

**Violence and Terrorism: Feminist Observations on Islamist Movements,  
States, and the International System**

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The horrific events of September 11, the discovery of a transnational network of Islamic extremists, and the U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan compel us to think seriously about the causes of religious terrorism, the broad implications of violence and militarism, the nature of Islamic fundamentalist movements, and the gender dynamics of political violence. What are the religious, ethnic, political, social, and economic factors behind the deployment of terrorism as a political strategy? Why do Muslim countries produce movements that seek religio-political objectives through violent means? What link, if any, is there between terrorism as a political strategy and militarism as a state strategy? How might the violence of political movements and the violence of states reflect not only dysfunction in domestic and international relations but also highly problematical concepts of masculinity? And what are some urgent alternatives to terrorism and militarism?

These are, I believe, some of the pressing questions that confront and require serious attention from researchers, policy-makers, and decision-makers.<sup>1</sup> I cannot begin to provide answers or explanations to all of the above questions and issues.<sup>2</sup> I will, however, address the gender aspects of terrorism and violence and describe some feminist alternatives. And because

political Islam has been implicated in the events of September 11, I will briefly explore the roots, gender dynamics, and some characteristics of Islamist movements.

### **Fundamentalist Movements: Modernization, Globalization, and Gender**

The Islamic fundamentalist movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> century may be understood first in terms of general historical and sociological concepts that pertain to similar movements, and then in terms of the specific historical, social, and political contexts in which they emerged.<sup>3</sup> Like the Protestant fundamentalist movements of the United States in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Islamic fundamentalist movements have resulted from the contradictions of modernization and social change, including urbanization, proletarianization, secularization, and religious and social marginalization. In a social order that seems to be turning upside down, certain social groups experience a certain anxiety that leads them to seek to recuperate the more familiar values and norms. The (re)turn to religion and the family are typical responses to rapid social change and to the disruptions and uncertainties that modernization brings about. Religious fundamentalists are almost by definition extremely conservative on moral, cultural, and social issues, and in almost all cases they are situated on the right wing of the political spectrum.

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Islamic fundamentalist movements emerged in the 1970s, expanded during the 1980s, and peaked in the early 1990s. Certainly they reflected the difficult transition to modernity underway in the region, and the conflict between traditional and modern norms, relations, and institutions. Moreover, in common with radical movements elsewhere in the developing world, Islamist movements resulted from political and economic dysfunction, insecurity, and alienation. In particular, we may identify several factors in their emergence.

*National and global economic factors* loom large in the causes of religio-political revolts. These include distorted development, the unrealized promise of national development, and the persistence or growth of domestic and international inequalities. Some fundamentalist movements (e.g., in Iran, Egypt, and Algeria) have targeted both their own nation-states and the world capitalist order as sources of injustice – and claimed that the solution would be an Islamic order.<sup>4</sup> Disparities and inequalities within countries have been associated with corruption or declining oil revenues or misguided resource allocation priorities (such as huge military purchases). They also resulted from the austerities that accompanied the adoption of structural adjustment policies. It should be noted that political Islam emerged as the global political economy shifted from Keynesian to neoliberal, and it followed the collapse of talks on a new international economic order (NIEO).

*Salient political factors* include authoritarian rule, the absence of democratic or participatory political institutions, limited alternatives for pursuing political reform, and little trust in government or other institutions. In Middle Eastern countries, dissidents and opponents have often faced state repression, even when their methods were entirely non-violent. It should be noted, too, that many regimes fostered Islamist groups as a way of undermining socialist or communist movements in the region. This occurred in Iran, Egypt, and Turkey, with rather dire consequences for the regimes. Even Israel initially encouraged Hamas as a way of subverting the privileged authority of the PLO among the Palestinians. The United States encouraged an Islamist rebellion against a left-wing and modernizing government in Afghanistan, and spent the 1980s militarily and financially supporting the Afghan Mujahideen. A related political factor in the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements, of course, was the non-resolution of the

Palestinian problem, which many Islamist movements have explicitly identified as a *raison d'être*.

