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Europe's Leverage

The destinies of the United States and Europe are now intertwined in such critical ways as to be inseparable. Policies, programs, and practices of states on each side of the Atlantic must be measured against this reality. Some Europeans believe that Europe, Russia, and China can create a bloc to balance U.S. power, and some Americans believe the United States can divide European states from one another or simply ignore them. These attitudes and actions, however, are and will continue to be based more on fantasy than analysis or understanding. The United States in particular, with all of its power and potential, ambitions and aspirations, must grasp this notion and act according to its logic.

Nothing has happened to lessen the importance of the continent of Europe as the most important landmass—economically and politically—to be kept free of a hegemonic power at odds with U.S. interests, values, and objectives (the stuff of three world wars in the twentieth century). Europe still depends on U.S. power, influence, engagement, and leadership to be fully assured of its own independence, security, long-term prosperity, and in some places even domestic tranquility. Meanwhile, the U.S. and European economies, especially those of the European Union, are now so intermingled that both sides would suffer grievous injury if either tried to lessen their level of entanglement with one another significantly. The panoply of economic interaction between the United States and the EU, including trade in goods and services, investment, cross-ownership, travel, and finance, must now be valued in the trillions of dollars, with the power to control and influence rarely having a clear locus on one side of the Atlantic or the other; certainly neither side is able to claim decisive predominance. Indeed, transatlantic

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The Washington Quarterly • 27:1 pp. 91–110.

economic interdependence is now so much a fact of life that the concept is no longer even questioned. At the same time, a broad array of relatively common values and institutions of incalculable worth bind the United States and Europe together, creating an interpenetration of influence unrivaled among any other set of major powers. Much of what the United States seeks to do elsewhere in the world will depend on its ability to gain the support and active engagement of European power—and European powers—politically, economically, and militarily.

The Five Transformations

Radical changes have taken place in the nature of global politics, military strength and effectiveness, economics, society, and even culture—in a phrase, in the nature of power and influence in today's world. Taken together, these changes have made Europe a new repository of capacity to act in the world and thus have given new significance to the relationship between Europe and the United States. In recent years, five significant changes have redefined the position and role of Europe in the world.

End of the Cold War

With the collapse of the Soviet Union's internal as well as external empires and of communism's order and appeal in Europe, the European continent suddenly ceased to be the cockpit, the primary locus, of competition for global power and the place on which U.S. attention abroad had to be riveted. Europe's political and strategic independence is still critical to the United States, and if this wheel squeaked, it would be first in U.S. priorities for oiling. Yet, it is not now squeaking, and the United States has had the luxury, if not the compulsion, for the foreseeable future to look elsewhere in pursuit of many of its most important strategic requirements. No, Europe has not become a backwater, but no longer is it the central focus of global politics—at least as defined by the most important power in the international system—as arguably it had been previously without serious interruption since the inception of that concept a few hundred years ago.

Consolidation of the European Union

Although Europe's significance as a geostrategic entity at the top of the list of regions that must be actively kept free of anti-Western hegemonic or ideological dominance has radically declined, its internal development has preserved its inherent importance on the world stage. With some limited exceptions, notably

the United Kingdom, European military power has decreased apace with the retreat of the continental threat; but Europe's economic and political power have increased, in part because the EU has bounded forward on a number of fronts. Vigorous debates of a decade ago about whether the European Community should emphasize widening (admitting more members) or deepening (advancing economic and political integration among existing members) have been decisively answered with "Both." Although tension between the two projects continues, especially as the EU tries to admit 10 new countries while writing a constitution that can ideally chart a single course for all EU member states and the union as a whole, the overall success of the European experiment continues driving forward, despite its recurring fits and starts.

The destinies of the U.S. and Europe are now inseparable.

The Rise of Globalization

The end of the Cold War and of the threats it posed to the security of virtually all Western states, and even to the prospects for the survival of humankind, altered the reality and widespread perceptions of the efficacy of traditional forms of state power in international relations. To be sure, central European countries recently freed from Soviet and Communist dominance still placed security, including military guarantees and membership in NATO, well ahead of domestic prosperity and links to the EU; and residual concern remained about the reemergence of a challenge from post-Soviet Russia. The economically and politically dominant western part of the continent, however, judged military power to be of diminishing importance, EU economic and political integration to be of rapidly rising importance, the role of international institutions to be of increasing benefit, and nonstate interactions with other parts of the world to be of steadily growing significance.

Meanwhile, from the mid–twentieth century onward, historical barriers among nations and people were increasingly surmounted by technology, leading to the rise of globalization, defined here in shorthand as "those developments that are increasing the pace and extent of interaction among nations, societies, and peoples and of the speed with which information can be transmitted and processed"[1] plus its myriad effects on individual societies. Clearly, Europe has become as globalized as any other part of the world, with a profound impact on European perceptions of international society; instruments of power and influence; and relationships among governments, international institutions, and the nongovernmental and private sectors. In brief, in contrast to the Cold War era, the immediate territory of Europe as well as that of nearby regions has become more important to virtually all Europeans, with nonmilitary instruments increasingly the coin of the realm.

