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Social Sciences
Vol. 30, No. 1/March 1999
Specific Features of Mass Consciousness in the Transition Period
By Leonid Gordon
*
The ability to distinguish the possible from that which is impossible is quite topical as applied to the perspectives of development of mass moods in post-Soviet Russia, the growth or relaxation of public tension in it, social and political conflicts, and the organized or spontaneous protest potential. In this connection, of primary significance is the conclusion which, as it seems, follows immutably from the analysis of modern reality: the social situation which is assessed by the majority of Russian society as normal, satisfactory and just cannot set up earlier than in 20-30 years since the onset of transformations. (“Not earlier than” does not at all mean “in”—the return to the feeling of the norm may happen even later.) This uneasy perspective is motivated by the circumstances that cannot be eliminated in such a short time.
Naturally, a lot depends on the economic situation. Although the full realization of the market potential which may bring prosperity requires decades, however, the stable tendency to upraise, too, will not ensure a mass feeling of prosperity and well-being before the generations change. But in this case the degree of manifestation of discontent will be quite moderate. So, we may speak about the lack of satisfaction, rather than discontent. On the contrary, if a decline or stagnation of economic activity predominates during several years, the current passive discontent will grow into stormy indignation, “the grapes of wrath”.
How the strain of discontent is changing and what that means in the sense of social activity are vividly manifested by the materials of the all-Russia sociological survey. According to the data of the polls done by the All-Russia Center of Investigation of Public Opinion (ARCIPO) in 1993-1997, the share of people who believe that “all is not as bad and people can live” has almost never exceeded 10% and the share of those who avoided to answer was equal to 5%. The rest 80-85% made the share of those who were not contented and satisfied. In that case, about 45-50% of the respondents said that “it was difficult to live but they could manage” while 35-40% regarded that “they could not stand our troublesome situation”. However, the correlation in some months (for instance, in the beginning of 1997 during the peak of non-payments of salaries and wages) changed: the share of those who could not stand rose to 45% and the share of those who were ready to stand the situation for some time dropped to 40%. The same months the probability of mass manifestations and turmoil at places of residence significantly came up to 40-45% against the usual 20-30%. 1 One may conclude that in future, too, the positive economic dynamics (especially if it is accompanied by at least the minimum rise in the level of living) will more likely lead to the predomination of the “enduring dissatisfaction”, the negative one to the growth of “impatient discontent”.
It is understood that the real correlation of the forms of discontent which are more or less dangerous to society depends on many social, political, cultural and psychological factors and their complex interaction, rather than on the economic situation alone. [2] It is hardly possible to make any successful prognosis which would take into account the diversity of the combinations. However, one is to try to classify the form and degree of discontent (which is not at all reduced to “enduring” or “impatient” dissatisfaction) in order to then determine their comparative significance and prospects of alleviation. One can do it with ever greater reliability because the main forms of future discontent and protest activity (especially if we mean the nearest future) are present in today’s social reality.
From the point of social consequences, apart from the strong and weak dissatisfaction it is important we distinguish the predominantly passive (in the main) and active forms of discontent. It is no less important we take into account the origins of discontent. This will allow us to single out from the bearers those who find the reason for the burdensome troubles in the very market-capitalist (anti-etatist and anti-socialist) trend of the current transformations; those who are not satisfied with the course of transformations although in general support the refusal of state socialism but who would want to depart from it in a less painful way. Respectively, we may present four types of discontent which are typical of modern Russia and which are a sort of classical.
Firstly, the passive discontent which does not manifest itself in actions of people who feel alien and burdensome of modern transformations but who feel despaired of any hope to change anything, who are scared, or are not able, to counteract the changes and thus made up their mind to them.
Secondly, the discontent with what is going on that is motivated by the same rejection of the nature of changes, their trend contrary to the former habits of the Soviet (state-socialist) system but which is active in character, taking the form of people’s readiness to really oppose the current “anti-popular” reforms.
