



## Dissuasion in U.S. Defense Strategy

22 September 2004

A Workshop hosted by the [Center for Contemporary Conflict](#) and sponsored by the [Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Advanced Systems and Concepts Office](#).

Conference report by [Peter R. Lavoy](#), [Barry Zellen](#), and [Christopher Clary](#). Papers presented at the conference are available in the October 2004 edition of [Strategic Insights](#), the Center for Contemporary Conflict's e-journal.



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### Panel One: Introductory Session


The Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Contemporary Conflict organized a workshop on *Dissuasion in U.S. Defense Strategy* on 22 September 2004. The workshop was part of the Monterey Strategy Seminar. It was initiated and sponsored by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Advanced System and Concepts Office to enable the Center for Contemporary Conflict to bring together a top-notch group of experts and consider the role dissuasion might play in future U.S. defense strategy.

Dr. Kerry Kartchner from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency discussed the sponsor's expectations. Kartchner recalled that the process of developing a Cold War "deterrence" consensus didn't happen

overnight. The ideas of deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD) took several years of conferences, workshops, debate, and articles to take shape. Kartchner said he believes dissuasion is a useful elaboration on the classic theory of deterrence, and added that the seminar would explore the “who,” the “what,” the “why” of dissuasion, and identify the tools of dissuasion.

CCC director Dr. Peter R. Lavoy previewed the day’s lineup of panelists and their prepared essays. Lavoy indicated that the day’s discussions would address the targets of dissuasion, its relationship to other U.S. defense goals, the relationship between force and diplomacy, as well as unilateral versus multilateral actions—because international organizations may mitigate dangerous security competitions, Lavoy suggested it might be in our interest to have those efforts dovetail with some multilateral measures.

Lavoy also presented a matrix displaying a range of countries that pose difference challenges to dissuasion. If one considers a wide range of U.S. relations with these countries, from amity to enmity—including allies, coalition partners, friends, neutrals, adversaries, ideological enemies—where does dissuasion fit?



Lavoy observed that rogue and failed states, as well as non-state actors, may be very difficult to dissuade even though we might very much wish to influence their conduct. He noted it is an especially tall task to dissuade ideological enemies, who are "predisposed not to be persuaded by you." He said this was the case with the Soviet Union during the Cold war and also appears to characterize the challenges of dissuading rogue states today. And then there is the issue of dissuading allies, something that can be seen as "very impolite." Case in point—how do you dissuade a country like Pakistan, which is crucial for the success of U.S. strategic objectives but also has been a consistent source of troubling behavior? Within the realm of military competition, Lavoy said dissuasion can be applied toward weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Regarding the Soviet Union, Lavoy asked, "did we ever dissuade them or not?" After all, they didn't develop a new generation of aircraft carriers. But were they dissuaded, or did they simply realize they were a land power, without the need for such a naval platform? Such strategic ambiguity is the hallmark of dissuasion, just as it was with the world of deterrence that preceded it.

Lavoy posited that "dissuasion runs against the grain of world politics in some sense," because it is "a natural impetus of all states to acquire as much power as possible," as realist theorists, such as John Mearsheimer, believe. But "if every country is compelled to acquire as much power as possible, how can dissuasion work?" Enter the security dilemma, where "steps taken to increase our security decrease the security of others." As we get stronger, don't we give competing states a stronger impetus to compete against us? Looking to the defense requirements of dissuasion, Lavoy asked if dissuasion should be an overarching policy, or just "a component of our strategy vis-à-vis China or WMD proliferation," to cite two examples. Further, he asked, is dissuasion primarily a Department of Defense (DOD) mission, or a U.S.

government mission, or a coalition mission? After all, he added, "it might really take a village to be effective at dissuasion for the long run."

## Panel Two: Dissuasion As Policy

The panel considered existing dissuasion policy guidance and explored the relationship between dissuasion and other strategic goals.

One of the speakers noted that after 9/11, dissuasion helped fill a void which seemed to be insufficiently dealt with by assurance, deterrence and defeat. Dissuasion has emerged as a tool for the current strategic environment, since there are opponents that we "can't deter" and "can't defeat." The problem is that dissuasion is a fairly amorphous goal right now. It is not clear what it means, and this ambiguity reflects a similar position to where we were at the start of the Cold War, when we didn't really know what deterrence meant.