Emergence of the Sole Superpower

By the 1990s, the United States' 75-year vocation of eliminating European-based threats to U.S. security in the form of German and then Soviet efforts to dominate the continent had come to an unexpected and thoroughly successful end. With the sudden recognition that Soviet power and purpose had for some years been hollowing out from within, the United States found itself to be the world's sole superpower. Indeed, for years it had been steadily amassing, relatively and absolutely, more incipient military, economic, political, and even cultural power than any other country in centuries—some historians have argued since the Roman Empire. At the same time, the United States discovered that, at least geostrategically though not in terms of the rise of globalization, it had largely regained the sanctity of its two broad oceans with the end of the Cold War as the nuclear balance of terror with the Soviet Union disintegrated. For the first time since the bombing of Pearl Harbor, serious, direct threats to the U.S. homeland appeared to have receded into the realms of either strategic theory or the distant future.

For post–Cold War relations across the Atlantic, the United States could have emerged as an unmatchable strategic competitor for Europe, had either side had any interest in such a competition; it is striking that neither did, reflecting nearly a century of shared strategic perspective and an even longer history of shared values. Even in economic relations, where the demands of the Cold War had required that the United States and the European Community essentially bury their differences, no radical change occurred when the apparatus of confrontation with communism and Soviet power collapsed: both sides of the Atlantic discovered that they were destined to sail together in the same economic boat.

At the same time, the emergence of the United States as sole superpower also seemed to mean that European states and institutions no longer had to provide the military and economic sinews of power in pursuit of common security interests on the continent. Soon, however, this generalization was confounded as allies on both sides of the Atlantic realized that their strategic partnership was still useful and indeed necessary to secure the future of the continent. These reasons included preservation and reform of the NATO alliance and its historically unique, integrated command structure; the continued embedding of a now unified Germany into NATO and the EU; grounding central Europe firmly and fully in the West, not least to end its tragic history as *casus belli* and battleground of great wars; drawing the Russian Federation into the Western system of security, politics, and economics; stopping all conflict on the continent; and, to all these ends, keeping the United States engaged as a European power.[2] Nevertheless, the degree of

European engagement in these efforts, certainly in terms of providing classic tools of power, was concomitantly reduced from Cold War requirements.

Yet, the United States' role of sole superpower also meant that it could no longer require other countries, including its long-term strategic partner Europe, to respond to its definition of challenge, as had been patent during the Cold War. In this sense, superpowers come in pairs: without the Soviet Union or a strategic replacement for it, it hardly seemed possible that developments anywhere in the world could escalate to conflict necessarily embroiling Europeans and Europe. For Europe and generally for the United States as well, ending the Arab-Israeli conflict was desirable but not strategically necessary; the Indo-Pakistani conflict could erupt again into violence but was far away and largely out of sight; proliferation of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was believed to be a relatively managed, secondary matter; international terrorism attracted so little attention on either side of the Atlantic that it merited a scant four words in the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept[3]; and China's potential emergence as a rival to overall Western power and position was only a distant prospect.

> Europe has fully supported the U.S. use of military power to combat terrorism.

Thus, throughout the 1990s and into the new century, it was difficult for the United States to enlist support from European allies to develop and modernize relevant instruments of power, especially military power, for potential use elsewhere and certainly not to apply it toward any of the situations noted above. At NATO, after all, the term "outside of area" in the mid-1990s meant Bosnia and Kosovo, even though both were demonstrably within Europe. Further, although some European states did engage in peacekeeping and nation building, virtually all could safely cede responsibility to the United States to manage most problems external to Europe that might, unmanaged, at some point seriously affect European interests. These included, after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, developments in the greater Middle East of unimpeachable interest to Europe, indeed, arguably of even greater interest to Europe than to the United States. Sole superpower thus tended to be a lonely position.

Europe as an International System

Looking backward, Americans may be tempted to characterize Europe's post–Cold War behavior as free riding. In fact, some Americans made such arguments throughout the 1990s and continue to do so, especially in light of

major reductions in military spending; little European progress in developing particular military capabilities—so-called interoperability—that would permit allied militaries to fight together in an information-dense environment; and, in this U.S. view, Europe's commensurate failure to share the burdens—seemingly even in prosecuting the 1999 air war over Kosovo, despite the fact that this conflict was occurring in Europe and thus was in Europe's interest.

The divergence over Iraq deeply affected U.S. views of European power and influence.