Thirdly, the passive dissatisfaction with unusual and hard times of the changes which is accompanied with the conviction or belief that they are desired. The difficulties in this case are taken as something insignificant or inevitable, in any case, as something that cannot be eliminated promptly; usually, such moods go together with the hope that everything will come straight with time.
Fourthly, the active dissatisfaction with the way how the necessary and desired transformations are carried out. The dissatisfaction of this kind and the efforts motivated by it are not against the reforms as such but against the methods of their implementation—towards the intensification of social protection and justice in the programs of modernization.
Of course, in real life these varieties manifest themselves not in pure and subsequent forms but, more likely, as a combination of various social and psychological reactions. However, as tendencies these drives and inclinations undoubtedly are present in society. Such tendencies may be used as a logical carcass, a sort of grid of references of the moods in social dissatisfaction. It gives grounds to classify the types of discontent and understand the consequences of the predominant development of tendencies of one type or another.
The predomination of active discontent with the direction of reforms will evidently impede their development. Given an extreme aggravation, it may lead to a refusal from market democratic modernization like it happened in our country in the first quarter of the 20th century. The domination of passive dissatisfaction does not create by itself the conditions for the full collapse of the reforms. Therefore, from the point of view of their advocates, it appears to be less dangerous. However, the passive discontent with the essence of the on-going changes creates the ...feeding environment in which the active opposition to them can be bred. In addition, if separate moods of passive discontent with the direction of the transformations are not capable of changing their market nature, nevertheless, such moods forming mass psychological and electoral preferences of the actively dissatisfied minority may become the most important prerequisite of the success of anti-reform movements.
However, the passive rejection of changes (even if it does not become a basis for active anti-reform moods and actions) retards the reforms in any way and, what is most important, it worsens their quality. The historical experience shows that the broad discontent with the transformations carried out from top, if it remains passive and is not supported with mass actions, turns more often to become a retreat from the democratic character of the reforms, and then an emasculation of their content. The authorities which carry out the reforms in the environment of discontent and which fail to transform this discontent into socially organized activity become musty in their desire to impose their will, turning into bureaucrats and directing the changes along a technocratic, authoritarian and despotic way or they merely imitate the reforms. All in all, even if modernization still goes on, its results are worst, least developed types of market systems (for instance, nomenklatura or oligarchy) which for long will have to be “dressed” in order to bring about socially orientated and democratic market society, and this needs to make next sacrifices, not always ending in success.
Such a danger is especially great in Russia because the technocratic direction is a feature of even young reformers, let alone the powers that be from the old nomenklatura. As is known, as far back as 1990 the representatives of the Leningrad economists-adherents of the market economy who later became members of the Moscow team of reformers agreed with the inevitability of antidemocratic measures in carrying out the reforms. 3 No doubt, the understanding of such inevitability proves that those who in advance took this into consideration had far sight and sobriety. But this fact also proves that from the very beginning the future reformers did not believe in the potential of democracy, did not try to somewhat develop and use it, and in the long run were not capable of doing that. Their arrogant and indifferent attitude towards the new workers’ movement in 1991-1993 when this movement could have become a vehicle of democratic reforms was, to my mind, a natural consequence of such orientations and their inability.
One must admit that the predominance of passive democratic discontent, if we may put it this way, will result in similar consequences, I mean the discontent which is not directed against the market anti-socialist nature of transformations but against the methods and ways of their implementation. Since this discontent remains inactive (“frozen”), conditions are brought about for bureaucratization and authoritarian pressure on the man in the street. The principal coincidence of abstract long-term goals of the ruling reformist elites and people’s mass strata can hardly change anything. People are not disappointed by the fact where the authorities are leading society but, rather, how they are doing that. There is no saying that given certain circumstances, say, when the anti-reform discontent becomes active and wide-spread, the passive dissatisfaction, even quite democratic, may turn to be an involuntary ally of the “eternally obsolete”.
