

U.S.–Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond

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by [Farhana Ali](#)

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Introduction

In 2007 Pakistan witnessed more than dozen attacks against its military, security forces, government officials, and civilians. A number of unknown terror plots have been disrupted, if not derailed, and raids have been conducted in cities such as Quetta, known for its historic ethnic-nationalist struggle and links to the Taliban. The emphasis on the wave of terror that has reigned in Pakistan by the Urdu press in February 2007 suggests a widening conflict between the Pakistani government and the varied militia groups, as well as the influence of external factors, such as the U.S.-led war in Iraq and Afghanistan, in contributing to the recent violence throughout the country.[1]

Soon after 9/11, Pakistan occupied center stage of the United States foreign policy concerns in South Asia. Given the country's proximity to Afghanistan—the hub of al-Qaeda training camps and its ideological core—the United States sought Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's unequivocal support in its global war on terrorism. While Islamabad privately harbored concerns of allying with the United States, some Pakistani officials recognized that Musharraf had no choice but to reemerge as a strong partner on the U.S.-led war against terrorism.[2] Shortly after the Twin Towers attack, the pressure on Pakistan to cooperate with the United States and disengage the Taliban—a long-standing ally—was tremendous. Former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad considered this “a *moment of reckoning*” for Pakistan, and an American scholar bluntly noted that Pakistan did not have an option: “There is no more being a friend of the United States and of Osama bin Laden.”[3] In Musharraf's own words, “9/11 came as a thunderbolt” to the regime, thus forcing him to transform the previous policies of the state to align with U.S. national security interests.[4]

By offering support, U.S. officials in New Delhi acknowledged that “Musharraf was sticking his neck out dangerously.”[5] Another senior U.S. policy analyst described the U.S.–Pakistan relationship as “alternating engagement and withdrawal,” but a retired Pakistani diplomat indicates the historic on-off U.S.–Pakistan partnership is in part due to neither country having “shared perspectives.”[6] He indicated that neither country has “continuity, a larger conceptual framework, and a shared vision” beyond issue-specific problems and solutions.[7] Observers have said that U.S.–Pakistan cooperation is tied to one core issue: the global war on terrorism.[8] As a partner on the war against terror, an inescapable conclusion, drawn from author's interviews of both Pakistani and U.S. Government officials and supporting literature, is that no other country has provided more intelligence support, committed more troops, and captured more al-Qaeda operatives than Pakistan.[9] Even Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is quick to remind his

country and the international community that “we [Pakistan] have broken the back of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.”^[10]

Disabling al-Qaeda through the country’s “capture and kill” policy includes the arrest and death of more than 700 al-Qaeda militants and dozens of Taliban activists operating inside Pakistan.^[11] While this policy has permitted Pakistan to score a few successes on the war on terrorism, the President noted that “military action is never a solution. Eliminating terror networks in the long-term depended not on the military’s prowess but sustained development, education, and economic growth—all of which the government takes credit for within the past six years. According to Musharraf, “Military action against extremism and terrorism buys time for a long-term strategy to be executed, it busy time for other instruments to be used to get to the root. It is not the solution.”^[12]

Despite Pakistan’s Herculean efforts in the war on terror, the “trust deficit” among the United States and Pakistan lingers. Recent visits by U.S. officials to the region to prod Islamabad to “do more” on the war on terror are viewed unfavorably by Pakistani officials, including the President. According to a senior Pakistani official, the answer to U.S. expectations and demands of increased Pakistani counter-terrorism cooperation is “what is the limit?” How much more Pakistan can do given its internal security threats from “extremism, obscurantism, and religious bigotry” and external challenges from neighboring countries remains to be seen.^[13] What is clear are Musharraf’s constant reminder to the world that Pakistan has made a “great sacrifice” in the war on terror. In April 2007, Musharraf also indicated “Pakistan is being maligned by the West because of lack of understanding of the environment” and that he had no other alternative but to continue counter-terrorism cooperation.^[14] Dozens of interviews of Pakistani officials, academics, and journalists conducted this year by the author reveal the estrangement between the two countries. The general perception is that U.S. expectations of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism cooperation are unrealistic, and America has yet to understand the various elements of extremism that poses an internal security threat to Pakistan.^[15]

The misperceptions stem partly from the different views that Pakistani and Americans have in defining and mitigating the terror threat.^[16] Many Pakistanis disagree with the United States “war on terrorism,” a three letter word they say has nurtured a culture of suspicion of U.S. intentions and fostered the growth of anti-Americanism across the Muslim world, not only within Pakistan, against U.S. foreign policies.^[17] A retired Pakistani General noted that there is “no clash of cultures” between the West and Islam; rather, “U.S. policies feed anti-Americanism [and] are seen as a destructive track policy.”^[18] A retired U.S. Army officer also shared this view; he publicly said, “America and Pakistan are growing apart, [and partly because] U.S. channels are anti-Pakistan.”

Furthermore, while the majority of terror analysts point to the civil war in Iraq as the breeding ground of terror networks, several observers and scholars of South Asia stress the importance of Pakistan, vice the Arab Muslim world, as the “center of terrorism [with] global reach.”^[19] In both urban and rural areas of Pakistan, al-Qaeda and its supporters, the Taliban, and local militants—who call themselves the mujahidin—have proven to conceal their identities, whereabouts, and activities in densely populated cities like Karachi as well as the sleepy hillsides of Khyber. Urban centers such as Rawalpindi and Mardan have offered temporary residence to key al-Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaida.^[20] And the tribal belt that includes the Northwest Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have been coined ‘safe havens’ for terrorists and religious extremists as well as offer safe passage to the Taliban to and from the Afghan-Pakistan border.^[21] It is these regions of Pakistan and the presence of jihadi groups in all the three bustling metropolitan cities of Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad that some U.S. policymakers are “hinting” at the need for rule of law, free and fair elections, and a working judicial system in Pakistan.^[22]

Despite measured success against terrorists, Washington's concerns over "Pakistan's jihad culture" cast doubt on the country's ability and willingness to reign in terror.[23] Mounting international pressure on Pakistan to eliminate the presence of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and local jihadi groups in the country that threaten American and Pakistani interests continue to exacerbate tensions between the two allies. Apart from internal threats to Pakistan, the country faces many setbacks and enduring obstacles. Additional factors of instability include the war in Afghanistan, ongoing fighting in the tribal areas against foreign militants, India's meddling in Kabul's affairs, low-intensity violence in Iranian Baluchistan, and the Kashmir conundrum. The conflicts in neighboring states—who have in part contributed to Pakistan's growing terrorists and sectarian violence—will affect Pakistan's internal security for years to come. External threats and the implications they will have on shaping Pakistan's domestic political future will likely force Islamabad to improve its cooperation with neighboring states to minimize the extremist threat to the region.

This report will examine the impact of religious extremism and sectarian violence on Pakistan and its neighbors, address key challenges ahead for the United States and Pakistan vis-à-vis the threat of terrorism within the region, and conclude with specific policy recommendations to improve the bilateral relationship. So long as al-Qaeda, religious extremists, and sectarian groups pose a threat to U.S. interests in the larger region, Pakistan will likely remain an important strategic partner.

Mapping the Terrorist Terrain

Studies by Western and Pakistani scholars, journalists, and a few outsiders have detailed, to the extent that is possible, the organizational structure, membership, and ideological and political goals of numerous militant outfits and the different *tanzeems*. [24] While a complete survey of Pakistan's militant landscape is difficult for the simple reason that they are constantly evolving, it is possible to categorize the nature of Islamic radicals into broad groupings. [25] Based on publicly available literature and author's fieldwork since 2005, five broad groupings emerge:

1. Groups divided along sectarian lines.

Many of these groups are influenced and organized by religious affiliation, to include the anti-Shia, *Sipah e-Sahaba*, and its Shia equivalent, *Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan*—both operate openly despite a brief period of hibernation. [26] Other groups have an ethno-nationalist orientation, such as the insurgency in Baluchistan, supported by Iran and with active support from Pashto-based tribes. While sectarian affiliation plays a major role, some groups share an ethnic bond. For example, *The Muhajir Quami Movement* (MQM), founded by its leader Altaf Hussain represents the *muhajir* (or migrants from India to Pakistan) and is based in Karachi. Hussain, an icon of the movement, represents the city's "martyrs and prisoners" and is today a viable opposition party. [27] Many sectarian groups are often supported by external actors, such as neighboring countries in South Asia, and Arab states, thereby enabling them to influence these groups with their Wahhabi and Deobandi traditions. [28]

2. Groups supporting the Kashmiri jihad.

Under this umbrella are a wide range of extremists, such as the *Jaish-e-Muhammad*, *Harakat-ul-Ansar*, *Harakat ul-Mujahideen*, *Hizbul Mujahideen*, and other Deobandi organizations. Though the primary goal is to liberate Kashmir from Indian control, some of these groups share a sectarian affiliation with other groups. Having fought the Soviet Union during the Afghan jihad, these groups are well-equipped, well-trained, and resource rich, relying on support from Pakistan's intelligence agencies to wage a war of attrition against the Indian army. [29]

3. The Taliban and its affiliates.

Members of these groups are Pashtun nationalists and operate in the open frontier province of Pakistan such as the FATA and NWFP, along the Afghan-Pakistan border, and inside Afghanistan. Their aim is to overthrow the ruling elites of Kabul for an Islamic-style government that would be led by the Taliban. Influenced by “Paktunwali,” the traditional Pushtun code of honor, and a “village Islam,”^[30] the Taliban’s supreme leader Mullah Omar would likely resume power. Groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan include a mix of conservative and moderate groups: *Jamiat-e-Islami*, *Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar Group)*, *Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis Group)*, *Itehad-e-Islami*, *Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami*, *Mahaz-e-Milli*, and *Jubba-e-Milli*.^[31]

4. Religious political parties with a hard-line and ultra-conservative posture.

Of particular importance is the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal*, a coalition of six fundamentalist parties led by Qazi Hussein’s *Jamiat Islami* and Fazlur Rehman’s *Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islami*.^[32] The party is anti-Musharraf, rejects secularism, and strongly advocates an Islamic government as defined by the party’s leadership. While advocating change by using the political process, they have and are sometimes linked with jihadi/extremist groups. Their narrow, literalist view of Islam could silence the voice of secularists and liberal Islamists.

