CIAO DATE: 09/04

Survival

 

 

Winter 2003 (Vol. 45 No. 4)

Articles

• Non-proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change

  Robert S. Litwak

  The Iraq war was unprecedented in at least one respect: it was the first case in which forcible regime change was the means employed to achieve non-proliferation ends. In addressing the current proliferation crises with North Korea and Iran, however, the Bush administration confronts major constraints on both the use of force and the US ability to bring about regime change. This has prompted a shift in strategy to the alternative combination of deterrence and reassurance. Implementing a strategy of deterrence and reassurance requires effective policy coordination to ensure that the two components are in sync. Military moves for purposes of deterrence should not undercut the message of political reassurance and thereby provide further incentive for either country to cross the nuclear threshold.

• From Preemption to Engagement

  Antony J. Blinken

  After the events of 11 September 2001, the Bush administration was right to focus its energy on a nexus of new threats to US security: the combination of rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. It was right, too, in its insistence that the US retain the right to use force preemptively against these threats, even without the sanction of the international community. But the Bush administration's elevation of preemption from option to doctrine is a misguided and even dangerous response to these threats. It is not enough to deploy power to end rogue regimes; the US must show staying power and engage the help of others to secure the peace. America must engage the new threats to its security sooner and more broadly, using hard and soft power to shape the environment in which it acts. This longer, broader view is the difference between a doctrine of preemption and a strategy of comprehensive engagement.

• Missile Defence Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War

  Dennis M. Gormley

  The American-led coalition’s 21-day march to Baghdad confirmed the extraordinary capacity of tightly integrated and carefully orchestrated offensive forces to achieve rapid success. American missile defences performed less impressively, however. While Patriot batteries intercepted nine threatening Iraq ballistic missiles, they were not so successful against Iraqi cruise missiles and other low-flying threats. Iraq's use of non-ballistic missiles also contributed to a series of friendly fire accidents and the loss of two coalition aircraft and three crew members. America's adversaries will likely absorb these lessons and accelerate their acquisition of non-ballistic missiles. Without a degree of joint-service integration comparable to that which has transformed its offensive forces, American missile defences could become increasingly vulnerable to adversaries who combine ballistic and cruise missiles attacks with flights of unmanned air vehicles. And if these delivery vehicles are armed with weapons of mass destruction, this vulnerability could be catastrophic.

• America’s Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq

  James F. Dobbins

  Since the end of the Cold War the United States has led six major nation-building operations—that is to say, the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin a transition to democracy. In Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and most recently Iraq, the US has renewed with varying success a form of activity upon which it had embarked in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Study of these past missions suggests a host of lessons applicable today in Iraq, and raises the question of why, in light of its substantial and recent experience, the US government’s learning curve appears so flat.

• Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq

  Andreas Wimmer

  When civil society is undeveloped, and when the state is too weak and poor to treat all citizens equally, democratisation may stir up rather than alleviate ethnic conflicts. Iraq had both of these disadvantages when it gained independence in 1932, and its political history since then has been characterised by increasing fragmentation and conflict along ethnic lines. There are institutional designs that may help in a democratic Iraq to prevent escalation of these conflicts: an electoral system that favours vote pooling across ethnic lines; federalism on a non-ethnic basis with a strong component of fiscal decentralisation; a strong regime of minority rights; and a judiciary apparatus capable of enforcing the rule of law. The UN is better suited than a US administration to provide outside support for the process of institutional transformation.

• Order and Justice in Iraq

  Leslie Vinjamuri

  Widespread trials of Iraqi war criminals are unlikely to enhance efforts to consolidate peace and rebuild a functioning Iraqi state. Rather, such trials may well serve to exacerbate cleavages between the dominant groups in Iraqi society, alienating Sunni moderates whose cooperation is critical to the success of future governing arrangements, as well as individuals with expertise vital to rebuilding basic state institutions. Domestic instability and the lack of a legitimate governing authority with an effective monopoly on the means of violence suggest the need for an alternative to trials. Policies that fell far short of legalists’ demands for universal justice have underscored the pursuit of peace in Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador and South Africa. A well-conceived strategy of justice—one that emphasises the logic of principled pragmatism—may serve to strengthen and enhance the legitimacy of coercive diplomacy, shorten the duration of war and support post-war reconstruction efforts.