The active democratic discontent makes a different impact on the course of social development. When the disagreement with the methods and character of the implementation of transformations—given the approval of the goals—turns into organized action. Essential changes in the authorities’ real politics are quite possible as a result. As history shows, in epochs of radical transformations the authorities do their best to realize the reform strivings in conditions when the social “middle”, while supporting the main direction of transformations, simultaneously exerts sensitive pressure on the groups that conduct them, compelling the elites to make maximum account of social justice and the interests of the masses. By the way, given the significant development of active democratic discontent, the passive democratic dissatisfaction also becomes an effective factor of alleviation and acceleration of transformations because this latter (and other trends of passive discontent) intensifies the active democratic discontent. In this respect, the interaction of passive and active moods of the democratic and anti-democratic character is quite symmetrical.
Naturally, on sharp historical turns the active democratic discontent hides quite significant danger to the socium—there is always a danger that organized actions will turn into spontaneous turmoil, social chaos or anomie which sometimes are worse than any cruel authoritarianism. Above that, in society in which different social forces and various currents of mass consciousness interact permanently the active democratic discontent may promote the intensification of the pressure of antidemocratic discontent. In particular, according to the greater part of the Russian democratic public such a menace existed during the 1996 Presidential election. For that reason, the assessment of the leading long-term tendencies does not replace thorough observation of the particular situations. But the diversity of such situations does not mean that the major tendencies and their assessment are not significant at all.
In short, the consequences of mass social discontent in the near future directly depend on what currents of it will become predominant. From the angle of the individual who is convinced that it is necessary to reject state socialism and go over to the market-democratic capitalist (better—postcapitalist) evolution these consequences may be assessed in the following way:
Anyway, the hope of getting an exact prognosis which of the currents of discontent will take the upper hand in the nearest future is insignificantly small. And the point is not in the fact that the processes of mass consciousness are contradictory and the information about them is scarce and not quite reliable and the opportunities of analysts are limited although this is also true. The main obstacle is the objective complexity of the current Russian situation and the presence of multifarious contradictory circumstances which both promote and impede the growth of each of the types of social discontent described above.
It is clear that Russia has a mighty historical tradition of patience and paternalistic hope that people’s life problems will be solved by a certain external, supreme force—authorities, a party of the “new type”, the state, “the coming of Varangians”, and the like. All conditions being equal, this tradition raises the probability of development of passive discontent. But at the same time, our history is typically characterized by the fact that in times of system crises the patient passivity unexpectedly turns into a boiling turmoil. Anyway, the extrapolation of past experiences is not very fruitful for the assessment of future opportunities. The current crisis is taking place in an utterly different country which is hardly alike the country that went through past turmoil, even those of the 20th century. It is exactly the latter quarter of our century that turned Russia from a peasant country into an urban, worker country in which the population in its majority graduated from high school, in which tens of millions of people have higher education. It is very likely that this new country will react quite differently to the upheavals than the former Russia. The more so, it does not take the activity of the majority to go over from the predominantly passive discontent to the predominantly active one. It will be enough if the majority merely follows the active nucleus.
It is even more difficult to take into account the correlation of factors which determine the direction of discontent. The leading role among such factors may be played not only by self-evident circumstances, like changes in the economy, which lie on the surface. Undoubtedly, as has been said, the economic revival and the related rise in well-being are capable of alleviating the masses’ discontent while the continuation of a decline or stagnation may aggravate it. But purely economic, material processes, changing the intensity of discontent and influencing in that sense the elections, can hardly change in full measure the emotional attitude towards the reforms, let alone the attitude at subconscious level. Apart from direct burdens, the social climate in equal measure (if not in greater) is created by the wide-spread system of values. Its stability over the span of human life motivates the preservation of discontent till the generation change. The unusual orders that emerge appear for consciousness not merely a prerequisite of preserving dissatisfaction but a reason for the fact that dissatisfaction turns more often against reforms as such than against awkward methods or wrong ways of their implementation. To put it another way, the lack of correspondence between the traditional values and the new life order is a mighty factor which instigate the long predominance of anti-reform discontent per se.
