Matake Kamiya

Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?

Will Japan go nuclear? Most Japanese find it unimaginable that their nation would ever attempt to develop nuclear weapons. The Japanese maintain an adamant antinuclear sentiment, which they tend to believe should be apparent to the rest of the world. Suspicion and speculation exist, however, that Japan might choose to pursue nuclear proliferation, despite repeated denials by the Japanese government and the proclamation of Japan's Three Nonnuclear Principles.

For many years, realist scholars of international relations have predicted that Japan will decide to build nuclear weapons when and if the country feels its survival is threatened by a foreign military power.[1] Comments by Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe in May 2002 have reinforced international suspicion. Abe pointed out that the Japanese Constitution permits possession of nuclear weapons with a range limited to that minimally necessary for self-defense, and Fukuda said that, "if international tension is intensified, some citizens might even argue that Japan should possess nuclear weapons."[2] Yet, the idea that Japan would build a nuclear arsenal anytime in the near future is mistaken and based more on myths, misunderstandings, and misperceptions derived from such comments than on empirical evidence. Japan is not willing, interested, or able to become a nuclear power.

Not Willing: The Nonnuclear Public

The Japanese share a deep-seated aversion to nuclear arms; that feeling transcends differences in political ideology and beliefs. An almost instinc-

Matake Kamiya is an associate professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan.

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tive dread of, and hatred for, nuclear weapons widely held across the spectrum of Japanese society is both one of the most fundamental roots of Japan's nonnuclear stance and an extremely powerful deterrent against Japanese nuclear proliferation.

The origin of such strong antinuclear attitudes obviously lies in Japan's tragic experience as the only nation ever to suffer a nuclear attack. The two bombs dropped on Japan in August 1945 killed about 140,000 in Hiroshima and about 70,000 in Nagasaki. In the years that followed, tens of thousands more died from so-called atomic bomb disease—various illnesses caused by exposure to radiation. Even today, many Japanese suffer from the aftereffects of this exposure. Naturally, Hiroshima and Nagasaki have greatly influenced postwar Japanese culture. Over the past half-century, numerous books, television and radio programs, and even comic books and cartoons about the bombs have exposed later generations to the horrors of nuclear war.

Another factor—often overlooked by outsiders but no less important in shaping Japanese antinuclear sentiment than Hiroshima and Nagasaki—was the harm done to Japanese fishermen by U.S. nuclear testing in the South Pacific in March 1954. The radioactive fallout from the first U.S. hydrogen bomb test on Bikini Atoll severely contaminated the *Fukuryu-maru No. 5*, a Japanese tuna-fishing boat known as the *Lucky Dragon* outside Japan, and its crew of 23, even though the boat was located 35 kilometers from the danger zone declared by the United States at the time of the explosion. The entire crew suffered from atomic bomb disease; one crew member died, and the rest were hospitalized for more than a year. The Japanese were both horrified and outraged to see that their compatriots were victims of nuclear weapons yet again, particularly because the tragedy occurred in peacetime.[3]

The *Fukuryu-maru* incident left a deep and lasting impression among the Japanese population that anyone could become a victim of nuclear weapons—anywhere, anytime. Shortly afterward, the first nationwide grassroots movement against nuclear weapons sprang up in Japan, and by the end of 1954, more than 20 million Japanese had signed the Suginami Appeal for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.[4] In April 1954, both houses of Japan's Diet unanimously passed resolutions that called for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and international control of nuclear energy.

