

Nation-Building: The Dangers of Weak, Failing, and Failed States

by Richard S. Williamson

Iraq continues to be in the throes of violent turmoil. The cost in treasury and blood is higher than anyone anticipated. Despite numerous “turning points,” milestones, and benchmarks, there is no neat solution in sight. The American people are thus understandably disheartened, discouraged and dismayed.

After over a decade as the world’s sole superpower, the brief and circumscribed US military actions in the first Persian Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, and the quick defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the American people were ill-prepared for a lengthened, bloody post-conflict engagement in Iraq. “Black Hawk Down” in Somalia was the rare exception, not the rule.¹ America’s high-tech military power was capable of vanquishing foes quickly and at acceptable cost. It was also thought that once Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime were brought down, Americans would be hailed as liberators and, like Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism, Iraqi democracy would emerge like a phoenix from the ashes. However, it is clear that the history of the 1990s and the history being written in blood in Sadre City, Baghdad, and elsewhere in Iraq, are tragically different.

A democratic broader Middle East would be a safer and more stable region. People desire the dignity, human rights, and opportunity granted them by their creator and promised by a freedom agenda. It also is undeniable that Saddam Hussein was a vicious dictator who victimized his own people, sought weapons of mass destruction, and threatened his neighbors. Testament to this indictment is found in Saddam’s mass graves and torture chambers, in his nuclear program in the 80s and early 90s and use of chemical weapons against Iran and Iraqi Kurds, in the long, bloody war initiated against neighboring Iran, the blitzing invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and his on-going military spectacles and bellicose rhetoric.² The world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power. Even given all of that, should Iraq have been invaded? That matter is for the historians to debate. My purpose is not to relitigate that issue, but to recognize that any discussion of nation-building going forward must be informed by the chaos and conflict in post-Saddam Iraq.

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It is abundantly clear that we were not adequately prepared to deal with the challenges of Iraq after the fall of Saddam. We have memoirs from some of the principles that, sometimes unwittingly, describe an overly optimistic view of Iraq after Saddam, based upon meager planning and unrealistic resource allocation.³ We have a growing library of books and other reports by journalists that seem to reinforce that conclusion.⁴ Moreover, our most powerful indication comes from the events on the ground.

These events have brought into question the wisdom of nation-building. Is it ever possible? If so, is the right sort of societal history, habits, and harmony a prerequisite for success? Is it worth the cost? If so, when and why?

DISCRETIONARY FOREIGN POLICY IS GONE

During the “long twilight of the Cold War,” America faced a great and terrible foe. The Cold War was a face-off between fundamentally different ways of life. The conflict centered on not just who prevailed, but about competing understandings of the nature of man: freedom versus coercion, individual rights versus collective responsibilities. The ideological battle lines between the West and the Soviet Union were clear: democracy versus communism, freedom versus totalitarianism, and market economies versus controlled economies. The terror of “mutually assured destruction” and the threat of nuclear Armageddon were known and thus focused the mind. Furthermore, the Cold War induced a sense that no corner of the globe was so remote, no place too small, no arena so insignificant that it was not a part of the great face-off between Washington and Moscow.

While approaches might vary from George Kennan’s “containment theory” to Ronald Reagan’s strategy to “rollback communism,” the requirement to meet the Soviet threat was widely recognized. It compelled an engaged, focused, and assertive foreign policy. The United States was engaged in a titanic struggle of values, political power and military might. Failure was not an option.

The Cold War confrontation provided a logic to global affairs; there was a bipolar ballast that imposed an order of sorts. The bipolar gravitational pull was geographic, ideological, and powerful. Few countries were immune to this force.

The competition played out in political influence, economic strength, cultural reach, and military might. Each side sought to contain the other, while trying to relentlessly expand its own sphere of influence. From time to time proxy wars broke out and costly mistakes were made, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. There were also internal upheavals here and there. The Cold War only looks simple from a rose-tinted rearview mirror. At the time, the stakes were high and recognized as such. The commitment to prevail was deep and enduring, with a willingness beyond doubt to pay the price required to carry the day.

