Islamic Fundamentalism and the Rise of the Fourth International Revolution

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Introduction

In the past, many Muslims divided the world into two parts, which were Dar Al-Harb and Dar-Al Islam. The former pertained to places that did not follow Islam, whereas, the latter was a label for the places that did. Supposedly, Islam also had to spread to these other areas where it was not present.   Coincidentally, certain followers of this faith, known as Islamic fundamentalists, still stick by this idea today. These individuals have demonstrated time and time again that they are willing to resort to desperate measures in order to spread Islam. Perhaps, the best illustration of this is the hijackings on September 11, 2001.

Not only has this fundamentalist initiative caused unfortunate terrorist attacks like the one from above, but more broadly it seems to have led to another international revolution.   To demonstrate this point, this paper will proceed through two steps. First, an analysis of a chapter in Martin Wight's **Power Politics** will be conducted because Wight perfectly describes the developments, which begin to transpire if and when a revolution is taking place. Second, this paper will examine the most recent actions of pertinent international actors ranging from the

aforementioned fundamentalists to the United States. This behavior is similar to these very same developments that Wight described several years ago.

Wight on International Revolutions

This section attempts to define the term international revolution and describe the developments that transpire when one is in progress. The most important of these developments are the emergence of a particular revolution in a specific country that serves as a model for potential revolutionaries abroad and the formation of a counter-revolution by politicians from other states. These two events should be accompanied by changes in loyalties, treason, fear of treason, the use of coercion and propaganda in order to spread particular doctrines, the prevalence of tension between certain nations, the weakening of international institutions, civil wars, imperialism, and the eventual return of realpolitik as the guiding force for international leaders. In the rest of this section, I delve into these issues one-by-one.

Wight thought of an international revolution as an organized attempt to "transform international society" (1978, p.84). If an attempt is going to be successful, the governmental structures in an assortment of nations will need to be altered. Each of the three international revolutions mentioned in **Power Politics** produced this type of drastic change. After the first movement, which was the Reformation, a variety of states inside of Europe were no longer dominated by monarchies that were devout supporters of Catholicism. This was the case because they were starting to support the new forms of Christianity as well. One example is Anglican Britain. The changes, which surfaced in the other two revolutions, turned out to be quite different than the one produced in the first. As a result of the French Revolution, democratic institutions replaced these very same monarchies that had flourished in Europe for so

long. Then over one hundred years later, the messages of the Russian Revolution forced numerous countries to become communist.

An Influential Domestic Insurgency

These historical examples demonstrate just how influential these worldwide movements can become and the manner in which they originate. While most events pertaining to international politics such as wars have systemic causes, the same cannot be said about international revolutions (Waltz, 1959). Instead, they have domestic ones. This fact can be uncovered when looking at one of Wight's remarks. As his discussion about revolutionary movements commences, he says "what we usually mean by the word revolution is a violent change of regime within a single state, of which the French Revolution is the classic European example. But we must remember that such revolutions have their international aspect" (Wight, 1978, p.81). One of the reasons why these internal uprisings can have such a drastic effect on international society as a whole is because individuals in other nations admire the revolutionaries in a particular state. This admiration stems from the way that they have the desire to stage similar rebellions in their own nations. It seems necessary to do this since large gaps have also developed between their expectations and reality (Calvert, 1996).

Changes in Loyalties

This link that is formed between these alienated citizens will force them to alter the manner in which they identify themselves (Armstrong, 1993). Usually, they will choose to align themselves with a particular nation-state. Furthermore, they will probably support the country where they reside. For example, if one lives in France, he or she will most likely support this

nation. However, when an international movement starts to unravel, this type of allegiance starts to decline. Instead, these people will begin to change their loyalties by supporting a particular ideology that is gaining acceptance. It is possible to notice this evolution by looking at how people labeled themselves during the third revolutionary period, which started in 1917 (Wight, 1978). At this point in time, many citizens in the USSR were not thinking of themselves as Soviets. On the contrary, they preferred to be labeled as members of the proletariat or working class due to their admiration for communism (Halliday, 1999).

Another indication of this change in allegiance is the strengthening of revolutionary organizations. It is quite common for revolutionaries to support groups, which are in the process of trying to generate widespread political change. This became fairly apparent throughout the Cold War. While it was in progress, countless individuals became avid followers of the Tricontinental and Latin American Solidarity Organization. The attendance at organizational conferences is probably the best sign of how popular these organizations were. In 1966, the Tricontinental Conference was "attended by 512 delegates from eighty-two countries" (Halliday, 1999, p.118). Then a year later, the Latin American Solidarity Organization's meeting attracted 5,000 delegates (Halliday, 1999).

Treason and Fear of Treason

There is a problem that many revolutionaries wind up facing after electing to display this support for a doctrine. They frequently are labeled as traitors in their native states by public officials. Of course, they are not the only ones who are portrayed in this manner. This is true because innocent individuals will be accused of treason as well. These erroneous charges come

about since a fear of treason is prevalent in most states (Wight, 1978). One does not have to look any further than the U.S. in the 1950's to recognize this fact. It was at this time that Senator Joseph McCarthy took it upon himself to falsely accuse many Americans of being communist sympathizers. This turn of events predominately came about because communists were supposedly "everywhere-in factories, offices, butcher stores, on street corners, and private business" (Chafe, 2003, p.95).

Formation of a Counter-Revolution

This fear of treason at the time of revolutions is a sign that there will be others who will not be supporters of the doctrine being spread. They choose to take this position because they will not benefit if the revolutionaries are successful (Halliday, 1999). Since they are fully aware of this fact, they will go to great lengths to undermine the particular initiative, which they see as a legitimate threat to their interests. In other words, they will attempt to initiate a counter-revolution (Wight, 1978). The actions of European monarchs after the reign of Napoleon can provide us with a solid example of this significant point. While efforts were still being made to spread democratic principles in Europe, these monarchs formed the legendary Holy Alliance, "which preached an international Christian Conservative Monarchism" (Wight, 1978, p.83). The manner in which this alliance was entered into so willingly by the various parties involved is an indication that counter-revolutionaries eventually set aside their loyalties to their respective states just like their revolutionary foes.