The development of the Japanese government's nonnuclear policy has consistently reflected this profound hatred for nuclear weapons. Since Japan launched its nuclear energy development program in the mid-1950s, government officials have repeatedly declared that this effort did not indicate that Japan would ever consider acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1955 the Diet adopted the Atomic Energy Basic Law, which strictly limits nuclear energy use to peaceful purposes. During deliberations on the law, one of the bill's

sponsors, Yasuhiro Nakasone—at the time, a young member of the lower house—stated that "weapons that utilize atomic energy to kill and wound people" would be excluded from Japan's atomic energy research and utilization program.[5]

In April 1958, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi told the upper house that Japan would choose not to possess any nuclear weapons, even though its postwar "Peace Constitution" (*Heiwa Kenpo*) did not prohibit their possession for strictly defensive purposes.[6] During a lower house session in April 1960, Kishi stated that "Japan will not arm itself with nuclear weapons, nor will it allow the introduction of nuclear weapons [into its territory]."[7] At the time, both Nakasone and Kishi were generally considered among the most hawkish nationalists within Japan's political circles. In May 1967, the director-general of Japan's Defense Agency, Kanehichi Masuda, told the upper house that "the government has maintained the principles of not manufacturing, possessing, or allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan since the Kishi cabinet."[8]

Antinuclear sentiments have not gradually faded over time.

Introduced as the "Three Nonnuclear Principles" (*Hikaku San-Gensoku*) in Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's remarks to the lower house in December 1967 and January 1968 and formalized in a resolution by the Diet in November 1971, these standards have been considered national principles (*kokuze*) by the Japanese government as well as the public. Each subsequent administration has repeatedly reaffirmed unwavering support for these principles as part of the government's national policy. Sato was even awarded the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize for his activities against nuclear proliferation, including his advocacy of the Three Nonnuclear Principles.

Beyond its nuclear history, the nonnuclear position of postwar Japan has been strongly buttressed by more general pacifism, which has its roots in the collective Japanese memory of the country's militarist past and which runs deep among Japanese elite and mass culture.[9] Memory of their suffering in World War II along with a sense of guilt over their nation's role in that war has produced an unwavering determination among postwar Japanese to transform their country into a nation of peace (*heiwa kokka*), which should never again wage war. In Article 9 of the 1947 Peace Constitution, Japan renounced forever the right to wage war as well as the right to maintain any military potential to do so.

The memory of World War II has also created another facet of postwar Japanese pacifism—an extremely negative image of the military among Japa-

nese society. In the 1930s, the Japanese military frequently usurped civilian control and intervened in political affairs. Under the military establishment's strong political influence, the Japanese government made a series of reckless moves—withdrawing from the League of Nations, starting war against China, and allying with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy—which led to Japan's disastrous defeat in World War II. After witnessing nearly two decades of the follies of their own military leaders, the Japanese people developed a deep distrust of the military after the war, as well as a strong aversion to anything related to the military as a tool of national policy, including even Japan's national security policy. This profound popular skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of military power has undoubtedly contributed to the widespread abhorrence for nuclear weapons.

Nuclearization would only threaten Japan's military security.

Public opinion polls have consistently demonstrated the strength and durability of postwar Japan's antinuclear sentiment. In polls conducted in June 1969, April 1978, and April 1981, the newspaper *Yomiuri Shinbun* posed the same question: "Do you want Japan to possess nuclear weapons?" Responses defied the intuitive expectation that antinuclear sentiments would gradually fade over time. In the 1969 poll, 72 percent of respondents answered "no," while only 16 percent answered "yes." In 1978 the percentage of those who answered "no" rose to 74 percent, whereas the percentage of those who answered "yes" dropped to 10 percent. In 1981 the percentage of those who answered "yes" remained 10 percent, but the percentage of those who replied "no" leapt to 82 percent.[10]

A more recent poll conducted by the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) in October 1999, which targeted 2,000 members of the Japanese public as well as 400 "informed Japanese people," produced an even more striking outcome. Asked what policy option Japan should adopt to protect itself from other nations' nuclear weapons if the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty were dissolved or rendered meaningless for some reason, only 7 percent of the general public and 14.6 percent of "informed people" responded that they believed that Japan should possess its own nuclear weapons.[11]

