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Volume 39/No. 3/Autumn 1997
NATO as a military alliance is no longer structured appropriately for its most important tasks. Despite recent innovations, such as the Combined Joint Task Forces and the creation of all-European units like the Eurocorps, the US remains today the only NATO member-state capable of deploying and operating significant military force beyond its own borders—the most likely new role for the Alliance. In order to fill an unsustainable gap between US and European capabilities and roles, NATO’s European members must reorganise their forces more appropriately for the new environment by focussing on strategic lift and deployable logistics support for combat forces. A reasonable programme would cost around $50 billion and would give NATO’s European members roughly half the mobile military capability of the US.
The Cyprus problem has reached a critical stage. A new round of talks between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities has begun under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, this time with the aim of ending the division of the island that has now lasted for over 30 years. The failure of the talks could have serious consequences for the strategic situation in the wider eastern Mediterranean region, where the status quo is unlikely to continue given Cyprus’ upcoming membership negotiations with the European Union (EU). International actors such as the US, the EU and some of its member-states, like the United Kingdom and Germany, must make every effort to enhance the readiness for compromise of all parties concerned. These efforts should include significant pre-accession aid for both Cypriot communities; reassurance for the Turkish Cypriots about EU membership; and a clear signal to Turkey that it, too, is a candidate for EU membership.
The 27–31 May 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine, and the accompanying resolution of the status of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, has redefined the relationship between the two states. The accords finally give substance to Russia’s rhetorical recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and mark a shift away from pressure towards cooperation as a way of persuading Ukraine that its future lies in closer integration with Russia. The accords also seem to vindicate Ukraine’s policy of building up relations with NATO and the West. While there is still opposition to the Russia–Ukraine deal in both countries, and an enduring desire by powerful Russian interests to dominate Ukraine, the Black Sea Fleet accords provide a basis for hope that Russian–Ukrainian relations will continue to improve.
Since autumn 1996, a new opportunity has arisen to implement the UN and Organisation of African Unity (OAU) settlement plan for Western Sahara. Contacts between the Kingdom of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front were renewed, and both the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (UNSC) have called for direct talks to continue. More recently, the appointment in March 1997 of former US Secretary of State James A. Baker III, as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Special Envoy to the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, has led to full-scale negotiations between the parties. If this fragile momentum is to be sustained, the legitimacy of multilateral fora like the UNGA and UNSC must be underwritten by the active engagement of individual UN member-states, and particularly the kind of effectiveness that US authority can provide.
The strategic context in East Asia has changed considerably since the US first proposed theatre-missile-defence (TMD) cooperation with Japan and South Korea. North Korea’s missile programme continues unabated, and China’s assertiveness has increasingly become a cause of regional concern. Although the direct missile threat to South Korea is greater than that to Japan, the latter seems closer to a positive decision on deployment than the former. TMD deployments by both Japan and South Korea would enhance rather than undermine deterrence, and would therefore be in the interests of the US, Japan and South Korea. Deploying TMD would promote, not undermine, regional security.
North-east Asia is in the midst of a geopolitical transition. Superimposed upon this unstable milieu is competition for secure energy supplies, tension over conflicting claims to potentially oil-rich seabeds, and the protection of sea-lanes vital for energy supply. In an increasingly energy-resource-scarce world, such issues can create insecurity and even conflict. At the same time, however, the uneven distribution of major energy production factors in North-east Asia indicates that mutual benefits can be derived from cooperation within the energy sector. Indeed, multilateral energy regimes such as those adopted by the Association of South-east Asian Nations and in Europe could build confidence and help stabilise relations in this complex and dangerous region.
East Asian states are gaining access to more sophisticated military-technology know-how through aggressive offset and counter-trade deals, enabling them to expand their defence-industrial capacities in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Despite the determination of many East Asian leaders to become more self-sufficient in defence production in order to reduce their dependency on Western sources of supply and enhance national prestige, East Asian defence industries are subject to the same forces of change that are compelling Western defence industries to restructure, internationalise and civilianise. As a result, the distinctiveness of East Asian defence industries is breaking down as they become drawn into the complex chain of international supply, itself increasingly determined by strengths in generic technologies such as information-technology systems and civil electronics.
The world-wide diffusion and integration of the information technologies (IT) of digital telecommunications and computing has led to growing dependence on electronic infrastructure. The likelihood of terrorists using IT or attacking IT infrastructure to pursue their goals depends on the benefits and risks inherent in such use. A careful examination of these factors reveals a mixed picture: present conditions do not seem to favour IT terrorism, but the current trends of increasing societal vulnerability and decreasing technical difficulty might encourage it in future. International agreements, deterrence and defence must all be developed to deal with this potential terrorist threat.