*Gender and social change* also are behind the emergence of Islamist movements, and this distinguishes Islamist movements from other radical movements (especially left-wing ones). As is well known, the role, status, comportment, and *couverture* of women constitute a major preoccupation of Islamist movements, who claim to seek greater independence from Western hegemony via a return to a more conservative or “authentic” culture. In fact, fundamentalist movements called for veiling because Muslim women had been taking off their veils. The movements called for a return to traditional family values and female domesticity because women had been entering public space and the public sphere, which for so long had been the province of men.<sup>5</sup> Some of the moral and gender preoccupation of fundamentalist movements is theologically rooted. Much of it, I believe, can be explained in terms of the inevitability of gender conflict at a time of tension between the waning patriarchal order and the emergent feminist movement.<sup>6</sup> In some countries, such as in Iran immediately after the revolution and in Algeria during the rise of the FIS (1988-91), unveiled women were the targets of seriously punitive Islamist action.

As mentioned above, Islamic fundamentalist movements reflect the tensions and contradictions of the transition to modernity and the conflict between traditional and modern values, norms, and social relations. Women’s rights – and the conflict over the roles, rights, and privileges of men and women, and the structure and status of the family – are at the center of this transition and this conflict. In the MENA region, governments have dealt with the Islamist threat in various ways, sometimes by accommodating fundamentalist demands and sometimes by confronting the organizations head-on. Early on, the Tunisian government confronted the an-

Nahda movement and banned it; the Syrian government put down its growing Islamist movement rather violently though effectively. Accommodation was initially the response of the governments of Egypt and Algeria, who conceded women's rights to the Islamist movements as a way of placating them. This concession took the form of reinforcing the patriarchal principles of Muslim family law. Only when the Islamists took up arms against the governments, sought to overthrow them, or used violence and terror in a way that threatened the power and authority of the state, did the Egyptian and Algerian states turn on the Islamist movements, their leaders and members. More recently in Morocco, a (non-violent) conflict has emerged between the socialist government and feminists on one side and a fundamentalist movement on the other. The point of contention is a proposed national development plan for the advancement of women, which is bitterly opposed by Islamic fundamentalists.

Islamist movements may differ from each other in terms of tactics, strategies and even some discourses. However, they are similar in their approach to gender, public morality, and the preferred legal system. Although economic factors are critical in explaining the emergence of Islamist movements, economic policy is not of overriding interest to them, and Islamists exhibit no particular expertise on economic matters. Islamist movements propose no particular economic model and they seem to be able to cohabit with different types of economic systems.<sup>7</sup> They have stronger views on the legal framework, the moral order, and the gender regime – all of which are to be based on the Shariat, or Islamic canon law. Although Islamist movements have suffered from and confronted authoritarian regimes, no Islamist movement or theorist has offered a model of democratic governance. Indeed, many Islamists (e.g., in Iran and in Algeria) have expressed strong opposition to multi-party democracy. Islamist movements seem to be able to cohabit with various types of political regime, as long as the Shariat is firmly in place.

There are, of course, some notable differences among existing fundamentalist movements. Although most generally eschew modern norms and advocate early Islamic practices, some movements are in fact more modern than others. This observation would pertain especially to Turkey, Tunisia, and Iran, many of whose leaders and members were/are middle class and educated, with a more modern outlook than would be found, for example, among the Taleban of Afghanistan, Islamic Jihad of Egypt, or Hamas of Palestine. Although nearly all Islamist movements and states advocate or practice violence, some seem more willing than others to engage in outright terrorism and the deliberate killing of civilians (e.g., the Islamist extremists of Algeria and Egypt). Many Islamists seem concerned exclusively with their own national problems and seem not to want to export their movement or join another one elsewhere – Lebanon’s Hezbollah may be an example. Others are of a more internationalist inclination and engage in transnational Islamist organizing, mobilizing, and direct action, including terrorism. We first encountered such Islamist internationalists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, where the religious call to jihad and martyrdom – not to mention arms from the CIA, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan – attracted men from an array of Muslim countries. Subsequently, some of these “Afghan Arabs”, especially those from Algeria and Egypt, returned to their countries to wage a war against their own regimes. Others joined a transnational Islamist network that came to be known as al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization responsible for September 11.