Nonetheless, well before Fukuda's and Abe's recent statements, some Japanese commentators and officials themselves have raised the nuclearization question. In 1980 a famous sociologist and respected political commentator, Ikutaro Shimizu, argued that Japan should obtain nuclear weapons to become a full-fledged state.[12] In 1996 a military commentator, Nisohachi

Hyodo, insisted that Japan should try to acquire a credible second-strike capability by deploying a small number of nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines to carry them.[13] In October 1999, Shingo Nishimura, parliamentary deputy director-general of the Defense Agency, argued that the Diet should debate the possibility for Japan to go nuclear, like India and Pakistan had.[14]

Each of these proposals was rejected in Japan. The public either severely criticized them, in the Shimizu and Nishimura cases, or ignored them as complete nonsense, in the case of Hyodo's nuclear submarines. Nishimura's remarks even cost him his position as parliamentary vice-minister just one day after the major national dailies reported his comments.

Opposition to nuclear weapons is deeply embedded in postwar Japanese culture and society. Although there may be no guarantee that this sentiment will last forever, it is still far stronger, even today, than those who warn of impending Japanese nuclear armament realize.

Not Interested: Comparing Costs and Benefits

As alive and fundamental as antinuclear sentiment is, it does not represent the sole factor behind Japan's nonnuclear stance. Comparing the costs and benefits of going nuclear yields at least four basic reasons why Japan's decision to remain nonnuclear is also largely based on its national interests.

First, Japan's decision to go nuclear would surely undermine the stability of the international environment in which the country lives. As a resource-poor island country, friendly international relations are Japan's only hope to maintain its security and prosperity. The country imports nearly 80 percent of its total energy requirements and almost 100 percent of its petroleum requirements.[15] In fiscal 2000, Japan was self-sufficient for only 40 percent of its calories and 28 percent of its cereal grains.[16] As an island nation, Japan depends on sea-lanes for imports and exports. Thus, the Japanese are not merely speaking rhetorically when they say that world and regional peace is inseparable from the country's security and prosperity, as the government's *Diplomatic Bluebook* recently emphasized.[17]

Since the end of World War II, Japan has used every opportunity to show the international community and especially its East Asian neighbors that it has been reborn as a nation of peace. Japan's postwar, exclusively defense-oriented policy has played a particularly large role in restoring the trust of other East Asian countries by providing clear evidence of Japan's resolve not to become militaristic again. In abiding by this policy, Japan has voluntarily limited the resources and application of its Self-Defense Forces to the absolute minimum necessary to maintain national self-defense. It has refrained

from acquiring offensive weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, and offensive aircraft carriers and imposed strict conditions on when and how the Self-Defense Forces can lawfully mobilize. According to these conditions, Japan can employ military force only if an armed attack has already been initiated against it and if dealing with the situation without using military force is impossible, but only within the limit of what is minimally necessary. Were Japan to go nuclear, more than a half-century of abiding by such conditions would immediately go up in smoke.

The decision to go nuclear would only weaken Japan's political power internationally.

Foreign Minster Yohei Kono's comments in August 1994, when tensions about the North Korean nuclear development program were at a peak, demonstrated a clear understanding of the stakes involved. Asked about Japan's nuclear option, Kono declared flatly that it "would not benefit Japan at all" because Japan's development of a nuclear arsenal would increase tensions with its neighbors, the United States, and presumably other countries as well.[18]

Second, contrary to what most foreign observers believe, nuclearization would actually threaten Japan's military security. A decision to go nuclear might trigger an arms race in Northeast Asia—in a worst-case scenario, prompting the two Koreas and Taiwan to accelerate their nuclear development or go nuclear as well—ultimately reducing regional and global security.