5. New jihadi groups.

Over the last six years, the crackdown on sectarian groups and well-known jihadi groups involved in terrorist activities has likely forced the creation of a new generation of jihadis with a virulent anti-Western outlook. A researcher in Karachi told the author that the young male students, who may be affiliated with the *Jamiat ud-Dawa*, are ready to kill the U.S. President. So strong is their hatred that these men are ready to wage jihad, he indicated.^[33] An updated book by Indian scholar Amir Rana also highlights the emergence of new groups, such as the *Lashkar-e-Umar*, who view the overthrow of Musharraf “a religious duty.”^[34] Other groups include *Al-Mansuria* and *al-Intiqam*. Of growing concern are the exploitation of radical women, as is evident in this year’s recent Jamia Hafsa case—where women of the seminary were used by the *maulvis* to protect their interests and threaten the government of suicide attacks.^[35]

Evidence of the various groups’ overlapping membership, shared goals, and close affiliation with the Taliban and al-Qaeda is an open secret, dating back to the Afghan jihad—a period when Pakistan’s active support of the mujahidin contributed to the “jihadi culture” that exists today. For decades, the Pakistani government courted and managed Islamist groups to advance its political and foreign policy goals. The United States also courted the jihadis for their national security interests; both Pakistan (under the Zia ul-Haq legacy) and the United States exploited the *mujahideen* during the Cold War era without much consideration to the impact of the Afghan jihad on either country. Today, the Afghan jihad continues to define the starting point from which Pakistanis view the fall-out of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship and the “legacy of bitterness” that has followed.^[36]

Therefore, the legacy left by Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq during the late 1970s and through the early 1990s further solidified the government’s ties to extremist groups.^[37] A senior Pakistani editor defines the 1980s as a period when Pakistan’s intelligentsia “exploited the fanaticism of the jihadi warriors to fight Pakistan’s proxy wars for it in Afghanistan, and later in Kashmir. In pursuing this strategy, the military acted as a midwife, giving birth to a murderous jihadi culture which went on to consume it.”^[38]

Pakistan was not alone. The United States, and other Gulf countries, similarly benefited from the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan and contributed to the “Kalashnikov” culture that emerged in Pakistan.^[39] The large influx of Afghan refugees, who brought with them their weapons, drugs, and militants to Pakistan, contributed to the “rise [of] Pakistani militancy and terrorism.”^[40]

During Zia's rule, the proliferation of religious seminaries of all sectarian persuasions served Pakistan's interests during the Afghan jihad, but also contributed to the clashes and political infighting among the different schools and their leaders. The Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahle e-Hadith and others held separate positions on how to transform Pakistan into a "Muslim" country, but failed to agree on a system of Islamic governance.[41] After Zia's sudden death, follow-on governments remained hostage to sectarian groups, religious parties, and extremists such as the Taliban, for a host of geopolitical and domestic reasons.[42]

Therefore, religious conflict remains a key source of tension in Pakistan. In recent years, Pakistan's religious parties have been revived and organized along sectarian affiliation. While the *Jama'at-i-Islami*, Pakistan's largest Islamist party, eschews sectarian violence, the party's call for an Islamic state is its ultimate objective. Other Islamist parties are organized along various schools of thought, representing key Barelvi or Deobandi political aspirations, which are reflected in at least 25 percent of Pakistan's religious seminaries, or *madaris*. [43] According to a Pakistani Islamic scholar, the religious class in Pakistan yields enormous power. He indicated their financial contributions from the population, including Pakistani government officials, support a booming *madrassa* system which is the fabric of Pakistani society. "Even the Pakistani army supports the *ulema* (religious scholars) in the *madaris*," thereby affirming the importance of *da'wa* (i.e., the propagation of Islam) across the country.[44]

Many extremist groups might be considered privileged Islamists because they are able to sustain their movements within a legitimate political space permitted by the current regime. While several militant groups have been declared illegal—and are on the U.S. Government's list of terrorist groups—some organizations are able, even encouraged, to campaign for political office, gain access to the media, and enjoy the government's hands-off policy. So long as militant groups do not strike at Pakistani or Western interests, they continue to thrive. *Jama'at ud-Da'wa*, formerly the banned *Lashkar e-Taiba*, is a case in point.[45] This and other group's extensive social services project, from housing to education, enable them to win the support of a largely illiterate society and disallow the government from taking punitive measures against them.[46]

Furthermore, religious Islamists' participation in the 2002 elections increased their political clout. For example, the MMA's victory in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) reflect growing concerns that religious parties with deep anti-U.S. sentiment yield influence in areas where the Pakistani Government has little access, control, or power.[47]

Finally, both U.S. and Pakistani authorities express concern that the al-Qaeda leadership continues to exploit and depend on its networked relationship with Pakistani militant groups to survive as an organization and spawn a new generation of violent jihadis that threaten the region's precarious stability.[48] Al-Qaeda also has exploited the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and Iraq to motivate Pakistani youth to wage jihad against the West and perceived secular regimes, such as Pakistan. Widening support for the *message* of Bin Laden—the "James Bond that never dies"—exists within the country's select mosques and religious schools.[49] Author's interviews of Deobandi and Barelvi *imams* in Karachi, for example, suggest that so long as Bin Laden is alive, Pakistani youth will be inspired and radicalized by the movement he has spawned.

The Challenges of Religious Extremism

While Pakistan has proved a valued partner in the war on terrorism, progress has come at a high political cost and rising domestic pressure against Musharraf for siding with the United States.[50] Two assassination attempts against Musharraf in late 2002 and attempts at other senior leaders, including Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, come at the heels of Pakistan's alliance with the United States. Recent attacks against the Pakistani army in the north and in Baluchistan, suicide bombings against Western hotels, and sectarian violence are indicative of the increased tensions between the government and its opponents. The new wave of attacks in Pakistan over the past

two months and the increasingly vitriolic statements by militants blaming Musharraf for his pro-U.S. policies are likely to increase as Pakistan forges a closer alliance with America.[\[51\]](#)

One of the key concerns several Pakistanis articulated to the author comes in the form of a question: 'how much more can Pakistan do in the war on terror?' Increased U.S. demands for Pakistan to "do more" has created a climate of distrust and disenchantment with the United States in its overall engagement (or occupation) of the Muslim world. For example, the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan deepen the misperception that Pakistan—and other Muslim countries—are an instrument of the West.[\[52\]](#) Growing antipathy against the United States in the Pakistani press spotlight the "trust deficit" as well as Islamabad's perceived courtship with militant Islamists. In a seminar in April by the Pakistan Institute for International Affairs (PIIA) in Karachi, several participants worried that the U.S.–Pakistan partnership was a one-sided relationship. Based solely on terrorism cooperation, participants told the author the bilateral relationship is short-sighted and could be short-lived.[\[53\]](#) The Chairman of the institute further indicated "You can not wage a war against terrorism. You can only counter it," therefore implying that a universal definition for "terrorism" had first to be defined and agreed upon by the international community.[\[54\]](#)

Currently, the United States have a vested interest in assisting Pakistan, so long as the war on terrorism is a driving force—the accepted Pakistani view—and the United States will be engaged in India, its long-term strategic partner, partly because the Indian elephant is a competitor against the Chinese tiger.[\[55\]](#) According to a Western source, Pakistan is key to U.S. policymakers because of short-term U.S. *tactical* interests, but "India is the future."[\[56\]](#) But that view might change, as more attention is drawn towards Pakistan as the "center of gravity" for international terrorism.[\[57\]](#)

The additional challenge of managing sectarian groups, which continue to serve as a buffer against New Delhi and allow Islamabad to yield some influence over Kabul's political future, may stall reform and distract Pakistan from increasing its goodwill efforts to improve relations with neighboring states to mitigate terrorism in the region. Some in Washington doubt that Islamabad will ever be able to become a global power, so long as the army holds onto the political seat. While democracy and civilian institutions are an important indicator of a stable society, Islamabad is bound by other concerns.