Because the proponents of revolution and counter-revolution become so committed to spreading particular doctrines the tension between them becomes rather intense. Moreover, it

often transcends the disdain people from opposing states will have for each other. Towards the end of Wight's chapter on this subject, he says while the world is in the middle of revolutions of this nature "Catholics hate Protestants, Ultras hate Jacobins, Communists hate the bourgeoisie, with a fiercer passion than Frenchmen hate Germans or Americans hate Japanese" (1978, p.87).

Weakening of International Institutions

The aforementioned hatred proves to be detrimental to international society as a whole. This is the case because the critical institutions that help it function are not relied upon as much by its members, though these are not the institutions which so many scholars have written about in recent years. In other words, they are not the United Nations and the W.T.O. (Erskine, 2003). Instead, they are patterns of behavior like diplomacy and international law (Bull, 1977). One might say it is only natural for the former to decline during revolutionary periods. After all, a lack of trust between diplomats emerges during them. Henry Kissinger, a classical realist, has been quick to point this out in the past. Within his historically based study about the interactions between the European powers at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, he mentions how no major diplomatic breakthroughs were able to occur as this period progressed because different diplomatic representatives could not believe each other whenever certain promises were made (Kissinger, 1964). Since the words of representatives cannot be taken at face value like those of the Europeans so many years ago, they begin to be perceived in an entirely different manner as they attempt to conduct business abroad. Rather than being welcomed, they are often scrutinized and labeled as spies in host countries. As a result of this, one of two unfortunate incidents will likely transpire. They could be asked to leave a country as soon as possible. If this does not

happen, then they will be allowed to remain with certain restrictions imposed upon them (Wight, 1978).

International law is another institution that is weakened. There are a number of items that can signify this turn of events including a complete disregard for the sovereignty of states. State sovereignty can be undermined both covertly and overtly. For the most part, overt infringements of sovereignty have transpired in previous worldwide movements. In other words, invasions of other nations have taken place. It was not until the third international revolution that covert violations became much more common. This was due in large part to the actions of the United States.   On several occasions, American leaders conducted operations ranging from assassinations to instigating mass rebellions so communist sympathizers could be removed from power (Schlesinger, 1986).

Tension between a Number of Nations

In addition to this growing disrespect for international institutions, it is quite common to see a tremendous amount of tension between various states as well. In fact, Wight goes so far as to say that they are "morally and psychologically at war all the time" (1978, p.90). Therefore, a cold war transpires between them. Of course, when one thinks of this term, the duel between the United States and Soviet Union automatically comes to mind. However, it is important to remember that this type of development was prevalent during the first two revolutionary periods as well. Perhaps, the best illustration of this fact was the manner in which "the England of Elizabeth I was in a state of Cold War with Spain for nearly twenty years before Phillip decided to launch an armada for the invasion of England" (Wight, 1978, p.90).

Using Coercion and Propaganda to Spread Doctrines and Civil Wars

Although relations between different national leaders tend to decline as revolutions take place, other bonds often surface. The leaders of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary powers will try to establish strong ties with the citizens in other states. For the most part, this is done by utilizing propaganda. One individual, who chose to do this, was Woodrow Wilson. When he was in Rome during 1918, he spoke "directly to the Italian people" instead of meeting with officials from the Italian government (Wight, 1978, p.89). Undoubtedly, men like Wilson elect to behave in this manner since they are determined to promote a certain ideology.

These very same leaders will also use coercion in order to export particular doctrines abroad. This will happen in one of two ways. They can rely on their own military forces. This appeared to be the preferred method of choice for the politicians in revolutionary France. As Kyung-Won Kim points out in **Revolution and International System**, they chose to invade other nations with the hope of spreading the messages of the French Revolution. At first, French troops moved into places such as the Kingdom of Sardinia to help the people there "recover their liberty" (Kim, 1970, p.45). Later, the French crossed into countries like Spain as well because all of the monarchies had to be eliminated throughout Europe according to revolutionaries ranging from Brissot to Montesquieu.

If the first tactic is not used, then sympathizers in other countries will be found to promote various principles. The United States did this quite frequently during the Cold War. For instance, it was able to get the Contras, a group of anti-communist rebels, to fight on its behalf in Nicaragua. These insurgents were supplied with a considerable amount of guns and

ammunition from the CIA. It was this military support that led to a prolonged war with the communist Sandinistas, the ruling political faction. Not only do the events in Nicaragua show us how revolutionary and counter-revolutionary states frequently find other parties to spread their doctrines for them, but it also displays the manner in which these relationships can generate civil wars while international revolutions are in progress (Wight, 1978).

Imperialism

The use of force will generally be accompanied by the emergence of imperialism. This is true because these same nations will simultaneously advance their economic and political interests as certain messages are being spread. If the events around the time of the Reformation are examined, this becomes fairly apparent. At this point, the German princes and Sweden were attempting to satisfy "their territorial appetites" (Wight, 1978, p.93). Meanwhile, others like the British and Dutch were in the midst of promoting their commercial goals.

Leaders Solely Being Guided by Realpolitik

Revolutions will eventually generate stabilizing outcomes. After states resort to such desperate measures, they will begin to behave in a more normal fashion. Politicians will start to completely focus on protecting their national interests once again (Morgenthau, 1954). Of course, Wight likes to refer to this as "doctrinal considerations being overridden by raison d'etat" (1978, p.93). Presumably, this evolution transpires since the allegiance to certain doctrines becomes so destructive. This appeared to be the case as the Cold War was winding down. At this point in time, the Soviets started to withdraw their forces from a variety of locations ranging

from Afghanistan to Eastern Europe (Halliday, 1999). They did this because an attempt was being made to improve this nation's lagging economy.

