

Generational Transition in China

The generational transformation under way in contemporary China continues a process that began in the 1980s of promoting younger and better-educated leaders to senior political positions. In some ways, one might argue that the major divide during this time was between the Deng Xiaoping generation—the revolutionary generation—and the Jiang Zemin generation. The revolutionary generation—whether led by Mao Zedong or Deng—had extraordinary self-confidence derived from years of political activity across a full spectrum of issues and from the widely accepted belief that victory in the revolution legitimized their rule. Thus, even when the leaders were disastrously wrong (Mao more often than Deng), they were supremely confident in their own political authority and hence their ability to control events.

A successor generation never has the luxury of such self-confidence (or, as some might term it, hubris). Indeed, Jiang and his cohort of leaders had careers that were nearly diametric opposites of their revolutionary predecessors. Rather than “overturning heaven and earth” in their effort to remake the social order and propel China into the modern world, the successor generation ascended by rising through the bureaucracies and by not offending people. This process has limited their experience, personal contacts, and authority, forcing them to adopt a more cautious style of politics that puts greater weight on consensus building (which they do not always achieve). Better educated and more technocratic than their revolutionary predecessors, Jiang and his generation have sought to craft policies and govern an increasingly complex polity rather than to strike out in bold new political directions.

Joseph Fewsmith is a professor of international relations and political science at Boston University. His most recent book is *China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition* (2001).

Copyright © 2002 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 25:4 pp. 23–35.

The generational change that China is about to undergo—symbolized by the apparent intention to promote Vice President Hu Jintao to general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the Sixteenth Party Congress in September—is really a continuation of the changes in elite recruitment that resulted in the promotion of Jiang and his generation. One could refer to the transition as the “Technocratization of the Chinese Leadership, Part Two.” Although Jiang’s generation and Hu’s generation share some significant characteristics, particularly in terms of their members’ technical training and their promotion through the bureaucratic ranks, some important differences are

Hu’s generation will be the first with no significant personal memory of pre-1949 China.

evident. The most significant difference, though perhaps the most uncertain in terms of its impact, is the simple fact that Hu’s generation will be the first generation of leadership in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with no significant personal memory of pre-1949 China. Jiang, born in 1926, had substantial grounding in China’s classical literature (which he shows off with recitals of Tang and Song poetry) before studying engineering during China’s civil war days, when he would

skip classes to organize students in the Communist underground. He also had significant knowledge of English and, to his regret, of Japanese.

Hu and his generation were the first in modern China to grow to maturity during relatively peaceful times. The young Hu, born in Shanghai in 1942 and raised in Taizhou, not far from Jiang’s hometown of Yangzhou (in Jiangsu Province), was apparently able to devote himself to his studies and thus pass the entrance examination for China’s most prestigious technical school, Qinghua University. In the 1950s, science and technology were a way for a boy from a relatively poor class background (Hu’s father was a merchant) to make his way, but it was also a time when Mao’s “red sun” shone brightly on the cultural landscape; neither Hu nor his age cohort would have devoted much time to traditional learning. Moreover, courses in foreign studies did not compensate for these students’ lack of a traditional education or exposure to the complex reality of pre-1949 China. Although many of this generation would later learn English (some remarkably well), their personal exposure to the “capitalist West” was nonexistent until the country was opened to the outside world in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Similarly, the Sino-Soviet dispute limited this generation’s familiarity with the socialist culture of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Whereas Jiang, chairman of the National People’s Congress Li Peng, and other members of the so-called third generation¹ of leadership had studied in the So-

viet Union, Hu and his generation did not, mainly because Nikita Khrushchev withdrew Soviet advisers from China in 1960, when Hu was 18. Surely, this early education in young revolutionary China leaves a residue in the nationalist sentiments one sees now.

If this upbringing is not auspicious in terms of exposure either to China's own tradition or to the outside world, the generational experience of the Cultural Revolution offsets it to a great extent. An examination of the generational transition in China reveals that two generations are actually coming to power, even though each is dubbed the "fourth generation" of leadership. Those who appear destined to assume the highest rungs of leadership—Hu, Vice Premier Wen Jiabao (born in 1942), head of the CCP Organization Department Zeng Qinghong (born in 1939), and Vice Premier Wu Bangguo (born in 1941)—graduated from college before the Cultural Revolution erupted. These potential leaders then watched the violence of the Cultural Revolution shatter their youthful ideals. Many spent the Cultural Revolution in some of China's poorest regions. Hu, for instance, graduated from Qinghua University in 1964; he stayed on campus as a political instructor but then became an object of criticism, at least briefly, in the early days of the Cultural Revolution. He was soon sent to the countryside for a number of low-level posts in the impoverished inland province of Gansu.