• Africa’s Growing Strategic Resonance

  Jonathan Stevenson

  The end of the Cold War largely removed Africa from the strategic considerations of great powers. The attacks of 11 September 2001 were regarded by some as potentially serendipitous for Africa: the continent's failing states would surely attract Western aid to prevent them from becoming lawless havens for radical Islamic groups like the Taliban or transnational terrorists organisations like al-Qaeda. That has not yet happened. But there is general transatlantic agreement about what is required in Africa: institution-building; peacekeeping; and outright nation-building. These are precisely the strategic areas in which US policymakers feel least suited to act and, by implication, most inclined to yield authority and responsibility to partners. The combination of relative transatlantic policy consensus and American operational deference could make sub-Saharan Africa an ideal locus of strategic cooperation in which to start rehabilitating transatlantic links in the wake of the Iraq crisis. It is also a suitable proving ground for the external ambitions of the EU and NATO. On balance, Africa may be riper for major-power involvement than it has been since Cuban troops landed in Angola in 1975.

• France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis

  Jolyon Howorth

  Franco-British relations have always been central to the fortunes both of the transatlantic partnership and of the European security and defence project (ESDP). Although fraught with ambivalence in the years after the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, the Franco-British partnership pushed ESDP forward. In 2003, however, France and the UK defined two extremes in their approaches both to war in Iraq and to relations with the US. Neither approach makes strategic sense. France’s apparent principled opposition will only serve to divide the EU into largely artificial pro- and anti-American camps. The UK’s apparent unconditional alignment will only serve to confine it to the margins of European policymaking in an area—diplomacy and security—where Britain can and must play a leading role. Only if both countries agree to adopt, along with all their partners, a new and more subtle policy of quiet, unified and critical dialogue with Washington can the EU have the kind of transatlantic impact that both profess to seek.

• Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is Bad for Europe

  Mette Eilstrup Sangiovanni

  Some European policymakers have been tempted to use the Iraq crisis to build new momentum for further integrating European security and defence policy. But proceeding along this path would be a mistake. Adding military force to the European Union at a time of fundamental disagreement about where and when to deploy troops is a waste of resources and will likely undermine European credibility by deepening divisions among its member states. If Europeans want more global clout, they should instead focus on strengthening their capacity for what they do best, namely non-military crisis-management and post-war reconstruction.

• US Interests and the Fate of the Alliance

  James Thomson

  Over the course of the twentieth century, American leaders have acted consistently to protect what they believed to be vital national interests, taking politically risky steps such as using or threatening to use massive military power, launch preventive wars or escalate conflicts to nuclear war. Up until the end of the Cold War, a shared appraisal of vital interests was the basis for the strategic partnership between the US and Europe. Now, the threat vector for the US has shifted to terrorism, the Middle East and northeast Asia. For Europe, it has simply disappeared. Without this common ground, another transatlantic crisis comparable to the dispute over Iraq seems entirely possible. If US leaders feel vital interests are endangered, they are unlikely to rely on NATO and the UN Security Council to help deal with the threat.

Book Reviews

• Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.

  P. W. Singer. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003. 330 pp. $39.95

  Simon Chesterman

• Our Final Century.

  Martin Rees. London: William Heinemann, 2003. 228 pp. £17.99

  Barry Buzan

• Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to U.S. Military Power.

  Roger W. Barnett. Dulles, VA: Brassey’s Inc., 2003. 183pp. $24.95

  Paul Cornish

• Non-lethal weapons as legitimising forces? Technology, politics and the management of conflict.

  Brian Rappert. London: Frank Cass, 2003. £18.50. 286pp

  Christopher Coker

• Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions.

  Anthony H. Cordesman. Westport, CT and London: Praeger & the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2003. 440pp. $65.00

  Joseph A Kechichian

• Global Civil Society: An Answer to War.

  Mary Kaldor. Cambridge: Polity, 2003. £14.99. 189pp

  Martin Shaw