In recent months, two domestic crises have challenged the government's resolve and captured headlines worldwide: the Jamia Hafsa case and the suspension of the Supreme Court Chief Justice. Both cases have sparked civil unrest and sharp criticism from the press. In the first case, threats made by the Jamia Hafsa women have stunned most Pakistanis. Daily editorials from mainstream Pakistani newspapers reflect the public's distaste with the government's inaction. In an op-ed in early April in the *Daily Times*, the writer indicates, "no other country in the world [except Pakistan] lets its citizens take the law into their own hands and becomes [the] accusers, judges and dispensers of justice."[\[58\]](#) Another journalist indicates the Jamia Hafsa case sends the message that "Pakistan's mosques and seminaries raise terrorists and not scholars."[\[59\]](#)

The second case involving the suspension of the Supreme Chief Justice also remains unresolved and contentious. Since the March 2007 incident, the government has faced mounting opposition, including exiled leaders; a well-known Pakistani writer Ayaz Amir in late March called the episode Musharraf's "biggest blunder whose fallouts will be far [more] dangerous than Kargil."[\[60\]](#) An Urdu slogan inscribed on the Pindi chapter of the High Court Bar Association, *tumhari aik naan, tumhein amar kar gai* accurately reflects the idea that the government's actions against Chaudhry will come at a high-cost and not be easily forgotten.[\[61\]](#) The government is faulted for "manhandling" the Chief Justice and using force against the lawyer community and the media.[\[62\]](#)

Coincidentally, the two incidents occurred this spring. The timing of the two events within weeks of one another not only weakens the government's position but will force Islamabad to quickly

resolve the crises. A popular opinion voiced in the Pakistani press is the government's intention to allow "anarchy" created by the radicals of the Jamia Hafsa case to "divert attention [away] from the judicial crisis."^[63] These events could cast a shadow of doubt on the government's intention to uphold free and fair elections later this year. The events could further prompt the international community to question Musharraf's ability to move Pakistan towards an open political system that stymies corruption, mismanagement of resources, and nurtures a liberal religious movement capable of diluting the loud voices of right-wing *maulvis*, jihadi politicians, and their supporters. How Islamabad resolves this incident will be a test of Musharraf's policy of "enlightened moderation." What matters now is how he intends to peacefully resolve these issues while maintaining a grip on his political seat.^[64]

Related to the Jamia Hafsa case is *madrasa* reform. The military's push to reform the former Pakistan's Madrasa Ordinance Act has come under great scrutiny by Western and Pakistani observers. According to a former Pakistani civil servant—who conducted a thorough study of *madaris* in one Punjab locale years ago—the registration of *madaris* is "a failed project."^[65] While seminaries that registered under the new law received a slush fund to teach 'mainstream' education, it was unclear whether the government followed through with this proposal. The Pakistani source added that Pakistan appears not to be committed to *madrasa* reform, given the widely held perception that so long as these religious schools do not threaten the government, they are permitted to operate. The trouble is, however, that many *madaris'* administrators act above the law. While some encroach on public land and teach an austere form of Islam, they also provide a social welfare system that the government is unable to currently replace.

In sum, mounting domestic pressure by political Islamists, including the neo-conservative oppositionists, could impede Pakistan from strengthening its ties to the United States.^[66] The strength of the militants lies in their ability to propagate their message, maintain a steady level of recruitment, and position themselves as anti-state so long as Pakistan is perceived as backing the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. The combined threat to Pakistan by al-Qaeda remnants, sectarian groups, and religious extremists pose significant challenges and risks. The publication of a myriad of violent jihadi and right-wing news and magazines and their circulation to hundreds, if not thousands, of supporters and sympathizers in the northern areas and urban centers such as Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad confirm the importance of extremists' rhetoric, allure, and ongoing activism.^[67] That the Pakistani Government is unaware or unable to shut down the groups that enjoy privileged access to the print media is an unanswered question. It remains unclear if, and the extent to which, an alliance between some of these groups and the Pakistani military exists. Of the groups the government is pitted against, it would be a tall order to expect that Islamabad could eradicate all sectarian and militant groups without assistance from regional allies and outside support.

External Implications of a Rising Threat

Pakistan's relations with its neighbors, namely India and Afghanistan, have been defined by mutual distrust and interference.^[68] While Pakistan and Iran are considered friendly rivals, a resurgent Taliban and Iran's meddling in Baluchistan could alter their relationship.

Of the many challenges ahead, a resurgent Taliban using Pakistan to maneuver, regroup, and rearm destabilizes not only Pakistan's internal security but damages Afghan-Pakistan relations. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid's recent statement, "Taliban bases and sanctuaries in Pakistan are at the heart of the problem," point specifically to Quetta as the Taliban base and safe haven.^[69] The exploitation of the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which Ahmed considers the "world's [new] 'terrorism central', inhabited by Pashtun tribes, has refocused attention in Washington and Islamabad.^[70] The penetration of the tribal belt by al-Qaeda—once an ally of Pakistan's intelligentsia—and the Taliban is publicly acknowledged by the Pakistani military.^[71] According to Pakistan's military spokesman, Major General Shaukat Sulat, "We don't deny the Taliban come and go, but that is not the entire truth."^[72] Whatever the truth may be,

greater U.S. engagement in Afghanistan creates risks for Pakistan. After the United States assumed control of NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban said 2007 will be “the bloodiest year for foreign troops” and have indicated a ready supply of at least 2,000 suicide bombers for their spring offensive against the United States.[73] Concerns of the “Talibanisation of Pakistan” presents enormous challenges ahead for the multiple countries engaged in Kabul, whose future is linked closely to Islamabad’s actions.[74]

Another contentious issue between the two neighboring countries is the Durand Line. Some scholars indicate Pakistan’s exploitation of the threefold frontier for “covert asymmetrical warfare” has now caused Islamabad to lose control of the area to the Taliban and other militant groups.[75] Afghanistan, too, lacks a formal policy on the frontier area, and has said publicly it does not recognize the Durand Line as an international border. Efforts to improve the Afghan-Pakistan stalemate has included recent talks to form a Grand Jirga, or council of leaders, between the two countries intended to establish peace in Afghanistan and restrict cross-border infiltration.[76] Other options include Pakistan’s plan to fence and mine the porous border to counter Afghanistan’s charges of cross-border incursions. Musharraf indicated Pakistan would fence approximately 35 kilometers of eight points in the NWFP, and consider fencing a 250 kilometer in Baluchistan. Even these options are subject to debate and do not guarantee that insurgents and other militias would be prohibited from crossing the unmanned Afghan-Pakistan border.

The Taliban’s rise also bedevils Pakistan’s relationship with Iran, who “gained from the collapse of the Taliban” before 9/11.[77] A reemerging Taliban once again puts the Iran and Pakistan relationship at risk. Islamabad’s fear of an of Iranian inspired Shia subversion inside Pakistan, rooted in the 1979 Shia revival, may be unfounded as regional stability serves Iran’s interests.[78] However, Iran is keen not to provoke the rise of a militant Sunni regime in Afghanistan and is particularly “on guard that Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism does not become ascendant.”[79]

While a crackdown against the Taliban suits Pakistan’s immediate interests, it is not clear how Pakistan will be able to sever its ties completely with Kashmiri separatists. Pakistan’s original plan to drive India out of Jammu and Kashmir by then ISI Director-General Hamid Gul has since evolved, although observers suggest that Islamabad will continue to support Kashmiri separatists so long as India remains the dominant power in the region.[80] Several studies examining the ISI’s heavy-handed role in Kashmir and Pakistan’s Kashmir policy are of considerable importance, but few have addressed alternative solutions to a systemic problem between India and Pakistan.[81] Most South Asian experts would agree that Islamabad’s support for the Islamic militancy “remains [the country’s] most successful strategic weapon against Indian regional hegemony, including its penetration into Afghanistan.”[82] Hence, an unresolved Kashmir conflict could complicate Pakistan’s efforts to curtail terrorism and sectarianism for years to come.[83] Of course, the Kashmir crisis may not be the *only* dispute that prohibits Pakistan and India from long-term cooperation. An American expert on Pakistan makes it clear that “even if Kashmir is ‘resolved,’ in the long term India will continue to develop economically and militarily in ways that Pakistan cannot owing to the vast differences in resources and national potential of the two states.”[84] Still, a resolution on Kashmir could open the doors of opportunity for both countries.

Other issues of prime importance to Pakistan’s stability include the Baluch separatist movement and the influence that al-Qaeda and other religious groups yield across the country. The government’s crackdown against Baluch national leaders has arguably fanned additional reprisals against Islamabad; Pakistani scholar Asma Jehangir said a “war-like situation” had emerged in Baluchistan, and the former Baluch leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti, blamed the government for “fanning terrorism and destruction” in the province.[85] These accusations—and frequent strikes held to protest the state’s development projects—only solidify the increased conflict between the government and the unrelenting power of the separatists in Baluchistan.[86]

Finally, the greatest challenge to Pakistan is arguably the rise of militant Islam, both as an ideology and political force. The number of organized and ad hoc groups in Pakistan today that

represent a radical form of “political Islam” is unknown, but arguably have a mass following from various quarters of society, including some elites, members of the armed forces, a booming madrasa population, and women. The latter group is new and is represented by right-wing women’s groups, either as members of extremist organizations or leaders of a new educational class that has emerged in the last five years.[87] This could include the Al-Huda Organization, a conservative Islamic educational institute for girls, with establishments in Karachi, Islamabad, and some rural areas. While not supporters of terrorism, neo-conservative, right wing women’s groups arguably are more susceptible to extremist ideology than liberal, secular organizations. Different radical Islamists also hold a wide range of religious ideas that appear to contradict one another and highlight the sources of friction among them.[88] For example, the Bareilvi’s respect for a spiritual guide, or *pir*, is rejected by the Deobandi tradition of subscribing to only the Qur’an and the Prophet’s traditions, or *hadith*.[89]

Keeping track of the myriad of radical groups cultivated by some support from other Muslim countries—namely, the wealthy Gulf Arab patrons—will render it difficult for Pakistan to penetrate their networks, institutions, and newer establishments. A more robust counter terrorism strategy, with improved human intelligence and access to extremists’ communications, is therefore key to Islamabad’s success in staying alert of the changing face of terror.

