

Combating Terrorism

None of the four counterterrorism goals identified by the U.S. government—defeating terrorist organizations with global reach; denying sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists; diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and defending U.S. citizens and interests—can be achieved through unilateral action alone. Although the February 2003 U.S. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* explicitly recognizes that an effective campaign against terrorism will require extensive multilateral cooperation, it says little about how to bring about such cooperation and next to nothing about the role of the United Nations.¹

U.S. observers have paid scant attention to the UN's role in the international campaign against terrorism, yet the UN Security Council has made, and can continue to make, critical contributions to this effort. UN-imposed sanctions regimes have changed the attitudes of state sponsors of terrorism and helped stigmatize terrorism. After the attacks of September 11, the Security Council made the fight against terrorism a global one by ordering every UN member state to implement a wide array of measures to prevent and stop terrorist activities. The council also militarized the response to terrorism by legitimizing unilateral military action in response to terrorist threats.

The UN can continue to be an effective force against terrorism by enhancing the legitimacy of military actions and increasing the effectiveness of economic and political sanctions; strengthening and sustaining multilateral

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collaboration in the fight against terrorism; and establishing and maintaining international standards of accountability. Moreover, through its efforts to resolve regional conflicts, foster economic and social development, and develop the rule of law and standards of good governance, the UN can improve the political, economic, and social conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.

Only with U.S. leadership, however, can the UN remain strong on terrorism and become an even stronger force. The diplomatic standoff in the UN over the war in Iraq is not the rule but the exception. Indeed, the UN's track record since the end of the Cold War shows that, when the United States demonstrates leadership and determination, it frequently convinces other Security Council members to follow its lead and take effective multilateral action. In the future, this will require the United States to exercise political restraint and a willingness to listen to the concerns of other states. Enlightened leadership will generate substantial payoffs in the form of multilateral cooperation and action.

UN Counterterrorism Sanctions in the 1990s

In January 1992, at the Security Council's first ever meeting of heads of state and government to define a new post-Cold War agenda for the council, the heads of state and government "expressed their deep concern over acts of international terrorism and emphasized the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts."² In March 1992, for the first time the Security Council backed up its rhetorical commitment with action, imposing mandatory economic sanctions on Libya, which had been accused of involvement in the 1988 and 1989 bombings of UTA flight 772 and Pan Am flight 103. The Security Council imposed mandatory—as defined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter—sanctions to fight terrorism on two other occasions: against Sudan in 1996 and against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1999.

The changing nature of the terrorist threat throughout the decade made it imperative to tackle this problem in concert with other nations. Five trends in international terrorist activity continued to attract U.S. and Security Council attention to the issue:

- An increasing proportion of terrorist attacks targeted U.S. facilities or citizens. According to some calculations, attacks on U.S. targets increased from about 20 percent of total attacks in 1993–1995 to almost 50 percent of the total in 2000.³

- The average number of casualties per incident was increasing. U.S. Department of State statistics revealed a fourfold increase in the number of casualties per attack in the latter half of the 1990s.⁴
- More and more terrorist groups seemed to be operating worldwide as part of global networks. The attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998 underscored the global reach of the Al Qaeda network, which was estimated to have 4,000–5,000 well-trained fighters scattered around the world. Compared to the 500 members of the Abu Nidal organization, the 200–400 activists of the Irish Republican Army or the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), or the 50–75 hardcore members of the Red Brigades, Al Qaeda was significantly larger and a qualitatively different type of terrorist organization.⁵
- Fears that terrorists might one day use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were increasing. The 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo made such fears less theoretical. The possibility that terrorists could obtain biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, either by buying, stealing, or colluding with states that were developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), was a growing concern.
- The United States became particularly concerned about certain nations' role in supporting and sponsoring terrorism. State support enhances the reach and power of terrorist groups and might provide them with WMD; states could also use terrorist groups as proxies for their own fights.

