

It's Now 2007: So Where are We in the Long War?

Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 2 (March 2007)

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Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the [Center for Contemporary Conflict](#) at the [Naval Postgraduate School](#) in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

I'm going to suggest that if I was an American from the 1942 era and was studying the current national discourse on "the War" (regardless of how you define the current "War") using major legacy network television, cable news, legacy newspapers, and the Internet as my sources, I'd immediately draw some conclusions for this Long War.

I'd expect our daily casualties to be in the tens of thousands, our base camps in the war zones to be falling one after another, Al-Jazeera footage showing disheveled Coalition General Officers walking out of Camp Victory with their hands in the air followed by their weary staffs, ships being torpedoed off the Virginia Coast, forces of Al-Qaeda and the Axis of Evil relentlessly advancing on I-95 towards Washington DC and so on.

There's one problem with the gloom and doom of our national discourse—it has little to do with operational reality.

So where are we now in the Long War? Although we continue to have operational dominance in different theaters—in geo-political strategic terms though, we've lost "Clausewitzian" momentum at the strategic level.

Even worse, some Americans have become psychologically defeated and want to throw in the towel (or already have). Some who supported military action are inarticulate in their defense of the War, while others who only supported so they could be with the majority are now changing their story, again so they can be with the majority.

We need a new national resolve that focuses on success and victory and not acrimonious finger pointing and pursuit of retreat at all costs. We also need to reflect on history as a way forward.

We're at the "Anzio Beachhead"^[1] phase of the Long War. The disorganization, chaos, and panic of many former supporters of the War has some of them sprinting faster than the survivors of an M-3 Half Track after getting whacked with a Pack 7.5cm round.

On top of that, now we are a "war-weary" nation.^[2] Even worse, while in World War II combat reporters gave their reports with National Pride, the current American Press gleefully bombards the American Public with nightly recounts of friendly casualties and stories of how we have lost the war.

It's because the real action in the Long War is now at home. The fate and path of the Long War now has very little to do with actual military strategy and operations in the foreign fronts in the Long War. It's now all about who can achieve and maintain dominance in the media and domestic political playing field through better articulation of their vision of the outcome of the Long War.

Those of us who are part of the professional military element of National Power[3] need to conduct an operational pause to our efforts in the Long War. We need to understand and apply the Principles of War, re-communicate why we went to War, and clearly articulate the way ahead. All of this must be done in a professional manner while totally understanding the political inferno raging around us.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze where we are at currently and suggest a way ahead. It attempts to steer clear of polemics and political histrionics, but at the same time, some of these issues have become absolutely inseparable from the current situation and must be addressed for redefining our challenge and struggle in this conflict.

Principles of War

To frame the current situation, I've presented three of the critical Principles of War[4] and some analysis and comment.

1. Unity of Effort and Command (which Includes Issues Such as Public Support): The overall American War Effort has become fractious and internally divisive. Within the Executive Branch, the Department of Defense seems for the most part to be on a war-footing. As for the rest of the Federal Government, that is unclear.

The majority of seats in the Legislative Branch, the 110th Congress, are now held by what was previously the opposition party. Some in the new composition of the Legislative Branch question whether there really is a Long War,[5] while others question the handling of the war effort[6] by the Executive Branch.

I'm not sure of a historical parallel where an American war-time Executive Branch Leader had a hostile congress. The American Civil War is probably the closest point of comparison.

Drawing any conclusion from November 7, 2006, that there is overwhelming support to quit the Long War[7] is premature and based upon very transient mood swings. The American people want success in the Long War and don't feel they are getting it. As one columnist noted, the margin of victory was given by swing votes. "The loan can be recalled at any moment" he said.

In one of the most strategically important moves in the Long War, the enemy has successfully shifted the decisive battle front—the ideological battle[8] from overseas to the home front. Many in the American public have become sullen and disenchanted with the war effort. A surprising amount accept[9], without any evidence, the conspiracy theory that 9/11 was an inside job.