Table One:

Common Developments During Revolutionary Periods	
An Influential Domestic Insurgency	Tension between a Number of Nations
Formation of a Counter-Revolution	Weakening of International Institutions
Changes in Loyalties	Civil Wars
Treason	Imperialism
Fear of Treason	Leaders Solely Being Guided by Realpolitik
Using Coercion and Propaganda to Spread Doctrines	

As the summary in table one shows, this decision by international leaders to solely concentrate on protecting their national interests once again is the last major development in the rise and fall of international revolutions. We will now turn our attention to the second objective of this paper. This involves showing how a fourth international movement is currently transpiring. It will be possible to do this by pointing out how many of the developments, which have just been discussed, are now prevalent in the international system.

The Iranian Revolution and the Increase in Islamic Fundamentalism

As we have seen, an international revolution begins after an influential domestic uprising transpires. For example, the third international revolution commenced once workers around the

world were inspired by the actions of the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution in 1917. What will become apparent during this portion of the study is how the Iranian Revolution is the true origin of the current international revolution because it is responsible for motivating many Islamic fundamentalists throughout the globe.

As a result of this Iranian upheaval, the Shah of Iran was removed from power. While many political figures had some say as this event unfolded, Ayatollah Khomeini was indeed the most influential out of all of them. Many arguments have surfaced about why Khomeini became the most popular figure within Iran. After all, there were other individuals who were just as determined to be the Shah's successor including Abolhassin Bani-Sadr and Muhammed Beheshti. The problem for them was that they did not go far enough to distance themselves from the Shah's unpopular regime. This can be noticed simply by looking at the main reasons for why the Shah was disliked. There was a tremendous amount of discontent over his modernization program and the prevalence of corruption inside the government (Walt, 1996). However, the item, which appeared to be the most troubling, was his close relationship with the United States. Because of this strong bond the Shah was seen in many circles as a U.S. puppet. All of the opposition leaders spoke out about the first and second reasons, but only Khomeini paid close attention to the ties with America.

In the eyes of this Muslim cleric, the Shah's relationship with the United States was significant because it was responsible for the emergence of unwanted Western values within this Middle Eastern nation. They happened to be the principles that had been supported by the West for so many years such as human rights and consumerism (Lewis, 2002). These symbols of

Western Civilization were condemned by Khomeini and his supporters since they were seen as a threat to Muslim values. One of the better cases displaying the validity behind this crucial point was the role of women. For the most part, females did not have many individual rights. However, their position in society was slowly improving during the Shah's reign of power. In fact, some of them were able to teach adolescent boys (Lewis, 2002). This type of progress was unacceptable since it would allegedly lead to widespread immorality. Fundamentalists thought it would be better if women were forced to resume their traditional roles. In other words, it would be more appropriate for them to return to the confines of their own homes. The best way to ensure that this turn in events would take place and other Western values would be eliminated was by establishing an Islamic republic. In addition to this, it would be necessary to have clerics "play an active and direct role in the political system" (Walt, 1996, p.213). Supposedly, they would be able to make sure Islamic principles were followed at all times.

The development of a new foreign policy was also used in order to stop Westernization. Part of it was based on cutting off many relations with most Western powers. As one might expect, the United States was the focal point of this new initiative. Perhaps, the best illustration of this fact is how "the new regime refused to accept the credentials of the U.S. ambassador designate and then canceled a $9 billion arms deal" (Walt, 1996, p.225). Other nations that started to have problems with Iran were Britain and France. The British were exposed to the most difficulties; the British embassy and several members of the Anglican Church were attacked. These events forced "London to withdraw most of its diplomatic personnel in 1980" (Walt, 1996, p.223).

This new foreign policy also entailed exporting the revolution to other nations. At first, the desire was to concentrate on spreading the messages of this movement throughout the Muslim World, but eventually it was supposed to reach all parts of the globe (Ramazani, 1986). Other Muslims would be receptive to these ideas according to Khomeini because "Muslims are one family, even if they are subject to different governments and even if they live in regions remote from one another" (Algar, 1981, p.35).

The ruling clerics claimed that they were not willing to resort to coercion in order to accomplish the above goal. However, various choices prove just how misleading this claim was at the time. On more than one occasion, Iran either resorted to violence in an effort to create other Islamic republics or sponsored terrorist organizations that were attempting to do the same thing. One can notice the way the Iranians utilized their own military personnel just by taking the Iran-Iraq War into consideration. This conflict originally started because Iraq invaded Iran. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, elected to do this since he wanted to stop Iranian support for insurgents in Iraq and seize the oil rich province of Khuzistan. There were signs that both of these events were about to transpire because Iraqi forces took control of "approximately ten thousand square miles" inside of Iran (Walt, 1996, p.241.). But then Iran's soldiers were able to retake a number of important territories like Abadan and this growing Iraqi momentum came to a halt. By 1982, Iraqi soldiers started to withdraw from Iran. Therefore, it looked like the war had come to an end. The problem was Iran then invaded Iraq hoping that this course of action "would trigger an uprising by Iraq's Shiite majority and that the creation of an Islamic republic in Iraq would accelerate the spread of revolutionary Islam throughout the region" (Walt, 1996,

p.242). The Iranians later provided support to groups like Hezbollah with the intention of establishing a similar government in Lebanon.

Everything did not go according to plan for Iran's leaders due to the fact that Islamic republics never emerged in Iraq or Lebanon. This does not mean that this effort to export the teachings of the revolution was a complete failure. As it turns out, it was successful in one respect. Countless Islamic fundamentalists would later try to replicate the Iranian model in other countries (Hadar, 1992). In other words, these militants would attempt to construct other regimes, which were based on Islamic law. Therefore, for all intent and purposes, the events on Iranian soil showed these individuals that it was still possible to create Islamic governments in an era being dominated by secularism.

They were not able to do this immediately due to the surfacing of a major crisis. Throughout much of the 1980's, the Soviet Union attempted to maintain a satellite government inside Afghanistan, so numerous Islamic militants went to this nation in order to assist Afghans with their resistance effort. The majority of them were so anxious to provide this assistance because Soviet aggression was seen as an attack against all Muslims rather than just a violation of Afghani sovereignty. But more importantly, it turned out to be invaluable since the Soviets later withdrew their forces in 1989. This victory was very similar to the Russian defeat at the end of the Russo-Japanese War. When the Russians lost in 1905, Asians started to believe that European colonial powers could actually be defeated. Whereas, the conflict in Afghanistan was interpreted by these fundamentalists as a sign that all threats to Islam could be eliminated in the long run (Huntington, 1998).