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Throughout the 1990s, economic sanctions were the main policy instrument employed in the campaign against terrorism. By imposing sanctions on Libya, Sudan, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Security Council not only sought the extradition of certain individuals but also hoped to send a more general message and to change the behavior of state sponsors of terrorism. Washington in particular viewed “this type of concerted multilateral response to terrorism ... as an important deterrent to states considering support for terrorist acts or groups.”⁶

Sanctions were fairly effective against Libya, getting it to meet both the specific and the more general demands. Even before the 1992 sanctions took effect, Libya offered to surrender the suspects in the UTA bombing to a French court and those responsible for the Pan Am explosion to an inter-

national court. Washington, however, insisted that the suspects of the Pan Am bombing be turned over to either a U.S. or a British court. The imposition of sanctions also helped to achieve the broader security objective of weakening Libya's support of terrorist groups. This broader objective was largely achieved by the late 1990s.

In 1996 the State Department noted that Libya's support of terrorism had been sharply reduced.⁷ Consequently, it became difficult to justify continu-

The UN set a precedent, legitimizing unilateral force against terrorist attacks.

ing imposition of UN sanctions against the country. In addition, international support for the sanctions regime was crumbling. In response, the United States and United Kingdom developed a compromise proposal whereby the two Libyan suspects would be tried under Scottish law in a court in the Netherlands. The Security Council made this plan its own in August 1998. After several months of negotiations, spearheaded by UN secretary general Kofi Annan, the Libyan

government accepted the plan and handed over the two Libyan suspects in April 1999. Sanctions were suspended that same day.

UN sanctions limiting the travel of Sudanese officials were imposed in April 1996 after Sudan refused to extradite three suspects in the assassination attempt of Egypt's President Husni Mubarak. Although Sudan subsequently expelled some members of terrorist groups, notably a number of Egyptians, Palestinians, and "Arab Afghans," including Osama bin Laden, sanctions were left in place and then strengthened by the adoption of an air embargo in August 1996. Indeed, the United States argued—and other Security Council members concurred—that Sudan continued to be used as a safe haven by other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The more stringent sanctions, however, were never implemented because Security Council members feared the humanitarian consequences of an air embargo, particularly on a country already ravaged by a humanitarian crisis and civil war. In this case, sanctions were used less to punish a particular state and more to transmit a general message that supporting terrorist activities was not acceptable and would provoke a substantial response by the international community. UN sanctions were lifted in September 2001, once Sudan pledged its full support for the global campaign against terrorism.

At Washington's urging, the Security Council imposed financial and air travel sanctions on Afghanistan's Taliban regime in October 1999 because of its support for international terrorists and because it refused to extradite bin Laden, who was accused of involvement in the 1998 bombings of

the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Unfortunately, the UN sanctions had no noticeable effect on the Taliban's behavior because of the country's economic isolation: the extent of Taliban-controlled air traffic was negligible, the Taliban had limited funds abroad, and it was not active in the aboveboard global economy, deriving much of its money from illegal opium and heroin trade. A strengthened UN sanctions package, which had been adopted in December 2000, could not change these economic fundamentals.

Although the UN sanctions regimes of the 1990s failed to stop worldwide terrorist activities, they made supporting terrorist activities more costly for states and helped to change at least the declared attitudes—what they say if not what they do—of states toward terrorist groups, particularly the attitudes of state sponsors of terrorism. The State Department recognized this transformation in the late 1990s and again in 2001 when it noted the continuation of a slow trend away from state sponsorship of terrorism.⁸ At the same time, terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda adapted by becoming less dependent on state support, diversifying their organizational structures as well as their funding sources to make themselves more autonomous.

Most importantly, the UN sanctions regimes of the 1990s stigmatized terrorist activities and secured the growing international consensus that terrorism is an illegitimate activity that must be countered through collective international action. By designating terrorist activities as “threats to international peace and security,” UN sanctions paved the way for more forceful international responses to terrorism after September 11, 2001.

