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Volume 39/No. 1/Spring 1997
At its July 1997 summit meeting, NATO plans to invite several countries to begin negotiations leading to their membership within a few years. To enlarge the Alliance without a parallel improvement in NATO–Russian relations could lead to a major and unnecessary deterioration in West–East relations. It could empower anti-Western and nationalist elements in Russia; provoke a retrograde Russian defence policy, including emphasis on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; cause Moscow to feel unconstrained by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; and kill the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II Treaty. It would be far preferable to engage Moscow in a serious and substantive NATO–Russian charter—a package of measures including institutionalised political consultations, modernisation of the CFE Treaty, formal reassurances concerning the non-deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign forces in new NATO member-states, enhanced Russian participation in Partnership for Peace (PFP), and a coordinated response to the Baltic states. The engagement of Russia would make enlargement politically acceptable.
NATO’s involvement in former Yugoslavia has graphically illustrated how the Alliance has adapted since the Cold War. At the same time, this involvement has given impetus and reality to many aspects of NATO’s transformation. With the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) and now the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), NATO is operating ‘out of area’, with all 16 allies and in coalition with forces from over half the countries in its Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme. NATO has established practical cooperation with the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international organisations. A major lesson from this experience is the need to ensure that future peace-support missions are clearly defined and backed by adequate mandates and resources. NATO will also want to develop its capabilities for civil–military cooperation and to establish standing mechanisms to incorporate Russia and other PFP countries into future operations.
As US defence planners review their six-year, $1.4 trillion defence programme, they need to assess priorities at a time of shifting demands on US forces and rapidly changing technologies and concepts for warfare. If US forces are to remain capable of supporting an ambitious strategy of global engagement and leadership, within likely budget constraints, the Clinton administration will have to change some deeply ingrained ways of thinking in the Department of Defense (DOD) and challenge some powerful interests. Among the changes required are a willingness to examine new and more challenging scenarios of future conflict; to re-examine requirements for forward-deployed US forces; to restructure the DOD’s support infrastructure; and, most important, assess the implications for force structure and force mix of revolutionary changes in the effectiveness of information systems and precision-guided weapons. In brief, cuts in selected portions of the force are needed to provide sufficient funding for key modernisation programmes.
Recent developments in air-power’s capability relative to that of more traditional surface-force elements have made possible the application of new concepts of operations. Although successful high-intensity warfare will, for the foreseeable future, continue to require the involvement of all force components in an appropriately tailored fashion, new air capabilities will allow military campaigns to be run both differently and more quickly and efficiently. Already, the newly acquired strategic leverage of air-power, thanks to the combination of stealth, precision stand-off attack capability, and situational awareness dominance, has unburdened ground commanders of any need to undertake a frontal assault against enemy forces until the costs of such an offensive can be made tolerable. The net result is that the principal role of land-power in high-intensity conflict may now be merely to secure a win rather than to achieve it.
The Nunn–Lugar or Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme has facilitated the denuclearisation process in the former Soviet Union, enhanced control of nuclear materials and provided a symbolically important vehicle for US strategic engagement with Russia—all for a financial pittance. Yet halfway through its expected life-span, the programme is facing a mid-life crisis: bureaucratic machinations and legislative games in both Washington and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union have threatened the programme’s effectiveness. Now is not the time to be penny-wise and pound-foolish: CTR is in everybody’s interest, and should be pursued.
Transatlantic armament relations were increasingly troubled in 1996, as vigorous US defence-industry consolidation raised fears that either European weapons producers would fall under the domination of their larger counterparts from across the Atlantic, or that Europe would close its defence markets and provoke a transatlantic defence trade war. Yet it does not appear likely that either of these worst-case scenarios will occur, and a rough status quo in the armament relationship seems set to endure. This status quo is not a pretty one, however, as it is based on very sharp US–European competition for third-country arms exports, a limited degree of reciprocal market access, and extremely difficult to achieve cooperative armament initiatives. To move beyond this modestly ‘optimistic’ future, US and European leaders must successfully tackle formidable barriers to a more fruitful armament relationship, an outcome that is highly uncertain.
When analysts dismiss Asia–Europe security cooperation as irrelevant, they are missing an important potential development in international relations. The first Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), held in Bangkok in March 1996, was a tentative, initial step, but it did call for initiatives in security cooperation, and launched a process that will be continued with the second ASEM summit in London in 1998. Imagining a serious Asia–Europe security relationship is not wishful thinking; the two sides already cooperate in both hard and soft security. It is also possible to envisage a substantial and achievable agenda for future action. An important part of the ASEM process is finding ways to keep the United States honestly committed to multilateral cooperation, both in Asia and more globally.
The academic question of why alliances endure or collapse has taken on new practical significance with the end of the Cold War. A study of this question suggests that military alliances often collapse when perceptions of threat change, when the members acquire other means to protect themselves, or when key members question the reliability of their partners. An existing alliance can, however, overcome these strains when strong leaders act to discourage defections, when the alliance is highly institutionalised, and when the alliance is reinforced by a sense of shared identity. These latter elements help to explain NATO’s continued existence, but also suggest that the sources of unity are becoming weaker and centrifugal tendencies are growing. NATO may endure, but its cohesion and resilience are likely to decline.