The already mentioned extremists were still determined to generate political change within Muslim states that appeared to have Western sympathizers controlling them despite the fighting in Afghanistan. It is possible to notice this by looking at the words of a radical Egyptian Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj. In 1982, he said that:

> It is our duty to concentrate on our Islamic cause, which means first and foremost establishing God's law in our own country, and causing the word of God to prevail. There can be no doubt that the first battlefield of the jihad is the extirpation of these infidel leaderships and their replacement by a perfect Islamic order. From this will come release (Lewis, 2002, p.108).

The leaders of extremist organizations firmly believed that terrorism was the best way of carrying out this plan, so the leaders of groups such as Al Qaeda had operatives conduct numerous attacks in an effort to decrease public support for regimes ranging from the Husai Mubarak regime in Egypt to the al-Saud royal family in Saudi Arabia after the Afghani War was finished. Both of these governments had been classified as Western supporters since they maintained solid relations with the U.S. like the Shah did. However, the Saudi royals were scrutinized the most. According to Osama Bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda, this extra scrutiny was deserved due to the fact that this ruling elite allowed the United States to place soldiers inside of Saudi territory. This was considered to be unacceptable because Mecca and Medina, Muslim holy sites, were located in Saudi Arabia (Lewis, 2003).

The West's Counter-Revolution, Changes in Loyalties, Treason, and Fear of Treason

As one might expect, the Iranian Revolution and the proliferation in fundamentalist activities left Western states in an uncomfortable position. Since an ally was removed from

power and others were also on the verge of being removed, Western influence in the Muslim World was deteriorating steadily. Therefore, politicians had to come up with strategies for dealing with the Islamist problem.

Leaders from the United States had three plans to undermine the influence of Islamic radicals. At first, Americans attempted to discredit these extremists by generating a counter-revolution within Iran. The hope was to remove Khomeini and the other clerics from power and then have more moderate politicians take control of the government. For the most part, this idea came about in the middle of the 1980's while Ronald Reagan was in office. After all, the members of the Jimmy Carter administration had more important problems to concentrate on such as a devastating domestic recession. Eventually, the Reagan cabinet decided that secretly selling arms to Iran would allow them to bring down the Islamic republic. Not only was this initiative supposed to strengthen the position of moderate forces, but it was also designed to get the American hostages in Lebanon released. Neither one of these developments ever materialized. Instead, the platform of the radicals became even more popular among the Iranian citizenry. One of the better indications of this was the manner in which most moderates drastically changed their position. Men like Ali Akbar Hashemi- Rafsanjani started to become more critical of the U.S. and its Western allies whenever they were in the process of making public statements (Walt, 1996).

Although the U.S. was unable to slow down the growing popularity of the fundamentalists in Iran, it was still determined to defeat others who were trying to obtain political power within other Muslim countries. This was done by being more supportive of the

secular regimes which these hardliners were seeking to destroy. More often than not, this support came in the form of military aid. In fact, Egypt became the second leading beneficiary of American military assistance. On average, it received up to $1.3 billion from the Americans (United Press International, 2004). The majority of the materials that were given to the Egyptians and others would later be used to break up demonstrations and preserve order.

This other U.S. strategy did nothing to weaken the Islamic fundamentalist movement. If anything, it seemed to strengthen it. Extremist organizations started to get more recruits due to the aforementioned coercive policies of the United States and its allies. Since countless individuals were subjected to continuous torment from security forces, they thought it would be beneficial to become members of groups like Al Qaeda. For example, in 1998, Egyptians such as Ayman al-Zawahri, Bin Laden's current deputy, joined this organization (Shrader, 2004). This made sense since Bin Laden's followers were trying to eliminate these very same regimes, which had been so abusive. After this rise in membership commenced, the Western World was placed in a much more vulnerable position. These new recruits were not only willing to go to great lengths in an effort to bring down the leaders in their native states, but they were also determined to make their Western allies pay for giving them the means to harm their fellow countrymen. The United States started to realize this after 9/11 due to the fact that most of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia.

Due to the failure of the second strategy the United States again found itself searching for a new alternative to deal with this growing problem. One finally started to surface when President George W. Bush came to power. While his administration still felt the need to help

some of these hated governments, it insisted on simultaneously pushing for democratic reforms throughout the entire Muslim World (Bush, 2005). This meant that there was a desire to see more respect for human rights and the establishment of representative governments.

Support for Bush's initiative was warranted for one major reason. It marked the first time that American leaders attempted to set forth a logical solution for reducing the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism. The first two U.S. strategies backfired since they alienated moderate politicians and citizens and simultaneously pushed them toward the fundamentalist camp. But trying to spread democracy does nothing like this. On the contrary, it is more likely to get these two groups, which extremists prey upon, to condemn both fundamentalist actions and ideas since certain benefits will emerge if democracy flourishes. For example, there would be an opportunity for children to attend public schools rather than the Islamic religious schools that have become so prevalent in many states (Maykuth, 2004).

This new effort may or may not be effective. However, it has been correlated with a new wave of extremist attacks. In 2003, the number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East rose to sixty-seven (U.S. State Department's Global Terrorism Report, 2004). One of the more notable attacks was a string of suicide bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that killed nine American citizens.

The unity between these radicals has also increased. While fundamentalists have been engaged in their struggle against Westerners, they have tended to help each other out by providing financial and moral support, but a new form of assistance has emerged. Since the

commencement of the occupation in Iraq, numerous foreign fighters have traveled there in order to assist other Muslims who are responsible for the growing insurgency (Priest, 2005). Perhaps, the most notable of these foreigners is Abu Musab Al Zarquai. This native of Jordan is currently the most wanted man in Iraq because he orchestrated a number of deadly bombings. This strengthening of Islamic fundamentalist solidarity could only be expected. After all, as the previous discussion about the Soviet-Afghan War showed, Muslims have always seemed to place the interests of Islam above those of the state. The best explanation for this type of allegiance has to do with the Muslims' thoughts regarding the concept of the state. For the most part, it is nothing more than an artificial construction to them. It is perceived in such a negative fashion since the Muslim World never agreed to be divided up into different states. By contrast, Western leaders elected to do this at the conclusion of World War I by creating states like Iraq and Syria, which were once parts of the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 2002).