### **Al-Qaeda, Violence, and the International Order**

We know very little about al-Qaeda, but I will venture a few observations about the network. In common with some other Islamist groups, al-Qaeda:

- Uses the language of Islam and the Qur’an

- Refers to political problems and issues (e.g., the Israel/Palestine problem, U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, repressive Arab states)
- Denounces Western hegemony
- Evinces a patriarchal and misogynist position on women and gender
- Projects the symbolism of warrior, heightened masculinity, and male bonding
- Is militaristic and willing to engage in terror

But in al-Qaeda, each of these features appears magnified and exaggerated. What seem distinctive about al-Qaeda are the following characteristics:

- It is not rooted in a nation-state but is transnational and appears expansionist
- Its objectives are ambitious, indeed grandiose
- It is a well-endowed organization that is able to mobilize financial resources easily and effectively
- Its leaders are more educated and privileged than is typical
- It seems to operate like a cult, with Osama bin Laden as the charismatic (and apparently narcissistic and megalomaniacal) leader, and with members undergoing what may be ideological indoctrination.<sup>8</sup>

We may discover that, its transnationalism notwithstanding, al-Qaeda is/was more like the now-defunct Sandero Luminoso or the Red Brigades or the Khmer Rouge than like a typical Islamic fundamentalist movement. And like UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, or any other violent, fascistic, and militaristic organization, it may be more about politics and power – and the use of terror to obtain these – than about the return to religious authority, a pristine moral order, and the comforts of tradition.<sup>9</sup>

An obvious, if disconcerting, observation is that all the movements and organizations I have mentioned are masculine and masculinist. They are comprised almost exclusively of men, they place a high premium on violence and war, and they are patriarchal in their attitudes and practices toward women.<sup>10</sup> This pertains as much to the Albanian KLA, the Chechens, and U.S. militia groups, as it does to any of the Islamic extremist groups I have discussed.<sup>11</sup> And sadly, such groups do not have good models in most of the governments of the world or in the international state system, which is unequal, hierarchical, and militaristic. Although al-Qaeda, like other extremist movements, no doubt fights for the sake of fighting, it does voice some legitimate grievances. The violence of the Israeli state and the illegality of its occupation of the West Bank are well-known. And yet, Israel has not received the sort of multilateral actions that were taken against Yugoslavia over the Kosovo problem. When sanctions and bombings are reserved for countries like Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan while Israel receives barely the proverbial slap on the wrist, the moral bankruptcy of global governance is manifestly clear. And when the U.S. or U.K. or NATO or Security Council chooses to drop bombs rather than seek alternative means to resolve conflict, such recourse to militaristic solutions evinces the masculinist bias of states and of the world-system, and perpetuates all manner of violence. In such a context, how can terrorism possibly be counteracted?

### **Feminist Responses and Alternatives**

Our world desperately needs new economic and political frameworks in order to end the vicious cycle of violence and bring about people-oriented development, human security, and socio-economic justice, including justice for women. Such frameworks are being proposed in international circles, whether by the UNDP, the anti-globalization movement, or the global



feminist movement. Women's peace movements in particular constitute an important counter-movement to terrorism, and they should be encouraged and funded.

Feminists and women's groups have long been involved in peace work, and their analyses and activities have contributed much to our understanding of the roots of conflict and the conditions for conflict resolution, human security, and human development. There is now a prodigious feminist scholarship that describes this activism while also critically analyzing international relations from various disciplinary vantage points, including political science.<sup>12</sup> The activities of anti-militarist groups such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Women Strike for Peace, and the Women of Greenham Common are legendary, and their legacy lies in ongoing efforts to "feminize" peace, human rights, and development. At the third UN conference on women, in Nairobi in 1985, women decided that not only equality and development but also peace and war were their affairs.<sup>13</sup> The Nairobi conference took place in the midst of the crisis of Third World indebtedness and the implementation of austerity policies recommended by the World Bank and the IMF. Feminists were quick to see the links between economic distress, political instability, and violence against women. As Lucille Mair noted after Nairobi:

This [economic] distress exists in a climate of mounting violence and militarism ... violence follows an ideological continuum, starting from the domestic sphere where it is tolerated, if not positively accepted. It then moves to the public political arena where it is glamorized and even celebrated ... Women and children are the prime victims of this cult of aggression.<sup>14</sup>