The same speaker noted dissuasion presents "many challenges," such as what we tell our allies, the public, and our adversaries. And how do we dissuade both state and non-state actors? He presented the Department of Defense's new matrix of four distinct categories of threats—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and destructive—and argued that each might require a "different art of persuasion." Dissuasion relies upon multiple components of national power. Diplomatic tools include allies and partnerships, whereas military tools include security cooperation and training exercises. Technology tools include trade sanctions and embargoes on prohibited technology. He described the need to look at what DOD brings to the game, and where we can make investments and make equipment capability investment decisions, and invest in our people to prepare for executing dissuasion as strategy.



**Fmr. Asst. Sec. of Defense Edward Warner and Mr. Martin Neill from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy.**

A separate speaker explained the need for having effective, short slogans to try to capture dimensions of your strategy. Hence, the quartet of the 2001 QDR to "assure, deter, dissuade, defeat" adversaries of the United States. This speaker said dissuasion falls within that "subset of preventive measures" with the target being "decision-makers and their decision calculus," with one of the primary goals of dissuasion

being the acquisition of WMD and their means of delivery. To achieve dissuasion requires having a set of capabilities to thwart that behavior, coupled with threatening declaratory statements that "if you move that way, we will punish you." He concurred that dissuasion goes beyond military instruments but requires the whole range of national power.

During the course of the discussion that followed, it was determined that dissuasion, like deterrence, is very difficult to gauge. Looking into the past, it is difficult to point to examples where "X country was dissuaded by Y action(s)." As a consequence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure the success of dissuasion as a strategy.

### Panel Three: Targets of Dissuasion

The next panel took a look at regional case studies of dissuasion, and its objectives included discussing the kinds of countries, coalitions, sub-state and non-state actors that should be dissuaded.

#### China

Dr. Brad Roberts of the Institute for Defense Analyses indicated it was a matter of conjecture whether China was simply a target of dissuasion or *the* primary target of dissuasion. The challenge of dissuading China from engaging the United States as a peer is altogether different from dissuading smaller states from developing nuclear weapons, Roberts contended. Interestingly, the 2001 QDR report's focus on emerging peer adversarial relationships retreated from center stage in the Bush administration's strategic thinking, evident by the shift in thought presented in the National Security Strategy that followed the QDR. China's post-9/11 cooperation in the global war on terrorism has helped foster a more optimistic vision within the Bush administration in which great power rivalry could be subsumed by cooperation against common threats.

In this context, Roberts asked how should we configure our strategic posture in order to de-motivate China's choice to sprint to some medium-term advantage in its strategic posture. Roberts identified five potential force postures for dissuasion, and assessed each of them with regard to the goal of dissuading China: (1) through large nuclear deployments, (2) strategic responsiveness, (3) strategic defeat, (4) selective competition, and (5) mutual contingent restraint. Large nuclear deployments and strategic responsiveness appear ill-suited to dissuade China's military competition since they presume an offense-offense competitive paradigm, in contrast to China's offense-defense mode of competition. Strategic defeat, while the best strategy to deal with rogues, is problematic for dissuading China since it offers no benefit for restraint, and could motivate an arms race or precipitate the very war the United States seeks to avoid—while also risking alarming U.S. allies. Selective competition worked against the Soviets, but China today is quite different from the USSR of the 1980s. And mutual contingent restraint would appear to work against the current administration's commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD). Roberts explained that dissuasion is in essence a hedging strategy, with the challenge being that hedging sometimes backfires, creating the very situation it sought to prevent.

#### Russia

Dr. James Goldgeier from George Washington University discussed the case of Russia, and looked at the range of deterrence and dissuasion policies the United States has applied to the Soviet Union and Russia since the end of the Second World War. Today, U.S. policy toward Russia is not so much about trying to dissuade it from becoming a peer competitor—that is not going to happen—but dissuading it from reconstituting empire in Central Asia and also facilitating the military ambitions of others. So far, the United States has a mixed report card: Russian democratization appears to have stalled, if not gone into remission; Russia repeatedly has defied U.S. wishes in providing dual-use technologies to states of proliferation concern; but Russia has not been able to reconstitute its past empire in Central Asia, largely because of its own limited capabilities.