Many extremists have been labeled as traitors in their home countries due to this willingness to assist other Muslims in need. One of the more notable cases is the American John Walker Lindh. He was discovered with radicals who were attacking U.S. soldiers. While he did not fire any shots at the Americans, he was still found guilty of helping a declared enemy of the United States since he knowingly "carried a rifle and two grenades" to a location where fighting was taking place (Jackman, 2002). There have also been others on U.S. soil who have been falsely identified as fundamentalists. A Muslim man in California appeared to be "mixing some sort of chemical concoction" in his backyard so his neighbors called the police (Schevitz, 2002). In actuality, he was just "making a special rice mixture" (Schevitz, 2002).

Western actors have not displayed as much camaraderie as the fundamentalists. Only a small number of nations have decided to establish closer ties with the U.S. Presumably, one of the reasons why countries like Great Britain and Australia have elected to do this is because Islamic militants have made it quite obvious that terrorist attacks will continue against Western interests well into the future. For example, Bin Laden declared that it was the individual duty of every Muslim to continue the killings of "Americans and their allies" (Huntington, 2004, p.358). This allegiance has been most visible when certain politicians have made public speeches. On more than one occasion, Tony Blair has spoken about the topic at hand. The British Prime Minister has made it very clear that it is imperative for his nation to maintain a strong "alliance with the United States of America" if it is going to be secure (Frankel, 2004). Conceivably, this is why the United Kingdom was so supportive of the invasion of Iraq.

Using Coercion and Propaganda to Spread Doctrines

In this section, the above invasion will be focused on in greater detail. The primary objective will be to display how coercion has been utilized by the West in order to spread democracy. The other goal will be to show the way propaganda has also been a tool, which Western and fundamentalist actors have relied upon during this fourth revolutionary period. Once these objectives have been accomplished, it will then be possible to discuss the consequences that have emerged due to this dependence on coercion and propaganda.

There is no need to present a thorough discussion regarding the use of force by Islamic fundamentalists since we have already seen how they primarily depend on terrorism in an effort to meet their political objectives. The West has turned to another tactic, which is supposed to

allow Muslims to enjoy the privileges associated with democratic rule. The U.S. and select allies have carried out two invasions during the past four years. The first occurred in Afghanistan back in the fall of 2001. This military operation happened to be very low key in comparison to past invasions. Usually, there are thousands of troops if and when an operation of this nature transpires. This did not prove to be the case four years ago. Instead, a small number of American special operation teams and members of the CIA moved into Afghan territory without much trouble. Once they were inside of this nation, they worked with the Northern Alliance, a group of domestic insurgents, so it would be possible to topple the ruling theocratic regime. At first, many believed that it was going to take a considerable amount of time to produce a military victory. This pessimism surfaced for a variety of reasons. One of them happened to be the terrain in Afghanistan. For the most part, it is dominated by mountains and flat surfaces are few and far between. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to move military equipment and supplies from one place to another. The other reason why this effort was supposed to take so long was the failed Soviet initiative back in the 1980's. All of this worrying proved to be unwarranted though because the Taliban, the ruling political faction, was defeated rather quickly. This success emerged in such a short period due to the fact that American air strikes broke up enemy lines and made it much easier for allied forces to proceed south toward Kabul and Kandahar (Davis, 2002).

The removal of the Taliban was welcomed by the majority of the Afghani people. This could be noticed in many ways. For example, countless males wound up shaving their faces after being forced to grow beards by religious zealots like Mullah Omar (CNN, 2001). Since these individuals enjoyed this autonomy so much, it seemed appropriate to form a new

government, which would allow them to have it on a daily basis. In other words, the creation of a representative government was the best thing to do at the time. Eventually, a transitional one was set up that distributed political power between the major tribes within Afghanistan. Although most tribes had some power, it was fairly apparent that the Pashtuns had the most. This was the case because Hamid Karzai, the Prime Minister, was a member of this group. Unfortunately, disputes developed due to this new arrangement throughout much of 2002. However, the government continued to function despite these disturbances.

The disagreements between the various factions inside the government were not the only threat, which had the potential to harm this experiment with democracy. In addition to this, there were parties on the outside that were trying to undermine the new leadership. These parties were the Taliban and Al Qaeda. They predominately relied upon guerrilla warfare tactics in order to reduce the power of politicians such as Karzai (McCarthy & Borger, 2002). Not only did they conduct hit and run attacks against the Afghan army, but they also were responsible for a number of assassination attempts. These efforts were weakened because of foreign assistance. U.S. soldiers remained in Afghanistan after the fall of the previous regime and they went on a number of search and destroy missions with the hope of finding Taliban and Al Qaeda members (Brown, 2003). Moreover, these sweeps made it much more difficult for these rebels to operate since several of them were captured when missions of this kind transpired.

Bumps in the road like the ones that have been alluded to can only be expected. This is true because, as history has shown, it is hard for any democracy to survive at the beginning. But the Bush administration is still confident that Afghanistan's government will be prosperous in

the long run. After all, most citizens continue to display a desire to make it work. Perhaps, the best illustration of this fact is how approximately 8,000 of them registered to vote on a daily basis prior to the 2004 elections (U.S. State Department, 2004). Of course, the same cannot be said about the other place where Western coercion has been utilized and that is Iraq. When this Middle Eastern nation was invaded in March of 2003, there were a variety of explanations for this course of action. Without a doubt the most popular one had to be the need to strip Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction. What is important to note about this explanation though is how it was constantly utilized as a justification before this military operation actually transpired. Once it was in progress, more and more leaders throughout the West were starting to say that the main mission was "to free the Iraqi people" (Bush, 2003, Speech #1).