Since the 1980s, when women activists formed networks to more effectively work on local and global issues, transnational feminist networks have engaged in dialogues and alliances with other organizations in order to make an impact on peace, security, conflict resolution, and social justice. The expansion of the population of educated, employed, mobile, and politically-

aware women has led to increased activism by women in the areas of peace, conflict resolution, and human rights. Around the world, women have been insisting that their voices be heard, on the streets, in civil society organizations, and in the meeting halls of the multilateral organizations. Demographic changes and the rise of a “critical mass” of politically-engaged women are reflected in the formation of many women’s groups that are highly critical of existing political structures, that question masculinist values and behaviors in domestic politics, international relations, and conflict, and that seek to make strategic interventions and to formulate solutions that are informed by feminine values. An important proposal is the institutionalization of peace education.

Prominent women’s peace and human rights organizations include the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, in Argentina, who are credited with helping to bring down the dictatorship in a non-violent manner and to highlight issues of human rights and justice, and Women in Black, which began as an Israeli campaign against the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and has spread to other countries (e.g., Italy, Germany, Serbia). In Muslim countries, women have fought on another front, the struggle against fundamentalism, forming transnational networks such as Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), which is a feminist anti-fundamentalist network that promotes Muslim women’s human rights. At the national level, Algerian women’s groups have been strongly anti-fundamentalist, while the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) has drawn attention to the violence and misogyny of both the *jehadis* (their term for the Mujahidin remnants in the Northern Alliance) and the Taleban.<sup>15</sup>

Examples of women’s peace and conflict resolution initiatives abound. One is the historic women’s peace petition presented to the UN in October 1997. That petition, a non-governmental

initiative that had 150 organizational co-sponsors from around the world, demanded that all governments of the world transfer a minimum of five percent of their military budgets over the next five years to health, education, and employment programs. South Asian feminist networks and the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy created linkages in civil society across the region's most divisive and dangerous frontier. Despite the initial resistance within the Forum to feminist analyses of the connection between sexism and war, the feminist analysis was eventually accepted unanimously.<sup>16</sup> In Sudan, women mediated an inter-tribal conflict between the Dinka and the Nuer and helped broker an agreement. In Northern Ireland, women activists calmed tensions during the "marching seasons", and on very short notice formed the Women's Coalition and mobilized enough support to ensure feminist representation in the parliament.<sup>17</sup> The Association of Women of the Mediterranean Region (AWMR) convened a major conference on the subject of peace and conflict resolution in the region, producing resolutions sent to parliaments as well as a book entitled *In Search of Peace*.<sup>18</sup> In Israel/Palestine, despite the continuing violence on both sides, the Coalition of Women for a Just Peace carries on with its work. In Jerusalem in late December 2001, it bravely held a March of Mourning and led with a large banner that read, "The Occupation is Killing Us All".<sup>19</sup>

Many women's groups draw on motherhood, maternity, and femininity as discursive resources discursive strategies. Indeed, maternalist politics – the political use of motherhood and feminine values of nurturing and care – has a very long history. It describes the work of WILPF at the beginning of the twentieth century, Women Strike for Peace in mid-century, and organizations in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century such as the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, Israel's Four Mothers Movement and Mothers Against Silence, and the

Saturday Mothers of Turkey (who quietly protested arrests and killings associated with the Kurdish problem).

Maternalist politics constitutes one model of women's activism, seen largely in peace, anti-militarist, and human rights movements. But there is another model as well: that of women in armed struggles, in liberation movements, and in revolutions. Whether these two models of women vis-à-vis peace and conflict are completely contradictory or simply two dimensions of women's lives, experiences, and collective action is a difficult question. Feminists rely on women to lead the way in peace, conflict resolution and human rights, while also accepting that women will be active participants in liberation struggles. There is, however, a distinction to be made between legitimate resistance movements and terrorist organizations or movements that rely on terrorist action such as the targeting of innocent civilians. For example, even though Palestinian aspirations for nationhood and dignity are just and legitimate and the Israeli occupation has been brutal, a feminist perspective cannot condone the killing of Israeli civilians by Palestinian organizations or individuals. Whether carried out by Tamil Tigers or Palestinians, suicide bombings cannot be justified as a political tactic. And even though some of the stated grievances of Osama bin Laden echo those of legitimate movements and organizations, the atrocities of September 11 reveal the man and his network for what they are: violent and criminal.