This experience was quite typical of Hu's generation. Having devoted themselves to being "both red and expert"—a value that was particularly emphasized at Qinghua University—and having worked hard to pass their college entrance exams and to graduate, members of this whole generation found their careers put on hold for a decade. Whereas someone such as Deng could ponder the Cultural Revolution from the vantage point of one who had participated in the whole course of revolutionary history, Hu and his generation must have found their early faith in Mao and socialist China smashed by having their careers cast aside and watching the country destroy itself in a paroxysm of violence.

This generational experience imparts a sense of caution in thinking about policy and social stability. Undoubtedly, one lesson of the Cultural Revolution was that grand ideas, rashly implemented, lead to disaster. One does not have to reach back to the Cultural Revolution, however, for examples of ill-considered policy initiatives. Deng's effort to promote price reforms in 1998 led to inflation, and Premier Zhu Rongji's efforts to eliminate corruption in the grain purchasing system led him to close private markets rather than extend them. Hu, Wen, and others of their generation are much more likely to consider policy options carefully; they are, after all, technocrats.

The other part of the fourth generation that is coming to the fore, either as top political leaders or as their advisers, are the *laosanjie*—members of the

classes of 1966, 1967, and 1968 who became deeply involved in the Cultural Revolution. These people joined Red Guard organizations, some fought pitched and violent battles, and then they were sent to the countryside to learn from the peasants. They, too, lived in some of China's poorest areas—many going to the cold wilderness areas of northern Heilongjiang Province, others to places such as the old revolutionary base of Yanan or the poor areas of Henan Province. This generation gained a great deal of political experience early, going up into the mountains and down to the countryside in

**Jiang Zemin
appears reluctant
to relinquish
political influence.**

their efforts to foster revolution and join like-minded individuals (*chuanlian*). Many came to value their time in the countryside, even though being sent there was wrenching. They had been idealistic. Then they had been caught in battles that were anything but idealistic. Finally, they had been sent to learn from the peasants. Learn from the peasants they did, but not what Mao had hoped they would learn. They realized that Mao had simply used them for his own ends and

then discarded them. When they asked peasants about the bitter old days, the peasants talked about the Great Leap Forward, not pre-1949 China. Members of this part of the fourth generation came to an understanding of rural China that simply would have been impossible for this privileged urban elite, had it not been for the Cultural Revolution.

The best of this group—the famous class of 1977—passed entrance exams and were admitted to universities when the Cultural Revolution finally came to an end and Deng restored the examination system. Because of a decade-long moratorium on exams, ten years' worth of applicants competed for a very small number of university slots. Those who succeeded threw themselves into their studies and extracurricular activities with incredible energy. To a large extent, these students and their professors were groping to understand both the world and China at the same time, after the illusions of Maoist China had been dashed. Some of the best of this generation participated in the early rural reforms—a movement that has had a tremendous impact on contemporary China—and the veterans of this movement are still very active in a number of high-level advisory positions. Others became economists, many of whom studied abroad, and have since become experts and advisers. Still others pioneered the advent of contemporary sociology and political science in China. These individuals may become the most important leaders in the coming years as the country grapples with the negative impact of reform, even while continuing to push ahead with economic growth and technical change.

Generational succession is always important because different generations have different formative experiences, different expectations about the world, and different types of training on which to draw when dealing with problems they encounter. The generational differences are arguably greater in China than elsewhere. Chinese politics has undergone major upheavals about every 10 years for the past century and a half—from the Opium War in 1840 and the Taiping Rebellion in 1850 to the Cultural Revolution in 1966, the launching of reforms in 1978, and the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Given the sharp differences in the formative experiences of each generation, the occupation of the political stage by one generation—the one that made the revolution—for nearly half a century is remarkable. That long tenure on the political stage has made the subsequent generational shift all the more striking. Indeed, the shift from Deng (born in 1904) to Jiang (born in 1926) was much greater than the difference that the two decades in their birth dates would suggest. If Hu, who was born in 1942, takes over as general secretary, the generational transition that China's political system will have undergone between Deng and Hu in only a decade is nothing short of extraordinary. As important as generational succession is, however, noticing differences within a given generation is also important.

