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Social Sciences
Vol. 30, No. 3/September 1999
Coevolution of Nature and Society: A Practical Proposition?
By Viktor Danilov-Danilyan
The problem of averting an ecological or biospheric catastrophe and effecting a transition to sustainable development (the global ecological problem) is, without question, more grandiose than any that man has ever encountered in the course of his evolution. Never before has there existed such a wide gap between the scope of the problem and the available opportunities for solving it.
Although over the past 40 years, counting from the 1960s (when the global ecological problem began to be articulated in scientific publications and discussions), there has undoubtedly been some progress in creating an intellectual field of this problem, physically almost nothing has been achieved: the isolated breakthroughs are negligible in comparison with the increase of the destructive effect on the biosphere exerted by civilization over that period. But 40 years, however short they may seem in comparison with astronomical, geological and even historical epochs, is a period that is probably comparable to the time that separates us from the outset of irreversible degradation of the biosphere (if, of course, it has not already begun).
Studies of the global ecological problem are becoming increasingly diversified. Judging formally, by the structure of the stream of publications, diversification is occurring mainly through interdisciplinary activity and expansion of the range of relevant material accumulated by the social sciences–economics, sociology, history and especially the numerous attempts at philosophical generalization of the findings of the natural sciences.
In a way, all this is very similar to the noise that accompanied the rapid advancement of cybernetics, the information science and the theory of systems between the late 1940s and early 1960s. Much of what had, at that time, appeared to be the most encouraging proved superfluous and has been reposing in archives for a quarter of a century, finding almost no demand. The founder of the information theory Claude E. Shannon foresaw this and called the hullabaloo around the new disciplines the “band wagon effect”, borrowing the term from American election campaigns of those years.
Such close attention to the new scientific trend precludes unambiguous evaluation. On the one hand, public interest is aroused, but on the other, quick “overheating” usually ends in quick and undeserved “cooling”. Attempts at various generalizations and extrapolations stimulate research but may drown both pressing scientific issues and long-term results in verbiage. And maybe the most important thing is that a gap is forming between the rates of advancement of the natural sciences and the philosophical-methodological superstructure which appears over it extra quickly. It makes an unpleasant impression that there is a shortage of concrete knowledge, which is an additional incentive for only a few and a source of mistrust for the majority.
As the history of science shows, mutually exclusive approaches to a problem can coexist for a while, until exhaustive arguments in favor of one and against the other have been found. Sometimes, there occurs a synthesis of what originally seemed essentially incompatible (a classical example is “unification” of the corpuscular and the wave theories of light). But, in any case, it would be useful to determine which postulates do not fit into any logically non-controversial system and which are compatible, at least formally. Frequently, collisions of concepts and approaches are caused by a difference in the interpretation of the same terms; in this case, it is useful to ascertain the meaning put into them.
This is the stand from which I will try to examine the concept of coevolution as applied to the interaction of nature and society, proposing to ascertain its relation to the analysis of the global ecological problem in the case of various interpretations (known to me), and in passing, to comment on the concepts of the noosphere, noospherogenesis, and anthropocentrism, also in the context of the global ecological problem, without leaving the intellectual field determined by this problem.
Academician N. Moiseev writes: “The term ‘noosphere’ has gained wide currency but is interpreted differently by different authors. This is why in the late 1960s I began to use the term ‘the epoch of the noosphere’. This is how I called the stage of human history (anthropogenesis, if you will), when man’s collective reason and collective will prove able to ensure joint development (coevolution) of nature and society. Mankind is part of the biosphere, and implementation of the principle of coevolution is a necessary condition of securing the future of man.”
He goes on to say: “In Rio-de-Janeiro, an attempt was made to formulate some common stand, some shared behavioral pattern for the planetary community, which came to be known as sustainable development.” In Moiseev’s view, it is closest to the term “coevolution of man and the biosphere”, which is why he regards the drafting of a sustainable development strategy as “a step towards the epoch of the noosphere, that is, a step on the way of noospherogenesis.” 1
Analyzing this terminological abundance, one cannot help asking: is the concept the epoch of the noosphere clearer and less ambiguous than the noosphere? Unfortunately, literature on the subject does not provide any definite indications of the time of the advent or existence of the noosphere. Neither shall we find any convincing criteria of “noosphere-ism”, not counting the attempts to identify or link up this concept with others, which have a later origin or qualitatively different source, the way Moiseev does it.