Japan's Defense Agency soberly recognizes this reality. An unofficial study conducted in 1994 by Defense Agency officials and Self-Defense Forces officers at the behest of Administrative Vice-Minister Shigeru Hatakeyama concluded that Japan's possession of its own nuclear arsenal had little if any strategic merit.[19] In a 1996 presentation, Lt. Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces—reportedly a participant in the 1994 study group—asserted that, even without the protection of a U.S. nuclear umbrella, Japan would be worse off with its own nuclear arsenal.[20] He emphasized that, because Japan is an island country with a large part of its population of more than 120 million living in a small number of densely populated cities, nuclear armament would not suit Japan because of its inherent vulnerability to nuclear attack. As a result, Japan is better off in a world where just a few states possess nuclear weapons capability. Consequently, going nuclear would only endanger Japan because, while bringing only minimal military benefits to the country, such a move would motivate numerous other currently nonnuclear states to pursue proliferation.

Third, Japan's decision to develop nuclear weapons would inevitably have a detrimental effect on the country's relationship with the United States—Japan's most important bilateral relationship. U.S. leaders do not want to see Japan become a major military power, much less a nuclear power. In March 1990, Maj. Gen. Henry Stackpole, commander of the U.S. Marine Corps bases in Japan, expressed the U.S. position quite clearly: "No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan. … So we are a cap in the bottle, if you will."[21] This sentiment has been echoed by many U.S. politicians and security experts on numerous occasions, and the Japanese are well aware of it.

Fourth, and again contrary to the views of many foreign observers, the decision to go nuclear would only weaken Japan's political power internationally. In fact, Japan has won the respect of other nations for its decision not to go nuclear despite its latent nuclear capability. For example, many of the countries that have expressed their support for Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council have listed Japan's nonnuclear status as one of the reasons for their support. For example, in August 1994, Brazilian foreign minister Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim told Japanese foreign minister Yohei Kono that limiting the permanent membership of the Security Council to nuclear weapons states would not be appropriate and that Japan should be included in the rank of permanent members.[22] Thus, nuclearization would only undermine Japan's international position and the reputation it has built for itself thus far. As the second largest economic power in the world, Japan, unlike India, does not need to acquire nuclear weapons to assert its power and prestige in the world.

Not Able: Technical Constraints

Those who emphasize the potential for Japan to go nuclear in the foreseeable future argue that, of all the elements required to be a nuclear power, the only one that Japan lacks is the will. The proponents of this view are mistaken, however, because Japan currently has only latent, not immediate, nuclear capability. In other words, even if Japan decided to build its own nuclear arsenal tomorrow, it could not achieve that goal overnight.

First, Japan has intentionally avoided acquiring the necessary weapons-grade plutonium to make bombs; Japan's plutonium stockpile consists only of reactor-grade plutonium. Although some kind of small-scale nuclear bomb production with reactor-grade plutonium may be possible, experts generally agree that bomb production with this kind of plutonium involves an extremely dangerous technological process and that such bombs are likely to be too unstable and too militarily unreliable to be deployed as ac-

tual warheads. In fact, no country has ever tried to produce nuclear weapons with reactor-grade plutonium.

If Japan decided to develop its own nuclear weapons, it would surely choose to do so with weapons-grade plutonium because the process would be much easier, safer, and cheaper. The amount of weapons-grade plutonium, however, that Japan could obtain from existing nuclear power plants would be limited. For a major power such as Japan, having a small number of nuclear warheads is militarily meaningless. A militarily meaningful nuclear arsenal would require production of hundreds of warheads, which would first necessitate that Japan spend at least a decade constructing new facilities to extract the grand amount of weapons-grade plutonium required.[23]

Japan currently has only latent—not immediate—nuclear capability.

These facts clearly demonstrate that Japan's plutonium program and its plutonium stockpile are unrelated to the possibility of nuclearization. Japan's acceptance of comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards further assures that Japan operates its plutonium program strictly for peaceful purposes. Moreover, since 1994, Japan has disclosed specific figures on its plutonium stock as part of its effort to promote the transparency of the country's nuclear-fuel recycling program, to help assuage any inevitable suspicion of Japanese intentions.