For this reason, feminists and women's groups around the world condemned September 11, while also warning against any unilateral militarist responses that would result in civilian deaths – as in fact happened when the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan began – and drawing attention to the repressive policies of Arab governments and certain U.S. foreign policies that are partly to blame for the rise of militant and terrorist groups. For example, a representative of

RAWA said, “Say you get the Taleban out, then what? Who’s going to be responsible for rebuilding? Those who’ve waged proxy wars for foreigners on Afghan soil for 20 years? Those who’ve committed atrocities against their own people in the past?”<sup>20</sup> An Egyptian woman journalist now living in the U.S. pointed out: “Through censorship and intimidation, [the Egyptian government] has silenced the voices of the intellectuals and activists who could have acted as a much-needed counterforce to the hard-line and extremist version of religion the militants propagated. The government and the militants, almost in tandem, have succeeded in stunting the growth of civil society.”<sup>21</sup>

WILPF wrote: “Once again our deepest beliefs hold that true security can only be rooted in social justice and strengthening the domestic and international rule of law.” The Association for Middle East Women’s Studies (AMEWS) issued a statement that expressed its horror over the loss of life and destruction in New York and Washington D.C. and asked if any military action “could possibly have any positive effect on the hatred that fueled these terrible events.”<sup>22</sup> The statement by WLUML similarly expressed sincere condolences, adding that “We are particularly aware of the human cost of terrorism and war frequently perpetrated in the name of religion or belief systems.” But “vengeance is not justice”, they stressed, “misguided retaliation” is not the way forward, and “ending terrorism requires addressing the roots of global inequality.”<sup>23</sup> WLUML, it should be noted, has been warning since at least the early 1990s about the existence of an “Islamist international” with the organizational, human, financial, and military means to threaten secularists, feminists, and democrats. WLUML leaders identified Saudi Arabia as a principal sponsor of Islamist movements around the world, and denounced the granting of political asylum in the West to Algerian and other radical Islamists charged with crimes against women.<sup>24</sup> After September 11 and the U.S. bombing campaign began, an article in

a WLUML newsletter stated:

Countless documents drawn up by international women's groups bear witness to the denunciations of all of this in recent years. Denunciations that not only fell on deaf ears but also suffered attempts of being silenced through the use of pressure and threats.

Western governments are the prime responsible ones for the creation of these big and small monsters that they are now attempting to fight against. The West never cared when the Taliban attacked Afghan women's rights, when they assaulted them, when they killed them. It has looked in the other direction while in Algeria the radical Islamic groups have kidnapped, raped, killed and ripped to pieces scores of women – the latest aggression taking place barely two months ago – while in Bangladesh man women have to live with their faces scarred by the acid thrown in their faces by fundamentalists.

And now. Is an end to western hypocrisy going to come with the resounding measures being taken against the terrorism of the radical Islamic networks? Will they be compatible with measures of justice? It does not seem just to carpet-bomb a people, the Afghan people, who in the last years have been the prime victim of a regime which has been indirectly tolerated and harboured. There must be another way of achieving justice ...<sup>25</sup>

In India, women's groups joined a coalition called Jang Roko Abhiyan (Anti-War Campaign) that condemned the massacre of American civilians on September 11 but called on the U.S. to accept responsibility for the fallout from past foreign policies and to refrain from military retaliation in Afghanistan which would very likely cause considerable civilian death and suffering.<sup>26</sup> In Pakistan, women's groups held a protest rally on 25 September 2001 against terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and war. The U.S. Feminist Majority issued a very measured statement on September 11 that pointed out the U.S. role in the 1980s in supplying "billions of dollars to fund, train, and arm the mujahideen, which gave rise to the Taliban." The statement continued: "Just as we must not condemn the Afghan people for the acts of terrorists, we also should not condemn Arabs and Muslims, the vast majority of whom do not support this so-called religious fanaticism. This extremism, which has now taken the lives of so many American citizens, Afghans, and others, is not about Islam, but is about the use of violence to

achieve a political end.”<sup>27</sup> A statement from the Women’s Center, Medical Mondiale Kosovo, was especially pertinent:

We have lived through war. We know what it is like to be attacked, to grieve, and to feel anger. We understand the urge for revenge is strong. And we know that it must not be given in to. We know that a violent response can only bring more violence not justice. Instead, it kills more innocent victims and gives birth to new holy avengers. It begins a new cycle and perpetuates more hate, more insecurity, more fear and ultimately more death amongst civilians. We therefore urge the US and its allies to temper their anger and to refrain from the folly of sweeping military solutions. Terrorists are not nations. And nations must not act like terrorists.<sup>28</sup>

September 11 and the responses to it – especially the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan – remind us that despite the long existence of women’s groups that have worked to enable women to be considered legitimate participants and to provide women’s perspectives on peace and human security, very few of the norms that guide this area reflect their contributions. This is in contrast to international norms regarding human rights (where feminists have made enormous gains) and, to a lesser degree, regarding social rights and economic justice (through the feminist critique of structural adjustment).<sup>29</sup> As many feminist scholars have noted (e.g., Enloe, Tickner, Peterson, Moghadam), approaches to security and conflict-resolution remain masculinist, guided by patriarchal, capitalistic, and state-centered interests.

And yet, some advances have been made at the international level, reflecting the long decades of women’s activism and feminist scholarship. While inter-governmental institutions remain the principal actors on the global political terrain, there is now recognition that non-state actors, such as women’s organizations, are increasingly important players. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which was agreed upon by the governments of the world on 11 September 1995, notes that “many women's non-governmental organizations have called for

reductions in military expenditures worldwide, as well as in international trade and trafficking in and the proliferation of weapons" (para. 138). And: "During times of armed conflict and the collapse of communities, the role of women is crucial. They often work to preserve social order in the midst of armed and other conflicts. Women make an important but often unrecognized contribution as peace educators both in their families and in their societies" (para. 139). And: "Education to foster a culture of peace that upholds justice and tolerance for all nations and peoples is essential to attaining lasting peace and should be begun at an early age. It should include elements of conflict resolution, mediation, reduction of prejudice and respect for diversity" (par. 140).<sup>30</sup>

More specifically, the Platform calls on governments to:

Increase and hasten, as appropriate, subject to national security considerations, the conversion of military resources and related industries to development and peaceful purposes; [para. 143(a)]

Recognizing the leading role that women have played in the peace movement: (i) Work actively towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (ii) Support negotiations on the conclusion, without delay, of a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that contributes to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects; [para. 143(f)]

Take measures in accordance with international law with a view to alleviating the negative impact of economic sanctions on women and children [para. 144(i)]

Encourage the further development of peace research, involving the participation of women, to examine the impact of armed conflict on women and children and the nature and contribution of women's participation in national, regional and international peace movements; engage in research and identify innovative mechanisms for containing violence and for conflict resolution for public dissemination and for use by women and men; [par. 146 (a)]



In March 2000, the UN Security Council, in its Proclamation on International Women's Day, recognized that gender equality is an integral component of peace, and in October convened a special session to consider the situation of women in armed conflict. On 31 October it passed Resolution 1325, calling on governments – and the Security Council itself – to include women in negotiations and settlements with respect to conflict-resolution and peace-building.<sup>31</sup> Key points of the resolution are:

- Increasing the representation of women at all decision-making levels
- Integrating a gender perspective into peacekeeping missions
- Appointing more women as special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General
- Supporting women's grassroots organizations in their peace initiatives
- Involving women as participants in peace negotiations and agreements
- Ensuring protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls
- Protecting women and girls from gender-based violence
- Integrating a gender perspective into disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.

This is certainly a feminist success story and a step in the right direction at the international level. But real progress will be slow. It is not enough to include a small number of women at meetings on peace, security and conflict issues; this can only be construed as tokenism. Rather, feminist scholars and representatives of women's peace and human rights organizations must be invited to the table, and their perspectives must be taken seriously.

Initiatives and understandings such as these – along with systematic and widespread peace education at the national and local levels – could affect “politics as usual” in the long run and help to transform international relations.