Goldgeier argued that there was a range of possible explanations for U.S. difficulty in dissuading Russia from troublesome activity. First, there may have been insufficient incentives for Russia to stop this conduct. Second, dissuasion may have assumed a unitary target when in fact that was not the case. For instance, Russian President Boris Yeltsin may have lacked sufficient control over the Ministry of Atomic Energy to elicit a change in technological cooperation. Third, the U.S. refusal to move back from NATO expansion may have led to a Russian refusal to cooperate with the United States on bilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts towards Iran. Fourth, rumors have suggested for some time that the Russians may have concluded a deal with the Iranians that if Iran would not support the Chechens, Russia would continue to provide technological cooperation to Tehran. If these rumors were true, there would be little the United States could do that would affect Moscow's calculations.

Goldgeier came to several conclusions with regard to dissuasion. First, when trying to dissuade an ideological foe, dissuasion means deterrence and reliance on threats to succeed. Only after Moscow abandoned the ideological competition, Goldgeier argued, did carrots play a useful role. For carrots to work, they must outweigh the benefits the adversary is getting from the unwanted behavior, and they must be acceptable to the stakeholders responsible for the unwanted behavior. As well, policymakers must be able to deliver those carrots. Additionally, when sticks come into play, they must be credible in order to be effective. In the end, it is important to realize that the adversary might be playing its own game of linkage against the United States, as Russia appears to have done over NATO expansion.

### **Allies**

Dr. David Yost of the Naval Postgraduate School discussed the possibility of dissuading allies, and observed that a certain awkwardness, even embarrassment arises when dissuading allies is discussed. Allies are different from adversaries in that they are partners—but even partners can disagree when it comes to the goals of dissuading mutual adversaries. NATO has disagreed on dissuasion and, as seen during the 1980s, on the merits of influencing the behavior of one's adversary through shaping or channeling arms competition. Even today, Yost noted that allies emphasize instruments other than military superiority, such as nonproliferation regimes and nation-building. Yost believes that dissuasion strategies may be difficult to pursue in an alliance setting because they involve speculative judgments about the effects of policies designed to shape adversary behavior, which can vary significantly across alliance partners. Yost also considered the challenge of targeting allies as the object of dissuasion, noting that dissuading allies not to pursue certain military capabilities may sound manipulative or impolite, but nonetheless has been an explicit part of national policy on both sides, such as with extending deterrence and promoting nonproliferation for both Germany and Turkey.

Yost explained that NATO allies differ in their ambitions and in their capacity to compete. As such, it is not surprising that Britain and France are both nuclear weapons states since they have long histories as Great Powers and remain less willing to depend on others for their security. In recent years, the United States has not been preoccupied with dissuading its NATO allies from becoming competitors but rather has actively tried to persuade them to "do more." The Cold War ended in debate between Washington and its NATO allies over "burden sharing," which began with U.S. efforts to persuade allies to spend more on conventional forces when most of allies preferred to rely on U.S. nuclear commitments. Yost concluded by noting that ally dissuasion is a two-way street. From the 1990s to the present, European allies have attempted to shape the U.S. military posture, in particular by encouraging the United States to enter into and maintain treaty commitments. The intense European efforts to encourage continued U.S. adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty are illustrative of how such dissuasive activities are likely to be carried out, and also how such dissuasive activities can fail.

### **Rogue States**

Dr. Robert Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars explored the challenge of dissuading rogue states. Current policy lacks clarity with regard to the target of dissuasion, and whether rogues are a central objective of this strategy, or if dissuasion is instead focused on potential peer adversaries. Dissuading a rogue state is greatly complicated by the U.S. pursuit of regime change against



some of these targets. Iraq was presented as a “warning to other states,” though pragmatists in the administration feared it would backfire by motivating Iran and North Korea to accelerate their WMD acquisition efforts. Litwak believes the administration is now pursuing, very reluctantly, a pragmatic pivot from the regime change/preemption model to an alternative deterrence/assurance of regime survival, and that both North Korea and Iran should be presented with structured choices, so they understand that benefits will come from behavior change, and that non-compliance will result in penalties.



**Robert Litwak speaks on dissuading rogue states with James Goldgeier in background.**

Litwak considered the case of Libya, whose “surprise announcement” that it would completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs was viewed by many in the administration as a “demonstration-effect” of Iraq. But Litwak said that Libya’s WMD program reversal likely was influenced also by assertive interdiction activities like the Proliferation Security Initiative. Litwak argued that the “crux” of the deal was assurance of regime survival as opposed to dissuasion. Or, as Clinton administration officials would say, perhaps it was the U.S. willingness to take “yes” as the answer, and thus Washington did not pursue regime change when abdication of WMD capabilities was sincerely offered. Will we do the same for North Korea and Iran? He noted the *New York Times* recently reported the administration is split over the pursuit of regime change or behavior change, and added he's concerned that as a result of this internal confusion that these regimes believe we will not take yes as an answer, undercutting our efforts at dissuasion. Litwak says his core conclusion is that dissuasion can not affect rogue state intentions so long as the U.S. objective is regime change.

