CIAO DATE: 02/04

Strategic Insights

Volume 2, Issue 7, July 2003

 

Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom
Barak A. Salmoni


Perhaps the least expected short-term consequence of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a serious aggravation in US-Turkish relations. After the Turkish Parliament dashed American hopes of deploying forces from southeastern Turkey on 1 March 2003, the US-Turkish deterioration raises questions about the health of the two countries' "strategic partnership." Some have opined that because the United States is a global power while Turkey is only a regional power, rather than "partners" Turkey and the United States are "allies" destined to conflict on key matters.

It is too early to prognosticate on the future US-Turkish partnership; mixed indicators included harsh comments from Washington tempered by reassuring words by US diplomats in Ankara. Likewise, supplementary war funding contained $1billion in aid for Turkey, conditional upon the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) not obstructing US operations in Iraq. The departure from Turkish soil of American assets associated with Operation Northern Watch has also worried Turkish commentators, though the 22 June 2003 meeting between Secretary of State Colin Powell and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül holds out the prospect that the tezkere krizi (parliamentary bill crisis) has been overcome in favor of humanitarian cooperation in Iraq.

The question remains: how did two NATO allies with supposedly common interests fail to activate their strategic partnership regarding matters of deep mutual concern? Chagrined American editorialists have asked how a country funded and protected by the United States since 1946 could let us down at this key time. 1 More telling, American officials have pondered how American (and Turkish) negotiators could fumble the ball so totally and publicly. 2

Appearances and Realities

Conditions in November 2002 appeared optimal for Turkish-American cooperation in the Middle East. The Bush administration's defense and foreign policy principals were extremely enamored of a Turkish-American strategic partnership, however defined. In previous administrations, they had secured Turkey continuing Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and had a strong rapport with the Evren and Ozal governments (1980-91), culminating in the latter's active support of the United States in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Policy makers such as Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman felt they grasped Turkish politics.

On Turkey's part, the time for cooperation likewise seemed propitious. After decades of reluctance to operate beyond Turkey's borders, the senior military echelon had enthusiastically advocated cooperation with UN peace-keeping efforts in Somalia and the Balkans. In 2002, Turkish forces led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at American urging, demonstrating Ankara's commitment to cooperation with the United States in the War on Terror. With the promotion of Hilmi Özkök as CGS-TAF (Turkish Armed Forces), it appeared America had gained an influential ally among Turkish decision-makers. As opposed to the previous CGS who had been somewhat reserved towards the United States, Özkök had spent long years at the NATO HQ in Brussels, and was on record as pro-American.

While the 1999-2002 Ecevit government—combining a secularist left of center party with an ultra-nationalist party—had repeatedly expressed apprehension towards Iraqi regime change, the victors of Turkey's November 3 election were the new politicians of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). AKP boosters in Europe and the United States presented it as combining Islam, sincere Westernism, and democracy with enthusiasm for close relations with the United States.

At first glance, failure to operationalize the US-Turkish alliance occurred when circumstances augured best for success. Other factors, however, generated sub-optimal conditions:

Thus, repeatedly expressed Turkish misgivings; AKP perceptions of basic domestic political needs vis-à-vis the electorate and levers of bureaucratic/military power; and the TAF attitude to AKP and Northern Iraq rendered the United States request to deploy between 50-95 thousand personnel in Turkey to invade a neighbor without hostile intent towards Ankara nearly impossible for the civilian government to deliver, based on a calculus never grasping the importance to the post-9/11 American administration of regime-change in Iraq.

Given the expedited military timetable, the new Ankara government viewed subsequent US negotiating intensity alternately as hardball inappropriate to 'strategic partnership', or as proof that Turkey was so indispensable to US plans that the AKP could hold out for the most optimal terms. This led to semi-official American accusations of Turkey being an unfriendly haggler, thus strengthening the rejectionist faction within the AKP, who could refer to intense popular opposition to the impending war as justification for refusing to cooperate.

