|
|
|
|
Volume 40/No. 4/Winter 1998
Globalisation is a political phenomenon characterised by the weakening of mediating institutions and the direct confrontation between individuals and global forces. Its impact on strategy will be profound, but also ambiguous. Civil conflict and terrorism using weapons of mass destruction are among the new threats that can confound traditional tools of strategy. On the positive side, more open societies may provide new opportunities to manage international affairs. However, the scope and ambitions of strategy may have to be scaled down, since too many factors are now beyond control. The dilution of power produced by globalisation is uneven and a successful strategy will have to combine classic balance-of-power politics and organised interdependence. US leadership is unlikely to provide a lasting solution, but a multipolar world may not be more stable; institutionalised interdependence, as attempted by the European Union, is a more promising answer.
Major war—war waged by the most powerful countries drawing on all their resources and using all their weapons over a period of years, with revolutionary political consequences—is obsolete. In the twentieth century, the costs of fighting such a war have soared, while the perceived benefits of winning one have shrivelled. While out of fashion, however, major war is not impossible. Although neither is eager for such a conflict, Russia and China, two powerful nations less affected by the social forces that have reduced the incentives for war, are the countries most likely to begin one.
The conduct of future warfare will be shaped not so much by the most substantial military powers as conditioned by the possibility of their intervention. While there are good reasons not to anticipate decisive military encounters between the great powers, war itself is hardly obsolescent. In all conflicts, consideration must be given to the relative strength of offensive forces, the threat posed by military operations to civil society, the relationship between political aims and military means, and the possibility of outside intervention. Recent conflicts in the Gulf and the Balkans indicate the variety of strategies available to small powers in their efforts either to deter larger powers, or to suck them into a conflict.
The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 reveal as much as the fall of the Berlin Wall about the prospects for international security in the next century. Asia, home to the world’s most complex nuclear issues, is witnessing the onset of rivalry between its two giants, India and China. Preserving the nuclear peace could become more difficult in the future. New players are complicating the chessboard; instability in large parts of the world is generating tensions at a time when governments are too weak to contain them; and proliferation could be encouraged not only by regional volatility, but also as a means to circumvent the West’s technological edge. The “revolution in military affairs” could prompt a “revolution in violence” in response.
It will be more difficult to establish a stable nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan than it was to establish deterrence between the Cold War’s nuclear contenders. Given the awesome consequences of nuclear war, reducing nuclear instability in the subcontinent must be the West’s overriding priority in handling India and Pakistan’s nuclear ventures. Rather than imposing inconsistent sanctions or engaging in needless lecturing, the West’s industrialised countries should consider a set of positive moves, while at the same time avoiding signals of approval for India and Pakistan’s nuclear build-up. Initiatives to enhance stability could include arms-control measures, particularly if China actively participated, and more direct technical-military measures. These could range from improvements in command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities to the sharing of early-warning information.
India’s 1998 nuclear tests were only a first step in dealing with threats to its security. The country should aim for a small, affordable but survivable nuclear force, with a doctrine that eschews both a war-fighting approach and the course of recessed or non-weaponised deterrence advocated by the US. In contrast to deterrence relationships elsewhere, Indian doctrine has to deal with two linked nuclear adversaries, Pakistan and China. Its priority must be to close its vulnerability against China; a nuclear-deterrent capability against Pakistan alone will not adequately address New Delhi’s security interests.
The current fixation with the Caspian Basin’s alleged resource bonanza is exaggerating the region’s commercial and strategic significance, distorting US foreign-policy calculations and raising the risk of unnecessary contention with other actors, particularly Russia and Iran. The Caspian Basin’s oil reserves are significant, but logistic, economic and political hurdles will prevent their speedy development. For the foreseeable future, the Persian Gulf will remain a cheaper, easier and more secure alternative. Rather than focusing on the Caspian “Great Game”, policy-makers should give more careful consideration to the growing ramifications of East Asia’s burgeoning dependence on Persian Gulf oil for global security.
The Persian Gulf’s security remains a strategic challenge for the global economy. Asia’s need for more Gulf oil coincides with further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; declining support for American policy towards Iraq; and the Caspian Basin’s emergence as a region of geopolitical competition. Today, low oil prices are one of the most serious sources of instability in the Gulf. The continued crisis over Iraq and the US stand-off with Iran are reminders of the region’s volatility. It is time to re-evaluate American policy. The initiatives taken by President Bill Clinton’s administration to improve relations with Iran are constructive, but the unresolved problem with Iraq remains the most dangerous issue.
Confrontation between China and Taiwan comprises the single most dangerous dispute for the US in the world today. Although the Taiwan Strait is peaceful again, and relations appear to be improving between Washington and Beijing as well as between Beijing and Taipei, all the problems that prompted the 1996 confrontation persist. For China, the aim is simple: to prevent Taiwan’s independence and all policies that promote it. For Taiwan, the question is more complicated, involving efforts to increase its international status, preserve its prosperity and nurture its fledgling democracy. For the US, relations between China and Taiwan pose a dilemma that reaches to the heart of its Asian posture. While US policy should be cautious and even-handed, Washington should not assume that unification is the only possible future.
Contributions from Karl-Heinz Kamp (Head of the Foreign and Security Policy Research Section, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, Germany), Joseph F. Pilat (IISS), Jessica Stern (Fellow at The Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC), and Richard A. Falkenrath (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University).