Survival

 

 

Summer 2000. (Vol. 42 No. 2)

• Europe's strategic ambitions: the limits of ambiguity

F Heisbourg , Chairman, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland

By any measure, the European Union's efforts to forge a new European security and defence policy (ESDP) have made remarkable progress. The essentially intergovernmental nature of the project, which thereby is not a frontal challenge to state sovereignty, is one of the reasons for this progress. However, a certain studied imprecision about the eventual destination has also been essential. This is not an unusual feature of the European integration process, in which progress has often depended on defining practical objectives first, and deferring to a later stage the consideration of issues of principle and of implementation. However, the virtues of ambiguity are now reaching their limit: the force planners charged with fulfilling the 'headline goal' will need some guidance as to what the force is supposed to do; and the corresponding budget input will have to be defined.

 

• In defence of European defence: an American perspective

CA Kupchan , Georgetown University, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, USA

The American foreign-policy community is now questioning the viability of the traditional transatlantic security bargain - namely, that Europe pursues integration while the US keeps the peace. In the aftermath of the Kosovo War, a new consensus is emerging in the US that the Atlantic security compact can be maintained only if it becomes more balanced. The US should therefore unequivocally support Europe's renewed efforts to forge a credible common defence. Under the terms of a new Atlantic bargain, Europe would build a robust military capability and the US would in return accord Europe a voice influence. The US and Europe should stop sparring over European defence, and get on with the hard work of bringing this new bargain to fruition.

 

• Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative

  J Howorth , Department of European Studies, University of Bath, Bath, UK

  Since late 1998, a Franco-British engine has driven remarkable progress in European defence. Continued progress, however, will depend on a basic agreement on ultimate goals between the leading partners. Are the French and the British really on the same wavelength? Are their visions for ESDP equally compatible with a strengthened and re-balanced Alliance? While London and Paris have successfully married their policies for the short-term, it is unclear whether, in the longer term, their strategic ambitions can be reconciled. France wants to promote a European project (ESDP) by using an Atlanticist instrument (NATO). The UK aims first and foremost to preserve the cohesion of the Alliance, by using a European instrument (ESDP). The compatibility of these aims in the long term will depend on the evolution of the Alliance itself. Without genuine mutual understanding and a clear common purpose - particularly between London and Paris - the Alliance could begin to unravel.

   

• Germany and the use of force: still a 'civilian power'?

  HW Maull, University of Trier, Trier, Germany

  Germany's military participation in the Kosovo War against Serbia represents an evolution but not a fundamental departure in its post-war security policy as a 'civilian power'. The decision to join the air strikes even in the absence of a mandate by the UN Security Council was motivated by considerations which have long been central to Germany's foreign-policy role concept. As a result of the Kosovo experience, Germany now is moving towards restructuring its armed forces to make them smaller, more professional and more capable of intervening in crises beyond traditional NATO contingencies. But the shift will probably be slow and messy. Germany's future role in ESDP therefore is likely to be paradoxical: while providing strong political support for further advances in European security and defence integration, Germany's military contribution may continue to fall short of expectations.

   

• Why institutions matter

  G Andréani , International Relations, IISS

  When British Prime Minister Tony Blair gave new impetus to a serious defence role for the European Union, he insisted that the debate should focus on real military capabilities, and stay clear of the institutional swamp in which previous attempts had been lost. Yet, institutions matter for the EU in a unique way: the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norms-setting and institution-building. Since the 1980s, each new step in European integration has brought along its own set of institutional requirements. Defence will inevitably do the same, all the more so because the EU is currently void of any defence culture: only in a specialised institutional setting will such a culture be imported into it, and solidify.

   

• Redressing NATO's imbalances

  G Parmentier , Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri), Paris, France

  Building a European defence will require a parallel adaptation in NATO's structures: to fit them better to the Alliance's new missions; and to make it easier for the Europeans to utilise NATO assets when the US is not part of an operation. The Kosovo War revealed flaws in the current arrangements. Planning was conducted unilaterally at US-Europe Command (EUCOM) rather than multilaterally at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). Dominated therefore by the US in its military command function, NATO is in other ways too micro-managed by its Council. The tensions and confusion that flow from these arrangements act to the detriment of the military operations themselves. Effective multilateral political supervision of the Alliance's military commands should be restored. And commands should be reorganised along functional rather than geographical lines. These changes should bring greater efficiency and flexibility, and also help to give substance to ambitions for making the European countries less dependent on the US.

   

• Terms of engagement: alternatives to punitive policies

  RN Haass and ML O'Sullivan , Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, USA

  The frequent failure of punitive policies - such as military force or sanctions - to achieve foreign-policy goals at reasonable costs has catalysed a search for alternative ways of dealing with problem regimes. In this quest, engagement strategies, or the primary use of incentives to persuade governments to change their behaviour, hold great promise. At the same time, unconditional forms of engagement which extend inducements to civil society or the private sector can also effect positive changes in the long run. Although an often neglected policy option, engagement has the ability to transform many of the problematic relationships with which the United States has struggled, such as its relations with Cuba, Iran, Libya and others.

   

• Engaging North Korea credibly

  VD Cha , Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA

  North Korea's intransigent behaviour has led many in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo to question the wisdom of policies that aim at persuading rather than coercing Pyongyang into cooperation. For critics of engagement, the solution for dealing with this rogue regime is simple: squeeze the regime until it either concedes or collapses. Yet, containment and robust defence are necessary but not sufficient conditions for dealing with the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK). While such policies can successfully deter a second invasion on the peninsula, they do not adequately address a new dimension of the DPRK threat: its capacity for undermining the non-proliferation and missile-technology control regimes. Engagement with North Korea, though distasteful, is still a better strategy than diplomatic isolation or coercion. However, engagement without certain additional measures on the military front is not advisable. In particular, if policy-makers in Washington and Seoul seek to make engagement more 'credible', this has implications for theatre-missile defence (TMD) initiatives in the region. US-ROK cooperation on certain forms of TMD can make for an 'enhanced' engagement strategy which is both more credible to Pyongyang and less susceptible to domestic accusations of appeasement.

   

• America and the new terrorism: an exchange

  O Roy, B Hoffman R Paz, S Simon and D Benjamin

  In 'America and the New Terrorism' (Survival, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 59-75), Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin described the emergence of a new, religiously motivated terrorism that neither relies on the support of sovereign states nor is constrained by limits on violence. Survival has invited three experts in the field to comment on this thesis. A reply from Simon and Benjamin follows their responses.

   

• Review essay

  C Cviic

   

• Book reviews

   

• New arrived titles