Survival

 

 

Winter 2000-01 (Vol. 42 No. 4)

• Palestine's prospects

Y Sayigh, Centre for International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Dramatic as it was, the bloodshed of autumn 2000 could not obscure the fact that little had changed in the basic political parameters of the Palestinian-Israeli relationship. On one side, any Israeli government, no matter what its ideological persuasion, still has to deal with the Palestinians as a separate national reality and political entity. On the other side, whether or not the Palestine Authority issues a unilateral declaration of independence, it will still remain unable to reach key national objectives except through a negotiated settlement with Israel. But a Palestinian state will emerge, and may pose an unsettling and potentially destabilising political reality for the two neighbours, Israel and Jordan, with whom it shares intricate ties of geography and demography. Governments in both Israel and Jordan do have policy instruments and resources that should enable them - given a reasonable level of political foresight - to head off worst-case scenarios of inter-communal conflict.

 

• Israel's dilemmas

MA Heller , Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

The paroxysm of violence that erupted in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza at the end of September came less than three months after Prime Minister Ehud Barak had reduced the gap in Israeli and Palestinian negotiating positions to the narrowest point ever - and lost his governing majority. This chain of events illustrates the policy dilemma that has plagued Barak since his first day in office. Reduced to its bare essence, the dilemma stems from the simultaneous fragmentation of the Israeli political system along multiple axes, making it extremely difficult to assemble a majority coalition for decisive action along any single one of them. The rationalisation of Israeli politics is necessary to move the peace process forward, but a domestically marketable peace agreement may be necessary to rationalise Israeli politics. An Israeli prime minister's ability to break this vicious circle will determine not only his own political fate but perhaps the very viability of Israeli democracy in its present form.

 

• Lebanon's malaise

  AR Norton , Departments of Anthropology and International Relations, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

  Lebanon is burdened by a weak economy, ineffective government, political subordination to Syria and a resurgence of sectarianism. The new government of Rafiq Hariri, whose election confounded Syrian designs, confronts an enormous debt burden as well as a plethora of diplomatic challenges that the previous government fumbled. If there is fragile hope, it is that the inchoate dialogue about Lebanon's relationship with Syria could signal the start of a larger debate, one that may help to rescue the country from its malaise. Certainly, there is not appetite for walking once again to the abyss of civil war. And while the violence in Israel-Palestine, as well as the capture of Israelis by Hizbollah, has strained the structure of Israeli-Hizbollah deterrence, it is a tribute to both sides that they have been careful to respect physical boundaries.

   

• Chinese nationalism, US policy and Asian security

  J Miles , The International Institute for Strategic Studies

  The eruption of nationalist demonstrations in China after the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade suggested a changing relationship between government and ordinary citizens that could have long-term implications for the conduct of the country's foreign and security policies. Confronted by enormous public anger over the NATO attack, the Chinese government felt it had no choice but to risk its foreign policy goals by allowing demonstrators to assault Western diplomatic missions. As Communist Party control over the behaviour of Chinese citizens weakens - a result of quickening economic reforms there is a growing danger that the leadership's efforts to prevent aggressive nationalist sentiment from affecting policy will be undermined.

   

• Japan's moment of truth

  Y Funabashi , itAsahi Shimbun/it, Tokyo, Japan

  Japan enters the twenty-first century still languishing in the 'lost decade' of the 1990s. The era of one-dimensional Japanese power - projected through economic diplomacy and managerial verve - is long over. Confidence has been eroded by chronic economic stagnation. The changing world order has undermined Japan's faith in the US-Japan alliance. Many Japanese aspire to a social and economic transformation that keeps pace with globalisation, yet find these aspirations frustrated by a paradoxical combination of political instability and immobility. Tokyo can ill afford this stagnation: its strategic neighbourhood is in a state of great flux, with events on the Korean Peninsula posing perhaps the greatest challenge. The new decade will determine whether Japanese foreign policy can recover its balance.

   

• The Koreas' new century

  S-J Han , Ilmin International Relations Institute, Seoul, Korea

  The June 2000 summit between North and South Korea has engendered exaggerated hopes and unreasonable fears. At one extreme is the optimism of those who see the summit as an irrefutable sign of North Korea's intention to join the rest of the world as a constructive player. At the other extreme, it is seen as a masterstroke of deception by Pyongyang to reap economic gains and lower the guard of Seoul and its allies, principally the United States. A more realistic assessment lies somewhere in between. Clearly, Kim Jong-Il has not decided overnight to atone for all the regime's past ills. Nonetheless, his emergence on the world stage has started an inevitable process - intended or not - of North Korea opening itself to the rest of the world.

   

• The NATO capabilities gap and the European Union

  DS Yost , Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA

  The defence-capabilities gap that divides the United States from its European allies is real, and it matters. The gap can most usefully be viewed as the aggregate of multiple gaps relating to the organisation and conduct of large-scale expeditionary operations. Transatlantic disparities in the ability to mount such operations became painfully obvious during NATO's Kosovo intervention in March-June 1999, and spurred commitments on both sides of the Atlantic to narrow the gap. However, a close examination of the European Union's post-Kosovo efforts to develop an autonomous military capability reveals serious obstacles to improving European forces. Chief among them is a deep reluctance to increase defence spending, in view of the low level of threat perceptions in NATO Europe and high social priorities in Europe.

   

• Arms control by other means

  LA Dunn and V Alessi , The years ahead may be a period in which traditional nuclear-arms control, as practised since the launch of SALT negotiations over three decades ago, will stumble at best and become deadlocked at worst. Instead, the US may have to pursue its arms-control objectives through less formal, non-treaty-based means. US-Russian nuclear reductions that are unilateral in principle, but coordinated in practice, could foster a cooperative restructuring of both sides' nuclear-force postures. More ambitious and integrated use of post-Cold War channels of nuclear cooperation - for example, the continuing Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, offer a means to reinforce and extend unilateral actions, as well as to enhance the safety and control of Russia's nuclear arsenal.

   

• How robust is India-Pakistan deterrence?

  M Quinlan , Woodrow Wilson International Center, Washington DC, USA

  The risk that hostility between India and Pakistan may generate nuclear war depends upon factors too diverse and shifting for a simple prediction or assessment. Overall, the underpinnings of deterrence seem less solid than they had become in at least the later years of the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union. Stability in that setting became, however, very robust, and to say that risk is higher in South Asia is not to say that it is in absolute terms at all high. Nevertheless, the magnitude and repercussions of the catastrophe, should it happen, require that everything practicable be done to reduce the risk. By far the biggest contribution would be a settlement of the Kashmir conflict.

   

• Review essay. Reagan's star wars magic

  SE Miller

   

• Book reviews

   

• Letter to the editor

   

• Newly arrived titles