Further, by requiring the TAF to curtail its own Northern Iraq operations so as to secure Iraqi Kurdish cooperation during and after the war, American diplomats made it quite difficult for the army to forthrightly support cooperation with the United States. Rather, American concerns to balance commitments to disparate regional allies reinforced Turkish suspicions going back to 1991 about American goals, so that the army came to see alliance with America as merely the least injurious step on an ill-advised path. 3

"Pressure", "Whingeing and Whining": A Diplomatic Timeline

On 25 February 2003, Turkey's NSC—through which the combined service chiefs usually clearly articulate TAF preferences—forwarded a bill of cooperation to the Turkish Parliament, yet with no endorsement. This bill authorized the entry of 62,000 US troops into Turkey, as a combination of the 4th Infantry Division, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 255 fixed wing and 65 rotary wing aircraft, unspecified special operations units, and combat support. The bill authorized limited TAF deployment into Northern Iraq, given US concerns. On March 1, the bill earned a plurality of parliament members' support, but not an absolute majority. American-Turkish strategic cooperation failed to materialize by four votes.

The March 1 vote was nearly eight months in the making, with a number of key chronological way-points:

Phase I: July—November 2002

Phase II: December 2002—January 2003

Phase III: February - Early March 2003

Certain important dynamics emerge from this selective review:

The American Post-Mortem

During and after the US-Turkish negotiations, American officials articulated several criticisms regarding their counterparts in Ankara:

  1. AKP inexperience. AKP's excessive party political focus prevented them from seeing the domestic force multiplier effect of foreign policy success. They misread significance of certain events such as the Bush invitation to Erdogan, misread US intent, exaggerated Turkey's own importance, and demonstrated a persistent indecisiveness. This indecisiveness extended to the public relations realm: AKP leaders never clearly articulated to the public that it was in their interests to assist the US—the media was not deployed, and the bully pulpit was left unused. 14
  2. Military inaction. The military-dominated NSC did not live up to its role as supreme arbiter on matters of national security broadly interpreted. TAF abdicated the responsibility of dictating to AKP neophytes the strategic interests of the country. US officials—and certain Turkish analysts—have claimed that by not indicating its desires to the AKP, the army forfeited much prestige and bears responsibility for a decision damaging bilateral relations. In this scenario, the army's insistence would have permitted the civilians necessary cover to support an unpopular agreement.
  3. Failure to act as an ally. A consistent American complaint has been that Turkey failed to reciprocate for fifty years of US support. Strategic partnership requires active assistance, especially when the US was offering Turkey great rewards. Rather, Turkey responded with conditions indicating a lack of trust, materially complicating the latest American initiative in the war on terror. There are three related issues here:

    a) While US vessels were offshore, the AKP kept upping their price, thus changing the spirit of the process, which America viewed as Turkey doing its utmost in the War on Terror.
    b) AKP insistence on the Turkish constitution requiring UN/international legal sanction or a parliamentary vote was a negotiating smokescreen. These 'requirements' could have been finessed. Rather, AKP used it avoid making a tough decision.
    c) By traveling around in fruitless summitry and inviting senior Iraqi officials to Ankara for consultations, PM Gül wasted precious time—even when US intent was clear.

AKP and the Road to No

These criticisms reflect profound disappointment at the highest echelons of US government. Going into the negotiating process in November, US diplomats assumed Turkish compliance. That Turkey had supported the US from North Korea to Afghanistan encouraged this view, as did the assumption that Turkey had so much to gain from cooperation with the US, and too much to lose from non-cooperation.

It appears that the US view—parallel to initial enthusiasm in academia—was that the AKP was moderate, and supported US policies in the Muslim world. 15 American diplomats' experiences with 1980s and 1990s Turkey also suggested that:

  1. Turkish political parties are oligarchies exacting total allegiance from MPs;
  2. The military will run the show on bedrock issues of strategic concern; and
  3. The TAF was well-disposed to US plans.

In thus assessing the approach of new government, US policy makers may have listened to the wrong Turkish experts, who advocated for AKP and who downplayed real disagreements. US officials did not alter initial assumptions, though on both the civilian and military level new dynamics required reevaluation.

Unlike earlier Turkish political parties, AKP leaders cannot exercise oligarchical control. AKP is a mixed bag of people associated with various elements of Turkish Islamism, an idea variously interpreted. Bottom-up autonomously resilient vernacular politics adds to the survivability (some say internal democracy) of Turkish political Islam. 16 Yet, this political genesis—distinct from Turkey's other major parties from the 1950s-1990s—lessens the ability or even inclination of leaders to 'control' constituents in and out of parliament.