At the same time, Russian society is also moved by opposite sociopsychological mechanisms. The share of youth whose orientations and values are forming today grows in a natural manner. The modern competitive orders and ideals are organic and habitual for young people and, therefore, their discontent is directed not so much against the transformations as against the methods of their implementation.
The major part of the most culturally advanced strata of society gravitates to a similar type of “pro-reformist” discontent. One should take into account that value shifts go easier and faster among people who have higher education, especially in conditions of modern towns. For that reason, the departure from the values of state socialism began yet in Soviet times, in the time of the “thaw”, what regards a part of the intelligentsia and residents of the capital cities or megalopolises. Of course, many new orders, customs and regulations, especially those which stem from the elements of early, or “wild” capitalism which are quite strong now, are not to their liking. So, discontent is typical of these groups, too, the more so that they experience the material troubles of the transitional crisis in full measure. However, many people from the highly educated and urbanized environment who clearly understand, and feel, the boons of the freedom of speech, free activity, open frontiers experience a relaxation related to the release from the iron burden of total compulsion and etatization. What is ever more important is that these categories of citizens manifest a stronger ability to rationally realize their position and the developments around them. Contrary to emotions and habits, the rational beginning of world perception is more likely a factor of changes. The discontent here, more often than in other sectors of society, manifests itself in the form of dissatisfaction with that how in particular the reforms are being implemented.
There is no saying that the current difficulties are perceived in the same manner (although sometimes for other reasons) by that part of the population which succeeded in adapting to the developments and improve its social and material position. I shall emphasize that I do not mean the power elite or those few new rich (there are several thousand families of them) but an embryo of the middle class which envelops now, as some believe, from one fifth to one tenth of an almost 150-million nation. 4
The predominance of democratic or, rather, pro-reformist dissatisfaction among the youth, the intelligentsia, the urbanist and comparatively well fixed media is manifested by regular and representative polls by ARCIPO. We can find out of them that the majority of the population is not satisfied with today’s life (at least, they feel the absence of satisfaction); it is true that some groups to a greater extent, others to a smaller. People in such polled categories as youth have higher education, they are in a favorable material position, satisfied with their life today, they amount roughly to 15-30%, and 40-50% are not satisfied (others are partly satisfied, partly are not). Among the rest of the population the share of those who are satisfied with their life does not reach 10%, 60-70% are not satisfied. So, the number of those who are not satisfied in all categories is significantly greater than the number of those who are satisfied. The majority of the youth, the intelligentsia and well fixed residents of big cities are sure that the market system is in principle more preferable than the administrative-planning one (about 50% against 15-25%) and that the current reforms should be continued (over 50% against 25-30%). At the same time, the composition of the non-youth, less educated and less favorable part of the population includes more those who begin to speak in the polls of the recent years about the advantages of the planning economy as compared with the market (about 40% against 20-30%); respectively, there is no solid predominance of the advocates of the continuation of the reforms here (about 25-30% of each speak “for” and “against” such a continuation).
The connection between education, urbanization, youth and enterprise, and the support of the market is also traced in many other polls—it should be regarded as one of the few surely established regularities of the current social situation. Therefore, one may assert that both types of discontent will develop in the near future: those who negate the use of the market transition as such and those who reject any particular ways and methods of such a transition. It is true that the total number of the youth, the intelligentsia, residents of big cities and people in general who live in relatively favorable conditions (these are mostly the crossing categories) is 2-3 times smaller than the number of people of middle and elder age who have no higher education, reside outside big cities and whose material position is quite poor. 5 Of course, the influence of young, well-bred and dynamic people on society’s climate exceeds far more their number.