In many ways, the forces of Al-Qaeda and rogue nations can conduct an operational pause. This is an ideal time for them to resource and reconstitute while they cheer a meltdown of American resolve. Just like Ho Chi Minh, all they see is the divisiveness within the American culture. And just like Ho Chi Minh, they may be planning a spring "Tet" offensive to solidify American disillusionment.

In spring of 1968, Ho Chi Minh sat back and was affirmed in his dedication to victory as he saw the American media elite turn on the Johnson Administration in the wake of the Tet Offensive and

then a few months later, Ho was treated to an even more visible endorsement of his actions by the chaos at the Democrat's National Convention in Chicago. After this it was game over.

The Communists had total resolve and steel in pursuit of their objectives. Today our enemy has the same resolve and is enjoying a similar American cathartic experience.

The talking points of America haters like Al-Qaeda, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, are indistinguishable^[10] from many in the domestic culture who oppose (and some who let's be honest—hate) the current Administration and are rooting for a 1974 scenario.^[11]

Thus we are at an impasse on the Long War until this issue of unity of effort and public support is addressed.

2. (Maintaining the) Offensive: While started for good reasons and objectives (i.e. remove the regime and their connection to WMD and Terror), the Iraq Front in the Long War has now become the consuming national issue. Recent successes in the Horn of Africa front in the Long War are obscured with the national attention on the OIF Front.

I'll address the often quoted, but factually incorrect mythology that Saddam had nothing to do with Terror or WMD later, but from a global perspective, OIF has brought the military Element of National Power to a standstill. We are no longer on the offense.

In the OIF Front in the Long War, while tactically maintaining military dominance, our Coalition Elements have actually been participants, bystanders, and observers to about five different conflicts in Iraq since OIF began.^[12] The most recent and overarching violence is a de facto proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi cash is the lifeblood of Sunni Fighters, likewise Iranian cash and advisors are the life blood of Shia fighters.

Unfortunately, our Big Media simply blurs it all together and strips out any meaning or context to what is really occurring and overrides it with an automaton like reprise of the friendly body count. No wonder the American Public has become jaded and "weary" of the Long War.

3. Objective: The immediate objective after 9/11 was clear—go after the threat—UBL—in his cave. As the Long War has evolved, the threat has morphed a number of times and will continue to morph.

However our national objectives in the Long War are still pretty simple. They Are:

1. Protect the homeland;
2. Deny sanctuary in ungoverned spaces for non-state actors;
3. Selectively strike targetable personnel, activities, and resources which threaten the homeland (i.e. pre-emptive action when appropriate) ;
4. Build partner capacity;
5. Conduct irregular warfare;
6. Greatly increase the capacity and effectiveness of the non-military elements of National Power to overcome aggression by non-state actors and rogue nations.

There is one issue however that is greatly affecting our objectives, yet there is scarcely any discussion of this issue. This is the issue of a rapidly evolving nature of the entire world system. There is a new world order.^[13]

Many nations initially looked at us with both awe and fear in the wake of our immediate military victories after 9/11.^[14] Now as the Long War has continued each nation state assesses its national interests in the different fronts in the Long War.^[15]

No longer can we count on automatic support such as we often received in the Cold War. Now each Nation State will assess its national interests against each world situation—it creates a Nation State free for all—in some ways a kind of a free market of alliance building, where each situation has to be decisively sold to gain support.

For example, France supports military operations in Afghanistan, but not in Iraq. The former situation is seen as a matter of national security, while the latter is viewed hastily since it deprived France of lucrative (and ethically disingenuous) UN sanctioned Oil For Food arrangements.^[16]

Some countries, especially the socialist nation states of Old Europe see no threat or have little capacity to deal with our common enemy in the Global Long War. Multipolarity deludes them into confident denial of the rapidly morphing Islamization of their own territory. This is occurring through unstoppable social and economic forces (negative birthrate, severe labor shortage in lower income jobs) that are swelling immigrant ranks in their own territory.