### **Discussion**

A commentator on the panel noted that if our end goal is to make sure those who want to do us harm do not have the military technology to do so, then dissuasion should be targeted at both sides of the equation—i.e., both the supply end and the demand end—to see where we have the best chance at interfering in the supply/demand relationship. For instance, this participant noted that in the case of

Russia, the United States put pressure on the supply end ( Russia) to inhibit Iran from attaining the nuclear technology we do not want them to have, rather than directly on the demand end, where we do not have the levers to make the Iranian government respond. Next, the commentator noted the U.S. need to look at the emotive base for weapons acquisition when assessing how best to dissuade others from WMD programs. The commentator referenced Niccolo Machiavelli's belief that it is good to be feared but not hated, since fear will inhibit action, while hate only propels it. If the target of dissuasion is still at the "fear stage," this participant argued that there remains an open window of opportunity. But, if they have made it to hatred stage, then the United States will have to work on the supply end, since the receiving end is no longer persuadable.

The participants then considered the question of whether dissuasion is smart policy. One speaker acknowledged that there is a case to be made, certainly among our allies, that dissuasion may not be smart policy, because we would prefer to be able to lean on them when necessary for coercing others. Secondly, is the effectiveness of dissuasion measurable? Several speakers argued that while outcomes might be measurable—whether Russia transfers nuclear technology to Iran or the number of cyber-attacks on U.S. systems from the Chinese mainland—determining causality will remain difficult. Dissuasion, like deterrence before it, is based on assumptions of how your actions will be perceived and how others will respond to such perceptions.



Conference participants enjoy lunch poolside.

## Panel Four: Scope of Dissuasion

### *International Nonproliferation Regimes*

Dr. Scott Sagan of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation observed identified severe tensions and deep contradictions between the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) regime and the U.S. strategy of dissuasion, and argued that scholars and policymakers must confront these to make wise policy choices. The best way to overcome these contradictions, Sagan said, is to

identify the underlying assumptions, and tensions, between these two strategies which have the shared aim of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.



**Scott Sagan discusses the implications of dissuasion for the non-proliferation regime.**

Sagan places the world's states into four distinct categories: (1) current nuclear weapons states; (2) latent nuclear weapons states with the technological know-how and infrastructure to become nuclear states in short order; (3) non-nuclear states either with no nuclear infrastructure or with limited nuclear infrastructure; and (4) "active proliferators" such as Iran and North Korea. Sagan argued that the NPT, which aims to slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons from the haves to the have-nots, and encourage the peaceful use of nuclear technology by those states that develop nuclear know-how, is sustained by three related bargains designed to reduce the incentive on non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear arsenals. And despite the exceptions presented by North Korea and Iran, Sagan points out that many other states have been successfully constrained by their NPT obligations. Unless the challenges facing the NPT are dealt with, we run the risk of seeing a significant number of non-nuclear states with the ability to develop nuclear weapons, all of whom in short order will be forced to reconsider the costs and benefits of remaining in the treaty.

In contrast to the NPT, Sagan explained that the logic of dissuasion is rooted in the idea that states will be constrained from developing advanced weapons capacity by their belief that U.S. defensive and offensive capabilities are so strong that their quest to match these would be cost-prohibitive. But the logic of dissuasion contradicts the logic of the NPT, since to dissuade potential adversaries from acquiring WMD, the United States must maintain significant nuclear numerical superiority over others, contradicting Article VI's commitment to work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Sagan pointed out an additional contradiction in the logic of dissuasion—noting that rogue states, which are presented as so irrational they cannot be deterred, are expected to be rational enough to be dissuaded. Sagan noted that dissuasion has always been a goal of U.S. strategy but in the past it was in the background, and not so clearly elevated to the foreground of U.S. strategic thinking. Now that dissuasion is front and central,



Sagan is concerned that its logic will continue to erode the already fragile foundations of the NPT, a system which, despite its imperfections, has remaining strengths worthy of preservation.