The leading role of the culturally most developed and most urbanized groups of people in the formation of mass consciousness is quite evident. What regards the youth and those who are well fixed they, of course, do not often become the most influential social forces. The significance of the youth usually rises particularly in the epochs of stormy transformation because of a special social demand for the properties they have—energy, enterprise, resolution, adventurism if one wishes, and the inclination to risk. It is likely that such properties in such times are needed more than the experience and traditional conservatism of the elder generations. Partly this refers to the averagely fixed strata, too—usually, in periods of radical changes a higher level of living is not inherited and is not given as an award for conformism and obedience (as it happens in stable epochs) but it is reached by way of one’s will, character, energy, talent and persistence. Alas, these properties in the time of transition are often combined with the relaxation (and sometimes with total absence) of moral restraints, enormous egoism and machiavellianism in means.
It will not be an exaggeration to regard that a higher social potential of the groups that tend to the modernization and pro-reformist dissatisfaction balances in the whole the quantitative predominance of anti-democratic, anti-reformist discontent. The more so that the numerical overbalance of those disappointed in the market manifests itself mostly at the cost of those who are passively dissatisfied. In this case, the factors that motivate various variants of changes in social dissatisfaction are balanced. If it is impossible in the nearest years to eliminate broad social dissatisfaction, it is equally probable that the passive discontent, active anti-reformist discontent or active pro-reformist discontent will take the upper hand in mass consciousness.
Unfortunately, such an equilibrium can hardly bring about a stable sociopsychological situation. Of course, by itself the broad dissemination of discontent and the presence of passive and active anti-reformist and pro-reformist currents in it create stable features of mass consciousness in transitional Russia. However, fast changes in the comparative dissemination of the said currents, fast replacement of passive dissatisfaction with active, transition from discontent with the methods of implementing transformations to the negation of the very essence of reforms, and the other way around—this wave-like nature of particular moods proceeds from the equilibrium of factors. They determine the variants of sociopsychological development with the same inevitability with which the stability of discontent as such proceeds from the...hardships of the transition time and the generation nature of values. Besides, the easiness of the radical change in the states of mass consciousness, its dangerous instability which is multiplied many times by the contradiction of the current objective position of the majority. If the living conditions of about one tenth of the population improved during the last decade, those of one third aggravated, and those of one half of the population changed in such a way that some living circumstances improved while others worsened. It is more than probable that the moods in such conditions will change instantaneously.
So, the assertions of “the irreversibility of market democratic” (or semi-democratic) changes that are now wide-spread have a quite conventional sense. A very fast restoration (for one or two years) of the state socialist system is indeed hardly possible. However, the “creeping” advent to power of the forces that try to restore state socialism or establish other forms of authoritarianism, and which is motivated by the whims of unstable mass moods and the growth of anti-reformist discontent is quite possible, even in the course of the next cycle of parliamentary-presidential elections. Although it is also possible that the fundamentals of democracy will be consolidated in the coming electoral cycle—in case of the growth in discontent of the pro-reformist character. It is even more possible that passive indifference will grow, promoting the preservation of current semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian, semi-market oriented, and semi-bureaucratic orders. In this respect, the sociopsychological and political situation in 1999-2000 will not differ too much from the situation in 1995-1996.
The prognostic conclusions that proceed from the complexity and contradictions of the transition period are dual in character.
On the one hand, the rational analysis allows us to surely single out (of course, within the margins of reliability of any rational approach) the possible from the impossible in the evolution of Russian mass consciousness. Possibly, the “normalization” of the sociopsychological state, that is the attainment of predominant satisfaction, the perception of the social system as “legitimate”, approved by the popular majority, is impossible before the generations replace each other. What is quite possible is the dissemination of various kinds of mass discontent of the opposite political direction: from patient and uncertain feeling that everything goes “wrong” to acute, active indignation; from the rejection of the market modernization per se and the disagreement with the negation of state socialism with all its values to the dissatisfaction with insufficiently active measures to overcome it and the discontent with the inconsequent, incomplete character of democratic market innovations.
On the other hand, the same analysis does not give ground to say which of the variants of sociopsychological dissatisfaction will become predominant in the near future, and, in particular, over the span of the coming electoral cycle. No sums of money invested in election campaigns, no manipulations of mass media with all their undoubted significance can guarantee a desired result.