While our objectives are clear, establishing and maintaining a coalition on these objectives will be difficult in this multi-polar free-for-all of the post-Cold War world.

Why are We at War?

I apologize for having to bring this up—but it seems lost in the national discourse five and a half years after 9/11. But it's very simple. 9/11 culminated a series of events where Islamic Fascists have sought to attack western interests, push westerners out of existing and former Islamic territory, and re-establish a caliphate^[17] system. After 9/11 it was undeniable we were at war with people who don't like us. They don't like us no matter how open minded or pandering we may be to them.

Past events such as the 1983 Beirut Marine Corps Barracks Bombing, the 1986 Khobar Tower Bombing, 1993 battles in Somalia, the 1998 Tanzania and Kenya American Embassy Bombings, and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole were not random, isolated acts. They were part of a campaign by constantly morphing Islamic Terrorist Groups. In hindsight, the connection of dots is obvious.

Is Iraq Part of the Long War?

Do we have the Saddam signed memo that says, “UBL, we're with you.” No—we don't. Was Saddam connected to Terror and WMD?^[18] Absolutely.

The problem is, some demand a level of evidence so utterly unachievable that they will never be satisfied. Is this because they want to be intellectually honest or just that they dislike the current leadership of the Executive Branch? I would suggest the latter clouds some of these minds—they will never be satisfied that Saddam had terrorist and WMD connections no matter what the evidence is. Each individual dot is dismissed out of hand as “not enough”—but the collective number of dots is overwhelming.

It's odd because the people who refuse to connect the dots on this issue are the same ones that indignantly accuse others of not connecting dots before 9/11. Demanding overwhelming, irrefutable, American Criminal proceeding level of evidence is how you guarantee a repeat of 9/11.

For a simple baseline of Saddam's connections to WMD and Terrorism I will point to nothing else than the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report (SSCI) released in 2006 (coincidentally released in an opportune time before a national election).[19] There is a lot more than this, but this report clearly shows the state of dishonesty surrounding the issue of Saddam's connection to WMD and Terror—by people who are feverishly trying to debunk the evidence on any connection.

Obviously I was one of the few people who actually read this report. It was chock full of evidence showing WMD activity and connection to Terrorism, yet in an extremely intellectually dishonest jujitsu concluded definitively that Saddam had no connection to WMD or Terror—which is basically the only thing that media reported.[20]

The 2006 SSCI report did nothing more than compare the fall 2002 National Intelligence Estimate with the two Iraqi Survey Group reports and then established definitive positions which they clearly felt could not be questioned.

They refused to look at any new information such as the incredible “Harmony”[21] effort. An even more disturbing issue is that only 2 of the 11 suspected Iraqi WMD sites have received an “in-depth inspection.”[22] This is incredible—all this blather about no WMD and nine of the 11 sites have not received an “in-depth inspection.”

Another stunning revelation[23] was the fact of “compelling” evidence that Saddam kept his “cadre” of nuclear weapons personnel “intact.” How about the clear evidence that Saddam had Biological seed stock, hid Chemical Warfare capability, and also hid numerous ballistic missiles?[24]

The study is silent on immense evidence showing a link between Saddam and other Terrorist groups including the key figures in the Terror War of the 1980s, Abbu Abbas and Abu Nidal. It does not give proper context to Salman Pak and Kurma as Terrorist bases. It also doesn't explain why Abdul Yasin went to Iraq after his release from investigations of the 1993 WTC I bombing.[25]

After reading just these paper based findings, I believe any reasonable American would conclude that something wrong, illegal, and dangerous to America was going on in pre-OIF Iraq. Yet this 2006 SSCI report is continually waved as the definitive source debunking Saddam's link to WMD and Terror. This is blatant misrepresentation of actual content of the report.