Also, there appears a temptation to use the so-called Ockham’s razor (a medieval philosopher who warned against unnecessary generation of new essences). Why should we need the term coevolution of man and nature or nature and society if it is identical with the term sustainable development, which is used throughout the world? However, the general interpretation of the term coevolution prevents me from accepting the alleged identity.
The idea of coevolution has become fashionable; there are already at least two Russian-language works dealing with it. 2 , 3 Originally, the term was necessary to designate the mutual adaptation of biological species. Then it became clear that it aptly conveyed a broader range of phenomena: co-development of the interacting elements of a single system, naturally enough, one that develops (so long as its elements develop) and preserves its integrity for at least as long as is required to raise the issue of coevolution in it. The co-evolving elements are, of course, themselves systems and are regarded as such during the study of their co-development.
E. Odum in his Foundations of Ecology 4 identified nine types of interaction of populations, and all nine can, with more or less reason, be regarded as a version of coevolution. The more interesting, “undegenerate” types of coevolution imply a closing up of two connected evolving systems–not, however, gradual merger into a single, common image (convergence) but mutual adaptation, when a change occurring in one system triggers off such a change in the other that would not produce undesirable, let alone unacceptable consequences for the first system. Such cases necessarily imply a certain (relative) symmetry, comparability, equality of the status of the evolving systems. There is no point discussing in general terms what “undesirable” and “unacceptable” means; it would be easier to define this ad hoc, in each individual case.
Analyzing the possibility of coevolution of nature and society, we are faced with a task so specific that there is no use trying to classify it. It is an event of the utmost complexity (at least in biological and social terms), which requires separate examination. Also, of great importance is the goal for the sake of which the issue of coevolution of the biosphere and man has been raised: solution of the global ecological problem, with coevolution acting as a means or as a form of such solution or even as its definition.
So how can one interpret coevolution of nature and society, the biosphere and man? In a variety of ways, depending on the interpretation of, above all, the former element of these conjunctions and the character of interaction between their two elements. The first postulate (using Moiseev’s definition) would hardly raise objections on the part of those who recognize at least the existence of the global ecological problem: mankind is part of the biosphere. This obvious postulate emphasizes the asymmetry of the “man–the biosphere” relationship and, if for this reason alone, makes one doubt that the very formulation of the issue of coevolution of the biosphere and man is justifiable.
However, using a bit of coercion against common sense (scientific knowledge does not always imply it), one may assume, in purely theoretical terms, that coevolution of a part and of the whole is possible. One may refer to an analogy with mathematics, where a particular case is sometimes equivalent to the whole, power of the subset is equal to power of the set, etc., although such analogies are not quite correct because they apply to ideal constructs and not to real systems. To examine this theoretical possibility as applied to our subject, we should specify what is the biosphere and its evolution, as well as the evolution of man (society).
I know of just one satisfactory definition of the biosphere: it is a system that incorporates the biota (i.e., all living organisms, including humans) and its environment (i.e., all the objects that experience the influence of the biota and/or influence the latter–the classical systemic definition of environment). This definition is not absolutely rigid, because it uses the term influence, which needs to be specified–this, however, can only be done ad hoc.
In accordance with the formulation of the global ecological problem, we shall concern ourselves with those influences of the biota upon the environment and vice versa which have relevance (directly or indirectly) for the survival of man as a biological species, for the preservation, reproduction of human society and civilization (its organizational form may be significantly transformed, but the use of the terms society, civilization should be justified). This is the stand from which we shall evaluate the changes in the biosphere and society as acceptable or unacceptable, desirable or undesirable.