After Hussein's regime was toppled, certain steps were taken to make sure that freedom would become a permanent fixture in Iraqi society. One begins to notice this when examining the effort to organize a post-Hussein government. Originally, certain individuals in the Bush administration wanted to set up a military dictatorship (Barr, 2003). Moreover, this government was going to be controlled by a general from the U.S. Armed Forces. The inspiration for this model came from General McArthur's occupation of Japan after World War II. This plan never materialized though because Bush opted to build a representative government instead. In order to make sure that democracy had a chance to flourish, two other major decisions were made in Washington. First of all, an envoy was sent to the Middle East, which was supposed to bring certain Iraqi factions together so it would be easier to assemble this new government. Jay Garner was the leader of this envoy, but Paul Bremer later replaced him (Tyler, 2003). The second move was probably more significant. It involved making sure that members of the Baath party

did not participate in these meetings. The logic behind this policy was quite simple. These individuals supported Hussein during his extended reign of terror, so there was an underlying fear that they would make an attempt to form another authoritarian regime. This would have sabotaged the effort to produce a more democratic political environment.

Even though the Baathists were stopped in the aforementioned manner, they were still able to undermine the initiative to bring democracy to Iraq. The manner in which they did this was by relying upon the same method as the opponents of Afghanistan's government. In other words, they also resorted to guerrilla warfare (Shanker, 2004). This became quite clear right after George Bush said that all major military combat operations were finished in May of 2003. At this point, routine acts of sabotage commenced. In fact, car bombings and hit and run attacks transpired so frequently that the death toll for American soldiers started to drastically increase (Squittieri & Miniz, 2003). The Baathists, of course, could not take credit for all of this violence since they began to receive help from other parties. As we already know, foreign fighters started to participate due to the leadership of Zarquai. Domestic assistance surfaced as well. It came from Shiites who followed the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Zarquai's group contributed to this growing resistance movement by conducting numerous operations against U.S. troops around Baghdad. Whereas, al-Sadr's militia got involved in gun battles on the streets of many Southern Iraqi cities.

The fact that al-Sadr and his followers joined the Baathist led insurgency was quite surprising. They were supposed to be very supportive of the effort to construct this new government. This was the case because they suffered the most while Hussein and the Baath

party were in power. In other words, they were subjected to torture just like the other Shiites

were. This was due in large part to the manner in which Hussein and party members were

Sunnis instead. The most common explanation for their reaction had to do with the way that the

Iraqi leaders were perceived by them. Rather than being representatives of the Iraqi people, they

were considered to be puppets, which were being controlled by the United States (Ignatius,

2005). But more importantly, this also meant that they would continue to allow U.S. led forces

to rule Iraq (Ahmad, 2003).

The United States tried to reassure these Shiites that it had no intention of controlling Iraq

for an extended period of time by using propaganda. From time to time, members of the Bush

cabinet made trips to Baghdad to meet with politicians. Moreover, once these meetings were

finished, there were press briefings or speeches and individuals such as former U.S. Secretary of

State Colin Powell and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld used these opportunities to

say that the U.S. was not attempting to colonize Iraq. Instead, its objective was to continue

helping Iraqi officials establish democracy despite all of the violence. On one occasion,

Rumsfeld addressed the whole nation by making a speech, which was broadcast on radio and

television. During it, he said that "Iraq belongs to you. The coalition has no intention of owning

or running Iraq." (Schmitt & Bumiller, 2003). Something else that was done in an effort to

squash the notion that Americans wanted to turn Iraq into a colony occurred towards the end of

June in 2004. At this point, sovereignty was handed over to Iraq's leaders. All of these efforts

appeared to be useless though since these Shiites continued to be defiant. In addition to

attacking American and Iraqi troops in the holy city of Najaf throughout the month of August, a

large number of them refused to participate in the historic January elections (Chandrasekaran,

2004). This boycott primarily came about since al-Sadr said the elections were illegitimate (Sanders, 2005).

This was not the only time when propaganda was used by the Bush administration. It also relied upon this tactic while dealing with the Islamic republic in Iran. The ruling elite there were not considered to be the true representatives of the Iranian people. Therefore, it seemed appropriate to drive a wedge between the two of them (Wight, 1978). This was done by reaching out to the citizens who did not see eye to eye with the government's harsh policies. Some of the individuals that fit this description happened to be young college students. They wanted to see more personal liberties surface throughout this country. In fact, on more than one occasion, they showed how much they wanted this to occur by protesting on the streets of Tehran. Presumably, it was these acts of civil disobedience, which played a role in Bush's decision to publicly display his sympathy for these dissidents. His best show of sympathy was when he said that the U.S. "would be a close ally of Iran" if the Iranian people continued to move towards freedom and tolerance (Bush, 2003, Speech #2).

Coincidentally, the same Iranian mullahs, whom Bush wanted to remove from power in Iran, began to use propaganda as well. They were convinced that it could help them create an Islamic republic in Iraq. As we already know, they tried to do this once before during the war with Iraq in the 1980's, but this initiative failed. The main reason why things did not go according to plan at that point was because Hussein had a tight grip on power. However, this was no longer an issue since he had been removed by the Americans. Therefore, it seemed more plausible that a theocracy could be established if pro-Iranian politicians were promoted in Iraq.

This was done by providing them with "huge amounts of money" to conduct political campaigns (Wright & Baker, 2004). Although this was considered to be a major step in the right direction, the Iranian leaders still wanted to do something in order to win over the average Iraqi citizen. So they started "paying salaries and providing welfare to unemployed Iraqis" (Wright & Baker, 2004).

The members of organizations like Al Qaeda also felt the need to spread propaganda. They chose to do this by relying on one tactic in particular. Speeches on audio or video cassettes would be made and then news agencies like Al Jazeera would broadcast them. These individuals had no other choice but to reach out to potential sympathizers in this manner due to legal troubles. The majority of them were wanted for being involved in prior terrorist attacks, so they had to do everything within their power to make sure that their whereabouts remained unknown.