With the hysterical politicization of this issue (by those who assert undeniable truth that Saddam had absolutely no connection to terror or WMD) it will take years for the truth to be ascertained on this issue. It took years to release and study the Venona[26] files which validated suspected Communists like Julius Rosenberg and Alger Hiss, were after all, no kidding, actual, real, undeniable Communists who were working to sell out America and hand victory to our enemy. Despite this level of evidence, they are still looked at as victims of the Right Wing Conspiracy by those that have an ingrained self-loathing of America.

To those who want to continue to bicker, now five and a half years later, about the justification for going to war—I challenge them to explicitly define WMD and Terrorist Connections in a rational post 9/11 context and stop cherry picking their way to their own pre-conceived conclusions.

The Way Ahead—Issues We Must Resolve to Move Toward Victory

The Mobilization of all Elements of National Power

Let's ensure, at least in the Executive Branch, all elements of National Power are coordinated, resourced, and participative. This will take additional Federal spending to expand Non-DoD U.S.

Government capabilities, it will take years of hiring and training to expand our Special Operations Forces and Intel/HUMINT structures, and years to bring Diplomatic, Economic, and Information Elements of National Power abreast of the capability of the Military Element.

I have previously written on this need to focus all Elements of National Power for the Long War.[\[27\]](#) Everyone in the national security system needs to apply the same sense of urgency that we did in WWII. During those war years, every day's effort was treated as if the very survival of our families and homes depended upon success of our endeavor. So it should be today.

The Home Front

As referred to earlier, one must take extreme care in analyzing the feeling and mood of the nation from the November 7, 2007 election. I would suggest Joe Public in America wants success and victory in the Long War, they don't want to run away from Iraq in failure as some wish for. But because of nominal pushback and limited alternative interpretation from the Executive Branch in different public forums, some have become wavering and even bitter in their support of the Long War.

On this issue, all I can say is that leading a nation at War is a contact sport that requires daily affirmation from senior Executive Branch leadership in every possible forum to show the nation that we are doing everything possible to win the war. This also includes fully developing and exercising the Diplomatic, Political, and Information Elements of National Power—which may mean more national security expenditures.

We are not going to get everyone on board. It's very disappointing that some embrace failure so that they'll look better in 2008. Just like the Civil War, Copperheads is alive and well in America today. And just like the Cold War, we as a society were not united in our stand against Communism. Many current "Cut and Runners" were the original "Cut and Runners" who saw no possibility of Victory against the Communists. For them to fondly recount how we stood united against the Soviet Menace is simply and factually incorrect.

Behavior of Big Media in the Long War—Where are the American War Reporters?

There used to be something called an American War Reporter. I think that went away when Walter Cronkite broke with President Johnson in early 1968.[\[28\]](#)

Many American War Reporters refuse to "imbed" with U.S. forces—they feel it would compromise their impartiality. To show the lengths at which Big Media is going to show "impartiality", in January 2007, the New York Times Military Correspondent, Robert Gordon, was reprimanded for allegedly showing support for the American effort in Iraq.[\[29\]](#)

Impartiality? Mike Wallace (one of the defining post World War II TV journalists) declared that he had a higher moral obligation, i.e. to get the story, then to warn Americans they were about to be ambushed and killed by enemy forces.[\[30\]](#) I'm not making this up—this is true—so let's throw this impartiality argument out the window—they've declared which side they are on—and it's not on America's side.

Reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan by Big Media has been horrible and has gotten worse—they have become too concerned about their own security and leave much of the actual reporting to local nationals of questionable allegiance.[\[31\]](#) This is shameful and totally corrupts the journalistic process. Paying local nationals, who are most likely connected one way or another to warring

factions, to collect the stories creates an environment where staged events and fictitious body counts are reported without any thought to corroboration.

Big Media is now simply passing along fictitious stories with little or no corroboration (*The Associated Press* has still not retracted it's "Six Sunni's burned alive" story).^[32] There have been many good reporters that have made the ultimate sacrifice in the Long War. But many more only leave their armed compounds in Baghdad with a significant force of paid security guards—this is not War Reporting, this is THE story, and the Big Media is now an active participant in the story.