The primary role in the evolution of the biosphere belongs to the biota: it is commensurate with the importance of the functions performed by the system of living organisms in the formation of rocks, the soil, the atmosphere and the ocean, although the contribution of abiotic factors should not be denied or underestimated. The evolution of the biota takes place through species formation; due to the systemic organization of the biota, the disappearance of a species or the appearance of a new species practically always causes a wave of specific changes in the ecosystems to which the given species is related (its “ecological niche”). Estimates of the rates of this process have been made. According to the data of paleontology, the average longevity of a species is three million years. The current view is that natural formation of a new biological species takes at least 10,000 years. These figures are unlikely to have changed over the past hundreds of millions of years.
Throughout the evolution of human society, Homo sapiens as a biological species retains its genetic constants thanks to the interdependent processes of the evolution of the social structures, public mentality, production systems, science and technology, material and spiritual culture. Of primary interest in the analysis of coevolutionary issues is the humans’ influence upon the biosphere and the qualitative character, type and structure of this influence change, first of all, in consequence of scientific and technological advances, technoevolution. The latter takes place through the process of innovation, which in some senses resembles species formation in the biota.
Like the biota, material production and its management have a systemic (spontaneously formed) organization; innovation, that is, the emergence of a new element of production technology or management and, equally, refusal to use some element (which is, in fact, also innovation) usually produce a wave of other innovations in the relevant “technological niche”. But unlike bioevolution, the rate of technoevolution is steadily increasing: now, at the end of the 20th century, the innovation cycle in the advanced industries takes approximately 10 years.
Given this vast difference in the rates of bioevolution and technoevolution, (of ten orders of magnitude) is it justifiable to refer to coevolution of nature and man? Can the biosphere respond to innovations in man’s realm by producing new biological species adapted to the consequences of these innovations, to the new character and/or scope of the influence upon it? Of course not.
Would such (hypothetical) responses of the biosphere to anthropogenic influences be desirable to humans? Apparently, the answer is yes: would one mind the appearance of bacteria decomposing polyethylene, quickly transforming mountains of empty tin cans into bauxites or nephelines, reliably protecting soil against overacidity, etc.?
Are there anthropogenic influences upon the biosphere that are unacceptable to humans? Of course: we all know of both local consequences of environmental degradation, which causes an unacceptable rise of morbidity, mortality and genetic defects, and regional consequences, e.g., desertification, which puts in question the very survival of whole ethnic groups. As for the threat of global consequences, it is still underestimated by most people, mainly because there is still no confirmed data about the number of deaths and disability cases due to these consequences, no verified statistics, no opportunity to show all this on television. It is a tremendous risk to wait for statistical and televised proof that this threat is tragically serious so as to finally begin taking drastic steps to deal with the global ecological problem.
Will man be able to accelerate species formation in the biota to “reinforce” its capacity for coevolution (e.g., by creating new species or, which is in fact the same thing, by targeted impact upon the genetic system of naturally formed species)? This formulation of the issue a la Jules Verne is sure to be engaging the imagination of some most zealous adepts of scientific and technological progress.
It is not a purpose of this article to discuss the probable (and most likely unavoidable) horrendous consequences of the introduction into the natural biota of organisms with a man-made genetic structure: just the opposite, not to deviate from our stated goals, we shall have to ignore such consequences. Since we are discussing only whether it is justifiable to apply the term coevolution to the development of nature and society, it is enough to mention that this possibility, once implemented, would mean an end of the natural evolution of the biosphere and the transformation of the biota into a system which is purposefully regulated by man. But then it would be pointless to discuss coevolution of the biosphere and man, as it would be pointless to talk about coevolution of a car and its owner, although in this case, too, the former does not always do what the latter wants.
So if we view the development of the biosphere primarily as evolution of its biotic subsystem, the difference in the rates of bioevolution and technoevolution would make it pointless and controversial to formulate the issue of coevolution of the biosphere and man. Would this conclusion be different if one examined development over relatively short stretches, in which case species formation would remain outside the field of vision? The answer is no. To prove this, let us take a look at the systemic-cybernetic views of the biosphere and the theory of biotic regulation of the environment.
The evolution of the biosphere over the period of human history has often been the object of scientific analysis. Summing up the accumulated material was one of the purposes of the work by Arsky et al. 5 Its main conclusion is neither new nor unexpected, although the majority is not yet fully aware that all human activity after man had learnt to use fire and passed on from hunting and berry-picking to land cultivation and cattle breeding was, as far as the biosphere is concerned, disturbance.