Leading the International Response after September 11

Within hours of the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the Security Council president, French ambassador Jean-David Levitte, circulated a draft resolution strongly condemning the attacks and paving the way for military action. On September 12, 2001, Resolution 1368 was adopted unanimously. Two weeks later, the council adopted Resolution 1373, obligating all 191 UN member states to take far-reaching domestic legislative and executive actions designed to prevent and suppress future terrorist activities. At that time, the U.S. permanent representative to the Security Council, Ambassador John Negroponte, called the UN “a unique partner in troubled times” and described Resolution 1373 as the UN’s “single most powerful response” in the war on terrorism.⁹ The two UN resolutions took the unprecedented steps of legitimizing military action against terrorism and globalizing the ban on terrorism.

MILITARIZING RESPONSES

Before Resolution 1368, the use of force in response to terrorist attacks often provoked condemnations in the UN General Assembly as well as among legal scholars. Prior to the September 11 attacks, the United States was well aware of the weak legal basis for the use of force in such situations and had used military force in response to terrorist acts on only three occasions: against Libya in 1986 in retaliation for its involvement in the bombing of a nightclub in Berlin that was frequented by U.S. service members; against Iraq in 1993 in retaliation for its attempt to assassinate former U.S. president George H. W. Bush and the emir of Kuwait; and against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 in retaliation for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The CTC could help states implement and enforce domestic counterterrorism legislation.

By invoking a state's right to self-defense and thus legitimizing the unilateral use of force against terrorist attacks, the Security Council set an important precedent that poses risks to the general prohibition on the use of force, as embodied in the UN Charter.

Indeed, the United States seemed to consider Resolution 1368 a blank check. In its letter informing the Security Council of U.S. action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the United States hinted that military action would be taken against other targets when it stated that "our inquiry is in its early stages. We may find that our self-defense requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other states."¹⁰ This declaration concerned Annan, UN diplomats, and legal scholars because, in the absence of international agreement on the definition of terrorism, they saw a legion of possibilities for abuse.¹¹ China and Russia, on the other hand, were quick to endorse the U.S. position: Beijing believed that it helped to legitimize China's suppression of opposition groups in Xinjiang, while Russia saw it as a useful precedent in its fight against Chechen rebels. In fact, in September 2002, Moscow invoked Resolution 1368 to justify possible military attacks against Chechen rebels operating in Georgia—with or without the authorization of the Georgian government.¹²

The UN Charter recognizes the right to self-defense as an inalienable right of states, but it is generally accepted that this right is not open-ended. Specifically, it ceases to operate when the Security Council takes action. In addition, the use of force in self-defense is subject to four critical conditions to judge the lawfulness of unilateral actions: whether there was an armed, or an imminent, attack and whether the military response was necessary, proportionate, and timely.

To date, the broader implications of Resolution 1368 on the legality of the use of force have received little attention. Yet, the UN did not wait to debate these far-reaching implications on September 12, 2001; the UN acted by passing the resolution unanimously the day after the unforeseen attacks.

GLOBALIZING THE BAN ON TERRORISM

Just two weeks later, on September 28, the Security Council adopted U.S.-sponsored Resolution 1373 that obligated all 191 UN member states to change and/or adopt domestic legislation that would criminalize terrorist acts, including the support and financing of such acts; deny safe haven to terrorists and prohibit any other support for terrorists, such as the provision of arms; and prompt cooperation with other states in the implementation of these measures.

Many of the measures mentioned in the resolution were present in two important conventions negotiated in the late 1990s: the 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which entered into force in May 2001, and the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, which at that time had not yet entered into force (but did in April 2002). Prior to September 2001, only two states had ratified both conventions: Cuba and the United Kingdom. Resolution 1373 made many of the provisions of these conventions binding on all states.

To monitor implementation of Resolution 1373, the Security Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and elected Jeremy Greenstock, the United Kingdom's permanent representative on the council, as the CTC's first chair. During his tenure, Greenstock emphasized the technical nature of the CTC, describing its functions as "to monitor, to be analytical and to report facts to the Security Council for consideration." The goal, he said, was "to help the world system to upgrade its capability, to deny space, money, support, haven to terrorism, and to establish a network of information-sharing and co-operative executive action."¹³

The CTC initiated a multistage program. In the first stage, the committee reviewed member states' existing legislative and executive measures to combat terrorism, which Resolution 1373 had ordered states to provide to the CTC within 90 days. The second stage focused on strengthening institutional mechanisms and providing assistance to improve states' capacity to combat terrorism. By January 2002, the CTC had received 117 of 191 reports—a remarkable response by historical standards—and by December 2002, 175 reports had been delivered. By April 2003, only three states—Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland, and Vanuatu—had not yet filed reports with the CTC.