Predicting Future Outcomes

The use of three future political outcomes is intended to aid understanding of the significant challenges that Pakistan faces in mitigating the terrorist threat. While not offering definitive answers, the three possible outcomes of Pakistan’s political future will enable both U.S. and Pakistani policymakers to explore some of the more fundamental questions that might arise in the years ahead. Their purpose is therefore to address and spark a discussion of some of the issues and problems that could arise, either to complement the prospects for peace in the region or complicate existing security arrangements.

Before outlining the three possible political outcomes, there are a few core assumptions that are likely to hold true in the near-term. These include, but are not limited, to the following:

1. Pakistan’s ethno-linguistic, tribal, sectarian, and religious communities comprise a sharp kaleidoscope of identities.[90]

Any future political system will need to confront the dynamic communities in Pakistan as they relate to one another and the state. The ground realities of sectarian strife, varied ideological groups, and conflicting interpretations of political Islam set in motion an ongoing process of conflict and cooperation that could either be integrated into the mainstream political system or cause a political explosion. The likely competition for scarce resources, the distribution of skills, knowledge, and religious dominance means varying political Islamists, as well as religious extremists, might struggle vociferously for public support and political power.

2. Influential militant Islamists, some linked to terror networks, will maintain a grip on the population for legitimacy, credibility, and independence from the state structure.

Varied militant groups, both sectarian and extremists, have for years operated within a political space afforded them by the state which has permitted them to firmly establish themselves as free agents, even though previously they were instruments of coercion and of convenience. Not feeling bound to Pakistan’s state policies, these groups will likely undertake action within their own rules, norms, and principles to harness their strengths and goals. The JUI-F militants’ failure to abide by the recently signed treaty with the government is an example of the militants’ strength to act with impunity and disregard the center of power in Islamabad.[91]

3. Pakistan will unlikely be able to monitor all trans-boundary activities, creating the need for greater reliance on collective security and collective burden-sharing with the people.

Using a central, activist, and effective participatory approach that requires the cooperation of the Pakistani public in centers of terrorist activity, such as select neighborhoods in the cities or known areas in key provinces, can help ensure a national effort to address particular issues or specific regional concerns. In exchange for public support, the state should consider making available state-funded and organized social and welfare programs to scores of Pakistanis, who currently receive such aid from militant and sectarian groups. (i.e., JuD uses its provision of social services to win the public's support and fulfill a religious duty.)^[92]

Examining Varied Political Scenarios

The debate over Pakistan's likely future is part of a larger scholarly dialogue about the structure of its political system and style of governance. While structural theories focus on the distribution and changing nature of power, the following three scenarios are intended to examine very broad outcomes and political behaviors, rather than focus on any specific actor within the structure of the system.^[93]

While the future of Pakistan is always accompanied by an element of surprise, two factors are predictable: the grip of the army, the oldest institution, will be central to any political form of governance the country pursues; and the *ulema* will likely play a role in defining the contours of state policy by exerting greater assertiveness in the country's political future.^[94]

The three different outcomes are as follows:

1. Strong central government

This can manifest in the rule by moderate Islamists; rule by the hard-line *mullahs* (or *ulema*); or the rule by the military (i.e., also called the *Fauji* culture).^[95] A central government has defined much of Pakistan's political history, in which power has been concentrated in the hands of a few. In the short-term, a central government model may offer stability to the country vis-à-vis the region by exercising tight control of the population to counter dissent while developing policies to ensure Pakistan's stability in a precarious region. In the long-run, tremendous power in the hands of a few resembles not only an oligarchy but helps to undermine a healthy political process from which democracy could emerge. Among the three choices above, rule by the moderate Islamists is preferable, but rule by the military *might* be desirable, given Pakistan's geopolitical constraints and the rising threat of sectarian conflict and terrorist threats. The problem with existing moderate Islamists, however, is that the country's two civilian parties—the People's Party of Pakistan and the Muslim League—have stained their political tenure with corruption, abuse of power, and contributed to the country's educational demise as well as the spread of militant Islam. Without other civilian alternatives, a central government led by the PPP or PML is questionable.

2. Participatory politics

The inclusion of multiple parties and voices in Pakistan's government helps pave the road to democracy.^[96] It bears noting that while a full-fledged democracy has yet to take shape in Pakistan, the constitutions of 1956 and 1973 helped to develop the "democratic culture." The military regimes of F.M. Ayub Khan, Gen. Yahya Khan, and Gen. Zia ul-Haq, however, suspended the early institutions of democracy and replaced it with "corruption, incompetence, and nepotism."^[97] Also, if democracy means a political system whereby the people, as active participants, determine the political outcome of the country, with an independent judiciary and the rule of law, then Pakistan would be excluded.^[98] Aside from the 1971 election that brought Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to power, Pakistan's history is described as the rule of dictators.^[99] Today, a

participatory government would include all facets of Pakistan's diverse political landscape, including moderate and militant Islamists, secularists, and a host of other parties affiliated with Islam but do not carry the Islamic slogan to represent their end goals. This form of government would be most desirable to the United States, other foreign actors, and regional players; all could benefit from a system where debate and dialogue of key policy issues would occur before the state made any decisions. Such a system would adequately represent its constituents and ensure a balance of power.[100] In this scenario, the military would be integrated into a civilian infrastructure, allowing for greater civilian-military cooperation on key foreign policy issues. Keeping the military engaged would be necessary for geopolitical reasons, but also to acknowledge that in times of crisis, the military has played a stabilizing role. Even under civilian rule, the link the military can not be easily severed, but integrating the military into a participatory model would enable the government to better manage lawlessness, corruption, and restore justice.[101]

3. Social unrest

Several factors could be contributing factors to wider social discord in the country. The country's diverse ethnic and religious makeup is one factor that has proven to divide people into groupings, and plays a role in creating opposing parties. Thus, ethnicities of all hues in Pakistan consider themselves a member of their specific ethnic family before they identify themselves as proud nationalists. Pakistanis also attribute to their identity the school of religious thought, or religious leader, even above their ethnic affiliations. These separations have proven to lead to ethnic and sectarian conflicts and ameliorate the tensions among Pakistanis. This scenario is the least favorable, and arguably only a military government could reign in the various factions with an iron fist to preclude national chaos. Today, the military is able to moderately manage ongoing threats to the state, such as the ethnic-nationalist struggle in Baluchistan, although it is unclear—and unlikely—that the government will be able to devote its resources, time, and energy to internal conflicts while countering external threats. A government of moderate Islamists may not yield the power necessary to crush such uprisings, unless the military offers a helping hand. Radical Islamists, on the other hand, might benefit from social unrest and insist that an Islamic state is the solution to unifying disparate peoples. Exploiting people's sentiments towards religion might, in the short-term, serve to unify a diverse country, but will likely fail to protect the country from internal power politics. Whatever the solution to social discord, the problem is likely to impact neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan, whose Pashtun population share familial and tribal links with Pakistan, and further upset Islamabad's relations with New Delhi and Tehran.

Recommendations

Given regional realities and imperfect regional partners, U.S. choices in Pakistan will be viewed in the context of America's broader foreign policy portfolio in South Asia. Washington will need to reconsider how to best develop policies towards Pakistan within the backdrop of current threats and regional instability. Providing Pakistan with the necessary resources—political, economic, and military—to undertake the momentous task of rooting out terror groups and their sympathizers should be contingent on Islamabad's performance within a realistic timetable. Likewise, Pakistan's desire to cement closer ties with Washington should be aligned with the peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes with its neighbors for overall long-term stability in the region.[102]

Looking for Alternatives

For the United States

Re-balancing U.S. policy towards Pakistan to reduce the long-term spillover of extremism and radical Islam into the region should take into account two key points: first, an increased U.S.

diplomatic presence in Pakistan can be stabilizing. This would convince Pakistan—and regional allies, such as Afghanistan—that America is genuinely interested in promoting stability among uncertain neighbors and will act as a mediator to reduce the seeds of conflict among the New Delhi-Islamabad-Kabul axis. Second, increased U.S. engagement with Pakistan and its allies opens several routes for a vigorous dialogue within Pakistan, particularly among the conglomerate of Islamists, on key issues, such as Kashmir and the question of the army's support for the cross-border insurgency.

Regarding the first point, projecting U.S. goodwill and trust will be central to winning Pakistan's trust and erasing years of mistrust and misperceptions of America's intentions in South Asia. Senior U.S. military officers in Islamabad correctly noted that the United States should consider an active public relations campaign to communicate to the Pakistani public that Pakistan is and will remain a full partner that extends beyond Pakistan's cooperation on the war on terrorism.^[103] A media campaign to clarify misperceptions about the U.S.–Pakistan partnership to the Pakistani people can diffuse the propaganda that extremists spread about U.S.–Pakistan cooperation. Measures to improve the two countries' long-term relationship also could include “U.S. statements of respect for a moderate Islamic Pakistan [\[to\]](#) help dispel concerns about religious bias.”^[104]

Reform in Pakistan need not be restricted to the political realm. Washington can further aid Islamabad in investing in its public and religious education sector, thus helping to improve the country's high illiteracy rate. Author's personal visits of the largest girl's *madrasa* in Quetta, owned and managed by Dr. Qari Abdul Rashid, attest to the need for widening education reform in religious schools to include a broad understanding of religious texts and acceptance of the different religious schools, known as *madhab*. Washington should continue working closely with the Pakistani Government to track progress made on *madaris* reform, which needs to include practical skills training to students, both boys and girls, such as computer literacy and foreign affairs, to expose Pakistani youth to a fast-paced, changing global environment. Absent these changes, Pakistan will continue to maintain an alarming illiteracy rate that could potentially preclude the country from competing on the world stage.