At a time when conflicts continue to rage around the world, militarism shows no sign of abatement, inequalities widen across the globe, and terrorist actions fuel insecurity but also misguided responses, it is time for women’s perspectives and their actions to be recognized. Clearly, feminist scholars and women’s organizations have much to say about the cycle of violence, war, peace, and change. Their voices and their activities, analyses and proposed solutions need to be publicized and disseminated.

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## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> I believe that Muslims who have a stake in their religious identity and integrity should also seriously face these questions.

<sup>2</sup> On religious violence and peace, see Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 2000); Fred Halliday, *Nation and Religion in the Middle East* (London: Saqi Books, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the five-volume study *Fundamentalisms Observed*, eds. Scott Appleby and Martin Marty (University of Chicago Press, 1991-95).

<sup>4</sup> In Algeria and Egypt, Islamists gained adherents by providing “Islamic markets” or “Islamic social services” that were cheaper or more readily available to low-income households than those of the governments. In Iran, Islamists initially utilized a strongly anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist discourse, and once in power, nationalized industries and banks, banned interest, and offered subsidies to the low-income.

<sup>5</sup> For an elaboration, see Valentine M. Moghadam, ed., *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1993). See also the articles in the special issue of *Journal of Women’s History*, vol. 10, no. 4 (January 1999), which focuses on gender and religio-politics.

<sup>6</sup> The analogy would be to class conflict or race conflict, when subordinate groups are making social and political demands and the privileged groups are resisting change. In all cases of conflict – whether class, gender, or racial – the roots of conflict are both ideological and material, and entail a struggle over power.

<sup>7</sup> The evolution of the economic system in the Islamic Republic of Iran – from radical populist in the early years to statist during the war years and more recently to the neoliberal model – is a case in point. In Algeria in 1988-90, the FIS denounced Western-style capitalism as anti-Islamic (as did the Iranians before them), set up “Islamic markets” offering cheap consumer goods and food, and declared it would ban interest-bearing loans once it came to power. Yet it had nothing to offer as a solution to Algeria’s serious economic problems except to promise to “...make the poor rich without making the rich poor.” See George Joffe, “Hidden Strength of God’s Party”, *the Guardian* (UK), 15 January 1992, p. 3.

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<sup>8</sup> Videotapes recovered from the rubble of al-Qaeda compounds in Afghanistan reveal that Bin Laden enjoys being filmed, taped, and flattered. But he is not the only one, for another videotape shows one of his cohorts caressing and kissing his Kalashnikov rifle before he grins and chuckles at the camera. See Dan Eggen, "Videos Spur Attack Alert", *Washington Post*, Jan. 18, 2002, p. A1.

<sup>9</sup> One article points out that after Sept. 11, several far right leaders and associations in Germany welcomed publicly the terrorist attacks, and that one person identified by the U.S. government as providing financial support to al-Qaeda is a well-known figure in the European far-right political movement. See Hugh Williamson and Philipp Jakin, "Al-Qaeda Links: Far-right has Ties with Islamic Extreme", *Financial Times*, 9 November 2001.

<sup>10</sup> An article in *Newsweek* (January 14, 2001) entitled "Married to the Jihad" and based on interviews with the wife of one of the men detained as an al-Qaeda operative suggests a milieu that is very traditional, in which the women are confined to the home, domestic chores, and their many children. They neither participate in nor have knowledge of their men's activities, and do not seem to be consulted on important matters. They appear to be socialized as very dutiful and loyal wives. Bin Laden himself is said to have several wives.

<sup>11</sup> Various theories exist to explain violent conflicts, including what many suggest is a new environment of civil violence. For an elaboration, see Indra de Soysa, "Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, Grievance, and Governance", UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper no. 2001/42 (Helsinki, July 2001). Some theories focus on ecological and demographic pressures; others on grievance-based, justice-seeking behavior; yet others on greed or self-serving behavior in areas with resource wealth. There is also the Huntington thesis of civilizational divides. In all cases, however, the instigators and combatants of violent conflict are men. What requires attention is the impact of values and institutions that reinforce patriarchal and violent practices – whether within the family, the society, or the world arena.

