Survival

 

 

Spring 2000 (Vol. 42 No. 1)

• Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How

  Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Goldgeier and James M. Lindsay. Ivo H. Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, and author of Strategic Defences in the 1990s: Criteria for Deployment (London: Macmillan, 1991). James M. Goldgeier is associate professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University, Washington DC, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and author of Not Whether But When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). James M. Lindsay is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

  The United States will deploy a national missile defence (NMD) system within the next decade. The question is no longer, therefore, whether to build an NMD system, but how to do so without making the US less secure. Washington must avoid two risks. One is that Moscow will respond by taking steps that raise the risk of nuclear war. The other is that the US Congress will reject a deal worked out with Moscow to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to allow for NMD deployment. Avoiding these two risks requires astute diplomacy abroad and smart politics at home. On the international front, the US needs to move quickly to strike a deal with Russia on modifying the ABM Treaty. On the domestic front, the Clinton administration needs to act quickly to begin building domestic political support for any deal that it might reach with Russia.

   

• Amending the ABM Treaty

  Dean A. Wilkening, Director of the Science Program at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, CA.

  In deploying NMD, the challenge facing the US is to devise a package of incentives that will secure Russian agreement to amend the ABM Treaty. The most promising would involve US concessions in a future START III Treaty to accommodate Moscow’s interests. In particular, the US could allow Russia to deploy multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are far less destabilising to the nuclear balance than many arms-control advocates assume. In addition, before making a deployment decision, the US should give greater attention to several 'boost-phase' NMD concepts which could produce a more effective defence with fewer negative consequences for relations between the major powers.

   

• Judging War Crimes

  William Pfaff, syndicated columnist for the International Herald Tribune and other newspapers. His most recent book, The Wrath of Nations (New York and London: Simon & Schuster, 1993), deals with the sources and nature of nationalism.

  The Hague and Arusha war-crimes tribunals have had two major accomplishments: they administer ‘international’ justice, not victor’s justice; and they have established in practice their right to indict and try individuals despite the national character of the crimes and those individuals’ formal subjection to national sovereignties. These accomplishments are nonetheless limited since they rest on an international consensus which could prove ephemeral. Neither the UN Security Council nor the General Assembly are legitimate democratic institutions: there is no true institutional embodiment of the international popular interest. US and Chinese opposition to plans for a permanent international criminal court does not help. Achievements in the 1990s towards extending the rule of law and establishing justice in international relations thus remain incomplete, contested and ultimately fragile.

   

• America and the New Terrorism

  Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin. Steven Simon is Assistant Director and Carol Deane Senior Fellow at the IISS. He was formerly a member of the US National Security Council, where he was Senior Director for Transnational Threats. Daniel Benjamin is Senior Fellow at the United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC, and was formerly Director for Transnational Threats on the US National Security Council.

  The 1990s saw the emergence of a new, religiously motivated terrorism that neither relies on the support of sovereign states nor is constrained by limits on violence. Its harbingers include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York; the 1995 sarin-gas attack in the Tokyo subway; the 1996 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building; and the 1998 East Africa bombings. In their effort to inflict damage on a grand scale, some practitioners of the new terrorism seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Although no single individual bears responsibility, the face of the new terrorism belongs to Osama bin Laden, the exiled Saudi who has marshalled a network of operatives in more than 50 countries. Officials in Washington believe that religiously motivated terrorism will persist for many years, forcing the US and other countries to develop better means of defence.

   

• Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

  Denny Roy, Assistant Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

  The Taiwan problem is the most enduring and dangerous of the East Asian flashpoints. Conflicting notions of sovereignty, deeply rooted in Taipei and Beijing, preclude a diplomatic breakthrough under present conditions. With cross-Strait tensions likely to persist well into the twenty-first century, Taiwan faces the daunting challenge of maintaining its de facto autonomy in the shadow of growing Chinese economic and military power. The threat of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conquering Taiwan through military invasion or economic coercion is often overstated, but the PRC’s determination and capability to bring extreme pressure on Taiwan through military means other than invasion should be respected. Instead of focusing on short-term solutions to the impasse, the best course is a careful management of the status quo, with Taiwan refraining from undue provocation of Beijing, allowing time for a future generation of Chinese to re-evaluate the relationship between formal Taiwanese independence and China’s security.

   

• Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners To Competitors

  David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, and Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program and Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution, Washington DC.