### ***NBC Weapons Proliferation***


Col. Charles Lutes of the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University examined the “who, when, and how” of the dissuasion of NBC weapons proliferation. First, he placed the world's strategic actors on a scale of increasing difficulty to dissuade, with allies among those least difficult to dissuade, followed in turn by global and regional powers, rogue states, WMD suppliers, and lastly, terrorists. He argued that it is harder to persuade rogue states and terrorists since dissuasion depends upon the implicit assumption of rationality and assumes rational action on the part of the part of the entity to be dissuaded. The less rational, the harder it is to persuade. However, Lutes considered that perhaps terrorists and rogues were rational in their own context.

Next, he examined the “when” of dissuasion, noting that dissuasion is more effective early in a NBC weapons program lifecycle. He presented a timeline for dissuasion, noting that assurance is preferable to influence intentions; dissuasion to thwart active acquisition; deterrence to prevent possession; and defense/defeat to prevent WMD use. Assurance is best-suited when there is only the intent to acquire, but once the entity in question acquires and possesses WMD, deterrence is more appropriate. Before an actor develops a strong WMD intent, Lutes noted a combination of assurance and dissuasion may be sufficient to convince it not to proceed. But once an actor starts actively acquiring WMD, Lutes argued dissuasive strategies alone provide the primary mechanism to counter this course. After an actor gains a WMD capability, the equation changes, and its threat of use is now countered predominantly through deterrence and defeat mechanisms. After WMD acquisition, Lutes noted, dissuasion is aimed at discouraging upgrades and advancement in technology.

Lutes observed that we tend to use WMD as a “one size fits all” term, failing to distinguish between nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile programs, when in fact each has quite different barriers to access and potential benefits. Looking ahead, Lutes believes one of the biggest challenges ahead may come from dissuading competition in emerging technologies that could have a revolutionary impact on military affairs, such as nanotechnology, genomic research, microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), and directed energy weapons. He added that countering the next weapon of mass destruction before it is developed is the ultimate challenge.

### ***Dissuasion and Confrontation: U.S. Policy in the India-Pakistan Case***

COL John H. Gill of the Near East-South Asia Center of the National Defense University examined U.S. dissuasion policy during several conflicts and crises between India and Pakistan, focusing particularly on the 1965 Kashmir War, the 1971 Bangladesh War, the 1999 Kargil conflict, and the 2001-2002 composite crisis. In the months prior to the 1965 war, ambiguous U.S. statements to its ally Pakistan may have emboldened Islamabad to launch the effort to “defreeze” the Kashmir dispute. However, the U.S. arms embargo contributed to the war’s limited duration. In the 1971 Bangladesh War, the United States only placed limited pressure on Pakistan to limit its suppression of the Bengali population in its eastern half. After the war began, Washington publicly and privately “tilted” toward Pakistan and deployed a Navy battle group to the Bay of Bengal as a warning to India. The tilt did little to stop Bangladeshi independence, and the deployment of the *U.S.S. Enterprise* had no impact on Indian decisions at the time, though it left a scar on Indian decision-makers, which would be cited as a justification for India’s nuclear weapons program. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, the United States was unable to prevent Pakistan from its dangerous land grab—partially because it had difficulty dissuading behavior it did not anticipate. The focus was instead on preventing Indian horizontal escalation, and Washington’s efforts seemed to have influenced Delhi’s decision to keep the conflict limited. During the 2001-2002 compound crisis, repeated visits by high profile U.S. leaders, most notably Secretary of State Colin Powell, combined with powerful messages of escalation avoidance actually worked very well.



**COL Jack Gill presents on dissuading Indo-Pakistani crises.**

Gill concluded that while the record for U.S. dissuasion in the India-Pakistan conflict is mixed, the United States has an important role to play on its own and with others. Among its most effective dissuasive tools are personal diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic measures, coordination with international partners, and the sound foundation of a long-term bilateral relationship. Less useful has been military force, though robust military-to-military programs have proven helpful to influencing behavior. Other factors to consider, Gill said, include balancing global and regional policies, and considering the impact of contemporary actions on the future in the region.