Tension between States, the Weakening of Institutions, and Imperialism

Since such drastic steps have been taken by the supporters of revolution and counter-revolution, a number of unfortunate problems have now emerged, which the members of international society must deal with accordingly. One of them happens to be the growth of tension between different states. The one at odds with the most nations is the United States. It is having the most difficulty with countries like Iran and Syria. One of the reasons why this is the case is because they have gone out of their way to assist the same extremists who have been trying to undermine the American led effort to spread democracy across the Muslim World. While there are several illustrations supporting this contention, one stands out the most. Iran and Syria have allowed numerous militants, who are wanted by Western law enforcement officials,

to receive sanctuary inside of Iranian and Syrian territory. In fact, investigations conducted by European countries concluded that a significant amount of Al Qaeda operatives were currently hiding in Iran. Furthermore, these individuals supposedly helped organize recent terror attacks ranging from the train bombings in Madrid to the car bombings in Saudi Arabia (Rotella, 2004). Meanwhile, the Syrians have been hosting "terrorist groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad" (Black, 2003).

The increase in hostility between states is not the only development, which the U.S. has found itself in the middle of recently. This counter-revolutionary power has also been involved in the reduction of diplomacy. Not surprisingly, fundamentalism has contributed to this unfortunate turn in events. Perhaps, the best example of this is the American relationship with Syria. As noted above, Syria's continued support of various extremist organizations has upset Washington. What was not mentioned is how U.S.-Syrian diplomatic relations have been weakened because of this. U.S. diplomats attempted to get Syrian officials to terminate their ties with fundamentalist groups on a variety of occasions, but no progress ever emerged in regard to this matter. This forced Bush to impose sanctions on Syria on May 11, 2004 (Combined Wire Services, 2004).

America has also seen its diplomatic problems with Iran increase. In fact, relations between these two states have deteriorated so much that they predominately communicate through intermediaries such as Switzerland (Linzer, 2005). As one might expect, Tehran's refusal to part ways with fundamentalist groups has contributed to this lack of diplomatic intercourse. This can be seen if Bush's State of the Union Address in the early part of 2005 is

taken into consideration. During it, he said that it is still not possible to establish normal relations with Iran's leaders since they continue to be "the world's primary sponsor of terror" (Bush, 2005).

Although extremism has caused problems for the U.S. on the diplomatic front a number of times, there have been instances where it has not played a role in failed American initiatives. The events before the Iraq conflict can provide us with a case in point. At this point in time, the U.S. was becoming restless with Hussein due to his refusal to fully comply with UN resolutions concerning disarmament. However, it is important to note that the members of this organization were gradually getting Hussein to comply with their demands. Prior to the start of the war, he allowed an inspections team back into Iraq. This progress proved to be meaningless since Bush continued to lay the groundwork for the eventual invasion. Of course, it was not seen this way by the President. According to him, he was still in the process of trying to find a non-violent solution, but his actions suggest otherwise. He had the American delegation at the UN make an attempt to get another resolution passed in the Security Council, which would have authorized the use of force in Iraq and he also attended a summit in the Azores with the leaders of Great Britain and Spain (Reuters, 2003). The latter was presented to the world as one last diplomatic initiative to prevent war since a deadline was set for full Iraqi compliance regarding the weapons situation. Yet if anything, it was the equivalent of a war summit (Sandstrom, 2003). The only way this could have been perceived as a diplomatic effort is if an Iraqi delegation or some sort of intermediary was also in attendance as this meeting transpired.

The other institution being weakened at the present time is international law. Several states have undermined certain treaties, which were consistently followed by them in the past. Undoubtedly, the United States has been scrutinized far more than any other nation about this issue. Originally, it was criticized for backing out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty from 1972 (Kreiger, 2002). It was imperative to do this in the eyes of the Bush administration because a missile defense system needed to be constructed so it would be easier to respond to any potential attacks from terrorists or rogue states. Another treaty America has not done a good job of upholding is the legendary agreement established at the Geneva Convention, which pertains to the treatment of prisoners of war. Within this document, it says that all prisoners must be treated in a humane fashion by the parties who capture them. The U.S. has not been doing this after apprehending various Islamic fundamentalists. Instead, it has routinely mistreated them according to Red Cross officials (Burkeman, 2004). Washington has claimed that these individuals can be treated in this fashion though since they are supposedly non-combatants rather than prisoners. At the moment, the United States is clearly "coming up with its own international rules" (Waltz, 2002, p.348).

Another state, which has been criticized for neglecting international law, is Iran. One of the better illustrations of this is the routine criticism that has been coming out of Iraq. Various members of the current Iraqi government have condemned Iran for intervening in the domestic affairs of their nation. In other words, they have scrutinized the aforementioned Iranian efforts to create an Islamic republic inside of Iraq. Perhaps the most vocal critic has been former Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawer. When he was in Washington, he "charged that Iran" was undermining Iraqi sovereignty by engaging in this type of behavior (Wright & Baker, 2004).

The last development that is visible at the present time is imperialism. Like many of the other developments, it has come about because of American actions in Iraq.   The Bush administration has tried to hide U.S. imperialism by treating the situation in Iraq as if it is just like one of the nation building initiatives, which have become so common in global politics. This becomes fairly apparent if two items are taken into consideration. It has convinced certain states to send troops to Iraq in order to perform peacekeeping duties. For example, politicians from South Korea agreed to deploy members of their military. This came as a surprise since numerous citizens disapproved of this course of action (Hwang, 2004).   Unfortunately, peacekeeping units like the one from South Korea have not been very helpful. Since they have not consisted of many soldiers, the members of the American military have been forced to maintain the majority of the responsibility inside Iraq. In actuality, the only nation that has contributed a significant number of troops is Great Britain. Currently, it has 9500 troops engaged in the tough task of preserving order within this volatile nation (Frankel, 2004).