In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Empire imploded. This was followed, in December of 1991, with the collapse of the Russian Empire. The Cold War came to its conclusion. Thus, a threatening cloud was lifted and a “new world order” seemed possible.⁵

Without the specter of nuclear Armageddon, the American people wanted a “peace dividend,” which politicians in Washington were happy to provide. Concern over foreign affairs, seldom dominant among the American people, diminished further. Without the Soviet threat, America entered a period that Professor Chester Crocker has described as “discretionary foreign policy.”⁶ No longer faced by the global totalitarian threat of the Nazis, then the Soviet Communists, America seemed to feel it could pick and choose what to engage, what to off-load to the United Nations, and what to ignore.⁷ It seemed the United States’ “unipolar moment” became a “unipolar era.”⁸

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

That all seemed to change on September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda’s attacks on America not only brought down the World Trade Towers, destroyed part of the Pentagon, and claimed a passenger airplane in Pennsylvania, it also ended the illusion that our superior military might and two vast oceans immunized America from the dangers of a menacing world. It became painfully clear that there are people and forces that wish America ill. Furthermore, September 11th established that there are not only competitors for economic, political and cultural influence; there are forces unleashed that could inflict great harm on America. America’s foreign policy could no longer be discretionary; it had to refocus to meet the new threat of global terror networks.

Importantly, President Bush immediately recognized that the civilized world not only had to counter the terrorists themselves, but also the countries that harbored terrorists. Al Qaeda was not only based in Afghanistan, it had helped turn Afghanistan into a terrorist state. Osama bin Laden was able to achieve this base of influence because Afghanistan was a weak state. This was in part because the West provided minimal humanitarian assistance and other aid for the Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan after the Soviet troops were driven out in 1988. The post-Soviet Afghan civil war, and vicious rule of the Taliban and various warlords, seemed inconsequential to Washington.

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Indeed, throughout the 1990’s many saw “nation-building” as a dubious enterprise. The killing of 19 marines in Somalia and the searing image of their bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in 1993, for many, captured the risk and futility of nation-building.⁹ However, in point of fact, the Clinton Administration repeatedly supported various nation-building enterprises in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. These were the result of multilateral cooperation

through NATO or the United Nations. These operations achieved varying degrees of success, though they were usually achieved with little fanfare. Furthermore, skepticism over these enterprises continued to linger.

Governor George Bush appealed to this public hesitancy in his 2000 presidential campaign against Vice President Al Gore. In the Presidential debate on October 4, 2000, Bush said, “The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation-building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation-builders.”¹⁰ On October 11th, Governor Bush further developed his position with the statement, “I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building. [...] Maybe I’m missing something here. I mean we’re going to have kind of a nation-building corps from America? Absolutely not.”¹¹

However, the 9/11 attacks forced a serious rethinking of nation-building; bringing down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was not enough. If we prematurely left the country, it could revert to a terrorist regime that welcomed al Qaeda. By April 17, 2002, President Bush’s views had shifted radically. In a speech at the Virginia Military Institute, he said:

*we know that true peace will only be achieved when we give the Afghan people the means to achieve their own aspirations. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan develop its own stable government. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan train and develop its own national army. And peace will be achieved through an education system for boys and girls which works. We’re working hard in Afghanistan. We’re clearing minefields. We’re rebuilding roads. We’re improving medical care. And we will work to help Afghanistan to develop an economy that can feed its people.*¹²