  During the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing and Washington shared common strategic purposes. But these shared interests have narrowed in the 1990s. The Sino-American relationship now involves elements of limited cooperation and growing competition. While there is an important convergence of interests with respect to North Korea and the spread of nuclear weapons, the two governments increasingly diverge on a long list of strategic issues, including: Taiwan; Japan’s regional security role; Iran and Iraq; the expansion of NATO; the strengthening of other US alliances; missile exports; theatre and national missile defences; and the US security role in the Asia-Pacific. This growing ‘strategic competition’ is likely to characterise Sino-American relations for most of the coming decade, irrespective of the new American administration that comes to office in 2001.

   

• Towards a Realistic Cuba Policy

  Linda Robinson, Latin America Bureau Chief for US News & World Report, and a recipient of the 1999 Maria Moors Cabot award for reporting on Latin America.

  Fidel Castro, now the longest-ruling leader in the world, has drawn one key lesson from the collapse of the Soviet bloc: too-rapid change unleashes destabilising forces, even anarchy. He has become Latin America’s foremost conservative, taking a step, watching to see the result, trimming his course. That course roughly parallels the Chinese-communist formula of permitting gradual economic reform while maintaining one-party rule — although Castro has been even more cautious in his economic reforms. As the Cuban revolution’s founder, Castro is reluctant to undo his handiwork and is vigilant against opponents at home and abroad. His chief adversary, the United States — through four decades of hostility and isolation — has unwittingly fuelled the ageing leader’s nationalist staying power. The US-Cuban conflict has deep roots, predating Castro and the Cold War, and is unlikely to end until Cubans feel that their island’s independence is assured.

   

• Inside Moscow’s Kosovo Muddle

  Oleg Levitin, Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London. He was formerly with the Russian foreign ministry, directly involved in Moscow’s Balkan policies in 1990-99. He served on the Russian foreign ministry Balkan desk and in the Russian embassies in Tirana and Belgrade, and participated in numerous diplomatic conferences on the Yugoslav crisis, including the Dayton peace talks and the Contact Group working group on Kosovo.

  In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, analysis has focused mainly on the deficiencies of Western policies. Yet it is Russia that has suffered the real fiasco in Kosovo and in the Balkans as a whole, where its influence and prestige have fallen significantly. Russia missed a number of opportunities to prevent the conflict in Kosovo, which has proven disastrous to its interests. However, the Kosovo crisis also proved that it is worth trying to have Russia on board for as long as possible, and that Russian intransigence can often be overcome through Western persistence. What is usually assumed to be Russia’s principled opposition is sometimes more the result of inertia and incompetence. Sometimes it might not be so difficult to persuade Moscow — still basically opportunistic and lacking a clear vision of its own long-term interests — to behave more constructively.

   

• Force and Diplomacy

  Carl Bildt, Member of Parliament and former Prime Minister of Sweden. He is presently the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Balkans, having served successively as Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Co-Chairman of the Dayton peace talks and High Representative in Bosnia.

  An old debate about the relationship between force and diplomacy has been rekindled by the experience of the Balkans during the 1990s. In Bosnia, the conclusion has often been drawn that the Dayton peace agreement resulted more-or-less directly in the use of air-power against Bosnian Serb positions. Yet, this conclusion is wrong: the peace agreement for Bosnia was far more of a victory for diplomacy than a victory for force. In Kosovo, NATO’s use of force failed in certain ways, succeeded in others, but left the basic issues of the conflict unresolved. The limits of both diplomacy and force have been amply demonstrated. Diplomacy backed by force and fairness could have a greater chance of success. But if the use of force replaces the search for more enduring political solutions, the result may well do little more than to complicate the search for solutions.

   

• Companies in International Relations

  Nick Butler, Group Policy Adviser of BP Amoco. He serves as Chairman of the Centre for European Reform, as a member of the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and as a member of the World Economic Forum’s global policy issues group. The views expressed here are entirely personal and do not represent a statement of corporate policy.

  Despite their increasing size and reach, multinational companies do not enjoy the unfettered power attributed to them by many critics. The long-term, physically static nature of much investment, coupled with the new transparency through which investors can monitor performance, means that the supposed transfer of power from governments to corporations is largely an illusion. It is true that companies are more involved with and dependent upon international relationships than ever before. Trade and investment have both grown more rapidly than output. The removal of political barriers has opened new areas to investment, and the development of communications has created a new degree of scrutiny and a new political agenda around issues such as human rights and the environment, which multinationals cannot ignore. In responding, companies have become part of the process of change and development, and actors in the international system. The challenge for all concerned is to ensure that their presence and influence are engaged as a force for positive change.