Something else which Washington has done in order to make the Iraqi operation come across as nation building is try to get different international actors to provide financial assistance for the reconstruction process. For the most part, this lobbying has been beneficial. Great Britain and Japan have promised to provide the new Iraqi government with substantial aid. The former has vowed to allocate $912 million while the latter insists it will be sending $5 billion to the Iraqis. There is also a chance that more states will be willing to send money to Iraq in the near future. France, Germany, and Russia have said that once an elected Iraqi government is established, they will probably start to provide the Iraqis with assistance. Even international

organizations have been willing to cooperate with the Americans regarding this matter. The World Bank recently gave $4 billion and the European Union agreed to contribute $325 million (Murphy, 2004).

Despite this military and financial assistance, it is still not appropriate to classify the U.S. mission as just a nation building initiative. This is the case because U.S. officials have simultaneously allowed certain corporations to generate considerable sums of money as it has been in progress. Undoubtedly, the most notable of them is Halliburton. This conglomerate, which was once led by the current American Vice President Dick Cheney, has put out oil fires and made emergency repairs to Iraq's oil infrastructure. Supposedly, this firm has earned close to $7 billion for carrying out these activities. Other businesses like Stevedoring Services of America have also benefited from the U.S. presence in Iraq. However, they have not gotten as much out of it as Halliburton. For instance, Stevedoring Services only received $4.8 million after agreeing "to manage the Umm Qasr ports in southern Iraq" (CNN, 2003).

Developments That Have Not Appeared Yet

Other developments that commonly transpire at the time of international revolutions have still not taken place during the current movement. As table two indicates, they are civil war*s* and leaders abandoning their quests to indoctrinate others so it will be possible for them to solely focus on protecting national interests once again. We will now turn our attention to demonstrating how these items are non-existent at the present time.

Table Two:

Present Developments	Missing Developments
An Influential Domestic Insurgency	Civil Wars
Formation of a Counter-Revolution	Leaders Solely Being Guided by Realpolitik
Changes in Loyalties	
Treason	
Fear of Treason	
Using Coercion and Propaganda to Spread Doctrines	
Tension between a Number of Nations	
Weakening of International Institutions	
Imperialism	

Civil wars have been prevalent. The problem is the supporters of the two doctrines being promoted have not really influenced the majority of these domestic disputes in any way. If we look at the on and off again crisis in the Sudan, this becomes quite clear. Fighting commenced in this country back in the 1950's due to a feud between Christians and Muslims. However, in recent years, the combatants have been motivated by economic concerns (Domke, 1997). Since this is true, it is not possible to conclude that they are being manipulated by any outside sources.

Although the revolution has not played a vital role in any civil wars as of yet, it might lead to some in the future. After all, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary actors have been thinking about instigating problems within various states. For example, the United States has

contemplated whether or not it should start backing opposition groups inside Iran. The most vocal supporter of this proposal has been Dick Cheney (Strobel, 2004). Besides possibly producing a tremendous amount of fighting throughout Iran, the implementation of such a plan would place the future of the Islamic republic in great jeopardy.

The other item that seems to be non-existent at this juncture in the current revolutionary period is heads of state displaying signs of abandoning the efforts to spread particular doctrines and just concentrating on protecting their national interests instead. One of the better examples of this is a remark made by George Bush while he was in the middle of the aforementioned State of the Union Address. At one point, he said that the United States will continue to "stand with the allies of freedom to support democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world" (Bush, 2005). Not only do comments like this tell us that Bush has no intention of giving up on his crusade of bringing democracy to places where it has never been seen before, but it is also a sign that the revolution we are in the midst of will not be ending any time soon. It is appropriate to say this because, as it was stated in the second section of this study, movements of this nature are in their final stages if and when leaders elect to make the return to solely being guided by realpolitik.

Possible Counterarguments about this Study

Although many of the developments associated with international revolutions have emerged recently, certain scholars such as Fred Halliday would probably insist that a movement is not really in progress. Halliday, a European scholar, has spent a lot of time studying the relations between the Muslim and Western Worlds. In his book Islam and the Myth of

Confrontation, he argues that there is not a major divide between Islam and the West as Samuel Huntington, the author of The Clash of Civilizations, has claimed. As expected, he includes several examples that are supposed to validate this contention. Among them is the present relationship between the United States and Iran. Halliday believes that American-Iranian relations are improving since the leaders of Iran were so cooperative when the U.S. removed the Taliban from power back in 2001 (Halliday, 2003). This is not an indication that these two states are actually getting along better for one reason in particular. Since 2001, they have consistently disagreed with each other over a variety of issues such as Iran harboring wanted terrorists. Therefore, the collaboration, which Halliday discusses, amounts to nothing more than an isolated incident.

The other reason why some might find it hard to believe that a revolution is transpiring is the division between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims. These two factions have been at odds ever since 632 A.D. when Shi'at Ali was not chosen to succeed the Prophet Muhammad (Ajami, 1981). With this in mind, it is very hard for many to envision them setting aside this resentment in order to prevent more Western influences from penetrating into the Muslim World. While it cannot be denied that they still have reservations about each other, there are indications that there already has been cooperation between them on various occasions. For example, in the 1990's Al-Qaeda started having meetings with Hezbollah. This was able to occur since Hasan Turabi and Abdallah Nuri, two Islamic fundamentalists, acted as intermediaries (Ben-David, 2002). Presumably, it was these events, which led to Al Qaeda operatives coordinating attacks against Western interests with militant Shiite groups (Fields, 2002).

Conclusion

At the moment, there are two initiatives under way in the world. On the one hand, there is a contingent of extremists who are desperately trying to construct governments in Muslim states, which will be guided by Islamic law. On the other, Western actors like the United States are attempting to reduce the appeal of these individuals by promoting democracy. For the most part, both of these efforts have been unsuccessful. This can be attributed to the manner in which Islamic theocracies or democracies have yet to emerge in most of these nations.

While a considerable amount of political change has not appeared, a number of other developments that often surface during revolutionary periods have. They range from an increase in tension between different countries to the weakening of the institutions that preserve order in international society. Two of the developments, which Wight alluded to years ago, are missing though. The most important of them is undoubtedly the failure of certain heads of state to return once again to just focusing on protecting the national interests of their respective countries. This is significant because it is an indication that the current movement is not on the verge of ending. Instead, it will probably be lasting for some time.

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