The second technological hurdle that Japan must clear before claiming to possess a militarily meaningful nuclear arsenal entails ballistic missile development. For Japan, tactical nuclear weapons would be useless in practical terms; as an island nation, it would find few meaningful targets for such weapons. But Japan would have to devote many years to developing a ballistic missile program before achieving deployment capability. Among other difficulties, converting Japan's H-2 rocket into a form for military use is not realistic. Liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, the fuels used to power Japan's H-2, must be maintained at extremely low temperatures. Because maintaining the huge H-2 at these temperatures for extended periods of time is practically impossible, technicians must first cool the H-2's fuel tanks before they are filled, shortly before launch, a process that requires at least a few hours. Finally, Japan lacks the technology necessary to build an accurate inertial guidance system and the reentry mechanisms that are essential for ballistic missiles.

Even if Japan technologically mastered ballistic-missile development, its small physical size (in territorial square miles) would still make it vulnerable to a first strike. Land-based missiles on such a small territory would not ensure a retaliatory capability, and air-launched missile systems would not nec-

essarily receive adequate warning time to allow the deploying aircraft to scramble to secure locations. Japan would have to deploy submarines to possess a credible second-strike capability. For that purpose, Japan would be faced with building nuclear engines as well as an extensive terrestrial or satellite communications grid to support their activities. The time needed for Japan to make this extensive list of technological strides can more realistically be measured in decades than years.

In conclusion, for all its latent nuclear potential, Japan is not capable now, nor will it be anytime soon, of going nuclear quickly. The likelihood that Japan would secretly pursue nuclear weapons development without the world knowing about it, even if Japan had the desire, is minimal. Japan is an open society; all of its nuclear power activity is subject to IAEA regulation; and it is practically incapable of surmounting all the technological hurdles without international assistance.

The Debate over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Despite the deep antinuclear sentiment in Japan that arose following World War II, Japan did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), established in July 1968, until a year and a half later. The country then took six more years to ratify it. Those who worry that Japan might go nuclear often claim that this delay indicated the Japanese government's desire to preserve a nuclear option.

The fact is that the Japanese government was consistently in favor of signing and ratifying the NPT early but was not able to do so until it resolved three persistent objections to the treaty in Japan. First, Japanese observers strongly criticized the NPT for its discriminatory nature because it officially approved the status of the five states that already possessed nuclear weapons, threatening to impede nuclear disarmament. Second, many Japanese also feared that the NPT might give nuclear weapons states the ability to harness the peaceful uses of nuclear energy more easily than nonnuclear states, including Japan. Third, a small but stubborn conservative segment of Japanese society asserted that Japan should not foreclose its nuclear option. They insisted that Japan remain nonnuclear but, at the same time, maintain the option to go nuclear for future generations, primarily because of the uncertainty of what the future might bring. This group failed to receive wide public support.[24]

During the NPT controversy that lasted from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, a number of Japanese security experts tried to estimate the costs and benefits of Japan's development of nuclear weapons, and almost all the experts reached the same conclusion—going nuclear would only have detri-

mental effects on Japan's national interests. For example, in the 15-part series "Special Issue: Should Japan Go Nuclear?" printed in 1967–1968 in the defense journal *Kokubo*, regarded as the quasi-official publication of Japan's Defense Agency, not one contributor answered "yes."[25]

In 1968 and 1970, two unofficial reports commissioned by the Cabinet Research Office and prepared by a study group headed by Michio Royama, a member of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's private foreign policy advisory group, concluded that nuclearization was a possible but not desirable policy option for Japan. Admitting that Japan would become capable of building a small number of plutonium bombs in the not-too-distant future, the reports also warned that Japanese nuclear proliferation would definitely invite the suspicion of its neighbors and thereby isolate Japan in the international community. Furthermore, according to the advisory group, the financial burden of nuclearization would be enormous, and public support for such a program was unlikely.[26]

Even during the NPT controversy, when the Japanese people feared the treaty might eternally lock Japan into an inferior position, few Japanese advocated the immediate development of a nuclear arsenal.[27] Since 1976, the mere argument for maintaining a nuclear option has rapidly waned.[28] In fact, Japan has been among the most enthusiastic supporters of the NPT regime since then. Tokyo's initial unwillingness to accept an unconditional and indefinite extension of the treaty in the early 1990s was not grounded in any latent desires to keep Japanese options open. Instead, the concern, shared by Japan and other nonnuclear states, involved an unconditional, indefinite extension of the NPT that could enshrine permanent retention of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear powers.