### ***Dissuasion and Regional Allies: The Case Of Pakistan***

Retired Brigadier Feroz Hasan Khan examined U.S. dissuasion from the Pakistani perspective, presenting a paper co-authored with CCC's research associate Mr. Christopher Clary. Khan noted that America's dissuasive capability is "severely constrained" by Pakistan's focus on regional threats, while the United States has tended to focus on international issues, such as nuclear proliferation. As a result, the United States was unable to dissuade Pakistan from pursuing nuclear weapons acquisition, and Khan observed that U.S. dissuasive efforts have often led to other behaviors that proved more harmful to U.S. interests. Referring to the famous quotation by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Khan explained, "sometimes when you expect a country to be dissuaded on something critical to its national security, sometimes they would rather eat grass than abandon the Bomb." Pakistan has learned that it must look to its own capabilities in order to deter future aggression, having seen its closest friends side with India in 1965 and in recent conflicts such as Kargil.

Pakistan continues to pursue a three-pronged strategy: (1) maintaining the conventional capability to deny India the strategic space to prosecute a limited war against it; (2) using proxies as part of an asymmetric strategy to tie down India in Kashmir, and earlier to defeat the Red Army in Afghanistan; and (3) developing its nuclear arsenal to deny India victory in a general war. While enabling Pakistan to confront regional threats, Khan noted Pakistani military strategy may have undermined U.S. security objectives in the region, and the emergence of the Taliban and revelation of A.Q. Khan's global nuclear supplier network are byproducts of this troubled U.S.-Pakistan alliance, as efforts to combat one problem can result in even tougher problems down the road. Khan noted the "fundamental challenge" inherent in

dissuading an ally, as "when that threat is on the doorstep, the exigencies of defeating the enemy trump abstract dissuasion goals," and it is only after that threat recedes that dissuasion returns to prominence. Today, Khan said, the United States aims to dissuade Pakistan in three areas: nonproliferation, regional instability, and support for radical Islamists. Khan believes for the United States to effectively dissuade Pakistan, it needs to focus on minimizing its competition with India, and stabilizing its border with Afghanistan. Dissuasion in South Asia means conflict management—and ultimately conflict resolution. The previous five decades of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship offer ample evidence that dissuading an ally with intense regional security concerns is very difficult.

## **Panel Five: Dissuasion as Strategy**

The afternoon session concerned the level, type, and modality of force required to dissuade; the balance between unilateral action and support for international institutions and norms; and defense posture requirements for the United States.

### ***Dissuading Terrorism***

Dr. Joseph Pilat of Los Alamos National Laboratory began by asking the question that has been troubling analysts, "Why haven't we seen more WMD terrorism?" He observed that significant WMD capabilities in significant quantities are difficult to produce and by their nature increase the chances of detection and interdiction. Additionally, he explained that if the United States looks at targeting non-state actors or support states that might provide key capabilities, we might dissuade them by identifying a credible threat to remove them, such as finding individuals with reputable expertise if their behavior was criminalized. As for state supporters, Pilat said that in many ways they can be dealt with in a more traditional manner. As strategies for WMD dissuasion are developed, he added that we must take account of the differences in WMD, since they each have different impacts and different capabilities they offer terrorists as well as different instruments that can be brought to bear against them. Nonetheless, Pilat believes that prospects are not great for completely successful dissuasion, and that there is some possibility that WMD terrorism might come to pass. While dissuasion will never be the ultimate instrument for dealing with the constant threat of terrorism, it could be part of an array of strategic capabilities brought to bear against WMD terrorists and would-be terrorists.

### ***Force Structure and Dissuasion***

Ms. Elaine Bunn of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University noted that the whole world is watching our force structure, and that U.S. deployments send messages to multiple audiences, and thus have a role in dissuasion. Bunn next defined dissuasion as efforts to discourage current/potential adversaries from developing, deploying, augmenting, enhancing qualitatively, or transferring military capabilities which threaten the United States or its forces. Or, in plainer English, the stuff you have, where you put your stuff, what you say about your stuff, how you use your stuff, the stuff you have, and how it gets you stuff in the future. Next, Bunn turned to the issue of China and BMD, and pondered whether BMD will be successful in dissuading China from augmenting its missile force or if it may send it down another path such as developing threats to the U.S. space assets or offensive information operations. In contrast to these thorny threats, she argued that the weapons of mass destruction arena is the most manageable.

Looking forward to new technologies and capabilities, Bunn turned next to science and technology investment decisions, and observed there are many options that we could bring to fruition in the future that will help us develop a pretty thorough dissuasion capability. Bunn explained by letting dissuasion be a factor to be considered when making budget decisions, it really does give the future a seat at the table.

