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CIAO DATE: 08/07
Spring 2007 (Vol. 49 No. 1)
South Africa's Troubled Success Story
Ian Bremmer and Sebastian Spio-Garbrah
Growing public impatience with failed government strategies to improve the lives of South Africa's black majority threatens the survival of the tripartite alliance that has governed the country since the end of apartheid. If the African National Congress-led government proves unwilling or unable to successfully address the issues - land reform and property rights - crucial for solving many other lingering economic ills, the ripple effects of capital flight and economic contraction will be felt throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
Pakistan's Dangerous Game
Seth G. Jones
The rising level of violence in Afghanistan has triggered widespread calls to increase NATO's presence. But there is growing evidence that a critical part of the solution lies not in Afghanistan, but across the Khyber Pass in Pakistan. Increasing the number of foreign troops or improving the competence of Afghan forces are no longer sufficient. Success requires a difficult political and diplomatic feat: convincing the government of Pakistan to undermine the insurgent sanctuary on its soil. It is time to fundamentally alter America's and Europe's approach toward Pakistan. Policymakers should focus on a much tougher policy that pressures Pakistan to curb public recruitment campaigns for the Taliban, close training camps and arrest key Taliban leaders in Pakistan.
Can Iran's Nuclear Capability Be Kept Latent?
Mark Fitzpatrick
Iran may not yet have made a decision to produce nuclear weapons and the evidence trail of weapons plans and military involvement stops in 2003. If, as seems likely, UN sanctions and financial pressure do not persuade Tehran to stop its uranium enrichment programme, the United States may turn to military options to try to push back the date by which Iran could have a nuclear weapon. Low confidence that air strikes could delay Iran's weapons programme, however, and the negative consequences that military action would entail should lead policymakers to consider whether the nuclear timeline might be prolonged through negotiation. Accepting the reality of small-scale, intermittent enrichment activity in exchange for tight international inspection access holds some appeal, and the asking price will only rise over time. But legitimising Iran's programme has significant disadvantages, especially without an assurance of swift and severe penalties in the event the deal is broken.
America and Iraq: The Case for Disengagement
Steven Simon
The United States has already achieved all that it is going to achieve in Iraq; staying in the country can only drive up the price of these gains in blood, treasure and strategic position. Washington should therefore make clear now to the Iraqi government that, as the results of the anticipated surge become apparent, the two sides will be negotiating a US military disengagement from Iraq. This would entail withdrawing the bulk of American forces from Iraq within 12-18 months; shifting the American focus to containment of the conflict and strengthening the US military position elsewhere in the region; and engaging Iraq's neighbours, including Iran and Syria, members of the UN Security Council and potential donors in an Iraq stabilisation plan. The civil war is unlikely to abate upon disengagement, but the lack of organisational capacity, broad communal consent, and heavy weapons on either side militates against a drastic increase in the casualty rate. The United States should act decisively and creatively across the wider Middle East to offset perceptions of American weakness triggered by the setback in Iraq. Full recovery from its misadventure in Iraq is likely to take the United States many years.
The Causes of US Failure in Iraq
Toby Dodge
None of the proposals for extracting the United States from the debacle in Iraq recognise the root causes of the violence and instability that has plagued the country since April 2003. The origins of the Iraqi civil war lie in the complete collapse of both the administrative and coercive capacity of the state. The Iraqi state, its ministries, their civil servants, police force and army ceased to exist in a meaningful way in the aftermath of regime change. It is the United States' inability to reconstruct them that lies at the heart of the Iraq problem. Until the state's capacity is substantially rebuilt - if ever - Iraq will continue to be violently unstable. Unless the United States can commit to the generation-long project of rebuilding the Iraqi state, Iraq will continue to be a place of misery for its population and instability for its region. This is a defeat of historic proportions for US foreign policy.
America in Arab Eyes
Shibley Telhami
The Iraq War has significantly altered the balance of power in the Gulf region and within the Arab world. It has also widened the gap between governments and publics in the region, increased the popularity of non-state actors, and resulted in an increase in terrorism and enhancement of al-Qaeda's presence in the Arab world. But it has had little impact on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and has not made al-Qaeda's agenda more popular. The rise of Islamic militant groups in the region appears to be more an effect of both the Iraq War and local circumstances, not a reflection of a sweeping Islamist globalist ideology. The imbalance of power in the Gulf will become more evident if and when American troops withdraw from Iraq, although the presence of US forces elsewhere in the Gulf will remain a major factor.