Political Succession

Generational succession will inevitably take place, but when, how, and how smoothly depends greatly on the ease of political succession. Even in June 2001, rumors persisted in Beijing that Jiang might retreat from plans to promote Hu to general secretary at the Sixteenth Party Congress and would keep the job himself for another term. In all likelihood, such rumors were only part of the very hard bargaining that occurs before a party congress—the quinquennial gathering of some 4,000 party delegates who approve the formation of a new Central Committee (consisting of about 200 people), which then approves the formation of a new Politburo (about 20 people), which then approves the formation of a new Politburo Standing Committee (about seven people) that stands at the heart of the political system. Nevertheless, the very existence of such rumors highlights the continued difficulty of transferring political power institutionally. China has a very long tradition in which political power has not passed from one person to another until the death of the leader, a tradition that the Leninist political organization has not helped. Although the gradual institutionalization of a retirement situation and the systematic training of a younger generation of political leaders have ameliorated this situation, institutionalizing the transfer of supreme political power has proven difficult.

In 2002 the issue at the center of the debate is something the PRC has never before faced—the selection of a general secretary while his predecessor is still alive and influential. Although Jiang became general secretary in 1989 while the “helmsman”—Deng—continued to hold ultimate authority, the difference in the prestige of the two men meant that Jiang did not pose a challenge to Deng’s authority. Moreover, Deng’s advancing age and ensuing senility allowed for a relatively smooth transition, though not one without its fair share of bumps. In 1997, delegates at the Fifteenth Party Congress agreed that all those older than 70 would retire. An exception was made only for Jiang, then 71, but he apparently promised to serve only one more five-year term.²

Jiang’s term is now coming to an end, but he remains healthy. More important, he appears reluctant to relinquish political influence. Although ego no doubt fuels this desire, Jiang’s retirement would affect the careers of many people, who thus may urge him to retain his position. The compromise position, which Jiang appears inclined to adopt, would be to retire from active office but nevertheless to control political power from behind the scenes, much as Deng did in his later years. Were he to pursue this option, Jiang would need to feel confident that those appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee would defer to him on critical issues. This outcome, however, depends on reassurances either that those appointed are personally loyal to him or that critical issues would be referred to Jiang under some basis in “law,” such as the Thirteenth Party Congress’s 1987 resolution.

The problem is that Jiang appears to be much more comfortable with such protégés as Zeng, Wu, and party secretary of Guangdong Province Li Changchun than with his designated successor, Hu. Yet, other senior leaders seem more comfortable with Hu and other emerging leaders (such as Wen, who is considered likely to succeed Zhu as premier) than with Jiang’s protégés. For much the same reason, some leaders seem unlikely to agree to a formal resolution that would support Jiang’s continued political control.

The much-anticipated solution—to have Hu succeed as general secretary but Jiang retain ultimate authority as head of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—remains possible but involves many problems. In CCP history, the head of the party has almost always headed the CMC as well. When Deng stepped down from the Politburo in 1987, the party’s constitution was amended to allow him to remain head of the CMC. The decision proved to be disastrous because it divided the authority between the general secretary of the party (then Zhao Ziyang) and the head of the CMC (Deng), thus paving the way for the confrontation between Zhao and Deng in the spring of 1989 (despite Zhao’s loyalty to Deng). Crisis breeds conflict, and the division of authority can make that conflict spill out of control.

Although Jiang may still opt to divide authority, this solution is an awkward one at best. CCP policy has always emphasized that the party controls the gun, yet this outcome would seem to prove the converse. Jiang also heads a National Security Work Leadership Small Group—designed to be a crisis management system, but one that obviously did not function well during the incident in April 2001 involving the EP-3 spy plane—and he might attempt to retain this position after the Sixteenth Party Congress. This solution, however, again raises constitutional questions about the relationship between the Politburo and this group and condones the practice of securing authority through the appointment of loyalists—a process that now seems to be encountering resistance.