By May, 2005, President Bush went further. He said,

*we’re improving the capacity of our military to assist nations that are making democratic transitions. [...] The main purpose of our military is to win the war on terror; is to find and defeat the terrorists overseas. [...] But at the same time, American Armed Forces are undertaking a less visible, but important task: helping these people of these nations build civil societies from the rubble of oppression. [...] To give our military more resources for this vital work, we are rebalancing our forces—moving people out of skills that are in low demand, such as heavy artillery, and adding more military police and civil affairs specialists that are needed in these types of situations. By transforming our military, we will make our Armed Forces faster, more agile and more lethal—and we will make them more effective in helping societies transition from war and despotism to freedom and democracy.*¹³

WEAK, FAILING, AND FAILED STATES

Since the end of the Cold War, there has not been a simple overarching principle on which to organize American foreign affairs. Some have suggested the global “war on terror” provides that logic, others a “freedom agenda” of advancing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. While both of these themes have merit and should help inform American strategy, both have been found wanting.¹⁴ While terrorism is certainly a threat, and must be vigorously combated, it must be regarded as only an

instrument used by extremists to advance their fanatic cause. Terrorism is not the cause itself. Furthermore, while the advance of freedom is a worthy moral aspiration for building a safer, more secure world, it is inadequate to help guide policymakers in addressing a long and menacing list of immediate dangers and emerging threats.

Meanwhile, weak, failing, and failed states encroach upon a broad spectrum of American interests. While a strategy to deal with such diminished nation-states does not establish a grand strategy for United States foreign policy, its importance necessitates a more thoughtful, sustained, and effective engagement. America continues its current episodic and uncoordinated approach to dealing with diminished states at its own peril.

Diminished states lacking professional police and an independent judiciary are prime targets for organized crime and narcotics trafficking. The pestilence of this lawlessness not only plagues the host country, but reaches deep into the streets of American cities and suburbs. The social and economic cost to America of organized crime and narcotics is immense and, constantly growing.

In addition, diminished states invariably have poor public health systems. Hospitals, health care centers, doctors, nurses, and pharmaceuticals are scarce and their reach into the countryside limited and uneven. The education system is backward, superstition high, and traditional folkways tenacious. People in urban areas often live in crowded squalor. Malnutrition is common in the countryside. Clean water is scarce. Infant mortality is high. Easily assailable by pandemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS, these societies breed and spread pestiferous illness.

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Diminished states also suffer from unregulated commerce. Lacking industry, a skilled work force, intellectual property rights, and the rule of law, these desperately poor countries are often overly dependent on resource exploitation for their modest commerce. Exploitive strip mining and deforestation are examples of the environmental degradation all too common in these societies.

Diminished states also curtail American economic opportunities and growth. Often these weak states possess vast natural resources. Hundred of millions of workers and consumers live in these impoverished countries. Due to poor education, skilled workers are few. Because of corruption and lawlessness, investment is too risky. Thus, these workers languish in abject poverty. With limited trading capacity, these states are left segregated from the global economy. Therefore, as their population faces a low ceiling of depravation and poverty, so American industry confronts a small portal of economic opportunity. The potential for development, thus, is left unrealized.

The combustibility of diminished states makes them prime markets for fragmentation and convulsion. Consequently, they are often home to private militias, rebels, and warlords. The spread of small arms into and out of these diminished states is common.¹⁵ In addition, diminished states often become markets for unconventional weapons of mass destruction, principally chemical and biological. As these terrible weapons make their way into the hands of rogue regimes and non-state actors, America is less secure.

By definition, diminished states are unstable. Lacking a strong central government, adequate army and police, as well as an effective rule of law, the environment of lawlessness and its consequences inhibits society. As violence spirals from ethnic tension to sectarian violence and on to full-scale civil war, the instability usually bleeds beyond borders. One state's mayhem and bloodshed spills over to neighbors, creating regional instability that threatens the broader interests of the neighborhood, and of America.