Judging the EU so negatively obscures some additional factors. Certainly, in terms of responsibility for the functioning of the global economy, key European states and the EU were then and are now playing substantial and effective roles more or less commensurate with their economic weight in the world. Europe was similarly coming to terms with what were then almost exclusively nonmilitary challenges of the emerging phenomenon of globalization, such as environmental damage, the movement of crime across borders, disruption of societies, the spread of disease such as HIV/AIDS, and waves of immigration.[4] Viewed objectively, the European role in responding to the challenges of globalization was also helping to shape the future battlefield, so to speak, in the sense that it helped directly and indirectly reduce the long-term likelihood of conflict in many parts of the world. Thus, European states have consistently outpaced the United States in foreign aid as a percentage of gross domestic product; and European governments, private industry, and nongovernmental organizations have done more than their fair share in trying to deal with the congeries of economic, political, social, and human factors that, left unaddressed, can contribute to conflict and to support for terrorism. These efforts show a capacity and the political will to act on behalf of interests that are also shared by the United States and others.

In judging Europe's contributions to overall Western security and its ability and willingness to employ power to that end, many outside observers also tend to overlook Europe's own system of international politics: sufficiently large, complex, modern, interconnected, productive, and sophisticated in all dimensions that its effective functioning is itself of vital importance in global politics, security, and economics, including of course for the United States. Indeed, the question of whether Europe is prepared to project power abroad, which has been a major U.S. objective for several years, must not obscure the necessity, first, for Europe to project power within Europe itself. Among top U.S. strategic interests is that Europe not be dominated by a potentially hostile, hegemonic power. A corollary is that Europe be able to orga-

nize and conduct itself successfully, within itself, in part to ensure that the United States will not have to intervene once again, perhaps militarily, in pursuit of its own strategic interests. The United States championed European economic and political integration as well as military defense from the late 1940s onward largely because of this same rationale. That mission, now turned essentially to the east of the existing EU, is still critical to U.S. interests.

The European system, therefore, includes the major projection of power within Europe itself in direct support of U.S. interests. NATO's redefined purpose within Europe in the 1990s to fulfill the remaining items on the twentieth-century transatlantic security agenda was conducted in parallel with EU actions geared toward complementary ends. Yet, although the United States played the leading role in NATO's transformation and has contributed significantly to Europe's future—all the while standing ready to be the guarantor of last resort of Russia's behavior—the Europeans have successfully undertaken most of the effort. This is especially true financially and economically, where Europe took on the lion's share of burdens, including the deepening and widening of the EU; West Germany's massive subventions to former East Germany; sovereign investment in central Europe, the Baltics, the Balkans, and even the Russian Federation; and the integration of these societies into the West.

Furthermore, European militaries, with limited exceptions, have in truth not kept pace with qualitative and high-technology developments in the U.S. military, but the vast proportion of Western military personnel in the Balkans are European, not American, and they would have borne most of the brunt of ground combat in Kosovo had it been necessary. Europeans share the military burden with the United States in postwar Afghanistan as well.

European Military Power: America Finds It Wanting

For the past several years, most aspects of European power projection capabilities and political will relevant to the interests and concerns of the United States have generally been found wanting in prevailing U.S. analysis. This reference is to Europe's projection of military power beyond Europe, which has been the principal criterion for U.S. judgment of European power and Europe's willingness to use it. Some U.S. criticism has been based on the unspoken assumption that, as during the Cold War, the existence of the Atlantic Alliance implies that European interests elsewhere in the world, including interests in projecting power, should be similar to those of the United States. Indeed, in many cases, U.S. success in dealing with regional challenges and conflict also benefits Europeans, even as far afield as the South Asian subcontinent and Northeast Asia. Perhaps, also, the 50-year existence of the

Atlantic Alliance, coupled with the fact, almost unique in history, that it was not dismantled when its principal purpose was achieved, has led to a natural if unwarranted assumption that one set of common interests necessarily carries over to a second.

This notion holds that modern-day allies, unlike traditional, independent sovereign states acting entirely according to their individual interests, instead form a community of interests that can reliably produce new common analysis and new common action. That result would certainly be unprecedented; indeed, a major part of NATO's reform during the 1990s was directed toward defying the classic history of alliances that had outlived their initial purposes. The United States led in nurturing the proposition that the Atlantic Alliance had an integrity and purpose that did not depend entirely on the Cold War from which it was born. Allies fearing that the United States would reduce or end its military engagement in Europe particularly supported this sentiment. This effort included preserving NATO for its own sake (16 countries jointly defending themselves rather than renationalizing military affairs); emphasizing the completion of the security work of the twentieth century that was listed above; nation building and fostering values as shared strategic interests as well as worthwhile in their own right; retaining an unprecedented and unsurpassed integrated military command structure (Allied Command Europe); and the slow recognition that some interests and challenges exist beyond Europe that could affect everyone sooner or later. The last-named notion was not a ringing endorsement for preserving an alliance, but it was better than nothing.

A division of labor can save the United States resources.