Furthermore, Washington could help Pakistan gradually move towards moderate/liberal Islam in two ways: a) offering increased support to the intelligentsia and armed forces to undermine radical Islamists and their movements; and b) supporting Islamic institutions, charities, and women's groups to promote moderate activism and peaceful engagement with the West. To the first point, careful not to interfere in Pakistan's religious institutions, Washington can work with the ISI to penetrate radical groups, collect intelligence, and detain suspected terrorists, all in the name of protecting Pakistan from falling prey to militant ideologies. Regarding the second point, Washington should consider funding Islamic groups and community leaders who practice and teach moderation and acceptance of other worldviews. Support for these groups will engender a positive image of the United States and open the pathways of awareness among the people of both countries.

Within Pakistan's foreign policy portfolio, Washington should consider acting as the mediator between Pakistan and its neighbors to resolve outstanding disputes. Being a buffer between India and Pakistan, Washington can encourage the two countries to “normalize” relations by first resuming the composite dialogue on Kashmir, before promoting cultural exchanges among the two peoples. Pakistan would require additional security and incentives from Washington to reverse its historic Kashmir policy, and assurances from the United States that its role in promoting cordial Indo–Pakistan relations will be sustained in the long run.

Finally, U.S. financial assistance to Pakistan must be delivered to the people who need it most. Rather than use aid for Pakistan's debt relief, which has little impact on the country's poor and socially deprived, Washington should support emerging NGOs, health organizations such as al-Mustapha—a competitor to the well-established Edhi Foundation—women's groups, rural

development projects, shelters for the underprivileged, and select religious leaders. Western aid delivered directly to the people of Pakistan will have immediate short-term impact, improving America's image in the country among the "average" Pakistani while serving the country's long-term interests.

For the Government of Pakistan

Pakistan's counterterrorism cooperation with the United States has significant domestic and foreign policy advantages. For Pakistan to be a global competitor, it will need to rethink its current spending of Western aid, shifting some resources to improving the country's socioeconomic strata while defending itself against potential threats and a new class of radical groups. Balancing aid for defense with greater investments in the educational sector, for example, will help the government focus on two issues of importance. The following measures by Islamabad can help to elevate Pakistan's posture in the global market and guarantee long-term stability in the country:

First, Pakistan must improve its funding and administration of public schools, offer teacher training programs, increase the standards of primary school education, broaden the scope of education in *madaris*, and encourage the expansion of private educational institutions. While the benefits reaped from these initiatives will be realized in the long-term, the country's transient political actors should consider investing heavily in education today to guarantee the country's survival in the future. This will require refocusing the country's resources, time, and energy into the educational sector, both secular (public) and religious institutions. Without making some changes, Pakistan will not be able to tap into and nurture the country's expertise, such as the youth's technical aptitude.

Second, Pakistan needs to reform its judicial system to win the public's confidence in law and order maintained by the police, local law enforcement agencies, and the intelligentsia. Replacing the system of patronage within the services and other governmental agencies is a prerequisite to having an accountable and legitimately sound institution of justice. The government should consider allowing highly qualified civilians to hold senior positions, based on their knowledge, skills, and abilities to encourage the public to take part in the country's political future. Pakistan also needs to prosecute individuals for corruption, including elite family businesses and military personnel. Needless to say, for institutions to be functional, the country's feudal lords must be replaced by local governments who can represent the needs of the people rather than manipulate them.

Third, Pakistan's willingness to settle old scores with its neighbors in a realistic political timetable helps to set expectations and push the government to address more consistently the 'high' politics of peace and security with neighboring countries. Pakistan must create incentives to resolve peacefully the Kashmir crisis, the festering conflict in Baluchistan, tensions with the radical religious groups such as the Taliban and other militias in the NWFP and FATA, as well as find creative solutions to the Islamabad-New Delhi-Kabul axis of power. Pakistan should increase its diplomatic influence as an alternative to military might to reduce signs of an aggressive posture towards its neighbors. Addressing concerns that affect all neighboring countries, such as the threat of terrorism, can help to improve Islamabad's bilateral relationships with other South Asian states and diminish longstanding international rivalries.

Finally, a key to stability in Pakistan is to increase its bargaining power against violent political Islamists, to avoid intense competition between them and the state, and to undermine their overall influence in Pakistan's civil society. While Washington can push Islamabad to disarm various militant groups operating in remote areas and along the border, only Pakistan can determine the right strategies for weakening the extremists' resolve. As it remains a sensitive subject, Pakistan's open attacks against violent political Islamists could create a backlash and facilitate further violence against the state. A more feasible strategy would be to accept all forms of expression and dissent within Pakistani society to avoid the appearance of autocratic rule.

Dissent in Pakistan, however, has to be managed in such a way that it does not threaten the stability of the state nor force the state to take repressive action against opposing “parties.”

Conclusion: Getting Pakistan Right[105]

As increased fears of bomb attacks in Karachi and elsewhere plague Pakistan’s national security, it is more important than ever for America to nurture Pakistan along the path of stability for renewed cooperation in the war on terrorism. Failing to address the systemic problems in the country could accelerate militant Islam, “regional separatism, a renewed war with India,” and foment social unrest.[106]

Now is the time for Washington to engage Pakistan on advancing its counterterrorism cooperation. As a recipient of U.S. military assistance and financial aid, Washington can have significant potential leverage with Pakistan. Binding Pakistan’s future cooperation to Washington’s demands to eradicate existing terrorist groups and the rise of new militants can be possible through continued U.S. financial support, deeper U.S.–Pakistani intelligence sharing, and a time-table that allows both sides to track progress. Above all, the bilateral relationship has to extend beyond the war on terror. As many Pakistanis have noted, the one-sided, one-track relationship will likely deepen an already skeptical Pakistan of future engagement between Washington and Islamabad. Thus, a relationship defined by economic progress, development, social reform, and women’s progress can have enormous benefits for Pakistan *and* the image of the United States as a sincere partner in the region.

More importantly, long-term engagement with Pakistan can reverse the perception in Islamabad that the U.S. views Pakistan as the tactical ally, while India remains a natural ally. Long-term U.S.–Pakistan engagement will also reassure Islamabad that the risks it has taken for siding with America will outweigh the negative consequences of having to fight extremists at home while keeping violent political Islamists at a distance. So long as Pakistan is convinced that it will not lose favor with America, Islamabad will give considerable weight to Washington’s recommendations. So long as the United States keeps Pakistan engaged, Islamabad can be an enduring partner in the war on terror and beyond.

About the Author

Farhana Ali is an International Policy Analyst at RAND Corporation. Her primary area of study is patterns of global terrorism, focusing on ideological drivers and motivations of various terrorist groups.

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1. Urdu press editorials include *Islam*, *Jinnah*, *Express*, *Jang*, *Khbrain*, *Ausaf*, and *Nawa-e Waqt*.
2. For background, see: Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

3. See Ahmad's critical analysis in "Post-9/11 Foreign Policy of Pakistan," in *Criterion* 1, no. 1 (October-December 2006). The journal is a new publication edited by S. Iftikar Murshed, a former Pakistani Ambassador. Citing NYU political scientist Barnett Rubin, in "Pakistan offers to help U.S., up to a point," in the *St. Petersburg Times*, September 14, 2001, compiled from *Times Wires* and originally reported in *The New York Times*, September 14, 2001.

4. Quoted in Ahmad, *From the President's Desk* on the webpage of the President of Pakistan.

5. Author's interview in India, November 2005. The U.S. Congressional Research Service Report on Pakistan from 2005 also acknowledged the pivotal Pakistan played by shifting its policies after September 2001.

6. Cohen, Stephen Philip, "America and Pakistan: Is the Worst Case Avoidable?" *Current History*, 131-136.

7. Touqir Hussain, "U.S.–Pakistan Engagement," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 145, no. 3 August 2005. The U.S. and Pakistan both viewed threats differently. For example, Pakistan did not regard Communism as "inherently expansionist or destabilizing" nor did the United States consider the "Indian threat to be a credible or real." See Hussain report for further background. In addition, U.S. military officials told author in interviews conducted in late 2005 that U.S. actions taken against Pakistan during the 1990s, to include sanctions, further created an environment of distrust between the two countries and hurt relations.

8. While the U.S.–Pakistan relationship has been largely defined and solidified after 9/11, a former Pakistani diplomat noted, however, that the relationship "collides with the current of religious extremism." See Touqir Hussain, "U.S.–Pakistan Engagement," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 145, August 2005. Also it is worth noting that there remains no one definition for terrorism accepted by the different United States' government agencies or among U.S.-based academics. Varied interpretations further complicate efforts of law enforcement, police and intelligence agencies to combat 'terror.' This term is particularly controversial in the Muslim world, many of whom hold different criteria for 'terrorists.' Thus, the age-old maxim, 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter,' continues to resonate with Muslim populations. Furthermore, several former U.S. government officials have expressed their disdain with the manner in which certain state leaders have conveniently abused their powers in the name of fighting 'terrorism.' For example, in September 2002, former U.S. National Security Advisor Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski said, "The rather narrow, almost one dimensional definition of the terrorist threat favored by the Bush administration, poses the special risk that foreign powers will also seize upon the word 'terrorism' to promote their own agendas, as President Vladimir Putin of Russia, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India...Hindu fanatics in India are also quite eager to conflate Islam in general with terrorism in Kashmir." Editorial by Brzezinski, *New York Times*, September 1, 2002. A recent op-ed by Brzezinski, "Terrorized by 'War on Terror': How a Three-Word Mantra Has Undermined America," in the *Washington Post*, March 25, 2007 further explores how the war on terror has one major objective: to promote a culture of fear, and the U.S. Government's "false historical narrative" has done little to confront the real challenges ahead.