American Power and Allied Restraint: Lessons of Iraq
Dana H. Allin
Over the past six years, US moral prestige in Europe has collapsed. Following President George W. Bush's re-election, allied governments for reasons of state have tried to restore relations, but we can only speculate on whether such raison d'état constitutes sufficient basis for an ambitious alliance of democracies. On this difficult foundation, what should the United States expect or hope for from European allies to help restore its position? In theory at least, Europe offers three things. First, capacity: the Europeans are not over-endowed with military power, to be sure, but their troops are needed in Afghanistan, Lebanon and beyond. Second, legitimacy: if America cannot bolster the perceived legitimacy of its foreign policy by way of a common moral vocabulary with France, who seriously expects to find it with Russia, China or even India? Third, restraint: the embedding of American power in the imperfect order of global institutions and governance. This does not mean an abrogation of US sovereignty or autonomy - America is too powerful to sacrifice these in any meaningful sense. It does mean American leaders allowing themselves to be restrained by international opinion - a restraint that would have helped the United States avoid disaster in Iraq.
The United States and East Asia after Iraq
Phillip C. Saunders
The US-led invasion of Iraq and its violent aftermath have had an adverse impact upon America's geo-strategic position in East Asia, but to date the consequences have been mitigated by a variety of countervailing factors. America's Asian allies and partners complain that US leaders are distracted by Iraq and the war on terrorism, and not devoting sufficient attention to Asia. The Iraq War has had a negative impact on the US image in Asia, but this has been partially offset by the efforts of Asian governments to encourage increased US regional engagement to balance China's growing economic and diplomatic role. The modest negative impact of the Iraq War might increase if the US commitment in Iraq drags on at a high level for several more years or if the United States is forced to withdraw suddenly, leaving behind a chaotic and unstable situation.
An Iraq Syndrome?
Ronald Steel
The American war in Iraq and the American war in Vietnam have disturbing similarities. In the 1970s the schisms provoked by the war in Asia led to what was labelled a 'Vietnam syndrome': a revulsion against colonial peacekeeping, nation-building, and costly and socially divisive military conflict in distant outposts not directly related to American security. That syndrome faded during the shock waves triggered by the terrorist attacks on American soil in 2001. But the subsequent American invasion of Iraq, the high human and financial toll it continues to take nearly four years later, and the public controversy over the justification for the war have eroded domestic support for similar future military interventions. This sentiment, translated into policy by future administrations, will have a profound impact on both the methods and the goals of American foreign policy, as well as on the cohesion of America's alliances.
The Use and Abuse of History: Munich, Vietnam and Iraq
Jeffrey Record
Decision-makers and their critics employ reasoning by historical analogy to interpret new events as well as deploying historical analogies to mobilise public opinion. During the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003, proponents and opponents of war trotted out the historical analogies of Munich and Vietnam. But for proponents of the war to argue that not taking decisive military action against Saddam Hussein was tantamount to appeasement was to completely distort the meaning of the Munich analogy. On the political side, the success or failure of the United States in Iraq may have analogues to the US experience in Vietnam - specifically, the American failure to construct a politically and militarily viable state in South Vietnam, and the collapse over time of domestic political support for the war. The lesson of Vietnam better informs America's dilemmas and challenges in post-Ba'athist Iraq than the lesson of Munich did for the decision to invade in the first place.
France and the United States: Waiting for Regime Change
Frédéric Bozo and Guillaume Parmentier
France's opposition to the US intervention in Iraq triggered the most bitter crisis between the two countries since President Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO's integrated structure in 1966. Since June 2004, the atmosphere has steadily improved. The relationship is now businesslike, making it possible for the two countries to achieve significant results on important and visible issues of common interest. To maintain their ability to work together in case of need, France and the United States must steer clear of the grand visions that they have often held as principal justifications for their foreign policies. When there is a mutual perception of common interests, the two nations work together extremely well. This pragmatism should be strengthened by the change of leadership that will take place in France in 2007. To be durable however, this change also needs to be paralleled in Washington.
Editor's Note
Review Essay: Torture and Incompetence in the 'War on Terror'
Adam Roberts
Review Essay - Iran: The Next Hegemon?
Geoffrey Kemp
Review Essay: The View from the Peak
Jérôme Guillet
Review Essay: India on the Move
Teresita C. Schaffer