Weak, failing, and failed states are fertile ground for terrorism. Such states invariably are impoverished societies with little economic or social opportunity. Good governance and the rule of law, preconditions for stability and justice, are usually unknown. Warlords, criminal cartels, and the exploitation of resources often prosper in this environment. Furthermore, weak central governments provide space for fiefdoms such as that which was provided for al-Qaeda by the Taliban in Afghanistan. These hothouses of frustration and rage are especially susceptible to extremist ideologies and calls to violence.¹⁶ Post-9/11, we must recognize that these squalls, however remote, can become gathering storms that shower destruction and death onto our homeland.

American exceptionalism is grounded in the belief that American values have universal application. Human rights, religious tolerance, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, representative government, and so on are not merely for the fortunate few, but the inalienable rights of all mankind. These values are transcendent. They are values for which American patriots have died. It is the opportunity and responsibility of Americans today to keep faith in those values at home, as well as in the animation of our foreign relations. Weak, failing, and failed states are places in which those values are denied, sometimes violently. These places are areas that offend American values. They are locations where America's efforts to project those values, and the benefits they provide, are denied.

The cascade of possible threats from weak, failing, and failed states is considerable. The spread of pandemic disease, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, narco-crime syndicates, organized crime, lost economic opportunity, arms proliferation, and lawlessness and disorder in general can lead to regional instability, and would thus present challenges to American interests. The war on terror properly commands urgent and sustained engagement. Therefore, the assault on human rights, and the humanitarian suffering common in diminished states, warrants our concern and aid. For all these reasons, diminished states must be taken seriously.

They warrant serious study, sustained diplomatic attention, and the development of policy to confront them.

Finally, America must come to terms with post-conflict scenarios. Traumatized, post-conflict states struggling to gain a sustainable peace are too familiar: Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to name just a few. In these states, warfare has wrecked havoc and death. The fabric of society has been torn, and state institutions have been discredited and destroyed. The people are traumatized and habits of civility broken. Sometimes the warfare has turned into a long and brutal civil war. Sometimes there has been ethnic cleansing that compelled the international community—including America—to militarily intervene to stop the carnage. In Afghanistan, the United States-led coalition acted in self-defense to hit back at terrorists who had attacked America, and the Taliban government that harbored them. In Iraq, America unleashed a pre-emptive strike against a gathering storm. The whys, ways, and means differ, but in each case, the remains of the day are rubble from which must rise new state institutions, new order and security, new commerce, and a new day of possibilities. To walk away without helping to rebuild state institutions, in all likelihood, increases the possibility for the descent backwards to chaos.¹⁷

In light of the torturous post-Saddam struggle in Iraq and the reversal of fortunes in Timor Leste, it is necessary to examine whether nation-building, especially in post-conflict societies, is even possible.

In some cases, the United States bears a special responsibility to help rebuild. As Secretary of State Colin Powell famously said before the invasion of Iraq, if you break a society by bringing down the old order, you have a heavier responsibility to help the reconciliation, reconstruction, and rejuvenation of that society.¹⁸ However, beyond whatever special responsibility the United States might have for post-conflict Iraq, it is very much in America's self-interest, as well as for Europe, Japan, China, the Middle East and on and on, to stabilize Iraq. Indeed, an Iraq that continues to be a cauldron of mayhem and calamity endangers the stability of the entire greater Middle East, and threatens global energy supplies. Similar interests can be seen with a Balkans in disarray and disorder, which threatens the underbelly of our European allies.

Thus, there are both moral motives and pragmatic reasons of self-interest to nation-build.

CAN SOMETHING BE DONE?

In light of the torturous post-Saddam struggle in Iraq and the reversal of fortunes in Timor Leste,¹⁹ it is necessary to examine whether nation-building,

especially in post-conflict societies, is even possible. Once shattered, can states be reconciled, rebuilt, and rejuvenated? Each nation-building exercise is particular, with unique dynamics and special challenges. Can it be done?