The American Public is not getting the detailed, investigative journalism they deserve from the Press. The Press doesn't want to imbed with our forces, but they won't go out on their own on a regular basis without significant local national security forces (i.e., a private army) under their hire. This is not war reporting.

We've Got a Fire in the Main Plant—Professionals Undermining the War Effort

This is one of the most disconcerting and sensitive issues. With constant books, articles, and leaks from inside, it appears even the executive branch is in disarray. There is clearly an on-going struggle between a requirement to carry out the lawful orders of the elected and appointed officials and some who feel it is their duty to not carry out these lawful orders.

I'm going to keep this section short and simple. We have some (but too many) Executive Branch employees who are undermining the War Effort because of two misapplied concepts—one is that they have a First Amendment Right to say and do what they want to undermine the war effort. Second they assert the constitutional concept of "checks and balances."

I'm not a constitutional legal scholar, but I think that concept refers to checks and balances between the three branches of government—not an employee undermining the chain of command within one of these branches. These two misapplied concepts are inappropriate and do not trump uniformed and civilian obligation to carry out lawful orders. If an executive branch employee is aware of an unlawful order then they have a lawful requirement to report it or use the defined whistle blower process. In one more historical parallel—I can't find any "kiss and tell" books from WWII exposing the Anzio debacle and questioning the Administration.

Not liking the current Administration does not allow Executive Branch employees to undermine the current Administration. If they can't philosophically handle the current Administration, the only dignified and honorable option for these Executive Branch employees is for them to resign their position, step off the government property, and they can have all the free speech they want. They can't take a paycheck AND undermine the Executive Branch.

Ground Tactical Activity in the Long War

I've been disturbed by an evolving trend. I've talked to a number of ground leaders (O-5 to O-8) whom are trying to induce not only outcome but also behavior on the ground. The thing I'm hearing regularly are words to the effect, "They're not doing it the way we would."

They won't and they never will.

We need to remove any expectation of this—no where in any of our War Plans is there an objective of ensuring the Iraqi's do things the way we do them. Expecting strict Iraqi and Afghan adherence to AR 700 series pubs or FM 100-5 is a bit questionable or at least debatable.

Admittedly we as military professionals are trained and indoctrinated from our first days in the academies, ROTC, or OCS to control the situation in our Area of Operations (and can be relieved of duties for not doing so). However complex Phase IV + operations are not Joint/Combined maneuver campaigns—other, non-kinetic issues come to the forefront:

“Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.”[\[33\]](#)

In addition, our rotation cycle is beginning to wear on supportive local nationals—we haven’t been there four years—more appropriately and accurately, we’ve been there one year, four times (in terms of Army rotations). Ground Commanders come in with the confidence and bravado that a Commander needs—that is a good thing—but it should be checked with an attitude of winning the war in increments over a long sustained commitment—not decisive, overwhelming success in one rotation cycle. Throwing the previous deployments’ progress out the window and starting all over again frustrates Iraqi’s and Afghani’s who look at us as their teachers or parents.[\[34\]](#)

Our objective in the OIF and OEF Fronts of the Long War was to remove the regime and their connection to WMD and Terrorism: mission accomplished. As the Iraqis and Afghans work out issues in post-regime nation-states, let’s focus our efforts on eliminating foreign threats and denying sanctuary. Let them work out their governance and societal processes among themselves.

Summary

Declaring peace or declaring failure won’t make hostile elements cease and desist in this Long War. It only provides time for them to resource, plan, and equip for their next actions. We need to put past disagreements behind us, fully acknowledge we’re at war, and achieve success (which includes military victory in addition to diplomatic, economic, and information success).