But that does not at all mean that the attempts to influence the public mood are fruitless. Quite to the contrary: since the mighty objective factors balance each other in most cases—for instance, the market transformations are accepted only by the minority of society but, in turn, this minority concentrates the most active, young and well-bred part of people—it is for that reason that subjective conscious actions can exert very effective influence on mass consciousness.
There is no need to dwell in detail how the beginning of somewhat stable and palpable economic growth can alleviate discontent, even without eliminating it fully. I shall note at this point that the character of economic rise may be different, depending on many circumstances, including political decisions. The reduction of mass discontent may be promoted only by the type of growth, orientated on the whole to a rise in payment for labor and ensurance of employment which will lead to the immediate improvement of the everyday life of the majority. The capital-intensive and labor-saving type of growth, promoting the technical progress in the remote future, may give the opposite result in the near perspective. In general, in connection with the prospects of development of mass consciousness, it would be wise to think of such things to which the attention is drawn least of all—of the importance of the system of non-economic, sociopolitical, sociocultural, and sociopsychological actions which can improve the mass moods, alleviate the coming of millions of people into new, unusual life.
The primary role may belong in this case to the account of psychological factors which multiply many times the subjective experience of both the negative and positive changes of the objective character. On the average, the delay in payments reduces the annual fund of payment of labor by 5-10% but because of its brash illegality which insults the elementary feeling of justice and which encroaches upon man’s dignity it causes greater indignation than inflation although the latter took annually 20-30% of real income. 6 If the practice of non-payment is continued further on, it is quite likely that it will turn to be an outbreak of mass spontaneous turmoil of unbelievable force and, it is not excluded, of quite irrational character. On the contrary, the elimination of arrears of salaries and wages and an improvement in pension payments (like in 1997), for the same sociopsychological reasons, can reduce discontent to a much greater extent than the usual return to norm and an increase in payments by one tenth (the figure statistically corresponds to the liquidation of arrears of labor payments). The reformation of the pension system and the housing and communal establishment which more likely will be done in the coming years may bring about many other situations in which the “disturbing” influence of sociopsychological factors will also be greater than the economic consequences proper if the reformers ignore these factors again.
No less impact may be exerted on the general outline of mass consciousness by the broad dissemination of knowledge about how the everyday life in market society is organized and how an individual should behave himself in it. It is understood that the full mastering of this “knowledge and abilities” which can be compared with the assimilation of new values will be reached in the generations to come (actually, knowledge and values are different components of the single process). However, we can already now reduce the “incomprehension” of new everyday realities and help people to adapt in unusual conditions by means of such cognition.
Above that, the transformation of the incomprehensible into that which can be understood, even if the explication in no way influences the material position, in any case diminishes the mental strain, reduces phobias that inevitably emerge when the individual has no (even simplified) idea of the mechanisms of the surrounding life. For instance, the mass explanation of the circumstance that the life-long (and even “inherited”) employment at the same enterprise which was wide-spread in the past now becomes rather an exclusion, and, on the contrary, that the re-qualification in the periods of searching for a job turns to be a norm which requires respective “life abilities”—such an explanation, without alleviating unemployment (other means are used for this purpose), may impart a somewhat less sad or hopeless character to social moods connected with it. In that sense, social education, together with political, is an effective means of adaptation of people’s majority to the changes in their life, raising the probability that the reforms will go on in the situation of moderate discontent and relative social...composure.
Finally, the most important in which the conscious impact of reformist forces may manifest itself on the correlation of social moods in the nearest years. In real, it is not the direct influence “from top” that may bring a serious result in this case. Head-long calls and explanations from anyone are not capable of convincing society in the advantages of the critical attitude to reality, even one that supports reforms. (Of course, this also refers to the agitation with the opposite sign: the slogans of the “implacable” will invoke no less anti-reform activity than the arguments in favor of the reforms.) Durable changes in the structure of people’s dissatisfaction, in particular, the resolute consolidation in it of active discontent with that how the reforms are being conducted, can be reached only within the framework of democratic social movements. It is only systematic participation of the major part of the population in such movements, rather than artful TV manipulations or agitation and propaganda actions of electoral headquarters, that can impart a solid democratic and pro-reformist direction to discontent.
