately, the incorporation of this region into the EU will assist its people in building peaceful, prosperous lives. Already, the EU in March 2003 assumed the NATO peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, with generally good results to date. Although that mission is small, with less than 350 troops, this is a positive indication that the ESDP can play a role in crisis management in Europe. In the future, the EU should assume the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and in Kosovo, but we must be careful not to risk the stability that NATO has brought to the region during the past eight years by having the EU assume these missions before it is ready to meet their challenges.

Both Gen. James Jones, the supreme allied commander, Europe, and Lord Paddy Ashdown, the UN high representative in Sarajevo, have stated that the EU is not yet prepared to take over command of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia.[18] However, both Gen. Jones and Lord George Robertson, the NATO secretary general, have since indicated that U.S. troops might be withdrawn from Bosnia and command transferred from NATO to the EU by the end of 2004.[19] When the time does come for NATO's role to end, it will be important that the EU focus on the needs of Bosnia rather than seek a proving ground for ESDP. The security situation in Bosnia may improve to the point that an expanded EU civilian police force, rather than a military force, will be all that is required to ensure stability. Kosovo is an even more difficult case because it formally remains a province of Serbia, despite the desire of its ethnic Albanian majority for independence. NATO should therefore retain command of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) at least until the final status of the entity is resolved, and possibly beyond, as the acceptance of the decision on final status and its implementation could be a difficult and volatile process. An eventual EU takeover of the KFOR mission should be a medium-term goal, however, as it would allow NATO to focus on greater security threats elsewhere.

Strong Partners Needed, Not Counterweights

At this point, one should neither underestimate nor exaggerate the damage that was done to the transatlantic relationship last winter during the dispute over the impending conflict in Iraq. Yet in the dozen years since the end of the Cold War, during which the drift in attitude and perception between the United States and Europe had begun to accelerate, this particular dispute may have served as a necessary wake-up call. It should alert us to the need to reinvigorate a transatlantic relationship that is based on a shared commitment to personal liberties, democratic government, and free markets. Absent the Soviet threat to focus our thinking, the perception at times of

relatively minor political differences as something larger was perhaps inevitable. The dispute over Iraq, however, forced us to confront the fact that some aspects of transatlantic relations indeed have changed. The United States and Europe must have a sound relationship that will permit each to move from a narrow focus on the Euro-Atlantic space to a greater focus on how to deal collectively with the broader world around us.

The U.S. should continue to make efforts to help further strengthen European unity.

For our part, Americans should recognize the tremendous progress that the EU has made toward unifying the continent and making war unthinkable among its soon-to-be-25 member states. Clearly, the United States should continue to make efforts to help further strengthen European unity, provided Europe continues to define itself as a partner rather than in opposition to U.S. power. Together, Europe and the United States can work together to advance common interests and address common challenges in the global arena, including bringing Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. Furthermore, Europeans and North Americans should redouble their commitment to NATO so that the alliance, complemented by an EU crisis-management component, has the capabilities and structures it needs to act wherever security threats to our nations arise. President Bush perhaps said it best when he noted, "When Europe and America are divided, history tends to tragedy. When Europe and America are partners, no trouble or tyranny can stand against us."[20]

Notes

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