To have an appreciation of the difficulty of nation-building and, therefore, the humility in which nation-building should be undertaken, it is worthwhile to step back and reflect on how challenging and long the process has been that led to modern industrial nation-states. Nearly a millennium ago, the norm was many small, loosely integrated dynastic fiefdoms. Gradually, through surges of integration and disintegration, larger dynastic states formed. Independent groups went through integration tensions and conflicts, struggles for power, preferences and prestige. There came a wide range of fault lines as different groups dealt with the structural tensions, struggles, and conflicts of integration, fearing domination or annihilation through reciprocal interdependence. Identity based on narrow chronicles of custom and culture lacked harmony with larger amalgamations. The familiarity, comfort, and loyalty of the particular clan became absorbed in the trade-offs of the larger society. Struggles between landowning elites, the rising middle class, and a growing industrial working class sought mechanisms to arbitrate power, keep order, and promote social harmony. New forms of representative and democratic governance emerged to absorb these tensions, distribute decision-making, and protect minority rights. It took centuries for segments of society to develop acceptable “functional interdependence” within a larger whole of the nation-state.

As Professor Norbert Elias has written:

Societies assume the characteristics of nations is the functional interdependence between its regions and its social strata as well as its hierarchic levels of authority and subordination becomes sufficiently great and sufficiently reciprocal for none of them to be able to disregard completely what the others think, feel, or wish.²⁰

It is clear that the history of tyranny and turmoil in many weak, failing, and failed states provides little confidence in the possibility that either restraint or respect among groups can emerge. A losing vote today negates all hope for tomorrow when the only thing known is the brutality and desperation in the fight to hold power. In such a condition, it may seem better to maintain a weak or failed state, where violence is a familiar tool, than suffer likely subjection, injustice, and possible eradication under the rule of a hostile majority. Therefore, there is little reason for promises of democracy to inspire a leap of faith when the public calculus still holds a loss at the polls as equal to death.

The habits of distrust and despair are well imbedded. The steps of shared power—compromise, conciliation, and cooperation—are unfamiliar. Building a bridge from a dark past to a liberal future is difficult, perhaps impossible. It is on such a rugged terrain that the constructs of nation-building seek firm footing.

The United States experience with nation-building goes back a long way, with some placing its origins in the Reconstruction era, following the ravages of the Civil War. Over 100 years ago, America devoted resources to rebuilding the Philippines

and Haiti, with mixed results. The long, comprehensive post–World War II effort to make a democratic Germany and Japan are often pointed to as examples of successful nation-building operations.²¹ As the pace has quickened in the past fifteen years, with missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq, America’s understanding and expertise has broadened. However, as has been especially evident with post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq, there still remains much room for improvement.

GOING FORWARD

The United States Government has been slow to accept that our vital interests are advanced by nation-building. We have been delinquent in accepting that nation-building will be a repeat task in which America must engage. Consequently, the United States Government has been slow to organize itself for this assignment. We have yet to put together our “lessons learned.” We have not established adequate personnel, resources, and coordination mechanisms to do this vital work. Tragically, these failures are playing out in Iraq. The status quo is insufficient; it is unacceptable; and it must change.

As stated by James Dobbins, a long-time foreign service officer with, perhaps, the most experience of any American with post-conflict nation-building, “Not every recent military expedition fits this description, but nation-building, peace-building, or stabilization operations, depending on one’s preferred terminology, have become the dominant paradigm for the use of armed forces in the post–Cold War world.”²²

Given the frequency and variety of recent nation-building efforts, a great deal of experience has been accumulated. There are smart and talented people developing “lessons learned” at think tanks and universities. The tasks seem clear: establish security, order, and the rule of law, re-establish basic services such as electricity, provide the ways and means to rejuvenate the economy, promote reconciliation, and launch sustainable representative governance in which minority interests are represented and minority rights protected. Each of these categories are complex. Most require high guardrails to promote new habits, and form new patterns of behavior. The obstacles are substantial.