The United States, meanwhile, pressed its European allies to maintain defense spending at the highest possible level and to develop capabilities that would promote interoperability and power projection. Thus, the United States accepted, in principle and to a great degree in practice, the EU's development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in part because that could provide incentives for European states to take defense seriously for the cause of European integration, even if they would not do so for the cause of NATO's continued effectiveness. At the same time, the United States, supported by some key allies, also argued forcefully for NATO's continued primacy. As part of this understanding, the NATO allies agreed that the EU's so-called Headline Goal Task Force (the Rapid Reaction Force) could have direct NATO support to give it any real chance of being militarily effective.[5] Even so, few expected that European capabilities

for power projection outside of the NATO framework would amount to much beyond some limited cases such as interventions in Africa, search-and-rescue operations, or extracting civilians from conflicts. In fact, within ESDP, the EU took on military responsibility in the Congo in 2003 and has promoted security in Macedonia; in 2004, it may do the same in Bosnia, where NATO now has lead responsibility.

ESDP is also allied to another important, long-term EU development, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Both are designed, progressively, to give the EU competence in foreign policy and security matters, among the last of the areas of sovereignty that any state is willing to see reduced. Along with ESDP, CFSP has a virtue that is unmatched by NATO because the EU institutions can act seamlessly on a crisis from its inception at the political level through the employment of military force, whereas NATO can only act when requested to do so by member states or the United Nations, often after a crisis has passed the point of nonmilitary resolution.

In a low-key way, the United States also chivvied its European allies to look beyond the continent to regions in which the United States was beginning to see emerging problems. Even so, the general interpretation of Senator Richard Lugar's (R-Ind.) famous 1990s slogan for NATO—"Out of area or out of business"—was of NATO's admitting new members rather than of its militarily engaging beyond Europe. Emblematic of this view, NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP), whose membership came to include every constituent element of the former Soviet Union, was essentially a U.S. show in terms of resources committed and day-to-day involvement of U.S. personnel in PFP countries. Washington did not make a particular point of asking allies to play similar roles.

Not surprisingly, therefore, in the relative absence of major challenges either to U.S. or to European interests from beyond Europe, much of the intra-alliance debate on issues of European military capabilities and political will to use those capabilities had something of an academic quality. The Europeans made commitments and pledges to increase their defense capabilities, including two rounds of a NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative at the 1999 Washington summit and the 2002 Prague summit, but rarely redeemed these promises[6]; and the WMD issue was placed under the mandate of three separate NATO committees as early as 1994 but largely languished.[7] In effect, the United States and Europe may have valued the continuation of transatlantic military cooperation, the preservation of Allied Command Europe, and the development of contingent capabilities, but hiding behind the intra-allied debate was a lack of clarity about where such capabilities might actually need to be used. Thus, in response to U.S. requests for increased military capacities, the European answer in large part was rhetorically sound

but reticent in practice, related less to analysis of what the future could hold than to the felt European need to influence the United States and retain U.S. engagement on the continent. Concomitantly, the Europeans' lagging effort toward creating military capabilities for the future was not a critical matter for the United States. Although the United States continued to press its allies, with the exception of the potential use of allied airpower in Kosovo—within Europe—no particularly compelling case existed where the United States wanted the Europeans to project military power and the Europeans were unable to respond.

The Impact of 9/11

From September 11, 2001, onward, different perspectives between the United States and most of its European allies regarding instruments of power and power projection beyond Europe gained a more tangible quality. The United States knew and the Europeans understood that the tragic attacks demanded a military response and that the United States alone had to define precisely where and what that would mean as well as take full command of operations. Purely on European and Canadian initiative, without being asked to do so by Washington, the alliance took the unprecedented step of invoking Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty.[8] Although many Europeans later expressed regret that the United States preferred to conduct military operations in Afghanistan through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing and able, rather than through the NATO military command, they understood what the United States had to do. Indeed, much of the later regret was based on the European concern that a U.S. vision of Europe's military backwardness would negatively impact Europe's influence in Washington and future U.S willingness to take NATO seriously.

Most importantly, so far in the U.S. global war on terrorism, no fundamental fault lines have developed between the two sides of the Atlantic in terms of the use of power and other instruments for combating terrorism in its immediate expression (distinct, for example, from debates about what constitutes international terrorism or about the relative emphasis that should be placed on different elements of counterterrorism activity, such as trying to prevent terrorism's development and emergence as opposed to targeting its practitioners and supporters). Europe has fully supported the U.S. use of military power, particularly but not exclusively in Afghanistan where in fact NATO formally assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force in August 2003.[9] Individual allies, the EU, and other institutions have contributed greatly to countering international terrorism in a wide range of areas, including intelligence, police work, border control, fi-

nancial assets blocking, and a host of other activities that can be at least as important as direct military action and on which the success of military action depends.[10] Some allies have also provided fighting forces, notably special forces of the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Germany, and Turkey in Afghanistan.[11]