An initial review of these reports pointed to several problems.¹⁴ States often had different understandings of Resolution 1373's key terms and provisions. For example, states equated the "financing of terrorist acts" with money laundering and dealt with it only in that context. Money used to finance terrorism, however, is not necessarily generated by illegal business transactions; on the contrary, much of this money is legal and is acquired legitimately. Similarly, member states were confused about freezing, seizing, confiscating, and suspending accounts.¹⁵

Many states reported dealing with terrorist activities in their own territories but were silent with respect to terrorist acts carried out by their nation-

als elsewhere. Moreover, the information provided on international cooperation was sketchy, focusing mainly on formal judicial issues, particularly extradition. Finally, although many states lacked the legislative and administrative capacity to implement Resolution 1373, few requested CTC assistance toward this end. Many states preferred to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Would the CTC be a serious body or not?

Similar problems had surfaced in UN sanctions regimes in the 1990s.¹⁶ For example, two noted scholars who reviewed UN sanctions regimes in the 1990s estimated that only 12 countries had enacted laws enabling them to enforce financial sanctions.¹⁷ In September 2002, the UN group monitoring sanctions on the Taliban and Al Qaeda reported that the latter continued to have access to considerable financial and other economic resources. The report noted that, even though \$112 million had been frozen in the first three months after the September 11 attacks, in the following eight months only \$10 million of that amount had actually been blocked. The report concluded that "al-Qaeda is by all accounts 'fit and well' and poised to strike again at its leisure."¹⁸

Implementation problems also hamper the safe haven provisions of Resolution 1373. In many countries, border controls are weak. Indeed, many countries do not have the capacity to police the territories under their jurisdiction effectively; they need additional resources to deal with these problems. The CTC, with a staff of a dozen and no independent budget, is waging a heroic battle but a losing one. If properly empowered, the CTC could help states put into place machinery to implement and enforce counterterrorism legislation crucial for the global battle against terrorism. For this purpose, the CTC should become "a full-time, professional and global body of experts" that can work with the Security Council and follow up on all avenues opened by Resolution 1373.¹⁹ Such a body

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would also be well suited to monitor and review implementation of Resolution 1373. Unfortunately, the United States is resisting this approach and prefers to handle these problems bilaterally. The United States also rejected a proposal to set up an Assistance Trust Fund because Washington preferred that funds for assistance be provided through bilateral channels. Washington's reluctance to provide sufficient resources to the UN—and to the CTC—is severely undercutting the international campaign against terrorism.

Policy Challenges and Responses

By ordering all UN member states to take legislative and executive measures to combat terrorism at home and abroad, the Security Council has made the fight against terrorism a global one. Although this approach should be applauded and is the only approach that has the potential to deal with a global threat effectively, five important problems persist.

First, although a declaratory consensus exists on the importance of outlawing terrorist activities, states continue to have widely divergent views on the exact nature of these threats. The United States has designated seven nations as “state sponsors of terrorism”—Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan²⁰—but not all UN members agree with this assessment.

The United States should take the lead in forging a consensus on the nature of the terrorist threat. Sustained attention to the concerns of other states, consultation with other governments, and genuine efforts to come to a multilateral understanding of the magnitude of the threat terrorism poses to international stability will help convince other states that the United States is concerned not only about its own national interests but also about the international community as a whole.

The second problem deals with identifying who will have the authority to determine whether Resolution 1373 is being violated and who will have the authority to decide on policy responses to noncompliance. The United States and Russia have been the most outspoken in stating that the Security Council does not have an exclusive right to determine policy on this issue. Washington and Moscow have argued that they can unilaterally decide whether other states are complying with Resolution 1373, and the two powers have argued that a unilateral determination of noncompliance would allow them to exercise their right to self-defense. Unilateral responses to noncompliance with Security Council resolutions, however, can set dangerous precedents: they can lead to abuse and can provoke serious rifts among Security Council members. In that sense, the contentious Security Council debate over Iraq in early 2003 could be a forerunner of other debates as the campaign against terrorism unfolds.