We need to develop doctrines for each of these tasks with sequencing and flexibility.²³ We need to develop a better understanding of the skills required, and organize a talent pool, within and outside government, to call on as required. We need to establish protocols for coordination within the United States Government and between the United States and other significant participants, both bilateral and multilateral.²⁴ Finally, and perhaps most important, we have to give nation-building a priority and seriousness of purpose generally lacking.

Following the challenges faced in post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States Government created the Office of Reconstruction and Stability in the State Department, and, in December of 2005, the United Nations launched a Peacebuilding Commission. These are positive steps. However, neither appears to

contain the priority or promise of real progress. Policymakers should provide greater support to such new mechanisms in order to ensure that their future decisions are better informed, and their strategies more effectively implemented.

Finally, we should be more humble. There are limits to our capacity to impose solutions on troubled societies.²⁵ Additionally, there are limits to the response of collapsed societies. When our reach exceeds our grasp, we invite failure at great cost to us, and for those who struggle for normalcy and hope at home.

Therefore, we need a rigorous matrix for analysis of history, culture, happenstance, and the perilous road ahead for weak, failing, and failed states. In order to maximize our potential to assess the realistic probabilities for success, we need hard analysis of the cost before we engage. Ultimately, we require attainable objectives.

Weak, failing, and failed states should be a significant concern for us. They threaten our interests and can challenge our prosperity, safety, and security. Recognizing this looming threat, and responding accordingly, is demanded of us. We let these challenges drift at our own peril.

Notes

¹ See, Mark Bowden, *Blackhawk Down* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). See also, John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995).

² See, for example, Lawrence F. Kaplan et al., *The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission* (New York: Encounter Books, 2003).

³ See, Tommy R. Franks and Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2004); and L. Paul Bremer, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope* (New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

⁴ See, Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Random House, 2006). James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* (New York: Free Press, 2006). Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of its Enemies Since 9/11* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). Michael Isikoff and David Corn, *Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006). Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). See also, David Rieff, *At The Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).

⁵ As Professor David Hendrickson observed in 1993, the end of Cold War tensions "persuaded many observers that we stand today at a critical juncture, one at which the promise of collective security, working through the mechanisms of the United Nations, might at last be realized." David C. Hendrickson, "The Ethics of Collective Security," *Ethics and International Affairs* 7, no. 3 (1993): 2–3.

⁶ Chester A. Crocker, "A Dubious Template for U.S. Foreign Policy," *Survival* 47, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 51–70.

⁷ As former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote, "'Let the U.N. do it' had become the operative phrase in Washington and other capitals. This shift was partly due to the hope the U.N. would finally fulfill the dreams of its founders. But it was due as well to the desire of many national governments, including the United States, not to take on the hard tasks themselves." Madeleine Albright, *Madame Secretary* (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 135.

⁸ See, Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited—United States World Dominance," *The National Interest* (Winter 2002). See also, Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990/1991).

⁹ See, Mark Bowden, *Blackhawk Down* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).

¹⁰ George W. Bush, Presidential Debate, University of Massachusetts, October 4, 2000. Available at: <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html> (Accessed Jan 23, 2007).

¹¹ George W. Bush, Presidential Debate, Wake Forest University, October 11, 2000. Available at: <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000b.html> (Accessed Jan 23, 2007).

¹² George W. Bush, "President Outlines War Effort," Remarks to the George C. Marshall ROTC Awards Seminar on National Security, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, April 17, 2002. Available at:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020417-1.html> (Accessed Jan 23, 2007).

¹³ President George W. Bush, Remarks to the International Republican Institute Dinner, Washington, DC, May 18, 2005. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050518-2.html> (Accessed Jan 23, 2006). See also, Wayne Washington, "Once Against Nation-Building, Bush Now Involved," *Boston Globe*, March 2, 2004.

¹⁴ See, for example, Chester A. Crocker, "A Dubious Template for U.S. Foreign Policy," *Survival* 47, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 51–70.

¹⁵ See, for example, Larry Kahaner, "Weapon of Mass Destruction," *Washington Post*, November 26, 2006.