Some AKP MPs—perhaps 30%—are holdovers from the more uncompromisingly Islamist and anti-US Refah Party (banned in 1998). From the start they worried that the 'moderate' Erdogan and Gül would sacrifice party interests. This vote was a way to keep the party on track. If we want to see party dynamics in terms of personalities, three elements emerge:

  1. PM Gül, followers. Pragmatists, they did not wish to alienate the United States. Yet, strong ideological perception of Turkey as a Muslim nation made this group reluctant to appear to be the US' regional policeman.
  2. Parliamentary Speaker Arinç group. Representing the unreconstructed Refah hardcore from 1995-98, they were determined to prevent Turkish cooperation. Arinc himself already had an uncongenial reputation among US diplomats. He and his associates view a close relationship with America as political/economic servitude.
  3. Party Leader Erdogan. Though hoping to minimize damage to AKP-US relations, his major goal was getting into parliament and becoming PM. Domestic objectives were uppermost in his mind: safeguarding AKP popularity; preventing a rupture in AKP-military relations that could lead to AKP's illegalization; and preserving his own leadership in AKP (read: preventing a Refah hijacking of AKP).

More broadly, the AKP government just did not want war, pursuing a 'maybe it'll go away' approach. Gül in particular misread until mid-February clearly-communicated American intentions. Beyond a domestic-economic agenda, AKP government evinced no concrete strategic vision, and never achieved foreign policy momentum from November 2002 to March 2003.

AKP inexperience proved telling. The principal Turkish interlocutors had never held their jobs before, and had little time to learn how to navigate in foreign policy. Rather, at key points, competing for their attention were fundamental internal economic, political, and party challenges. Two manifestations of inexperience were decisive:

  1. Misreading the significance of key events. The White House invitation to Erdogan was extraordinary. Still an un-elected and illegal politician, he was treated as presumptive leader of Turkey. Fixated on domestic political requirements however, Erdogan missed the value of strong endorsement by President Bush if AKP fulfilled the quid pro-quo on Iraq. Such an endorsement could have strengthened him in AKP, in parliament, in Turkey's domestic politics, perhaps even regionally. Instead, unlike the Bush-Özal common vision of 1990-91, Erdogan appeared shocked by the American approach to Iraq. Without his own strategic vision, Erdogan missed the inescapable implications of the US approach for what Turkey would ultimately have to do. He returned to Turkey seemingly thinking AKP could prevent the war, preserve its domestic standing, and finesse US-Turkish relations.
  2. Mixed messaging and faulty signaling. The new government displayed a certain distrust of the US and Turkish foreign policy establishments. In particular they did not yet perceive the latter as their own, considering it slavishly secular and Western oriented. Early on, AKP officials stopped using the embassy channel in both the United States and Turkey, using instead a wide variety of unofficial interlocutors and people they knew personally as semi-authorized go-betweens. Yet, Ambassador Logoglu in Washington is a professional diplomat respected by his US counterparts. Advocates for AKP likely falsely advertised to US diplomats Turkish readiness to cooperate on US terms. Further, back channel, parallel communication made US officials wonder who was in charge, and whose messages counted.

Mercurial Military?

Turks attempting to put a good face on the March 1 vote herald it as democracy in action—civilians made a parliamentary decision based on an evaluation of public sentiment, without military intimidation. Remarkably, Arab and Greek commentary seems to concur. By contrast, US officials expressed disappointment that the TAF had not exercised "the strong leadership role that we would have expected," by dictating a yes vote to the AKP. 17 This has elicited complaints in Islamist-affiliated media 18 that the United States does not in fact favor democracy, as 'proven' by American expectations of TAF determination of government policy, occupation policies in Iraq, support for the Israeli government, and lack of meaningful dialogue with President Khatemi of Iran.

Why did the Turkish military pass up the opportunity to cement security relations with the United States in a fashion guaranteeing increased military assistance and influence on the post-Saddam security regime in Northern Iraq? Western analysts have suggested a divide within the TAF; the Turkish high command has adamantly rejected this notion. In this scenario, while a faction associated with Özkök is pro-US and inclined to cooperation, a less congenial grouping is affiliated with preceding CGS Kivrikoglu. Appointed to senior positions in the General Staff, NSC, and service academies prior to Kivrikoglu's retirement so as to prolong his influence, they were reserved towards the United States, desired much greater TAF freedom of action, and entertained partnerships with Russia, a "Turkic world," and China.

As the TAF is a non-porous hierarchically-sound organization particularly at its upper levels, this is guesswork. There is indeed a long-standing strain in Turkish military thinking —the "Turkey has no friends" approach—that mistrusts motives even of allies. All armies have a certain amount of hyper nationalism.