9. This statement is based on author's professional experience in the U.S. Government, as well as discussions from 2005-early 2007 held with Pakistani Government officials in both Pakistan and the United States. Pakistani officials include former and current intelligence and military officers. Also see work by Christine Fair, *The Counterterrorism Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004) for additional data.

10. Statement made at an international seminar organized jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad and the Hanss Seidel Foundation in August 2005. Also see *Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures*, op. cit., vii.

11. This figure was told to the author by a leading Pakistani intelligence officer. This figure is regularly cited by the media. A recent reference to this figure is included in an op-ed by Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram, "A United Front Against the Taliban," *New York Times*, April 7, 2007.

12. For background, see article by Quaid-i-Azam University professor, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Pakistan's Judicial System Curbing the Menace of Terrorism," in *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 1 (January 2007).

13. The recent visit this year by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney has infuriated some Pakistanis, who believe that their country is "doing enough" on the war on terrorism. Other U.S. visits to Pakistan in April 2007 include Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Gastright's meeting with Interior Minister Sherpao. In the latter meeting, Gastright praised Pakistan for its role in the war on terror and hoped the partnership "would further grow in the future." The meeting was covered in all the English and Urdu language dailies on April 11, 2007, to include *Nawa-e-Waqt*, *Ausaf*, *Jang*, *Mashriq*, *Jang*, *Jinnah*, *Stateman*, *Daily Times* and *The Post*. Also segments include discussion with the author in April 2007. Also see, *The News*, April 17, 2007

14. *Dawn*, April 15, 2007

15. All interviews conducted by the author in person from February to April 2007. A high-ranking Pakistani official told the author that there are different levels of extremism, and the United States needs to de-link the threat of al-Qaeda from the Taliban. In his words, "this vie is too simplistic and needs to be disaggregated for a better comprehension of the terror threat in Pakistan" and Afghanistan.

16. Interviews by the author were conducted with a number of high-level Pakistani military officials, former Ambassadors, leading journalists, and university academics in Islamabad and Karachi from February—April 2007. Many Pakistanis disagree with the United States "war on terrorism;" a former high-ranking Pakistani official noted, "this is not our war."

17. Statement made by retired Pakistani General at a conference held at the National Defense University (NDU) in Islamabad in February 2007. He also noted the existence of weak governance and the growth of radical Islam as a potential future challenge to the existing regime. Finally, the General indicated that there exists "no clash of cultures" between the West and Islam; rather, "U.S. policies feed anti-Americanism [and] are seen as a destructive track policy." A retired U.S. Army officer also shared this view; at the conference, he publicly noted "America and Pakistan are growing apart, [and partly because] U.S. channels are anti-Pakistan."

18. Statement made at a conference at the National Defense University (NDU) in Islamabad in February 2007. The event was co-sponsored by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

19. Barnett R. Rubin, "[Saving Afghanistan](#)," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2007).

20. For complete list of al-Qaeda leaders arrested in Pakistan's urban centers, see The White House, "[Fact Sheet: United States and Pakistan, Long-Term Strategic Partners](#)," March 4, 2006.

21. A December 2006 report by the International Crisis Group, entitled "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants," offers detailed analysis of the terrorists' use of FATA, the military's operations in this region, and external implications.
22. This was noted by Lahore-based Pakistani scholar Ahmed Rashid in an interview with Terry Goss on Fresh Air radio, April 5, 2007.
23. Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," in *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2000).
24. Simply, the word stands for any group, typically rooted in the Islamic faith. In Pakistan, a religious and political group, *Tanzeem e-Islami*, is based in Lahore, Pakistan. Established by Pakistani religious scholar Dr. Israr Ahmed, the Tanzeem called for the return of the Caliphate system. More information about the group can be found on its webpage, www.tanzeem.org.
25. Militant groups never reveal their membership, the full breadth of their activities or reach to the population, their financiers—both internal and external—nor their day-to-day tactical and operational planning.
26. See Kanchan Lakshman, "Deep Roots to Pakistan's sectarian terror," *Asia Times* (9 July 2003). For a more detailed analysis of Pakistani militant groups, see Amir Rana, *Gateway to Terrorism* (India: Minerva Press, 2003) and *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (India: Mashal Books, 2004), and Mariam Abu Zahab and Oliver Roy, *Islamic Networks: The Pakistan-Afghan Connection* (London: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers, 2004).
27. For a detailed analysis of the MQM, see Oskar Verkaaik, *Migrants and Militants* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2005), 56-136.
28. See Muhammad Amir Rana (translated by Saba Ansari), *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore, Pakistan: Mahsal Publishers), 2006.
29. With improved relations between India and Pakistan, Musharraf has banned many of these groups and a few remain on Pakistan's watch list by the ISI, such as the *Jamaat ud-Dawa* (formerly the *Lashkar-e-Taiba*).
30. For in-depth background and first-hand account information, see the book by former Pakistani Ambassador, S. Iftikhar Murshed, *Afghanistan: The Taliban Years* (London: Bennett & Bloom, 2006).
31. Ibid.
32. Political Islam has always been a reality and *tour du force* in Pakistan since its birth in 1947. The clearest manifestation of political Islam is within the creation of the *Jama'at al-Islami*, Pakistan's first and largest political party founded by the late Maulana Mawdudi, whose work on Islamic resurgence and doctrine define the group's activities and membership. This article is not intended to address the evolution of political Islam and its various manifestations throughout Pakistan's history. The important point is that political Islam likely exhibits greater influence on the country's overall Muslim population than the myriad of extremist groups combined.
33. Discussion with a researcher in Karachi who is studying terrorist and extremist groups in Pakistan, December 2005.
34. Rana, Ibid., 283.

35. This incident was reported widely in the Pakistani press. For background, see *Dawn*, March 31, 2007; *Daily Times*, February 2, 2007, March 26, 2007 and April 8, 2007; *South Asian Analysis Group*, March 30, 2007. The women have demanded the release of Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistani intelligence officer with links to the Taliban and Usama bin Laden. He is currently in a Pakistani jail for instigating the women of the Jamia Hafsa seminary to speak against the state for demolishing mosques and madrasas built in Islamabad on government property.

36. Comment made to the author by a retired Pakistani military officer, April 2007.

37. See M.S. Korejo, *Soldiers of Misfortune, Pakistan under Ayub, Yahya, Bhutto and Zia* (Lahore, Pakistan: Ferozsons, 2004), 154-210.

38. See Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, op. cit.

39. Many scholars have given this subject due attention; for background, see Stephen Cohen's *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Press) 2004; Musa Khan Jalalzai, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Lahore, Pakistan: Ariana Publications, 2003).

40. For background of the Afghan jihad on the tribal areas, see *Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses*, eds Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 129-50.

41. The varied interpretations of Islam by the different schools of thought create an atmosphere of distrust among the religious group leaders and their ability to unite to promote an Islamic system in Pakistan. These differences are enumerated by the multiple ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and tribal groups in Pakistan.

42. The objective of this article is not to expedit the various reasons for why Zia's policies during the Cold War contributed to, and had lasting impact on, Pakistan's polity today. For the role of the state and religion (i.e., political Islam as well as militant political Islam), there are several excellent resources. See for example, Musa Khan Jalalzai, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Lahore: Ariana, 2003), *Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context*, eds., Ajay Darshan Behera and Joseph C. Mathew (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004), S. V. R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (2000): 139-80, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'a and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asian Studies* 32, no. 3 (1998): 689-716.

43. See Barbara Metcalf, "Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs," and Mandavi Mehta and Ambassador Teresita C. Shaffer, "Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions." For background on the *madaris* and their influence on Pakistani society, see Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Schooling Islam: Modern Muslim Education* (Princeton: February 2007), and a forthcoming book by Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam* (Princeton University Press, March 2007).

44. A Pakistani female academic in Islamabad calls the religious local leaders (or *maulvis*) the "VIPs of the local masses." Comment made to author during November 2005 visit.

45. The power of the JuD should not be underestimated. Author's discussions with Pakistani independent journalists, former military and intelligence officers, all agree that after the Pakistani army, JuD is the most organized group in the country. The key difference, noted one Pakistani journalist, is that JuD does not rely on Western support to sustain its popular base.

46. Groups such as the *JuD* and the *Al Rashid Trust* immediately responded to Pakistan's earthquake crisis in October 2006. Regarded in part as humanitarian organizations, the government is hard pressed to take action that would tarnish the image of these groups for fear of backlash and reprisal.

47. Ajay Darshan Behara offers a critical view of MMA's victory during the October 10, 2002 elections. He notes U.S. concerns of MMA's success, given the group's outspoken anti-U.S. rhetoric, its commitment to end U.S. bases, expel U.S. soldiers from Pakistan, implement Shar'ia (Islamic) law, and continue jihad in Kashmir and Palestine. See Ajay Darshan Behara and Mathew Joseph C., eds., *Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004), 15-24. MMA also won seats won in Karachi and the southern part of Punjab.