So that the shifts in social moods could acquire somewhat mass amplitude we must develop such movements and other types of social activity which are felt (or could be felt) by people’s majority as their own, connected with everyday life of the man in the street. Given the particular historical conditions of modern Russia overburdened with official hypocrisy, populism and public disappointment, it is not likely that political parties will be able to play such a role in the near future. They will hardly be able to become effective unless they are formed from bottom, unless they hinge on undercurrent social movements which are by nature called upon to defend and express the interests and needs of common people in their everyday labor and life.
In current Russian life such are by their function trade unions, cooperation, societies protecting consumers, law-protecting associations, committees of soldiers’ mothers, housing communities, ecological formations, and the like. One should admit that the real authority of many such organizations among the citizens, their actual appurtenance to the popular medium is very weak so far. However, social movements can become quite mass and even all-national. For that reason, conscious effort to develop such movements and realize their opportunities is one of the principal trends to social progress and the formation of civil society.
It is particularly the social movements and organizations that are capable of changing and accumulating the currents of mass consciousness to impart the constructive democratic character to the inevitable discontent of the majority of people. Apart from that, they also form ground for the health politicization of masses and building a multi-party system. As is known, it is particularly the parties that are the principal institutional instrument for transferring social contradictions and discontent to the field of politics. According to the observations of political scientists, the heterogeneity of the class composition of parties allows us to diminish significantly the intensity of socioeconomic contradictions in society. 7
It is understood that social movements (like political, too) can acquire an anti-democratic direction. Threats of that kind are evidently felt in certain Cossack, ethnic, religious and public associations, that is in movements that are capable of expressing mass hopes and receiving broad support, having a high social potential. Although not a single movement—neither trade unions, nor ecologists, nor local self-government—is insured against the emergence of reactionary bias.
And in general, a self-made movement may become dangerous if it goes beyond the limits of legality to become a self-sufficient force which violates democratic order. In the final count, all depends not so much on the leaders as on activists and the rank and file of these movements, that is on ourselves, on the predominance of good or evil, wisdom or madness in our souls and minds.
Translated by Valery Yasinsky
Endnotes
*: D.Sc. (History), professor, head of the section of social-labor research at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS. The article is abridged. It was published fully in Russian in the journal POLIS, No. 3, 1998. Back.
Note 1: Ekonomitcheskie i sotsialnye peremeny, 1997, No. 1, pp. 49-50; No. 5, pp. 47-48. Back.
Note 2: To my mind, we shall recall one conclusion made by Alexis de Tocqueville on the eve of the Great French Revolution in his L’Ancien Regime et la Revolution. He wrote that “popular indignation” gets aflame not at all when the position of masses is most unbearable but when this position becomes better after the long-term suppression. As has been rightly noted in our literature, this “law of Tocqueville” evidently fails to correspond to Lenin’s scheme of the emergence of “a revolutionary situation”. (See M.I.Lapitsky. “The Far—the Near. Notes on Tocqueville.” POLIS, 1993, No. 3, pp. 127-129). Back.
Note 3: See, for instance, “A Rigid Course”. An analytical note on the conception of the transition to the market economy in the USSR. Vek XX i mir. 1990, No. 6, pp. 15-19. Back.
Note 4: Monitoring obshchestvennogo mnenia. 1998, No. 1. Back.
Note 5: Rossiysky statistichesky ezhegodnik. 1997. Moscow, Goskomstat, 1997, pp. 75-83, 181-183. Back.
Note 6: Sotsialno-trudovye issledovania. Issue VII, Moscow, IWEIR (the Institute of World Economy and International Relations), RAS, 1997, pp. 78-91. Back.
Note 7: See, for instance, A.Leiphart. Democracy in Multicomponent Societies. A Comparative Survey. Moscow, 1997, pp. 120-124 (in Russian). Back.