Concrete TAF security concerns, in both the foreign and domestic context, are more telling. From the mid 1990s, the TAF nurtured tremendous misgivings about US plans in Northern Iraq, particularly regarding the Kurds. In this view considering Northern Iraq a matter of southeastern Anatolia, Operation Provide Comfort and the Iraqi Kurdish safe haven aided anti-Ankara Kurds affiliated with the PKK. The latter prosecuted an insurgency in southeastern Turkey which sputtered until 1999, after thousands of casualties, reciprocal brutality, and finally PKK attrition and the capture of their leader Abdullah Öcalan. That he had been hosted by the Greek embassy in Kenya prior to capture showed Turkey's Kurdish problem had also become an Achilles heal vis-à-vis Greece, Syria, and even Iran. Likewise, the conflict was economically catastrophic, consuming so much of the military budget as to prevent long-overdue force-restructuring and modernization.

US diplomats did not assuage TAF concerns that this no-win situation would not reemerge. In the run-up to war, American discussions of joint military operations with Iraqi Kurdish opposition groups—some of whom had intermittently condoned PKK actions in the 1990s—was operationally sensible. Yet, it cooled TAF enthusiasm to sign onto southeastern Turkey becoming an American combat corridor. Likewise, American efforts to limit the TAF deployment in Iraq out of consideration for Kurdish warnings of the "serious consequences" of a Turkish army incursion, 19 and suggestion that TAF units be subject to overall US command, could be justified as preventing a war within a war or C2 confusion. Still, this was anathema to TAF commanders.

American exigencies also threatened the TAF sense of sovereignty. With a military tradition perceived as going back to the fourteenth century, Turkey would not submit to foreign command structures on or adjacent to its own territory. Furthermore, the last time large numbers of foreign troops had been on Turkish soil was immediately after WWI, during a European occupation of Istanbul and parts of Anatolia. The war to eject these forces became the foundational crucible of the Turkish Republic, still commemorated ubiquitously. That the TAF rejected the entry of British ground forces from the beginning of negotiations on OIF suggests the strength of that memory. More than money, if Turkish cooperation was judged necessary, its military-political price tag would have been assuring the Turkish military that they would remain masters in their own house.

TAF commanders worried from the start that war in Iraq would go wrong on these counts. Yet, for that very reason they desired Turkish inclusion, as only this could protect Turkey's strategic interests and preserve the essential relationship with the United States—army commanders said as much in March. These concerns have continued to today, with the TAF attempting to square the US-Kurdish-Turkish triangle. 20

Still, Turkey's generals did not clearly urge the government to say yes early or often enough. Rather than pecuniary reasons, misgivings discussed above could not be sidestepped. Also, while the army has long been an untrammeled entity undoing civilian governments in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997-98, in all of those cases, it had been able to cite convincing domestic security concerns or the clear support of influential sectors of the public. Given the total opposition to war in Iraq among the Turkish public, a TAF or NSC diktat to the AKP would have undermined the army's prestige, and may have increased the popularity of the Islamist ruling party. Conversely, a yes vote without military pressure could have injured the AKP, a goal of the secularist army. Even here then, domestic politics informed foreign policy judgments.


Policy Lessons?

It is tempting to blame the Turkish environment for the lack of cooperation during OIF. Yet, the United States might derive certain policy lessons:

  1. As the global hegemon advocating system-destabilizing intervention, America could have demonstrated greater diplomatic adroitness. At key points, American actions were interpreted as cultural insensitivity—references to "haggling," "Ottoman-style bazaar," etc. This is especially important in negotiations with smaller allies. From the outset the United States will appear more powerful, threatening and pressuring, especially in an ambience of the War on Terror. American officials have admitted to an arrogant assumption of Turkish docility, suggesting the implications of this insensitivity. 21
  2. Regardless of our interests, potential regional partners prioritize their own perceived strategic needs, viewed through the prism of domestic politics. US negotiators must grasp local dynamics. Diplomacy is indeed a multi-level game. 22
  3. A strong a priori assessment of the strategic map is also essential. Two operational fronts were not essential to OIF victory. One may conjecture that two fronts could have doubled combat casualties, fatal accidents, etc. The rapid success of American troops—slowed more by sandstorms and prudent field commanders than Iraqi forces —raises the question whether US negotiators pushed Turkey too hard on a matter ultimately not mission critical, but guaranteed to spark acrimony.
  4. Given US congressional midterms and Turkish elections, the diplomatic and military tracks were out of sync, injuring our signaling ability. Still, the United States might better calibrate efforts among its own departments.
  5. By all accounts the principal American negotiators were exceedingly skilled. Their seeming inability to account for potential problems vis-à-vis Ankara recommends a more streamlined means to provide accurate information and analysis to leaders whose time is short and agenda long.