Much Ado about Nothing

The recent comments of Japanese officials Fukuda and Abe never suggested that Japan is likely to begin developing nuclear weapons anytime in the near future. Their remarks were highly hypothetical, suggesting only theoretical possibilities. Unfortunately, the international media failed to report or translate their statements accurately, thereby exacerbating international misunderstanding about Japan's nuclear intentions.

The *New York Times*, for example, quoted Fukuda as saying that "in the face of calls to amend the Constitution, the amendment of the [three nonnuclear] principles is also likely."[29] Fukuda's original statement in Japanese, however, used an expression "*…mo … kamoshirenai*," which is not accurately translated as "likely." A more precise translation should read "…even the amendment of the principles could take place." The same article re-

ported that Abe said that Japan's possession of nuclear weapons would be legal under Japanese law if it were "small." Although this translation was technically accurate—the word Abe used, *kogata*, does mean "small" in Japanese—the article failed to explain that use of the word "small" in this context in Japan implies "small enough to be considered strictly defensive nuclear warheads."

Ever since the late 1950s, the Japanese government's official position has been that possession of strictly defensive nuclear weapons is not unconstitutional. This position, however, rests on the assumption that such weapons may be invented someday in the future. In reality, strictly defensive nuclear weapons have not yet been invented. Because all existing nuclear weapons are offensive in nature, possession of any nuclear weapons by Japan today would be unconstitutional.

> For Japan, having a small number of nuclear warheads is militarily meaningless.

Japan has ample reasons to remain nonnuclear. Even an acceleration of North Korea's nuclear program would not likely cause Japan to follow suit. Facing nuclear threats is not a new experience for Japan. During the Cold War, the country was exposed to a substantial Soviet nuclear threat as well as a lesser threat from China, but even then, there was never serious discussion in Japan about Japan pursuing its own nuclear weapons. Japanese memory of World War II experiences ensured strong antinuclear sentiments in Japanese society, and the Japanese elite was very aware of the enormous military, political, and economic costs associated with the development of a nuclear arsenal.

Today, no one should assume that the U.S.-Japanese alliance serves as the "cap in the bottle," without which Japan would easily go nuclear. Japan's nonnuclear policy is much stronger than that characterization would imply. It is more legitimate, however, to claim that Japan will be even less likely to reconsider its nonnuclear policy as long as it maintains a strong partnership with the United States. In his February 2002 speech to the Diet, President George W. Bush declared that the alliance between the two countries "has never been stronger" as a result of Japan's active cooperation in the U.S. war on terrorism. For a variety of reasons, particularly under such favorable circumstances today, international observers should be even less concerned about Japanese nuclear intentions.