Thus, allies do not diverge from the United States on the application of these elements of power, and the Europeans have capabilities—plus the locus of a number of counterterrorism efforts on European soil—of great and immediate benefit to the United States. The United States has appropriately acknowledged that contribution. Therefore, in helping to meet the most important current threat to U.S. security, the European allies have the capacity to be of direct value, they have been willing to use those capacities, and the United States depends in significant part on European actions. Of course, this is not just European willingness to support U.S. needs—putting power and influence at U.S. disposal. Although some assessments of the nature and extent of the challenge from international terrorism differ between most European countries and the United States—and every European state believes that major progress in settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial in limiting terrorists' appeal in the Arab and Islamic worlds—few in Europe can rule out their own vulnerability or the need to take at least prophylactic steps to counter terrorism.

What do the U.S. and Europe need to *shape* the future, not just respond to it?

On to Iraq

Despite a significant degree of transatlantic understanding on practical and short- to medium-term steps to counter international terrorism, especially that emanating from the Europe-proximate Middle East, the same cannot be said to exist regarding the U.S. view of Iraq during the past two years; the arguments for the war in Iraq and the conduct of the postwar period; and overall issues related to WMD. Differences of view do not necessarily pit the United States on the one hand versus all European allies on the other; a variety of assessments and viewpoints can be found within countries on both sides of the Atlantic. Much has been written about these differences and need not be rehearsed here. For purposes of this discussion, important questions can be limited to a focus on instruments of and attitudes toward power and influence in terms of (1) what Europe can and will do; (2) how that response relates to U.S. expectations, thus either influencing or failing to in-

fluence U.S. views of the place, power, role, and potential of European countries and Europe as a whole; (3) how the United States should judge the future European role in terms of these criteria; and (4) how the United States should view the future in general in terms of instruments, processes, countries, and institutions needed to secure its national interests.

European nonmilitary capacities can become 'influence multipliers.'

Unlike the conflict in Afghanistan, as part of the war on terrorism, most European allies were not able, much less willing, to contribute to the anti-Saddam military effort as defined by the United States. With some notable exceptions, most prominently the United Kingdom,[12] a number of leading European countries and much of public opinion diverged from the United States in terms of what should be done, why it should be done, when it should be done, and who could as well as would take part under U.S. leadership and command. This divergence deeply affected U.S. views of European power and influence in terms of subjective assessments and objective capacities, regardless of whether European countries would employ those capacities. Further, this disagreement created a two-part problem, both parts of which are important but the nonmilitary one more so than the military because, at least in combat, the United States has less need for allies than it has in either pre-combat diplomacy or providing security and other forms of support after combat is over.

This last point is of particular concern in regard to the European role within NATO and the projection of military power to places such as the greater Middle East. Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq argues against trying to get European states to spend more money on defense for its own sake and, except for a few more advanced militaries, against emphasizing high-technology weapons capabilities (advanced tactical aircraft, precision-guided munitions), and in favor of convincing allies to create other military capacities that are also important to common action and potentially a useful supplement to U.S. action outside the framework of the alliance. These capacities must focus not only on integration of forces across the battlefield (emphasizing C^{4}ISR, or command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) but also on special forces, peacekeeping units, strategic and tactical airlift and sealift, other steps needed to increase force deployability, and the full range of paramilitary activities that have proved so important in every venture from Bosnia through Iraq—activities at which several European countries excel.

These possibilities have played a major role in NATO's formation of a new NATO Response Force (NRF). It is the complement to the EU's rapid

reaction force and is designed "to be a robust, high readiness, fully trained and certified force that is prepared to tackle the full spectrum of missions, including force."[13] Among other things, it can be a vehicle for European allies to provide what capabilities they can to joint military operations relevant to twenty-first-century challenges and deployable beyond Europe. The NRF can be the nucleus of increased European defense efforts, a renewed military partnership with the United States, and perhaps even the core of NATO's capabilities in the future.[14] Of key significance are the NRF's practical rather than theoretical approach to European military contributions to the alliance, the maintenance of integrated military efforts by a number of allies, and the creation of a force that can actually act militarily in useful and effective ways, however limited, at least at first. Although unlikely to blunt U.S. criticism of European defense efforts at least in its early days, the NRF is a start;[15] it is also a start on Europeans regaining some limited influence over the U.S. approach to the use of force.