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References

1. Anzio was in historical hindsight a disaster—if the American public had received comparable contemporary coverage of the Anzio landings, they would have been clamoring for a negotiated settlement to WWII.
2. “What plausible scenarios could draw even a *war-weary* United States back into the Middle East, into a Gulf War III?” asks David Rothkopf in [“The Coming of Gulf War III: Even If We Leave Now, We’ll Be Back,”](#) *Washington Post*, December 10, 2006, B01.
3. [JP1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 November 2000](#), v: “The United States relies for its security on the complementary application of the basic instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Guided by national security policy and strategy, the Armed Forces of the United States shape and employ the military instrument to advance and defend national security interests and objectives.”
4. Carl von Clausewitz, [Principles of War](#), translated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke (The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942.) as presented on [Clausewitz.com](#). Also see the interesting

[overview](#) of Clausewitz's *Principles of War* on the University of Florida's Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) website.

5. See: U.S. Congressman Jim McDermott, "[Stuck in the Middle of a Civil War](#)," *U.S. House of Representatives website (House.gov)*, February 28, 2006; and Laura Rozen, "[Mr. Bring-Em-Home: An interview with Representative John Murtha](#)," *The Village Voice*, December 19, 2005.

6. See: Bob Geary, "[David Price Against Long War--and Timetable: Nearly 800 constituents--the vast majority of whom want out of Iraq now--show up to hear their congressman debate the war, and himself](#)," *The Independent Weekly (Indyweek.com)*, October 12, 2005; and U.S. Congressman Steve Rothman, "[War in Iraq](#)," *U.S. House of Representatives Website (House.gov)*.

7. E.J. Dionne Jr., "[Meeting at the Middle](#)," *Washington Post*, November 9, 2006, A29.

8. GEN Schoomaker: "This is a clash of ideas, an information war," cited by Joe Galloway, "[War on Terror Never Going Away, Top Army Chief Says](#)," *Military.com*, June 16, 2004.

9. Thomas Hargrove and Guido H. Stempel, "[A third of U.S. public believes 9/11 conspiracy theory](#)," *Scripps Howard News Service*, August 2, 2006.

10. See: "[Imam Leads Democrats in Prayer of Conversion: Muslim leader at party's winter meeting also asks Allah to stop 'the occupation'](#)," *WorldNetDaily.com*, February 3, 2007. It's stunning that apparently not a single person took exception nor challenged this Imam for some of his questionable characterizations of the American War Effort.

11. When in a dramatic expansion of congressional power after the 1974 election, Congress cut off funding for the South Vietnamese.

12. *War One—Removal of the Regime—Mar 03 to Dec 03; War Two—Initiation of Insurgency Operations by Foreign Forces (Syrian, AQ, Iranian) Who had been Waiting and Resourcing—Dec 03 to April 04; War Three—Decisive Coalition Military Defeat of both the AQ/Sunni Alliance and the Iranian Sponsored Shiite Uprising—Fallujah I, Fallujah II, and summer battles in Najaf, Karbala, and Samarra—April 04 to Nov 04. Military Victory was achieved during this period by Coalition Forces—from this point on, Iraq is all about Iraqi's working out their future—our major contribution now should be ensuring outside influences do not contribute to violence in Iraq and sanctuary is denied to non-state actors; War Four—Year of Elections, Three major elections that mark the first modern democratic vote in the Islamic World—Dec 04 to Jan 06; War Five—Iraqi's (violently) work out their future—Initiated by the February 2006 destruction of the Golden Domed Shia Shrine in Samarra, Sunni's receive life support from Saudi Arabia and the Iranians expand train and equip activities for Sadr—Feb 06 to the present.*

13. Fareed Zakaria, "[Preview of a Post-U.S. World](#)," *Newsweek*, February 5, 2007.

14. "Interview with Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou of the Air Force of the People's Liberation Army," *Heartland: Eurasian Review of Geopolitics I*, 2005, Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso/Cassan Press-HK.

15. A fascinating recent development is discussed in Jeremy Page, "[Giants Meet to Counter U.S. Power](#)," *Times Online*, February 15, 2007.