The Security Council's leading powers should not dodge discussion of this issue but rather recognize that, when noncompliance with Resolution 1373 leads to imminent and direct security threats, individual states always retain the right to self-defense. If not faced with imminent and direct threats, however, states have an obligation to develop collective responses. The Security Council should define minimum standards for all states to comply with Resolution 1373 and develop guidelines on how to respond when states do not comply. A state's behavior below the minimum standard should trigger punitive measures such as political, economic, and even military sanctions, whereas performance above and beyond minimum international standards should reap rewards. For example, states that demonstrate a willingness to build up their counterterrorism capacities and cooperate with international authorities could get preferential treatment when applying for international loans. To avoid suspicion that punitive measures and rewards would be controlled by the political agenda of any one state—the United States, for example—the Security Council should decide on these matters collectively.

The UN can help to isolate state sponsors of terrorism politically and economically .

The long-term implications of recent Security Council actions with respect to the use of force constitute a third problem area. By legitimizing the unilateral use of military force in response to terrorist attacks, the Security Council has broadened the conditions under which states can use military force for self-defense. Because there is no commonly accepted definition of terrorism, the possibilities for abuse are obvious and dangerous. U.S. officials have argued that terrorist threats, including state sponsors, need to be countered by preemptive and possibly covert military actions, and this position further complicates the issue of using military force for self-defense.²¹

Rather than continue to emphasize its unilateral right to use force against noncompliant states, the United States should take the lead in defining criteria for the use of force in self-defense against terrorists and state sponsors of terrorism and engage the members of the Security Council in collectively addressing this issue. Defining such criteria will require resolving when terrorist acts are the equivalent of armed attacks, what defines an imminent attack, and whether threats of imminent attack always justify a military response. The United States must tread carefully in handling this issue. Weakening the existing norm on the prohibition of the use of force could yield widespread regional and international instabilities and thus prove contrary to Washington's long-term interests.

Implementing the UN's counterterrorism measures promises to provide the fourth challenge. The financial and safe haven provisions of Resolution 1373 require monitoring and enforcement capabilities that most countries do not possess and that may be too expensive to acquire. The Security Council's response to this problem thus far has been inadequate. Although the CTC's political credibility has been established, its minimal resources allow it to provide only minimal technical assistance. Thus, those countries needing assistance will have to rely on it coming through bilateral channels, making the aid ad hoc and selective.

Ultimately, if the United States and the other Security Council members are serious about their determination to fight terrorism, they must provide states with the resources needed for them to implement the counterterrorism measures expected of them. Beyond providing technical assistance, the Security Council should also push to establish a UN mechanism that can help finance counterterrorism programs in states that have problems monitoring and enforcing the provisions of Resolution 1373. Members should therefore consider transforming the Counter-Terrorism Committee into a Counter-Terrorism Organization—an independent UN agency designed to address these technical and implementation issues and with the responsibility to review and monitor the effectiveness of these measures.

Finally, as recognized in the U.S. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the fight against international terrorism is a long-term battle against the “underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace, rather than shun, terrorism.”²² This campaign thus involves tackling broader societal problems: poverty, social disorder, lack of democracy, and poor governance.

Although limited, the UN's track record in dealing with such problems is promising and should be enhanced. Its capacity to help states set up good governance structures that can provide law and order, economic development, and respect for human rights is notable. The technical and political expertise it gained in the 1990s should be utilized. Investing in social and development programs ultimately will pay off significantly in the campaign against terrorism. Terrorism is not just a military problem; defeating it will require a wide range of policy responses in nonmilitary areas, toward which the UN can make important contributions.