Even if Jiang secures control over the Politburo Standing Committee through the appointment of protégés, the division of authority between Hu as general secretary and Jiang as *éminence grise* (and presumably head of the CMC) will create difficulties. The arrangement will suggest to others that Hu's position is not secure, inevitably leading others to jostle for power and to appeal to Jiang or Hu, as the case might be, for support. If this situation should arise, the Sixteenth Party Congress could simply muddy the waters, rather than clarifying the distribution of power, and invite political contention as leaders await a more definitive outcome five years later. Moreover, divided authority and uncertainty about the lines of power could also lead to indecision and timidity in policymaking at a time when China is facing enormous social difficulties, including unemployed workers, angry peasants, growing income disparities, and corruption. For the health of the nation, this combination of uncertain power delineations, pussyfooted policymaking, and potential violent social disorder is a dubious cocktail, to say the least.

Thus, the issues of generational transition and political succession are conflated in China. Should the political succession be as conflictual and as prolonged (extending perhaps to the Seventeenth Party Congress in 2007) as some of this discussion suggests, generational conflict might manifest itself in political conflict. Put simply, many people are expecting to be promoted in the autumn of 2002 or shortly thereafter. If those expectations are not met, dissatisfaction with the political system will be substantial.

Moreover, the sense that promotions should be based on some sort of objective criteria, which reward merit rather than family background or personal political loyalty, is apparently growing. This development is an important part of the generational succession that is occurring and opens a

This generation tends to be divided on the issue of globalization.

number of fault lines in Chinese politics. For instance, a great deal of resentment exists against the *gaogan zidi*—the sons and daughters of high-ranking officials, often referred to as “princelings.” One of the most striking recent examples of this phenomenon was the refusal of the Chinese Academy of Sciences to appoint Jiang Mianheng, Jiang Zemin’s son, who was suddenly appointed deputy president of the prestigious scientific institute two years ago, as a delegate to the Sixteenth Party Congress, thus ending any chance he might have had to be named to the Central Committee.

Today, the leading princeling in China is Zeng Qinghong, whose father, Zeng Shan, was an important official in Maoist China. Zeng Shan had been one of Mao’s henchmen in the infamous purge of the so-called AB Corps in 1931, one of the most violent inner-party purges in party history, through which Mao rid himself of those who disagreed with him and secured his control over the party and military in southeast Jiangxi Province. Zeng Shan later served in a number of positions in the Organization Department and various ministries, rising through the ranks. Zeng Qinghong seems to have inherited his father’s talent for organizational work; both the younger Zeng’s background and his talent for building files on leading party cadres arouse resentment among those who are not part of his network.

Thus, generational succession involves not only the kinds of attitudes that will come to the fore in the coming years, but also the criteria that the party will adopt for career promotion and the types of institutions that it will construct to constrain political contestation. Indeed, one hopeful aspect of the political process is that expectations for an orderly transition have grown, and such expectations may have sufficient institutional force to constrain the sorts of conflicts outlined above.

Impact of the New Generation

Assuming that negotiating the political tensions inherent in a transition of this sort is possible, what is this new generation’s likely impact on China? Both in terms of education (technocratic) and life experience (the Cultural Revolution), this generation is not expected to adhere strongly to ideological formulas—of either the Leninist or Western sort. To the extent that engineers are taught problem-solving techniques, they tend to be skeptical of broader, ideological approaches to life. The Cultural Revolution shattered whatever faith this generation had in Mao and reinforced its members’ tendency to look at problems individually. Hu certainly seems to have approached life in this fashion. When he reached Gansu, he toured each area, becoming familiar with its specific problems, and repeated this approach when he was posted to Guizhou Province in 1985. Wen, considered most

likely to replace Zhu as premier, appears cut from the same cloth. This generation has been taught to collect the facts and examine problems carefully.

Engineers like to know if a bridge will support the traffic it is designed to carry; thus, this generation will test solutions rather than push broad designs. The CCP has an enormous amount of this type of work to do. How can the government implement an adequate social security system? What combination of unemployment relief and job retraining should the government adopt for those who have lost their jobs due to economic restructuring? How can the government control corruption? To what extent can the household registration system be relaxed without causing urban slums to emerge or crime to escalate? How can the government strengthen its rule of law? How can the CCP reform itself to reduce tensions within society and promote better-qualified personnel? Can the government further open the processes for choosing party personnel to public scrutiny? In short, the state needs to meet the population's many needs, and this new generation seems well qualified to carry out the task. This generation of leaders is not wedded to the old ways of doing things and is not enamored of panaceas.