References

Note 1: The editorialist William Safire of the New York Times has been most uncompromising in his criticism of Turkey. For samples of his missives over the past few moths, see "Rewarding true friends"; "Turkey's wrong turn undermines a genuine friendship";" Jubilant V-I Day"; "Turkey can still make amends." For recent Turkish responses, see "Turkish Military - 4th Powerful Army of the World." Back.

Note 2: One of the best journalistic analyses of this topic is Glenn Kessler and Philip P. Pan, "Missteps With Turkey Prove Costly: Diplomatic Debacle Denied U.S. a Strong Northern Thrust in Iraq," Washington Post 3/28/03, p. A1. Back.

Note 3: One of the most prescient forecasts that indicates awareness of these points is Mark R. Parris "Heads up on Turkey," Washington Times October 28, 2002. Back.

Note 4: Ian Fisher, "Turkey, in the Middle, Grows More Worried Every Day About a U.S. Attack on Iraq," New York Times 10/28/02 p. A11. A strong early analysis reflecting the Turkish position is Bulent Aliriza, "Turkey's Iraq Jitters," CSIS Turkey Update, 10/18/03, PDF file. Back.

Note 5: See Turkish Press Review, 11/11/02. Back.

Note 6: Ayla Jean Yackley, "Turkey Would Open Bases for US Strike on Iraq," The Charlotte Observer 12/3/02. Back.

Note 7: See Bruce Wallace, "Turkey May Allow US Use of Bases," The Gazette (Montreal) 12/4/02, p. A22; Vernon Loeb and Karl Vick, "US Official Confident of Turkey's Support," The Washington Post 12/5/02, p. A29. Back.

Note 8: Scott Peters, "Iraqi Kurds Sidelined as US Woos Turkey," Christian Science Monitor 12/9/02. Back.

Note 9: Karl Vivk, "After Calls on Turkey, US Put on Hold," Washington Post 1/8/03, p. A14. Back.

Note 10: Ihsan Caralan, "Savasa Karsi Blokla Mucadele," (The Struggle Against the Anti-War Bloc) Ozgur Politika 12/1/03. Back.

Note 11: "US 'Sure of Support," BBC Online 1/20/03.  Back.

Note 12: Helena Smith, "Turkey Drives Hard Bargain over Access for US Forces," The Guardian 2/25/03. Back.

Note 13: Dexter Filkins, "Turkish Cabinet Endorses US Proposal on Troops," New York Times 2/25/03.  Back.

Note 14: For an early, strong postmortem addressing these matters by veteran Turkish diplomats, see Washington Institute's Policy Watch #734.  Back.

Note 15: For insightful early academic analysis, see Söner Çagaptay, "Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?," Middle East Review of International Affairs 6:4 (2002).  Back.

Note 16: Strong insights on this matter are provided in Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (University of Washington, 2002).  Back.

Note 17: Marc Lacey, "Turkey Rejects Criticism by U.S. Official Over Iraq," New York Times, 5/8/03. Back.

Note 18: For the latest example, see Husnu Mahalli, "Hani Demokrasi Gelecekti," (So You Remember that Democracy Would Have Come?) Yeni Safak 6/16/03.  Back.

Note 19: Owen Bowcott and Luke Harding, "Turkey Demands More Time on Troop Deal," The Guardian 2/28/03.  Back.

Note 20: M.A. Birand, "Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'tan Çekilme Kosulu…" (Turkey's Condition to Withdraw from Northern Iraq…) Milliyet 6/12/03.  Back.

Note 21: Glenn Kessler and Philip P. Pan, "Missteps With Turkey Prove Costly: Diplomatic Debacle Denied U.S. a Strong Northern Thrust in Iraq" Back.

Note 22: A basic reference on this is Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42:3 (1988), 427-60. Applied in the Turkish case, see Kemal Kirisci's “Turkey’s encounter with Europe and Its attitudes toward Greece and Cyprus.”  Back.