U.S. Leadership

As the largest and most powerful state in the world and as the Security Council member most directly targeted by Al Qaeda, the United States has

a special responsibility—and a special interest—in making the Security Council an effective instrument in the fight against terrorism. Having demonstrated its ability to respond to U.S. concerns since the end of the Cold War, the UN has great political and operational value in the war on terror. The UN can do more, but how much more depends largely on leadership and support from the United States.

The UN can make four critical contributions to the campaign against terrorism. First, it can enhance the legitimacy of state actions, including military actions against state sponsors of terrorism. Multilateral actions through the UN can also help to isolate state sponsors politically and economically and hence diminish their influence and reach. Second, the UN can help to create

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and develop international norms and international standards of accountability. The UN sanctions regimes of the 1990s played an important role in associating terrorist activities with criminal acts. In the next decade, the United States and other states will want to make sure that terrorist acts are prosecuted and punished around the world. Only then can Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations be contained. Third, the UN can help share the economic burden of the fight against

terrorism. Building up state capacities to combat terrorism will require material resources. The United States has an interest in sharing these costs with others. Fourth, the UN can also help share the burden politically. The fight against terrorism is a long-term fight that will see both successes and failures. The UN has been and will continue to be a useful political bulwark in this ongoing struggle.

Although the United States profoundly disagreed with some UN member states over the war in Iraq, Washington has continued to recognize the usefulness of the UN and the CTC in “fostering a global counter-terrorism network.”²³ Significantly, the harsh political dispute over the war on Iraq has not affected cooperation between the United States and France in the war against terrorism.²⁴ As the terrorist threat mutates into a more complex and increasingly transnational and global threat, countering it through multilateral efforts that use the full spectrum of policy responses—not just military ones—becomes all the more important. Washington must therefore continue to work with, build on, and enhance the capacities of the UN to enforce counterterrorism strategies effectively.

Notes

1. See Executive Office of the President (EOP), *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, Washington, D.C., February 2003.
2. See President of the UN Security Council, Note S/23500, New York, January 31, 1992.
3. See Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism," *Survival* 44, no.2 (summer 2002): 123.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
5. See Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," in *Countering the New Terrorism*, eds. Ian O. Lesser et al. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), p. 10.
6. See *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*, report of the UN Secretary General, A/48/267/Add. 1, September 21, 1993, para. 6.
7. See Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1997).
8. See Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 2002).
9. "Negroponte Discusses Post-9/11 U.N. Agenda During House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing," March 26, 2002, www.unausa.org (accessed July 1, 2003).
10. See Letter to the President of the UN Security Council from the United States, S/2001/946, October 7, 2001.
11. For a discussion of the complexities of defining terrorism, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Transnational Terrorist Organizations and Security," in *Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003).
12. "Russia Writes U.N., OSCE Invoking Right to Self-Defense," *U.N. Wire*, September 12, 2002, www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020912/28865_story.asp (accessed July 13, 2003).
13. See Chairman of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, press briefing, New York, October 19, 2001.
14. See Walter Gehr, "Recurrent Issues: (Briefing for member States on 4 April 2002)," www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/rc (accessed July 1, 2003).
15. *Ibid.*
16. See Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "Making Economic Sanctions Work," *Survival* 42, no. 3 (autumn 2000): 105–127.
17. See David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 234.
18. See "Efforts to Freeze Al-Qaeda's Funds Stalled, U.N. Report Says," *U.N. Wire*, September 3, 2002, www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020903/28644_story.asp (accessed July 13, 2003).
19. See statement by the outgoing CTC chairman, Jeremy Greenstock, UN Press Release SC/7718, April 4, 2003.
20. See Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002* (Washington, D.C., Department of State, 2003). In May 2003, the United States sought to remove Iraq, pending congressional approval.
21. See *National Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., September 2002. See also "U.S. Moves Commandos to Base in East Africa," *New York Times*, September 18, 2002, p. A14.

22. EOP, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, p. 29.
23. See Ambassador John Negroponte, statement to the UN Security Council, May 6, 2003, USUN Press Release, Nr. 63 (03).
24. See Jean-Louis Brugiere, "Terrorism After the War in Iraq," *U.S.-France Analysis Series*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., May 2003.