The corollary to this skepticism about ideology is apparently open-mindedness. Although characterizing Hu and his generation as liberal would be incorrect, they seem much more willing to listen to far-reaching ideas than their predecessors have been. These ideas extend from international relations to political change and certainly include considerations about private property and the development of law, civil society, and so forth. In short, this generation seems willing to listen to—if not necessarily accept—arguments about a wide range of reforms.

The new generation tends to be market oriented but cautious about the sort of deregulation that some Western economists might recommend. Notably, the new generation is internally divided on this issue, with some exhibiting market-oriented preferences and others reflecting nationalist attitudes on economic issues. China's leadership will need to negotiate this fault line, among others, over the coming years.

Similarly, the issue of globalization tends to divide this generation. Those who are likely to succeed to power show a deep awareness of the challenges that globalization poses and exhibit a refreshing willingness to see globalization as a force that can be harnessed to attain economic and political change on the domestic front. This generation believes that China has the

Social crises are brewing in parts of the countryside and in areas of high unemployment.

ability to meet these challenges, which is essential if China is to secure its place in the world. The same generation, however, includes individuals who have focused on the negative effects of globalization. Whether or not this aspect becomes a politically influential school of thought largely depends on how quickly and effectively China's new leadership can move to defuse the social crises brewing in parts of the countryside and in areas of high unemployment, such as the Northeast.

In handling such issues, the new generation's experience in China's poorest areas is likely to prove beneficial. In recent years, China's drive for economic development has led to an effective—though often corrupt—

coalition between the political and economic elites. This feature of the Chinese polity leads critics to decry the “marketization of power” because Hu, who spent much of his adult life in inland China, brings a different mentality to the question of development.³ Hu is hardly alone in this viewpoint.

Corruption is clearly one issue that will truly challenge the new leadership and one on which the new leaders might prove more effective than their predecessors. In recent years, the CCP has

tried to move to stem the tide of corruption. In 1998 the CCP ordered the army to remove itself from business affairs and in the same year adopted the mandate for its own members. Major corruption and smuggling cases have been exposed in Xiamen (Fujian Province), Zhanjiang (Guangdong Province), Shenyang (Liaoning Province), and elsewhere; and a new tax police unit now curtails smuggling and corruption among customs officials. Nevertheless, the number of corruption cases, as included in the annual report of the Supreme Procuratorate, continues to climb.⁴ Public opinion surveys reveal that corruption is a major concern, especially when people perceive it to be one of the primary causes of the growing gaps in income, both inter- and intraregionally.

Although it may be premature to speculate, the new generation may bring a more professional ethos to office. The problems of corruption are deeply embedded and the temptations to succumb to it are great, so perhaps that prediction is too bold. Yet, Hu has participated in several major investigations of corruption, and he and others of his generation may use anticorruption measures to enhance both their control over China's governing machinery and their legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

In managing corruption, social tensions, and systemic problems, this generation appears somewhat more open to political reform. These new leaders

The impact of generational change may not be immediately obvious.

have certainly either sponsored or listened to discussions on political reform, and they are very aware of Chinese society's demands for greater political reform. The new generation can be expected to respond to these demands by focusing on building systems to solve problems. That is to say, they are likely to experiment with reforms that generate stronger and more effective government but neglect those that focus on procedural concerns. This generation tends to view democracy as a consultative process that produces the right answer or the right official. In other words, the sense prevails that any given problem has a correct answer, and this generation tends to see democracy as the process that includes enough people (but not too many) to generate the right answer. They view democracy in substantive terms rather than procedural norms, although they seem likely to consider implementing aspects of procedural democracy around the edges of the system—especially if such procedures improve social stability.

Another characteristic of this generation stems more from its members' general life experiences than from any particular event—they are nationalistic. That feature may well be true of all generations of Chinese leaders, and it may take some time to flesh out the sense of nationalism that this generation embodies, but a few generalities might be hazarded. First, this group does not appear to be bombastic. One does not expect to see Hu upbraiding Hong Kong journalists the way Jiang did or shaking his finger and warning the Taiwanese about their vote as Zhu did. One would also not expect this group to resort to violence in a situation similar to Tiananmen Square. The new generation is likely, however, to articulate a sense of Chinese pride and dignity. Hu captured a sense of nationalism when he was given the difficult task of responding publicly to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, but he did so without inflaming passions. In addition, these leaders would be expected to pursue national goals with the same sense of problem solving that they bring to other questions. Thus, the new generation may not dramatically move to build or use military force, but it will likely focus attention on military modernization as well as other challenges.