<sup>12</sup> Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1990); Betty Reardon, *Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993); Sara Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989); Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1992); V. Spike Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992). See also the following essays that appeared in a symposium on civil society, feminism, and the gendered politics of war and peace published in the *NWSA Journal* (vol. 13, no. 2, Summer 2001): "Introduction" by Gordana Rabrenovic and Laura Roskos; "Building a Culture of Peace: Some Priorities" by Elise Boulding; "Globalization, Militarism, and Women's Collective Action" by Val Moghadam; and "Women's Peacekeeping During Ethnic Conflicts and Post-Conflict Reconstruction" by Radha Kumar.

<sup>13</sup> Hilka Pietila and Jeanne Vickers, *Making Women Matter: The Role of the UN* (London: Zed, 1994).

<sup>14</sup> Lucille Mathurin Mair had been UN Secretary General for the UN's second conference on women, which convened in Copenhagen in 1980. The passage is cited on p. 71 in Charlotte Bunch and Roxanna Carillo, *Gender Violence: A Development and Human Rights Issue* (Dublin: Atlantic Press, 1992).

<sup>15</sup> On transnational feminism see V. M. Moghadam, "Transnational Feminist Networks: Collective Action in an Era of Globalization", *International Sociology*, vol. 15, no. 1 (March 2000): 57-85. On the Algerian women's movement see V. M. Moghadam, "Organizing Women: The New Women's Movement in Algeria", *Cultural Dynamics*, vol. 13, no. 2 (July 2001): 131-54. On Afghanistan see V. M. Moghadam, "Women, the Taleban, and the Politics of Public Space in Afghanistan", *Women's Studies International Forum*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 1-13. See also [www.peacewomen.org](http://www.peacewomen.org), which was designed by the New York branch of WILPF.

<sup>16</sup> Peter Waterman, *Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms* (London: Marshall, 1998), citing Amrita Chhachhi.

<sup>17</sup> Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa, "Women Waging Peace", *Foreign Policy* (May-June 2001): 38-47.

<sup>18</sup> Yana Mintoff-Bland (ed.), *In Search of Peace* (Limassol, Cyprus: AWMR, 1998).

<sup>19</sup> Information via internet from an organizer, Gail Svirsky, 29 December 2001. The posting includes a listing of Israelis and Palestinians who attended the protest march, including "Zahira Kamal, courageous Palestinian activist for peace as well as the rights of women and workers, who found a way to outwit the closure in order to reach Jerusalem and address this rally."

<sup>20</sup> Cited in Laura Flanders, "Afghan Feminists Speak Out", *The Progressive*, Nov. 2001, p. 38.

<sup>21</sup> Mona Eltahawy, "Where Were Egypt's Best?", op-ed, *Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 2001, p. B7.

<sup>22</sup> "Letter Regarding the Terrorist Attacks Against the United States of America on September 11<sup>th</sup>", Sherifa Zuhur, president, on behalf of the AMEWS Board of Directors, 17 Sept. 2001. <http://www.amews.org/alerts.htm>

<sup>23</sup> "WLUML Statement on Attacks in the USA", 21 September 2001. <http://www.wluml.org>

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<sup>24</sup> This was expressed at a conference I organized on comparative fundamentalisms and women, at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, in October 1990.

<sup>25</sup> Monserrat Boix, “Women’s Networks: Islamists’ Violence and Terror”, *WLUML Newsheet*, vol. XIII, no. 4 (Nov.-Dec. 2001), p. 7.

<sup>26</sup> “Rally on the 25<sup>th</sup> [of September, 2001]” by Jang Roko Abhiyan, circulated via Internet by [socglob@topica.com](mailto:socglob@topica.com)

<sup>27</sup> “Special Message from the Feminist Majority on the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and Afghan Women”, by Eleanor Smeal, President, September 18, 2001. <http://feministmajority.org>

<sup>28</sup> From <http://www.IWTC.org>

<sup>29</sup> Global economic justice – like global peace and human security – remains elusive. Economic justice and an end to WTO decision-making that reflects the interests of the North and of capital are key objectives of those within the “anti-globalization” movement, including a number of transnational feminist networks.

<sup>30</sup> *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* (New York: UN, 1996).

<sup>31</sup> See <http://www.un.org/docs/scres>