The reaction of any system to disturbance depends on the latter’s magnitude, on whether it is lower or higher than the system’s threshold of response. In the former case, the system uses its compensation mechanisms to suppress the adverse consequences and, usually, the source of the disturbance itself, but in the latter, it begins to disintegrate, becomes degraded. Up to a certain point it may preserve a capacity for self-restoration, but once beyond it, irreversible processes begin which either destroy or change the system in principle: it degenerates, acquires a new quality.
The quality of a system can be described using quantitative parameters as well. Of course, they are often absolutely insufficient for obtaining an adequate description, especially in the case of social systems, everything connected with man. Nevertheless, it is quantitative parameters, provided they are competently chosen (essential, focal, critical, vital, etc.–the selection is based on quite a number of attributes), that serve as a reliable reference point when recording and examining the processes and events mentioned in the previous paragraph.
When a system functions normally (to be more precise, when its state is undisturbed), the values of the essential (let us use this term) parameters remain within certain boundaries. In the case of disturbances that do not exceed the system’s stability threshold, its compensation mechanisms keep the values of these parameters within these boundaries. The latter belong to the characteristics of the system’s quality. A system’s degeneration means a transition to new stability, a revision of the scope of the allowable changes of the essential parameters (and maybe a different set of parameters).
These systemic-cybernetic postulates, as well as the principle of homeostasis and Le Chatelier’s principle applied along with them, are widely known from their numerous applications in a broad variety of fields of science and technology. But it is extremely difficult to decide how to apply them to the global ecological problem, how to identify the essential parameters of the biosphere, the boundaries of their allowable changes, the biosphere’s threshold of resistance to disturbance. One must determine first of all where lies the systemic nature of the biosphere and how this property, which in this case is almost self-evident in terms of the modern man’s common sense, can be described in scientific terms, making the broadest possible use of quantitative methods.
Let us take, for example, the issue of new stability which a system acquires after above-threshold disturbances. It would be natural to continue the reasoning in the following way: the new boundaries of allowable changes cannot possibly be acceptable to all elements (e.g., biological species) and subsystems (e.g., communities of organisms) of a system in the process of transformation; some of them are doomed to annihilation, and others to degeneration, acquisition of a new quality, although some may survive the transformation.
However, as applied to the biota, this outcome (which is, on the whole, optimistic enough) may not take place precisely because of its high systemic organization. The death of a biological species due to external causes is an event of disorganization, and our knowledge about the biota is absolutely insufficient for determining where the disorganization wave caused by this event will stop, how many other species will disappear from the scene of life, in which succession, and how quickly.
Would the action of this wave be confined to just one species, or would it wash away communities of organisms, devastating the environmental niches of whole ecosystems? Or, having combined with many other such waves, it would spread to the entire biosphere? Could humans find themselves among the vulnerable, internally unstable species if such changes take place? Or maybe no species would prove invulnerable? Any adaptation reaction takes time. The anthropogenic effect upon the biosphere may have already reached a threshold where not a single adaptation reaction is completed before a new effect that needs adaptation has begun. We do not know how to answer these questions, and only extreme naivite gives us unreasoning hope that things will some way or other sort themselves out.
One can only wonder at how few studies attempt to deal with these issues. Among the theories that have been advanced, V. Gorshkov’s theory of biotic regulation of the environment stands out thanks to its logic, consistency, well-founded conclusions, depth of analysis and the amount of “processed” material. 6 And, although his theory has been subjected to criticism, the latter is much less convincing than its target. Besides, there is nothing to outweigh the theory of biotic regulation: there is no other scientific concept that contains a system of logically uncontroversial answers to the broad range of questions generated by the global ecological problem.
Under the theory of biotic regulation, since the moment of its emergence, the biota not so much adapted to the environment as exerted a powerful formative influence upon it, which increased as the biota developed. A regulated environment was formed under its impact, while the biota’s regulatory mechanisms developed simultaneously. As a result, a highly organized system came into being: the biosphere, where adequate mutual adjustment of the flows of biogenes (substances which take part in the functioning of the biota) ensures an unprecedentedly high precision of the regulation of all parameters significant to the biota (physical and chemical characteristics of the climate, atmosphere, soil, surface water of dry land and the World Ocean) within a broad range of perturbation variation.