Conclusion

Generational succession in China will necessarily take time. The informal norms governing the system weigh heavily in favor of the older generation's continued exercise of power and influence until its leaders are no longer able to do so. Moreover, to the extent that the new generation shares a technocratic and cautious nature with the preceding generation, the impact of generational change may not be immediately obvious. Whether it takes a

relatively short period of a year or two or a somewhat longer period of four or five years, however, the generational transition under way in China will begin to have a major impact.

This impact will stem in part simply from the generational succession itself. The new generation cannot claim legitimacy from victory in the revolution or even, as Jiang and his cohorts can, from being the choice of the revolutionary generation. The further one moves from the reality of revolution, the more one has to search for legitimacy in the sensibilities of society.

That aspect will be particularly true of the new generation because it cannot rely on unmitigated economic growth to claim legitimacy. This new generation will have to address a variety of social needs even as it pursues continued growth; increasingly, it will have to find legitimacy in the establishment of procedural norms, the creation of systemic capacity, and a sense of justice—or risk losing its claim to legitimacy altogether.

Perhaps the most important challenge will be articulating a vision for the future.

Thus, the new generation of leaders is more likely to be more innovative than the previous generation.

The impact will also stem from the very rapid pace of change, both domestically and internationally. Complacency no longer seems to be an option. The leading figures in the new generation are obviously well aware of the challenges to CCP rule, and they have no doubt deeply contemplated possible responses. They must withhold action until after they have secured power, however, which may still take some time.

The new generation's ability to sort out its own intragenerational differences will in part determine how well it responds to these challenges. As previously intimated, significant differences exist: between those who graduated from college before the Cultural Revolution broke out and those who were direct participants in that event; between those who have risen to important positions on the basis of their own merit and those who have done so on the basis of family backgrounds; between those who are more market oriented and those who are doubtful about the market; between those who welcome globalization and those who are suspicious of it; and between those whose sympathies lie with the poorer interior regions and those whose allegiances lie with the wealthy entrepreneurs of the cities on the coast. The resolution of these differences will have as great an impact as the generational turnover itself.

Perhaps the most important challenge to this new generation will be articulating a vision for the future. Technocrats analyze problems but rarely inspire populations. Nevertheless, as China faces social change and manages

problems ranging from corruption to globalization, much of the population longs for a sense of where the nation is headed. The ability to articulate such a vision may determine how effectively this new generation can govern and how well the political system can adapt to the challenges confronting it.

Notes

1. The expression “third generation” of leadership derives from a speech Deng Xiaoping gave right after the Tiananmen Square incident. In that speech, he called Mao Zedong the “core” of the first generation of leadership, himself the core of the second generation, and Jiang Zemin the core of the third generation. See Deng Xiaoping, “Disandai Lingdao Jiti de Dangwu Zhiji” (“The Urgent Task of the Third Generation Leadership Collective”) in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping)*, vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 309–314. Although this usage has become popular, it distorts history. Mao, born in 1893, and Deng, born in 1904, were really of the same generation; Deng made the Long March with Mao and others destined to rule China. In this sense, Jiang, as representative of the successor generation, really marks the second generation of the leadership of the People’s Republic of China. Nevertheless, popular usage wins out and Hu Jintao is taken as the core of the fourth generation of leadership. Cheng Li defines the fourth generation as those born between 1941 and 1956. See Cheng Li, *China’s Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), p. 10.
2. Richard Baum, “The Fifteenth National Party Congress: Jiang Takes Command?” *China Quarterly*, no. 145 (March 1996): 153–175.
3. He Qinglian, *Xiandaihua de Xianjing: Dangdai Zhongguo de Jingji Shehui Wenti (The Pitfalls of Modernization: The Economic and Social Problems of Contemporary China)* (Beijing: Jinri chubanshe, 1998).
4. He Zengke, *Fanfu Xinlu (New Path to Combat Corruption)* (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2002).

