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Map of Asia |
Volume 41/No. 2/Summer 1999
More than a decade after Slobodan Milosevic rode the Kosovo issue to the pinnacle of state power, the Yugoslav president remains more powerful than ever. The cost has included the destruction of the old Yugoslavia, the destruction of ancient Serbian, Croat, Bosnian and Albanian communities and, since March 1999, the progressive destruction of Serbia’s infrastructure and the looming loss of Kosovo itself. Meanwhile, the remaining liberal dissenters in Serbia fear that once the bombing ends, or even before then, they might all become targets for revenge. In any event, with their country under attack from the air, it has hardly seemed the time for them to speak out against the man who led Serbia into such unparalleled disaster. Much of their anger, now directed against the West, results from their fear that out of this catastrophe Serbia will be left as an impoverished and embittered pariah state — with little hope of genuine democracy or a return to the European mainstream.
Tim Judah is author of The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
NATO’s military intervention against Serbia in March 1999 underscored the tensions between state sovereignty and the defence of human rights — two principles enshrined in the UN Charter. Since the early 1990s, a consensus has developed, buttressed by UN Security Council resolutions and the practices of UN member states, that massive human-rights violations can sometimes justify encroachment on a state’s sovereignty. However, this emerging consensus has not yet crystallised into clear rules establishing a right of ‘humanitarian intervention’, nor is it accepted by important powers such as Russia and China. Therefore, NATO nations have been at a loss to justify their Kosovo campaign in terms of international law. Rather than claiming that the Kosovo intervention is an exception, not to be repeated, Alliance members should lead a drive to adjust international law by developing clear rules for humanitarian intervention.
Catherine Guicherd is the Deputy for Policy Co-ordination to the Secretary General at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (formerly North Atlantic Assembly), Brussels.
The prospect of a tolerable political order in Bosnia-Herzegovina depends in no small measure on the capacity of the predominantly Muslim Bosnians to find a place for themselves at the crossroads of Islam, Europe and Pax Americana. The ideal of a multi-ethnic Bosnia was nearly overwhelmed in the calamity of the ‘Greater Serbia’ and ‘Greater Croatia’ projects of the early 1990s. Yet Bosnians should hold onto the secularism that is dominant in their identity and history. This secular tradition still represents their best hope to survive as a state and to maintain international and especially American support. In the best of all worlds, Bosnia’s future will continue to be full of perils.
Fouad Ajami is Majid Khadduri Professor of Middle East Studies, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins University, and author of The Dream Palace of The Arabs (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998).
The non-appearance of mass nationalist mobilisation among Russians — especially in the ‘Russian diaspora’ — has played a critical role in limiting the spread of ethnic conflict in the 1990s. This failure of Russians to mobilise along ethno-national lines forms a striking contrast with many of the stereotypes of Russian nationalism advanced by Western commentators. The failure stems from two main factors: the absence of civil and social institutions capable of acting as the basis for mass mobilisation; and the fact that, historically, Russian nationalism was subsumed by two multinational empires based not on ethnicity but on ideology. Russian nationalism now cannot easily be recast in ethno-national terms. The legacy of ‘Soviet internationalism’ thus continues to play a positive role in Russia and among its neighbours.
Anatol Lieven is a Research Fellow at the IISS and editor of Strategic Comments.
China’s increasing energy needs have underscored four questions concerning Beijing’s military posture and strategic intentions. How will China guarantee its most vital sources of energy supply, especially those that depend on the free flow of goods through international shipping routes? Does China possess the naval capability to secure sea-lines of communication? Is such a capability at the centre of its future naval planning? Can China’s missile capabilities be used to intimidate international shipping? The link between China’s historic use of force and resource considerations is tenuous. The particular case of the South China Sea has been inflated by many analysts into a more significant case study of Chinese strategic behaviour than it actually merits. Chinese strategic interests in resource supply are not incompatible with US hegemony. Indeed, an American draw-down in the Pacific is a greater threat to the stability of Asia’s energy markets than any potential Chinese challenge to the status quo.
Evan A. Feigenbaum is a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) has reinforced Africa’s status as a strategic ghetto in the post-Cold War world. The absence of non-African involvement or even interest underscores a break with earlier eras of colonial ambition and Cold War rivalries. Some observers have seen in this war the division of DROC and thus the break-up of central Africa. This does not, however, reflect the agendas of the states involved in the conflict. The chief protagonists — Rwanda, Uganda and Angola — are fighting to preserve their own regimes against insurgents mounting attacks from Congolese territory. Rwanda and Angola in particular, although on opposing sides, share similar goals: to install a sympathetic regime in Kinshasa that can put an end to these attacks. The fracturing of DROC will not serve this purpose, and could well worsen their problems.
David Shearer is a Research Associate at the IISS. Previously, he headed Save the Children Fund (UK) programmes in Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia and Sri Lanka, and was a senior adviser to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Liberia and Rwanda.
Despite its overwhelming military prowess, the US often finds itself unable to coerce regional adversaries. Several key features of US-style coercion — most notably sensitivity to casualties and a preference for multilateral involvement — constrain US military actions and reduce the potency and credibility of US threats. These features and the resulting constraints are apparent to adversaries and provide them with a range of counter-strategies to offset US superiority. These counter-strategies include fracturing US-led coalitions, inflicting US and allied casualties, and playing on concerns over the suffering of an adversary’s own people. Successful coercion requires that policy-makers confront directly the dangers inherent in any military action, and avoid limiting operations in ways that play directly into adversaries’ hands.
Daniel Byman is a Policy Analyst at RAND, Santa Monica, CA. Matthew Waxman is a Consultant at RAND.
Japan’s clumsy diplomatic performance during the 1991 Gulf War precipitated a series of efforts to raise Tokyo’s defence profile and upgrade the US-Japan alliance. However, bitter exchanges between the US and Japan in the face of the Asian financial crisis indicate that little progress has been made in bilateral relations. As the crisis deepened, Washington and Tokyo adopted sharply contrasting approaches to managing the turbulence; the result was severe tensions between the two capitals. In American eyes, Japan was once again proving itself incapable of exercising credible leadership. From Japan’s perspective, Washington was once again behaving like an unappreciative bully. On the cusp of the twenty-first century, allied tensions during the financial crisis indicate a steady erosion of purpose in the US-Japan relationship.
Christopher B. Johnstone is a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, HI.