They may be broad, but they are not infinite. That is the first point. The second is that to perform regulatory functions with respect to the formed environment, the biota should have a definite stable inner structure described through the distribution of the whole biomass, energy flows and biogenes by groups of organisms. Gorshkov aptly called the properties of these characteristics the laws of biospheric stability. Third, to maintain a high regulatory capacity (both for reacting to the well-known disturbances and to the new types, for which compensation mechanisms have not yet been developed), the biosphere should have a wide diversity of biological species (biological diversity).
Up to the mid-19th century, the human-induced disturbances of the biosphere did not exceed the permissible limits, the structure of the biota stayed within the boundaries determined by the laws of biospheric stability, and the loss of diversity was insignificant. But about a century ago, mankind, which was increasing the scope of its activity and its number at an unheard-of rate, crossed` the threshold of permissible influence upon the biosphere, distorted the structure of relations in the biota and caused biological diversity to decrease to a dangerous degree. These phenomena and processes are progressing; the biosphere has made the transition to a permanently disturbed state.
The epoch of global ecological crisis has begun. Its registered and generally known manifestations include a reduction of biological diversity, deforestation, desertification, degradation of surface waters, disappearance of whole ecosystems from the face of the Earth, higher concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and depletion of the ozone layer.
Although this view is not universally shared, there are no works containing convincing arguments in favor of the opinion that continuation of these processes would be harmless for humans, that the latter would survive in the deteriorating environment and that there is no need to revise the current development route of civilization.
Obviously, there is no reason to call the present type of interaction between civilization and the biosphere coevolution. But what can replace it if man manages to break the inertia of spontaneous, uncontrollable population and economic growth and destruction of nature? There are two main views on this issue.
The first and more generally accepted one (not because it is better substantiated, which it is not, but because it is more consistent with the traditional views and the standard interpretation of human interest) can be called technicist. Its advocates pin their hopes on the scientific and technological advances as the way of solving the global ecological problem. But what, in principle, can be expected from technology and machinery in this case? Just one thing, obviously: partial or complete replacement of the biota in the regulation of the natural environment.
Consequently, one has to compare the potential of the biota with the real and potential opportunities open to technology. Gorshkov made such a comparison and concluded that the information flow processed by the biota as it performs its regulatory function exceeds the foreseeable technological potential of civilization by 15 orders of magnitude. He also proved that even if mankind managed to cope with all the scientific and technological problems and built a system (technosphere) that would in actual fact replace the biosphere, it would consume 99% of civilization’s labor and energy resources.
But, as applied to the global ecological problem, the main thing is not the efficiency of such a system and its competitive capacity with respect to the natural biota (of course, applying human criteria). Much more important is that mankind has no time to build such a system: the prospects of its construction are incomparably more distant and vague than the threat of the ecological crisis becoming a biospheric catastrophe.
One may build speculative structures for partial replacement of the biota’s regulatory functions using technical systems not necessarily implying that, in time, these structures would form a technogenic surrogate of the biosphere. The reflections of the previous paragraph may, with simple modifications, be reproduced in application to such abstract structures as well. Besides, they have something that is anti-systemic in principle: it is proposed to gradually replace a system that is incomprehensible to us not only as regards its structure at operational level and the interaction of its subsystems, but also a body of data that we need just to approach what in the lingo of modern technical design is called “drafting technical specifications”. To launch a spontaneous process without a comprehensive plan, even if we intend to develop a detailed one in the course of its implementation, would be absolutely inadequate to the set issue.
In any case, should we accept the “technicist” viewpoint (even if we allow the slightest possibility of its implementation), there is nothing even distantly resembling coevolution of man and the biosphere.
What is the other viewpoint? Its supporters (including the author of this piece) proceed from the assumption that it is both impossible and pointless to transfer the biota’s regulatory functions to technical systems and believe that the global ecological problem should be solved reducing the anthropogenic load on the biosphere to the level at which it would return to and stay in the equilibrium state because the regulatory capacity of the biota would be sufficient for maintaining it (this limit is called the economic capacity of the biosphere). Meeting this condition is the criterion of sustainable development. Needless to say, the transition to such development mode calls for radical changes in human civilization, in all aspects of man’s vital activity.