48. The links between Pakistani militants and al-Qaeda are mostly found in Urdu literature. See Amir Rana, *Jihad-e-Kashmir Aur Afghanistan* (The Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan). The English publication, *Pakistan Media Monitor*, produced by independent researcher, Muhammad Shehzad, provides some information of the ties, but the extent of their relationships is not publicly available.

49. Statement made by a Pakistani researcher in a private discussion with the author.

50. U.S. government officials and intelligence agencies recognize Pakistan's role in capturing and killing a significant number of al-Qaeda operatives, middle managers, and other members providing logistics and financial support.

51. See various media reports for attacks in January-February 2007: GEO News TV, *Daily Times*, *The News*, and *Dawn*. Since February 6, 2007, there have been at least 25 people dead in attacks against the military, police, and Shia targets. These attacks do not include casualties from non-suicide attacks, such as violence in Hangu or the rocket attack in Bannu. The most recent statement came from a man known as Ashfaq Ahmad, who took responsibility for the suicide bombing in Tank against the Pakistani military. He said the attacks were in response to Musharraf's pro-U.S. policies. The man refused to identify which group he belonged to but told a Urdu press reporter, "we are all the same. It doesn't matter if we are from one group or another because we have a similar agenda." See Islamabad's *The News*, February 5, 2007.

52. A comment made to the author by a retired General of the Pakistani military, April 2007. Other observers point to the "aggression and occupation of Muslim territories" across the Muslim world, including the Middle East and North Africa, by Western colonials. See recent article by former Pakistan Ambassador, S. Iftikhar Murshed, "The Contemporary Challenge to Global Peace and Security," in *Criterion* 1, no. 1 (Oct-Dec 2006): 3-25.

53. One Pakistani academic and former official indicated that the "U.S. has written off the people of Pakistan." A retired Brigadier said that jihadis in Pakistan have adopted the tactic of suicide from the war in Iraq, where suicide bombings have become the norm.

54. As indicated earlier, there will unlikely be an agreed upon term and therefore, part of the problem will always remain. That said, the Chairman believed that a term that lacked a proper definition and agreement by international actors would "have a limited application." Event was held at PIIA in Karachi, April 2007. The author was invited to discuss U.S.-Pakistan relations in the war on terror; the talk mirrored similar findings presented at NDU in Islamabad in February 2007.

55. View expressed to the author by the Executive President of TATA Consultancies, Phiroz Vandrevalaa, in New Delhi, Nov-December 2005.

56. Indian journalist and expert Raja Mohan told the author that both the United States and India are the world's largest democracies, and "they find it difficult to build a serious political partnership." New Delhi, Nov-Dec 2005.

57. Phrase coined by Ahmed Rashid, 2007.

58. *Daily Times*, April 8, 2007

59. Op-ed by Kunwar Idris, "Surrendering to the militants," *Dawn*, April 15, 2007

60. See Ayaz Amir's op-ed in *Daily Jasarat*, March 16, 2007.

61. Literally, this translates into "your one piece of bread will be remembered for all times." Figuratively, this phrase suggests that the government's suspension of the Chief Justice will be stamped in history; the slogan is likely meant to remind the army that it will not be forgiven for its harsh actions against the Chief Justice—an act for which there is internal opposition against Musharraf and external disfavor with the military ruler for disregarding the writ of the judicial institution.

62. Editorial in the Urdu daily *Islam*, April 11, 2007

63. *The News*, April 16, 2007

64. Several Pakistani officials, journalists, and academics have varying views of how Musharraf should resolve this issue. Some have told the author that the government should have used force against the *maulvis* (the men behind the women in the madrasa) to deter any future action; others have indicated a "negotiated settlement," a view shared by Naveed Miraj, the editor of the Pakistani paper, *The Statesman*. There are also varying views on whether the women of Jamia Hafsa are capable of conducting suicide attacks. A few refute the women's capability, but others suggest that these women, who are "brainwashed and would act on the command" of the male leaders could blindly follow their orders. Comment made by Miraj, April 2007.

65. Official now resides in Islamabad and works on other issues. Discussion took place in April 2007.

66. South Asian experts Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique indicate that Pakistan's position as a front-line ally on the GWOT "has led to tensions with the Islamist-military alliance." Tensions arise over the arrest of al-Qaeda leaders and a crackdown against the Taliban and local militants. "Resolving the Pakistan–Afghanistan Stalemate," *USIP* (October 2006): 14.

67. Some of these publications include *Tayyabat*, *Akhbar-e-Jahan*, *Al-Qalam*, *Ummat*, *Jasarat*, *Kahmir ul-Yaum*, *Al-Haq*, *Ghazi*, *Sangat*, *Nida-e-Millat*, *Zarb-e-Taiba*, *Nannay Mujahid*, *Ghazwa Times*, *Naqqara*, *Takbeer*, *Wadi*, *Talo-e-Islam*, *Nawai Waqt* with circulations that range from 2,000-200,000.

68. See ICG report.

69. See Ahmed Rashid, "Letter from Afghanistan: Are the Taliban Winning?" *Current History*, January 2007, 17-20, and "A Taliban comeback," *Yale Global Online*, May 23, 2006. Noted in January 2007, Maj. General Shaukat said, "they [insurgents] do come for rest and recuperation." *Washington Post* (January 1, 2007), A20.

70. Ibid, "Letter from Afghanistan." Also, author's discussions with a senior U.S. Government official, who spent weeks along the Afghan-Pakistan border, noted that a solution to the problem requires more than military might. He strongly advocated the need to understand the cultural and human terrain; that is, to better understand the tribal belt, the U.S. Government would need to spend time with the Pashtun tribes to learn about their deeply rooted cultural history and beliefs as well as become familiar with the people currently supporting the insurgents.

71. A discussion of al-Qaeda's links with the ISI or conversely, the ISI's support of al-Qaeda remains controversial. However, it is noted in several places, including Stephen Cohen's *The Idea of Pakistan*, 191.

72. See Pamela Constable, "Pakistan Denies It Harbors Taliban," *Washington Post*, January 21, 2007, A20. According to the Major, "75 percent of [the problem] lies on the Afghan side...of four known top Taliban commanders, three are Afghan and one is Pakistani."

73. *Reuters*, February 4, 2007. The Taliban's seizure of several towns and villages in the past few years has dampened Western euphoria; some express disappointment with Kabul, the international community, and neighboring countries, to include Pakistan, in countering the rise of terrorism. See Alastair Leithead, "[Afghan analysis as general bows out](#)," *BBC News, Afghanistan*, February 2, 2007.

74. A common phrase used to indicate the Taliban's influence in certain areas of Pakistan. The influx of Afghan refugees and the mujahidin, with military and weapons training from the Afghan jihad, into Pakistan has created what many Pakistani academics and policymakers call the rise of the "Kalashnikov culture." Author's interviews of Pakistani scholars at Islamabad-based think tanks and at Quaid-e Azam University in late 2005 indicate that Pakistan's state policy to support the large numbers of Afghan refugees has had long-term *negative* consequences for the country.

75. Rubin and Siddique, op. cit.

76. *United Press International*, January 10, 2007.

77. See Mahan Abedin, "Iran: Understanding the Relationship with Pakistan and al-Qaeda," in *Terrorism Monitor* 2, no. 17, Jamestown Foundation (September 9, 2004).

78. Ibid.

79. See Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Afghanistan and its Neighbors," *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 162 (June 2006): 12-3

80. Private discussions between the author and senior Pakistani officials indicate that India's continued control over Kashmir with an overwhelming military force—in comparison to other South Asian countries—will remain a thorn in Indo-Pakistan relations. Until Kashmir is resolved, cultural exchanges, for example, between the two countries might be ineffectual.

81. The literature on this subject is expansive and well-documented. A few studies worth mentioning are: Sean Mitchell, "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government," *International Journal of Intelligence* 16, no. 3. "Kashmir" articles in *Pakistan Horizon* 56, no. 2 (April 2003).

82. Rubin and Siddique, op. cit., 14.

83. This article excludes an important discussion of Pakistan-Indian cooperation since 9/11 to reverse its aggressive posturing in Kashmir. Briefly, both countries have made considerable

progress in improving bilateral ties; Musharraf's historic visit to India for a cricket match is evidence of Pakistan's efforts, as well as Musharraf's recent talks with the Indian High Commissioner in January 2007 stressed the need to resolve the Kashmir issue if relations between the two countries are to normalize. (See *The News*, January 10, 2007). Pakistan and India first began talks on Kashmir at the Foreign Secretary level in 1990 and between 1990 and 1992, six rounds of talks were held, which resumed in 1994; both countries agreed to establish working groups. After a period of silence, the two countries resumed talks in late 1999, with slow progress since. Also worth noting is that Kashmir is not a "national" problem; that is, Kashmir is and has been a concern for the Punjab-dominated military and province. Other provinces, such as Baluchistan and Sindh, for example, "do not have this siege mentality." Remarks made to author by a Rear Admiral of the Pakistani Navy.

84. Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*, op. cit.

85. Radio *Aap Ki Dunya* (Your World), Urdu Service of Voice of America (VOA), Special Report, January 7, 2006 and BBC Urdu Service, *Sair Been* (name of the 8pm bulletin).

86. Author's visit to Quetta in late December 2005 was during the time of a planned strike held in the city to protest Musharraf's visit to the area and the reconstruction of the dam. These strikes enable Baluch nationalists to yield considerable power and influence over the area while disrupting the government's efforts to provide security and derail the nationalist movement there.

87. Several militant groups have a women's league, such as the JuD while other political Islamists also have a separate party for women, such as the JI.

