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Volume 40/No. 3/Autumn 1998
A sustainable peace on Cyprus is a strategic imperative, with implications for transatlantic interests in south-eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus. The comprehensive reintegration of Cyprus offers the best solution for a viable peace on the island and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, but Turkey’s obstructionism constitutes the most important obstacle to such an outcome. NATO strategists must adjust their long-standing policy towards Turkey by moving beyond a strictly military definition of security towards a conception which is rooted in democracy and which makes rewards conditional upon strict compliance with performance standards. A Cyprus-driven policy shift towards Ankara would restabilise Turkey’s role in NATO, offering the Alliance returns that far exceed those of immediate peace in Cyprus.
The threat of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) terrorism is a subject of increasing international concern, and deservedly so. While historically rare and likely to remain so, there is no reason to believe that an act of NBC terrorism is any less likely than other forms of NBC attack, such as ballistic missiles. Given the severity of the potential consequences, NBC terrorism should be regarded as probable enough to place this threat among the most serious national-security challenges faced by modern liberal democracies. To meet this threat, states should implement a broad and balanced programme of preventative and preparedness measures. They should place particular emphasis on intelligence, fissile-material security, emergency-services preparations and the public-health system.
Transnational organised crime is a critical challenge to democratic governance and to transition and modernisation processes in many parts of the world. Responding to this challenge requires a comprehensive strategy that combines law enforcement and regulatory responses, such as enhanced intelligence analysis and intelligence sharing, state-building, and trans-state cooperation, with non-regulatory approaches, such as the extension of the strategy to civil society and the private sector. The latter would include changing cultural attitudes towards organised crime and corruption.
Russia’s current strategic nuclear force will become obsolete shortly after the turn of the century. Strategic modernisation is therefore essential if Russia is to remain a nuclear power on a par with the US. But modernisation will be extremely difficult because of the country’s economic and political turmoil. Russia can probably maintain slightly more than 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I Treaty—roughly half of what the United States could, in theory, deploy. Under START II, Russia’s strategic force will likely contain between 1,800 and 2,500 warheads, compared to 3,500 for the US. Hence, the easiest—perhaps the only—way for Russia to recover rough parity with the United States would be through a START III Treaty that limits both sides to 2,000–2,500 warheads.
The relationship between Russia and the United States after 1991 could have developed like US relations with Germany and Japan after the Second World War, with Washington embracing a former enemy as a new ally. Instead, the general tendency in Washington has been to assume that the ‘lone superpower’ has the right and the ability to dictate policy to the rest of the world. The tension in US–Russian relations today stems largely from the inability, or refusal, of American policy-makers to respect the proper limits of US power. American leaders either do not understand or are unwilling to respect Russia’s legitimate interests on the Eurasian continent. There is little that Moscow can do now about US meddling in conflicts near Russia’s borders, but in the future it could lead to a new East–West confrontation. Such a future could be avoided by a more careful US approach to regional problems around Russia.
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq has repeatedly been coerced in the past and can be again in the future. The historical record is clear: in conflicts with Iran and with the US and its allies, Saddam has repeatedly bowed to outside pressure when it threatened his relationship with his power base, which is essential to his control over Iraq and very survival. To extract concessions from Saddam in the future, the US and its allies must target this power base by continuing containment to keep Iraq weak, by striking Iraq aggressively when Saddam challenges containment, and by supporting the Iraqi opposition to ratchet up pressure on Baghdad.
There is today a strong case for engaging Iran. Changes in Iran have made such a process feasible but its success will be constrained by political divisions among Iran’s leadership. US policy will have to take these divisions into account in not asking for more than President Khatami can deliver, or setting its objectives beyond what is realistically obtainable. While an improved atmosphere will not substitute for dealing with the hard issues of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, it will make it easier to address such questions. The process of engagement should stir the US to move from slogans to formulating more specific demands on Iran in the sensitive area of security issues. The US should consider what it wants and what it is prepared to give to get it, offering inducements and access to technology in exchange for greater reassurance about programmes causing unease.
The question of further enlargement rounds after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been admitted to NATO in Spring 1999 will place the Alliance in a difficult position. On the one hand, key allies see the coming years as a ‘digestive’ period to adapt NATO to the admission of three new members. On the other hand, NATO codified its commitment to an open enlargement process in a compromise formula found in Madrid in July 1997, which is likely to raise expectations among putative candidates and some NATO members, such as France, on a second enlargement round already in 1999. This would undoubtedly strain the relationship with Russia—particularly with regard to a potential NATO membership of the Baltic countries. It would be wise not to decide on another enlargement round too soon, but NATO will have to devote some thoughts to the ultimate goal of the enlargement process.