Notes

1. For example, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics" *International Security* 18, no. 2 (fall 1993).

2. *Yomiuri Shinbun*, June 1 and June 3, 2002; *Asahi Shinbun*, June 1, 2002; *Mainichi Shinbun*, June 1, 2002; *Shinbun Akahata*, May 28 and June 1, 2002; *Sandei Mainichi*, June 2, 2002.
3. For details of the *Fukuryu-maru* incident, see Kazuya Sakamoto, "Kaku-Heiki to Nichi-Bei Kankei: Bikini Jiken no Gaiko Shori" (Nuclear weapons and the Japanese-U.S. relationship: The diplomatic settlement of the Bikini incident), *Nenpo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu* 16 (November 1994): 243–271; Shigemichi Hirota, *Dai-go Fukuryu-maru* (The *Fukuryu-maru No. 5*) (Tokyo: Shiraishi Shoten, 1989).
4. Sakamoto, "Kaku-Heiki to Nichi-Bei Kankei," p. 251; Hiroshi Iwadare, *Kaku-Heiki Haizetsu no Uneri* (The surge of movement to abolish nuclear weapons) (Tokyo: Rengo Shuppan, 1982), pp. 11–13; Susumu Wada, *Sengo Nihon no Heiwa Ishiki* (Public opinion on peace issues in postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997), p. 93.
5. Akira Sakuragawa, "Nihon no Gunshuku Gaiko," (Japan's disarmament diplomacy), *Kokusai Seiji* 80 (October 1985): 64.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 65.
9. See Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (spring 1993). See also Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Politics," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (spring 1993).
10. NHK Broadcasting Poll Research Institute, ed., *Zusetsu Sengo Yoron-shi* (Postwar opinion polls illustrated), 2d ed. (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, 1982), pp. 170–171.
11. *Japan's Proactive Peace and Security Strategies*, NIRA Research Report No. 20000005 (Tokyo: National Institute for Research Advancement, 2001), p. 270.
12. Ikutaro Shimizu, *Nihon yo Kokka tare* (Japan, be a state) (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1980).
13. Nisohachi Hyodo, "Nihon Retto Kaku Heibi Keikaku" (Program to nuclearize the Japanese archipelago), *Shokun!* 28, nos. 10–12 (October–December 1996).
14. *Asahi Shinbun*, October 19, 1999, evening edition.
15. Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunication, ed., *Statistical Handbook of Japan, 2002 Edition* (Tokyo: The Japan Statistical Association, 2002), pp.79–80.
16. Ibid., p. 57.
17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Gaiko Seisho, 2002* (Diplomatic bluebook, 2002) (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau, 2002), p. 88.
18. Satoshi Isaka, "Japan: Going Nuclear Not an Option, Asserts Government," *Nikkei Weekly*, August 15, 1994.
19. "Anpo Minaoshi: Nichibei Sessho no Uchimaku" (Reviewing Japanese-U.S. security relations: The inside facts about the bilateral negotiations), *Shukan Toyo Keizai*, December 2, 1995, pp. 75–76. Because of the unofficial nature of the study, the final report entitled "On the Issue of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" has not been published and is not available to the public.
20. Noboru Yamaguchi, "Japan's Nonnuclear Policy in a Post–Cold War Era: A Military Perspective" (paper presented at the International Studies Association–Japan Association of International Relations Joint Convention, Makuhari, Japan, September 20–22, 1996).

21. Fred Hiatt, "Marine General: U.S. Troops Must Stay in Japan," *Washington Post*, March 27, 1990.
22. "Brazil: Brazil Supports Japan's UNSC Bid," *Jiji Press Newswire*, September 1, 1994.
23. Ryukichi Imai, interview with author, Tokyo, April 25, 1995.
24. Fuji Kamiya (member of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's private foreign policy advisory group), interviews with author, Yokohama, September 22, 1997, and August 31, 2002 (hereinafter Kamiya interviews). See also Takeshi Nakane, "NPT to Nihon no Taiou" (Japan's attitude toward NPT), *Kaigai Jijo* 42, nos. 7–8 (July–August 1994); Eiichi Sato and Shuzo Kimura, *Kakubo Joyaku* (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), 2d ed. (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1977), chap. 3.
25. *Kokubo*, July, August, September, October, and December 1967; March, April, May, August, and September 1968.
26. *Asahi Shinbun*, November 13, 1994. Because of the unofficial nature of the two reports, they were not published and were unknown to the public until this *Asahi Shinbun* report.
27. Kamiya interviews.
28. Nakane, "NPT to Nihon no Taiou"; Kamiya interviews.
29. Howard W. French, "Nuclear Arms Taboo Is Challenged in Japan," *New York Times*, June 9, 2002.