88. The term "Islamist" is used widely in the West and the Muslim world. A broad definition of the term is anyone from the Muslim faith who participates actively in the social, economic, or political realm. Hence, an Islamist is a neutral term and is not associated with violence. Attaching the term "political" to Islamist implies that a Muslim either holds political power, is vying for political influence (i.e., the leader of a party not yet elected into power, such as the Muslim Brotherhood), and/or someone who believes in the active role of Muslims in a given polity or governance system, which could include the Caliphate. One need not be an extremist to believe in the return of the Caliphate, but the likelihood of an Islamic renaissance today is an open-ended question. Pakistani scholars of Islam, to include the late Maulana Mawdudi and Dr. Israr Ahmed, wrote extensively about the need for an Islamic renaissance, or *nahda*, rooted also in Arabic literature, in order for Muslims to coexist peacefully and under the rule of God's law, or *hakimiyya*.

89. There is a wide range of Islamic views and practice in Pakistan; it is a unique country where Muslims are free to express religious opinion, particularly since Musharraf has opened the space for religion. The state's open/secular policies permit the population to express liberal, non-Islamic beliefs, for which the radical or neo-conservatives have strongly condemned publicly and privately.

90. In his article, "A Multi-Layered Policy for India-Pakistan Relations," Indian scholar Balraj Puri notes that "there are many Pakistanis within Pakistan—politically, ethnically and culturally—and each deserves to be treated separately." He elaborates on Pakistan's ethnic diversity to diffuse Indian misperceptions that Pakistan is a monolithic Muslim community. For his article, see Behera and Joseph, eds., *Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context*, 328-41.

91. For background, see ICG Report from December 2006, "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants." A summary of the report follows: The Musharraf regime concluded the treaties with 'Pakistani Taliban'/militants in South Waziristan in April 2004, and North Waziristan in September 2006. For various reasons, the government and FATA-based militants agreed to sign the treaty. Militarily, the war in the FATA was worrisome for Musharraf. (a) It tied up 80,000 soldiers and levies at its peak, diverting Pakistan's resources away from maintaining its military posture

against India; (b) security forces losses had been mounting in the region, and civilian casualties had also been occurring regularly, leading to further alienation of the population; (c) the violence had shown signs of spreading out of the FATA to the PATA areas of NWFP, and increasing radicalization of settled areas of NWFP was of mounting concern. (d) It can also be said that strategically, the Pakistan state's interests in limiting Pashtun violence in Afghanistan were conflicted. While responsibility towards the ISAF and international obligations indicated interdiction of the cross-border movement of Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistani) and Hekmatyar forces, strategic considerations of keeping a hostile regime in Kabul on the back foot indicated otherwise. (e) It may also be that Islamabad realized the paucity of tools at its disposal to limit the violence in the FATA, given its limitations in promoting the rule of law in these areas (which is a major focus of the ICG report). (f) The growing coordination and alliance of anti-government forces (Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Tajik, Arab and Chechen al-Qaeda elements, Hekmatyar's Hezb e-Islami, and the Sipaha-e-Sahaba/Jaish-e-Mohammad elements from Punjab/NWFP) in the FATA areas was also worrisome when the Islamabad regime was pushed by sectarian violence internally—the pressures to negotiate to ease the organizational motive of multiple Islamic groups was therefore ever-present. Even though the treaty language bound the parties to mutual non-aggression, it also included an agreement from the militants to stop cross-border attacks. Therefore, the treaties themselves were not a threat to ISAF/Kabul interests; it was the fact that the militants ignored the spirit of the agreement by continuing if not increasing cross-border movement. Therefore, the question one should ask is—what gave the militants this strength to act with impunity, despite the treaties? What is striking is the growing power of the JUI-F in being a broker between the government and Islamic militants, and the inability of the state to exercise full authority in this remote area. Based on the report's final assessment, one could reach the conclusion that violence continues to ensue in the region, especially in other agencies such as Bajaur, and PATA parts of NWFP such as Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. The activities of militant leader Baitullah Mehsud (of the Mehsud tribe of S. Waziristan) are of concern, considering a Jan 15, 2007 strike against his forces by the military that killed more than a dozen people. His network is implicated by Islamabad in the latest violence in NWFP in 2007. Tribal tensions may be at play—though the Wazirs in North and South Waziristan may be holding to non-aggression against the security forces, the Mehsuds are not (given multiple suicide bombings in 2007). Two years after the accord, violence in South Waziristan has been high, no high-value al-Qaeda targets have been found, and movements across the border continue. Meanwhile, in the Waziristans, 'Talibanization' of local customs and control over the structure of society continues, with the Political Agent method of governance employed by Islamabad losing its traditional sway. Deobandi parties and factions are indoctrinating the local tribal areas into their philosophies and will be able to use the undereducated foot soldiers from FATA in their future challenge to the state

92. More information of the JuD's welfare programs can be found on their webpage: www.jamatuddawa.org

93. It is not the intention of this report to offer the various structural theories that may apply to Pakistan nor do to examine the state's ascent or descent into power. A discourse of the distribution of power in South Asian states, including Pakistan, is evaluated in Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

94. Numerous Pakistani scholars and officers have correctly remarked that “civilian rule in Pakistan is not possible without the army.”

95. Term used by former Pakistani Ambassador M.S. Korejo in his book, *Soldiers of Misfortune*.

96. America's position on Pakistan's road to democracy is to allow Islamabad to choose its own course. As U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Crocker stated in January 2007, “America cannot design what kind of democracy should be practiced in Pakistan,” but would help Pakistan to

initiate reform in its economy, education, health and other sectors. From *The News*, January 11, 2007.

97. Korejo, *Soldiers of Misfortune*, 223-4.

98. Primary conditions of democracy include “the existence of free and fair elections; those elected must wield power and be part of the decision-making process; the presence of lack of stability does not determine whether [a government] is democratic; democracy is a dichotomous variable, fully separate from non-democratic regimes rather than being part of a continuum; thus, non-democratic regimes do not hold elections and do not encourage widespread electoral participation.” These conditions, when applied to the question of whether an Islamic state is legitimate, raise a different set of concerns. Broadly speaking, Islamic principles are democratic, but political Islam and its manifestation in contemporary Muslim countries, including Pakistan, may not always be liberal in its rhetoric. In other words, “Islamic society sees freedoms and rights as means and not ends.” These five conditions are taken from Mahmood Monshipouri and Christopher G. Kukla, “Islam, Democracy and Human Rights: The Continuing Debate in the West,” *Middle East Policy* 3, no. 2 (1994): 23-5. The authors continue to state that it is “important to be sensitive to the differences between Islamic and Western cultures when attempting to assess the democratic ideals present in Muslim society.” Furthermore, within the parameters of this definition, free and fair elections could be considered a pathway to democracy. In Pakistan, elections are perceived as being dominated by key Islamist parties and their supporters, rather than enabling the broader population to express their political preference outside of established party lines.

99. *Ibid.*, 100-1. The question of democracy and its failure in Pakistan is one of grave concern to current scholars and observers of Pakistan’s political order. Korejo attributes the failure to the military regimes of Pakistan’s early history, from the 1950s through the 1980s. One can only guess what might have transpired had the primitive roots of democracy been allowed to evolve in Pakistan.

100. While official statements from Washington insist on the importance of democratic reform in Pakistan, the reality suggests that elections in Pakistan alone will not necessarily produce democratic reform. The best decision America can uphold is to encourage its Pakistani interlocutors to allow political oppositionists, including arch rivals such as People’s Party of Pakistan and the Muslim League—both banned from the country since 2002—to run for elections, while precluding hardliners from participating in the political campaign that Musharraf has said would occur in 2007. The challenge here is whether Islamabad will permit a “tightly controlled democratic experiment” as it did at the end of 2000. Islamabad allowed for local government elections in 18 of Pakistan’s 106 districts in 2000; provincial elections were held in 2002; and federal elections held before the end of October 2002. Author Musa Khan Jalalzai states that “Pakistan was more interested in maintaining a firm grip on who was elected than in establishing democracy,” and there were suspicions of vote-rigging. See: *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Lahore: Ariana Publications, 2003).

101. Author’s interview with a retired Brigadier Gen. of the Pakistani Army and other senior politicians. Others indicate that only the army can bring change to Pakistan’s current political system; it is *the* continuity of the country. A Pakistani politician with anonymity indicated that “even without Musharraf, the army will play a key role in any future scenario.”

102. Studies that evaluate the importance of domestic factors and democratization maintain that democracies do not go to war with each other. For this to be true for Pakistan, one could argue that neighboring states also need to become democratic to preclude another war in the region. The literature on this subject is vast and expanding. See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “The War Process of Democratic Regimes,” *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 (1976). R. J. Rummel, “Liberal Propositions on Violence within and between Nations,” *Journal of Conflict*

Resolution 29 (1985). Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993). Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993).

103. Author's interviews of senior U.S. military personnel in Islamabad, December 2005. Officials included active Special Forces operating along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

104. See Polly Nayak, "Reducing Collateral Damage to Indo-Pakistani Relations From the War on Terrorism," The Brookings Institution, *Policy Brief* 107 (September 2002).

105. Borrowed from Stephen Cohen in his article, "America and Pakistan: Is the Worst Case Avoidable?" *Current History* (March 2005): 131-5. In the article, Cohen urges Washington to address Pakistan's "deeper problems" but concludes by saying, "For the United States, Pakistan is part problem and part solution. Washington has no option but to work with Pakistan in the short run" for its cooperation in the war on terrorism.

106. *Ibid.*