The trend of civilization’s evolution during and after the transition to sustainable development would, of course, have to change: it is incompatible with blind anthropocentrism, “conquest of nature”, uncontrollable demographic processes and an economic policy not thoroughly examined and tested for environmental consequences. Mankind would still have a very broad range of choices of development ways, while false goals (which currently dominate mentality structures) would neither obscure them nor preclude the choice of the trends that can best promote mankind’s genuine interests. At the moment, civilization does not yet know a constructive method, a “technology” of transition to sustainable development, and this gives reason to assert that this idea is utopian. However, aggravation of the global social-ecological crisis, which is inevitable if the current development trends continues, will force mankind to find such a “technology”.
Obviously, even if this approach is adopted, there is no grounds for expecting any evolution of the biosphere “towards man” and, consequently, for justifiably using the term coevolution.
We see that the examined approaches to the global economic problem (I know of no others) do not include one that would justify the use of the term coevolution with reference to man and the biosphere. This term does not carry any operational meaning that would have relevance to this issue. These arguments also prove that there is no reason to identify the terms coevolution and sustainable development. Even if we allow the possibility of coevolution of human society and nature, beyond any imaginable historical horizons and rather in science fiction than scientific terms, even then sustainable development would prove a necessary condition for it, while the meaning of relevant concepts would not coincide.
Lamentations about the bad translation of the term sustainable development into Russian is pure casuistry. What makes the French translation, development durable (long-term, stable development) better? As often happens with translations, a certain shade of meaning, self-maintenance, is lost, but an association with the stability of movement in mathematics (under Poincare and Lyapunov) emerges, which in my view is useful. The interpretation of sustainable development presented above is, in essence, in full accord with these mathematical concepts.
While coevolution of nature and society is a relatively new concept introduced in connection with the global ecological problem, the concept of noosphere has a much longer history and a different source. Unlike coevolution of nature and society, which has so far lacked a single meaningful acceptable interpretation, noosphere can be interpreted in a variety of ways, with the issue boiling down to choosing an adequate methodological foundation.
Although A.J. Lotka published his work, which is fundamental for global ecology, in 1925, 7 theoretical studies of the global ecological problem began as late as the end of the 1950s. V. Vernadsky and E. Le Roy, who introduced the term noosphere in the 1920s-1930s, did not yet doubt that the effect of the human economy upon the biosphere was, on the whole, beneficial, although this spontaneous process required rationalization. According to Vernadsky, “under the influence of scientific thought and human labor, the biosphere is making a transition to a new state, to the noosphere.” 8
Vernadsky proved the fundamental theoretical concept according to which the force of man’s influence, especially theoretical thought, upon the biosphere had become comparable with that of geological factors. Saying that this influence should become an object of management and that spontaneity would make room for purposefulness and deliberate intention, Vernadsky nevertheless did not view the spontaneous development of theoretical thought as a threat to the very existence of civilization. Stability of the biosphere as a system and the regulatory processes securing this stability are not considered in his works at all. (On a number of issues, Vernadsky, to whom any dogmatism was alien in principle, changed his stand several times; this article refers only to the views to which he adhered in the last period of his work.)
In 1939, Vernadsky wrote: “It is curious that with the passage of time, the expansion of machinery also proceeds as a geometric progression, just as multiplication of any living matter, including humans, does…” 9 Vernadsky clearly did not doubt the possibility of illimitable growth as a geometric progression. Hence the obvious extrapolation character of his ideas about the evolutionary trend of civilization.
From the stand of the theory of biotic regulation of the environment, the transition of the biosphere to a new stable state would change the planet so much that mankind’s survival would become improbable. An exactly opposite task was formulated: to survive, mankind should change civilization in a way that would stop the anthropogenic degradation of the biosphere and make the effect upon the environment commensurate with its economic capacity. Obviously, the term noosphere does not suit a future, again undisturbed, normalized state of the biosphere (if sustainable development is achieved), let alone its current disturbed state of progressing degradation. In fact, it does not suit any possible state of the biosphere.