¹⁶ See, for example, Jennifer Seymour Whitaker and Arthur C. Helton, "Nation-Busting from Afghanistan to Iraq; the War on Terror," *International Herald Tribune*, November 15, 2002.

¹⁷ Professor Chester Crocker has written that "successful military action can defeat enemy forces, topple regimes, seize and occupy territory, or deter immediate threats, but such action creates only brief moments of opportunity, not lasting political results." Chester A. Crocker, "A Dubious Template for U.S. Foreign Policy," *Survival* 47, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 59.

¹⁸ For an interesting history of "how efforts to stop the war (in Bosnia) turned into a broader responsibility for building a lasting peace" see Jim Mokhiber and Rick Young, "Nation-Building in Bosnia," PBS/Frontline Report. Available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/etc/peace.html> (Accessed Jan 23, 2007). See also, Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting To Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

¹⁹ See, "Foreign Troops Bring East Timor Violence Under Control," *Agence France Presse*, May 30, 2006. Jane Perlez, "Poverty and Violence Sink Grand Plans for East Timor," *New York Times*, May 31, 2006. Nancy-Amelia Collins, "Humanitarian Crisis Looms in East Timor," *Voice of America*, May 31, 2006. "Eyewitness: East Timor Unrest," *BBC News*, May 25, 2006. Lirio da Fonseca, "Foreign Troops Land in East Timor as Violence Rages," *Reuters*, May 25, 2006. "Residents Flee East Timor Capital," *BBC News*, May 5, 2006.

²⁰ Norbert Elias, "Process of State Formation and Nation-Building," *Transactions of the 7th World Congress of Sociology 1970*, Vol. 3, Sofia ISA, 274–284. Available at: <http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/social/elias/state.html> (Accessed Jan 23, 2007)

²¹ James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003).

²² James Dobbins, "The US and UN Ways of Nation-Building," *UNA-USA Policy Brief*, No. 8, June 1, 2005.

²³ For some excellent work on this topic see, James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003). James Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005). Brent Scowcroft and Samuel E. Berger, "In the Wake of War: Getting Serious About Nation-Building," *The National Interest* 81 (Fall 2005): 49–53. Karin Von Hippel, *Democracy By Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Jochen Hippler, *Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003). Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-Building 101," *The Atlantic Monthly* 293, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2004): 159–162. Samuel R. Berger and Brent Scowcroft, "The Right Tools to Build Nations," *Washington Post*, July 27, 2005. Stuart E. Eizenstat et al., "On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security," The Commission for Weak States and U.S. National Security. Available at: http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_archive/weakstates (Accessed Jan 23, 2007). Francis Fukuyama, "Nation-Building: the Failure of Institutional Memory," in *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006). Simon Chesterman, "Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of U.N. State-Building," *International Peace Academy* (September 2002). Chester A. Crocker, "Engaging Failing States," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 2003): 32–44. Gareth Evans, "Nation-Building and American Foreign Policy," Remarks at the Cato Institute, Washington, DC, December 12, 2001. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2290&l=1> (Accessed Jan 23, 2007).

²⁴ See, Max Boot, "Washington Needs a Colonial Office," *Financial Times*, July 3, 2003.

²⁵ Some argue that nation-building is not a realistic option. See, for example, Gary T. Dempsey, *Fool's Errands: America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2001). Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt, "The Shaky State of Nation-Building: It Doesn't Work. Is there Another Way?," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2004. Claudia Rosett, "Against 'Nation Building,'" *Wall Street Journal*, September 27, 2001. James L. Payne, "Deconstructing Nation Building," *The American Conservative*, October 24, 2005. George F. Will, "Transformation's Toll," *Washington Post*, July 18, 2006. Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson, *The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). Others have pointed out how deviously difficult it is to stop ethnic cleansing, genocide, as well as other humanitarian crises; thus compounding the challenges of some nation-building operations. See, Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War To Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

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