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Volume 39/No. 2/Summer 1997
The debate about a Palestinian state has been settled. An embryonic state already exists, and a more fully formed state will necessarily be part of any peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. What remains to be decided are its form and content. Israel should be as generous as possible in its attitude to the territorial and functional components of Palestinian statehood, but it needs to incorporate the major settlement blocs in the West Bank, retain military control of the Jordan Valley and insist on some restrictions on Palestinian sovereignty. The alternatives to this approach are few and far less promising.
Even if a Palestinian state is inevitable, its potential dangers should not be overlooked. The principle of self-determination, its merits notwithstanding, has played a major role in causing international disorder and conflict. A Palestinian state will be born in the still unstable and violent Middle East, and domestic politics could easily lead the new state to adopt a radical policy. Only by stretching out the timetable for statehood and limiting the new entity’s military power and sovereignty can the risks of a Palestinian be limited.
Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority (PA) developed into an authoritarian regime. Personalised authoritarianism has rational political origins: it serves to recentralise power after years of decentralisation during the intifada; and it marginalises the resident ‘intifada élite’ to the benefit of the PA, dominated by the formerly exiled Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership. Authoritarian rule will probably indefinitely for two reasons: because the PA is financially independent its own society, mitigating the need for a social pact; and because the PA’s likely failure to gain significant concessions from Israel in the negotiations will prompt the need to repress popular discontent.
Under Israeli occupation, Palestinians have been denied involvement in the management and development of water resources and have been severely restricted consumption for both agricultural and household use. Palestinians charge that Israel is stealing their water while preventing them from using fair share of this resource. Israelis counter that they have prior claim the water and that any further development by the Palestinians would damage the aquifer. The Taba Agreement of September 1995 made progress towards resolving this dispute, but only limited implementation has occurred and negotiations of an equitable water-sharing formula have been left to the final-status talks. The issue can only be settled with an agreement based on the principle of equal individual minimum requirements for Palestinians and Israelis alike.
The June 1996 appointment of an Islamist prime minister in Turkey has raised concerns among Western allies about the country’s foreign-policy orientation. Necmettin Erbakan’s florid in opposition, however, has not been a good indicator of his performance in power with an Islamist-led coalition government. On the key and potentially controversial issues for the West—Cyprus, the customs union with the European Union, Operation Provide Comfort and Turkish–Israeli relations—Erbakan has opted for continuity of policy rather than change. Even opening to the Islamic world has not been a radical policy shift. The conjunction of a strong state and weak coalition government in Turkey helped to constrain whatever radical foreign-policy preferences Erbakan might have.
Russia and China are building substantial political, economic and military ties. The days of enmity are over for the foreseeable future, but the countries are not allies. They are united by a strategic convergence—multifaceted cooperation and intersecting interests on important security questions—based not on trust and goodwill, but on calculated self-interest and a desire for leverage vis-à-vis third parties, especially the United States. While Russian arms sales will augment China’s embryonic power-projection capability, whether China becomes a great power will depend upon events within—events over which Russia has little control.
Following the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by the Haitian military in September 1991, the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the United Nations refused to recognise the de facto regime. They initiated a lengthy struggle to restore Aristide to power, culminating in the deployment of a UN Security Council (UNSC)-mandated, US-led, multinational force in Haiti in September 1994 and the ouster of the military leadership. The Haiti case carries lessons not only about international intervention and the promotion of democracy, but also about the internal dynamics within the UNSC, where US leadership is more central than ever, and trade-offs among the permanent members are playing a growing role.