Seeking a Role for European Power and Ceding Some Influence

At least in theory, the United States could provide all of these military capabilities on its own, developing and deploying those it currently lacks, without recourse to allies. Of course, the United States would be considerably constrained if particular European allies actively opposed a U.S. military action that required transiting Europe to get there (i.e., almost anywhere in the greater Middle East). That did not happen during the Iraq war.[16] Whatever any European state might have felt about that war, once it began, none could wish the United States to fail, just as none can wish the United States to fail in Iraq in the conflict's aftermath. All Europeans still depend on U.S. effectiveness, leadership, and commitment to Europe, which could be eroded if there were active efforts to impede the U.S. pursuit of its critical interests. Moreover, in regard to the greater Middle East, there is a common understanding that all Western states are in the same boat together in the end. It is in part for this reason that the European Council has begun debate on a set of far-reaching concepts, dubbed the "Solana Report" for its author, CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, that goes a fair distance in meeting U.S. concerns regarding European attitudes about threats and responses to them.[17]

The United States could also foot the bill for the conflict and aftermath by itself, without serious impact on the management of the U.S. economy or even the alternative potential uses of moneys spent on Iraq. Such a U.S. go-it-alone approach could thus depreciate the importance of any European role in securing U.S. national interests. Nevertheless, four primary reasons

exist for the United States to reject this reasoning, instead looking to allies to deploy niche capabilities in Afghanistan and Iraq; to provide military, paramilitary, and police forces for peacekeeping duties; to help provide logistical support for others' military efforts; and to engage directly and financially in nation building.

The first reason is instrumental: a division of labor can save the United States resources, so long as confidence is high that so-called niche capabilities provided by allies are either not critical to the United States or will be provided in any likely scenario. Furthermore, in some circumstances, as in postwar Iraq, both the United States and the United Kingdom (the latter as a former colonial nation) would benefit from decreasing their profiles and increasing the visible presence of personnel from other nations, both European and—especially—the non-Western and Islamic.[18]

The core task for the U.S. is to turn incipient power into lasting influence.

The second reason is alliance-political: to do what is possible to keep differing transatlantic perspectives of what is important in terms of national and alliance-wide security from further diverging. In this regard, preparing for joint military action can sometimes be as important as actually fighting together. That was certainly true in the conflict-free Cold War in Europe, and it is far from clear how many more wars, if any, like that in Iraq in 2003 there will be to fight in the foreseeable future, even in the U.S. estimation.

The third reason for the United States not to go it alone where it can gain the support of allies is that the greater the cooperation, the greater the chances of minimizing other problems across the Atlantic. This is about preserving the Atlantic Alliance not just for its own sake but also for the sake of continuing to promote a broader community of interests and values, not least in economic and other nonmilitary areas. This view also has strong resonance in Europe; thus, Poland assumed command of the Multinational Division Central South in Iraq in September 2003, and NATO actively supported it,[19] while some allied forces, notably French, continue to serve with U.S. fighting units in Afghanistan.

The fourth and most important reason is domestic-political within the United States. Although most Americans continue to be willing to pay a significant price to secure national interests and values in wartime, public and congressional opinion are reluctant to pay heavy costs, in either U.S. blood or treasure, following the end of formal hostilities. They certainly are not comfortable with the impression that the United States is bearing burdens without the support of the European allies. Naturally, therefore, following

an initial period of trying largely to go it alone, the United States has begun turning to allies and others for postwar support in Iraq. Also naturally, several allies and other states have conditioned that support on U.S. willingness to share perspectives and decisions, as well as costs and responsibilities, concerning what happens in Iraq as well as, for some European allies, concerning what the United States might do elsewhere, especially in the Middle East, for example, regarding Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In short, allies are prepared to trade needed support for influence or, put differently, to trade something that the United States needs, even if largely for domestic political reasons, for U.S. recognition and appreciation of European power to shape events and to help decide how and where this is done. That is clearly in the common interest.

Beyond Military Power

Events surrounding the war on terrorism, the defeat of Iraq, efforts to stop the spread of WMD, and the congeries of new U.S. responsibilities for rebuilding a system of security, economics, and politics in the greater Middle East—responsibilities perhaps to be shared with other states—should be leading to a reassessment of the critical elements in the realm of power: what is it that the United States and, in this case, its European allies need to be able to do to influence events in the Middle East and elsewhere to their liking, especially in a rapidly globalizing world? What do they need in order to shape the future, rather than just respond to it?[20]

Further, what forms of European power are relevant within this context, for European ends and as judged important by the United States in the pursuit of its own national objectives? Discussed above have been the roles of European economic power and influence, European actions to stabilize and transform emerging democracies in the former Warsaw Pact, European active engagement in the war on terrorism, European military efforts in the Balkans and as far afield as postwar Afghanistan, and European niche and other military capabilities and willingness to deploy them, including the dispatch of the Polish multinational division in Iraq.