16. In late summer 2003 I personally looked over some of the "aid" France or French Interests provided to Saddam's forces. The "aid" was at the Kirkush Training Center in Iraq. The hundreds

of crates had a variety of military equipment in them—with French addresses for the point of origination and dated in the 2001 to 2002 time period. The crates I specifically inspected had AK assault rifle magazines—a clear violation of [UNSCR 687](#) (1991) which stated:

“24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

(a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;”

17. A soft definition of Caliphate on [Caliphate.eu: A Vision of a 21st Century Islamic State for the Muslim World](#); a more balanced view can be found in James Brandon, "[The Caliphate: One nation, under Allah, with 1.5 billion Muslims](#)," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 10, 2006.

18. Did Saddam have ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads ready to fire—no and I don't believe that was ever asserted. Did Saddam have people, programs, and resources assigned to WMD capabilities with the intent of rapid weaponization after sanctions were lifted and also sharing of these capabilities with non-state actors—absolutely no question about it.

19. See: See the [Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments together with Additional Views](#), September 8, 2006.

20. The committee was split among party lines in an unprecedented manner in summer of 2004 in response to demands of the minority element. During the Cold War this committee remained together—despite a number of occasions where elements hostile to the Reagan Administration cooperatively worked through the “Nuclear Freeze” movement to undermine National Security efforts.

21. An ongoing effort to translate and interpret the millions of documents seized from Saddam's regime.

22. See page 41 of the *2006 SSCI Report*.

23. See page 21 of the *2006 SSCI Report*.

24. See pages 32, 43, 47 of the *2006 SSCI Report*.

25. A good summary of Saddam's connections to Terror is at, Stephen F. Hayes, "[Camp Saddam: What we've learned about Iraq's terrorist training camps](#)," *The Weekly Standard* 11, No 27 (April 3, 2006). In addition, a very puzzling piece of data has not been fully explored—relationships between Terry Nichols (OKC Bomber) and significant al-Qaeda personnel in the Philippines. See: Patrick B. Briley, "[The Oklahoma City Bombing Case Revelations](#)," *LibertyPost.org*, January 15, 2007.

26. See: Robert L. Benson, "[The Venona Story](#)," *NSA.gov*; and Peter Tyson, "[Read Venona Intercepts](#)," *Nova Online, PBS.org*.

27. John R. Mills, "[All Elements of National Power: Re-Organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War](#)," *Strategic Insights* V, No. 6 (July 2006).

28. See *Wikipedia* entry on Walter Cronkite: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Cronkite

29. *New York Times* chief military correspondent Michael Gordon remarks with regard to the President's plan to build up forces in Iraq on *The Charlie Rose Show* in January 2007. As cited by Brit Hume, "[Reporter Gets Called on the Carpet for his Comments About Bush's War Policy](#)," *FoxNews.com*, January 29, 2007. His illegal act—saying: "As a purely personal view, I think it's worth it—one last effort for sure to try to get this right, because my personal view is we've never really tried to win. We've simply been managing our way to defeat. And I think that if it's done right, I think that there is the chance to accomplish something."

30. James Fallows, [Why We Hate the Media](#) (NY: Pantheon Books, 1996).

31. "'Much of the basic reporting now is done by Iraqis.' Which is fine—it is Iraq. However, foreign national (i.e. non-Iraqi) journalists cannot sit in their armed compounds and pretend to be reporting from the front. See: Orville Schell, "[Baghdad: The Besieged Press](#)," *The New York Review of Books* 53, No. 6 (April 6, 2006).

32. Multi-National Corps—Iraq, Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory, "[One Mosque Burned in Hurriya](#)," Office Website of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (*MNF-Iraq.com*), November 25, 2006.

33. *FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, Page 2-2, Dec 06.

34. In 2003 I was told by an esteemed Iraqi who had been a survivor of the regime years, "We are like children—you must teach us"—from a man who had received a Master's in Electrical Engineering at the University of Michigan in the 1970's.