### ***Challenges for U.S. Combatant Commands***

Mr. Greg Giles of Science Applications International Corporation noted that dissuasion is the least developed and understood of the 2001 QDR's four defense policy goals. As such, dissuasion is long on assertions, claiming that a well-targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating military competitions, while it is short on analysis, articulation, and guidance. Giles discussed dissuasion's conceptual challenges, noting the ambiguity between threat- versus capabilities-based approaches to military competition, and the ambiguity in determining if dissuasion is working.

After examining the conceptual ambiguities inherent in dissuasion, Giles turned to the planning challenges, asking how one operationalizes dissuasion planning so that you influence a competitor's operations, decision-makers or a group of decision-makers, and thus successfully manipulate peoples' motives to compete. And, he asked, how does the United States integrate dissuasion with its other defense policy goals? Within an AOR, Giles said there can be ripple effects resulting from dissuasion, and this not only might impact plans but may also have an impact on other actors in the AOR. It is necessary to understand these relationships well. Giles looked at the relationship between the regional commands and the strategic leadership, noting that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) aims to offer "one stop shopping" for combatant commands to meet their "assure, dissuade, deter" planning needs, and serve as a clearing house to mitigate competing requests for similar or same intelligence. But, Giles wondered if it is appropriate that we are relying on the combatant commands to carry out dissuasion. Giles concluded that what comes out in spades is the overriding need for greater interagency coordination and collaboration, as the current thinking going on really does not get by DOD thinking about dissuasion and deterrence, but it really needs to.

## **Discussion**

One discussant observed that there were several new ideas this panel added that were not in the earlier discussions, especially concerning the idea of dissuasion of non-state actors, one of the most difficult and significant potential targets of dissuasion. Referring to Pilat's presentation, this commentator reiterated how infrastructure can be used as a lever, target and tool, and that terrorist infrastructure may be something that the United States can manipulate. Additionally, comments were made that that U.S. infrastructure is an asset that can be used to further manipulate competitors' decisions. Regarding the role of intelligence in dissuasion, a participant noted that intelligence is clearly the most essential precondition to success as an enabler of any of these efforts in this arena. One commentator agreed that we are signaling from overall U.S. actions and postures, whether we want to or not, so we need to think about the positive and negative proliferation signals that emanate from our other actions, such as science investments and technology research and development. One participant highlighted Giles discussion of interagency dynamics and noted that while such interactions can be crucial in how dissuasion is operationalized, they are still nascent and must be explored further. A discussant noted that it was important to disaggregate dissuasion in terms of its levers, targets, objectives, and effects. Unlike deterrence, which was mainly practiced against one adversary for decades, the United States is attempting to dissuade multiple targets, composed of a number of different types of actors, from doing several different kinds of activity.

One participant discussed the role of intelligence in dissuasion, and considered the case study of India and U.S. failure to dissuade India from testing again after 1974. The participant observed that U.S. policy to dissuade Indian nuclear testing proved successful several times, causing India to hold back on at least three occasion prior to its May 1998 tests. The commentator also considered the intelligence role in the case of Libya. He explained that when Libya realized the U.S. intelligence community had penetrated their supplier network, it was ready to do the "Full Monty," while beforehand it was not expecting to. So this commentator concluded that the Indian test experience illustrates the difficulty of reliably acquiring specific warning, whereas the Libyan experience provides an example over many years of the use of intelligence for the successful use of numerous dissuasive techniques.



## Closing remarks

One participant noted in closing that there are those who were in attendance who think that dissuasion is ready to become a strategy concept, but it was just as clear there are also those who think that it is not. He also speculated that the very concept of dissuasion might disappear from our strategic lexicon, as dissuasion does not do anything in isolation, and it remains "an amorphous blob" that we do not really understand. He concluded that he hoped future discussions would cover the whole of the threat spectrum, from traditional to irregular to catastrophic to disruptive, while today's discussion gravitated on the traditional challenges. The United States needs to consider ways in which it can be dissuade others away from catastrophic and disruptive threats towards less extreme challenges.

Another participant noted that whether or not the next QDR revives the concept of dissuasion, repeats it or sweeps it away, he was confident it would nonetheless incorporate its basics. Regardless of its name, dissuasion is assured to be a long lasting idea worthy of further deliberation and analysis, and specifically relevant to the new challenges that the United States finds today.