Yet, European countries and the EU can and will act in other ways that can significantly shape events and in some cases reduce the likelihood of conflict or other threats to Western security interests. Terminology used in discussion and debate of these matters, such as "hard" versus "soft" power, is often fuzzy and imprecise, especially as between diplomacy and force and as between military and nonmilitary instruments. Analysts and commentators often rate military force as most significant, without reference to what outcome is desired, simply because it is widely believed to be most clearly deci-

sive. Yet, shaping the future and building security can depend as much on what is done effectively in advance of situations emerging that could then require more robust capabilities and intense action, especially the use of military force. Of course, this proposition is nothing new, nor is the aphorism that recourse to war in the absence of outright aggression by one or another party usually reflects failure to use nonmilitary instruments and methods effectively beforehand.

At the same time, to borrow a term in vogue in strategic analysis—the notion that certain military capabilities can become "force multipliers"—European nonmilitary, crisis-shaping capacities and the willingness to use them can become "influence multipliers" in relations with the United States.

Whether timely U.S. and European joint efforts can forestall the emergence of key challenges to Western security interests, including international terrorism and the spread of WMD, is of course now being deeply debated. Debates about preventing terrorism, for example, turn on complex questions, such as whether changing conditions in societies that produce terrorists or at least the political and personal support for terrorism, can help to dry up the sea within which the terrorist fish swim.[21] For his part, U.S. president George W. Bush has said, "We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror."[22]

More generally, Western security, as broadly understood, faces a wide range of actual and potential challenges where nonmilitary instruments are important. Preventing communicable diseases from coming to a nation's shores, especially in a world of easy and frequent travel, is one such case; less well understood is the value of promoting health in countries where its absence can help produce conflict, support for terrorism, and social and economic breakdown—potential security as well as humanitarian concerns that can operate beyond the borders of the immediately affected country or region. Health is not alone; the full range of issues that cluster under the rubrics of development and environment, broadly understood, are part of this canon.

Strategic Partnership to Shape the Future

These points may seem far afield from the original discussion of what power and influence Europe can wield, how Europe relates to the United States, and how seriously the United States should take Europe, but they are not. Indeed, the greatest potential for agreement and reinforcement of action in the transatlantic world falls in the area of advance effort, of trying to prevent the emergence of threats in common to the United States and Europe. The United States and the European states should be looking for means to augment traditional political-military security cooperation, that is, the mu-

tual harnessing and rationalizing to common ends of the military power on the two sides of the Atlantic, primarily through NATO. Even though that cooperation continues to be important to both sides, they should also be looking for ways to build on the obvious and ineluctable intertwining of their respective economies, shared leadership of the global economy, and interests and capabilities in a wide range of third areas, especially health, education, development, promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as well as other aspects of society, nation, and institution building.

One such means should be the creation of a strategic partnership between the United States and the EU, in league with the NATO alliance partnership, reflecting a wide range of shared goals, similar threats and challenges, and complementary means to meet them. This U.S.-EU strategic partnership would not primarily be about military relations, left largely to NATO, but rather about marshalling the economic strength, talents, leadership, and commitments that are common to all these nations, to a greater degree than any other set of nations, for purposes of working together on critical elements of a twenty-first-century agenda, as introduced above, that must be pursued even to deal with more exigent matters such as the threat of terrorism.

Such a scenario for U.S.-European engagement would harness each side's capabilities to produce effects that neither can produce alone, even to promote its own national security. It also looks very much like the pattern of U.S.-European relations during the past half century, which included a heavy reliance on working with others, forging and fostering international institutions, and promoting the rule of law—old lessons being learned all over again, not out of textbooks but from hard, practical experience. Given that events have once again demonstrated that neither the United States nor the European states can achieve their national goals alone—or at least that each will better be able to do so in cooperation with, rather than opposition to or abstention from, the other—and given the wide range of areas in which the two sides are ineluctably interdependent, moving in a cooperative direction is the course of wisdom for the twenty-first century, just as it was in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Turning U.S. Incipient Power into Lasting Influence

As argued above, the United States emerged from the Cold War with more incipient power than any other nation or empire since the collapse of the Roman Empire. Yet, even a decade ago it was also clear to many observers—and it becomes ever more clear with each passing month—that the emphasis has to be on the word incipient and that the core task for the United States in the years ahead is to turn this incipient power into lasting influ-

ence. The method for doing so was evident from 1945 until the end of the Cold War and it is becoming clear again: the United States can only make this critical transition of power to influence by once again building institutions, attitudes, policies, and practices that can fulfill U.S. interests precisely because they also meet the interests of other countries and peoples. This insight, which should in fact be self-evident, is only now beginning to be relearned, and it must still be fully adapted to the post–September 11, post-Iraq era. It very much validates the proposition that Europe—its people, power, influence, and institutions—matters decisively not just to the prosecution of European interests and values but also to those of the United States and of other peoples and societies across the inevitably globalizing world.