This is why one cannot accept the suggestion to talk “about the emergence of local-regional spots (areas) of the noosphere in the biosphere.” 10 The biosphere as a self-regulating system is an integral unit and will remain such regardless of what humans may do, for as long as there is reason to call it the biosphere and nothing else. The laws of its evolution and stability extend to everything comprising it, including the humans and civilization, and it is, in this case, unjustifiable to say that it contains “spots” that constitute higher elements with respect to the biosphere. By meaning and by claim, the noosphere should, in the end, embrace all of the biosphere, not just isolated “spots” in it (objections to this interpretation can be found in the preceding paragraph), or, as an attribute, should find an object of description other than the biosphere as an integral system.
I do not believe there are any objections to applying the term noosphere to a state of human society, as has been repeatedly suggested, especially by philosophers, including A. Ursul. This concept of the noosphere is somewhat closer to the views of Teilhard de Chardin than to the those of Vernadsky and Le Roy. But society’s attainment of the state of noosphere should be associated, not with Teilhard de Chardin’s mystical Omega point, which allows no scientific explanation, but with a purposeful effort to achieve stability, with mankind directing theoretical thought at comprehending man’s abilities and limitations and responsibly choosing only those development trends that do not endanger the future of civilization.
Given this interpretation of the noosphere, noospherogenesis is a clear term that does not require explanation. This process is already under way, although by itself this is not a guarantee of its success. Its origin should, of course, be looked for not in the epoch of man’s appearance on the Earth or the formation of theoretical thought, but in the 20th century, when the global ecological problem was realized and a search for its solution began.
By way of conclusion, a few words about anthropocentrism. We must, of course, discard its traditional premise, i.e., man is the crown of creation, the center of the Universe, the conqueror and master of nature, where everything exists, if not for the sake of man then at least for his benefit. It is this world outlook that leads to the observed and mounting crisis phenomena accompanying the progress of civilization, first of all, the global ecological crisis.
There is no doubt that man can lose everything human among his countless (and all too often senseless) inventions, destroy his habitat initiating in it degradation process, and, in the end, destroy himself. But he was endowed with reason not only for inventing and producing technologies: human reason should also be used for gaining an awareness of the consequences of his actions and objectively evaluating them. In this man would, of course, always proceed from his interests, advancing and deepening their understanding and pushing the temporal horizon of his vision farther and farther. In this sense, man will never leave the stand of anthropocentrism.
Translated by Natalia Belskaya
Endnotes
Note 1: N.N. Moiseev, “Coevolution of Nature and Society”, Ekologiya i zhizn, 1997, Jan.-Aug., pp. 4, 5. Back.
Note 2: S.N. Rodin, The Idea of Coevolution, Novosibirsk: Nauka Publishers (Siberian Branch), 1991 (in Russian). Back.
Note 3: R.S. Karpinskaya et al. Philosophy of Nature: A Strategy of Coevolution, Moscow: Interpraks, 1995 (in Russian). Back.
Note 4: Eugene P. Odum, Fundamentals of Ecology, Philadelphia, 1971. Back.
Note 5: Yu.M. Arsky et al. Ecological Problems: What Is Happening, Who Is to Blame and What Is to Be Done? Moscow, 1997 (in Russian). Back.
Note 6: See: V.G. Gorshkov, Physical and Biological Foundations of the Stability of Life, Moscow (in Russian). Back.
Note 7: A.J. Lotka, Elements of Physical Biology, Baltimore: Williams Wilking Co., 1925. Back.
Note 8: V.I. Vernadsky, About Science, Dubna, Fenix Publishers, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 312 (in Russian). Back.
Note 9: V.I. Vernadsky, Issues of Biogeochemistry, Moscow, Leningrad, AS of the USSR Publishing House, 1939, Issue 2, p. 6 (in Russian). Back.
Note 10: A.D. Ursul, The Way to the Noosphere: The Concept of Survival and Sustainable Development of Civilization, Moscow: Luch Publishers, 1993, p. 42 (in Russian). Back.