Notes

1. Robert E. Hunter, "Global Economics and Unsteady Regional Geopolitics," in Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (eds.), *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2001), www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%202001/Global%20Century%20-%20June%202001/JDSChap4Hunter(ri)FinalCr.htm (accessed October 29, 2003).
2. See Robert E. Hunter, "Maximizing NATO: A Relevant Alliance Knows How to Reach," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 3 (May/June 1999), www.foreignaffairs.org/19990501faessay1037/robert-e-hunter/nato-at-fifty-maximizing-nato-a-relevant-alliance-knows-how-to-reach.html (accessed October 10, 2003).
3. "Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources." "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, April 24, 1999, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
4. For further information on the significant migration of Muslims into Europe, see Shireen T. Hunter, ed., *Islam: Europe's Second Religion* (New York: Praeger, 2002).
5. See Robert E. Hunter, *European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion—or Competitor?* (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2002), www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1463/ (accessed October 6, 2003).
6. "Defence Capabilities Initiative," NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)69, April 25, 1999, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm (accessed October 12, 2003); "Prague Capabilities Commitment—individual Allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in areas key to modern military operations, such as strategic air and sea lift and air-to-ground surveillance." "NATO Transformed: New Members, Capabilities, and Partnerships," *NATO Update*, November 21, 2002, www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/11-november/e1121e.htm (accessed October 12, 2003).
7. The Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the NATO Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP), under the authority of the Joint Committee on Proliferation (CJP). See Crispin Hain-Cole, "The Summit Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Rationale and Aims," *NATO Review* 47, no. 2 (summer 1999): 33–34, www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-08.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).

8. "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and … will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith … such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." "North Atlantic Treaty," April 4, 1949, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (accessed October 12, 2003). Note that this act is still discretionary, thus emphasizing the political significance of invoking this provision.
9. Although little noted, before NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United Kingdom and Turkey, as well as Germany and the Netherlands in joint cooperation, had in turn exercised command of ISAF.
10. "European Union Steps Up Fight Against Terrorism," European Union News Releases No. 67/01, September 20, 2001, www.eurunion.org/news/press/2001/2001067.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
11. "Operation Enduring Freedom—Order of Battle," www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-01.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
12. Other NATO countries formally supporting U.S. policy on the war in Iraq were Spain, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Denmark, and the Czech Republic. Also, the so-called Vilnius 10 group of central European states agreed to a common declaration of support for U.S. policy. See "Eight European Leaders Support Disarming of Iraq," January 30, 2003, www.useu.be/Categories/GlobalAffairs/Iraq/Jan3003EuropeLetterIraq.html (accessed October 10, 2003). See also Quentin Peel et al., "The Plot That Split Old and New Europe," *Financial Times*, May 27, 2003, www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/2003/0527plot.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
13. "NATO Response Force—NRF," www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_intro.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
14. The NRF was formally "stood up"—became active—on October 15, 2003. It could be the vehicle for any alliance-agreed, NATO-wide engagement in Iraq peacekeeping. It could also serve as the framework for a NATO peace-enabling force in support of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. In time, an augmented NRF could become the key institution for organizing and projecting NATO military power, perhaps becoming the dominant element of the integrated military command structure. See Robert E. Hunter, "The Perfect Army for Iraq: NATO," *New York Times*, September 13, 2003.
15. Notably, French forces are playing a leading role in the NRF.
16. Only Turkey and Austria, for different reasons, refused the use of their air space to coalition overflights.
17. See "Draft European Security Strategy Presented by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to the European Council, 20 June 2003 in Thessaloniki, Greece," *Internationale Politik* 4, no. 3 (autumn 2003), www.dgap.org/english/tip/tip0303/solana200603.htm (accessed October 10, 2003).
18. This was a principal strategy of U.S. president George H. W. Bush during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
19. On June 2, the North Atlantic Council agreed to a request from the Polish [r]epresentative to support Poland in the context of its leadership of a sector in Iraq. That NATO support has consisted of providing intelligence, logistics expertise, movement coordination, force generation, and secure communications support. … Several NATO and [p]artner countries are among the nations contributing to the Polish-led multinational division. Spain provides a substantial presence and the [d]eputy [c]ommander, while Ukraine is the second[-]largest force contributor. Other [a]llied and [p]artner contributors in-

clude Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, [t]he Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia and the United States.

"Poland Assumes Command of Multinational Division in Iraq With NATO Support," NATO Press Release (2003)93, September 3, 2003, www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-093e.htm (accessed October 12, 2003).

20. This concept was a central component of U.S. military strategy from 1995 until 2002: "Shape, prepare, respond." Jim Garamone, "Capabilities, Strategy Must Converge to Face New Threats," American Forces Information Service, June 22, 2001, www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/n06222001_200106221.html (accessed October 10, 2003).
21. "The people may be likened to water, and guerrillas to the fish that swim in it." Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (1937), www.bellum.nu/wp/mtt/mttogw.html (accessed October 10, 2003).
22. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "President Outlines U.S. Plan to Help World's Poor," March 22, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-1.html (accessed October 6, 2003).