

Multiple Theories of Development

by Joseph Stern

Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective.

By Ha-Joon Chang. London: Anthem Press and Wimbledon Publishing Company, 2002. 284 pp. \$22.50, paper. ISBN 1843310279.

The subject of what are the appropriate development policies is wide-ranging. Recently, the list of essential prescriptions has been expanded to include “institutional development,” a term that refers to the need to strengthen a host of national institutions that guide resource flows and help a society overcome the impact of market failures. Although numerous institutions are in need of reform, Ha-Joon Chang wisely focuses on a small subset of the many reforms favored by the international financial institutions. In doing so, he endeavors to show there has been a misreading of the economic and political history of, and by, currently developed countries. He begins his analysis with trade and technology policies, then turns to the establishment of good governance institutions, before concluding with a summary of what the true lessons of the past may tell us about the underlying causes of the current development failures. However, readers should warily accept his definitive conclusion as development policies are in fact not static.

The current emphasis on tariff reductions and quota eliminations as a means of improving national competitiveness arises from the supposed embrace of free trade by the early developers. In a historical analysis of Great Britain, for instance, Chang notes that the real shift in trade policies was not with the repeal of the British Corn Laws, but with the signing of the Anglo-French free trade treaty in 1860. By that time Britain’s economic and technological prowess was well established, a development that benefited from the presence of high and long lasting tariffs. While this is true, it places so much emphasis on the historical story of free trade and causes Chang to ignore a rich history of strong theoretical insights that support the argument for freer trade.

Next, Chang focuses on the use of industrial and trade policies in the US, France, Germany, Sweden, and smaller European and East Asian economies. His review of industrial policies reaches a reasonably balanced assessment. He argues that because of the large gap between productivity levels in the advanced and less-

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advanced countries, “developing countries need to use much higher tariffs as compared to the now developed countries just to get the same protective effects” (p. 67). However, this misrepresents the lessons of comparative advantage, in which access to cheaper goods produced more efficiently overseas has allowed many economies to expand beyond autarkic capacity. Chang admits “that it is not simple to measure international productivity gaps” (p. 67). But a lack of knowledge of how large the gap might actually be, how long special incentives to catch up are needed, and most important, which industries could benefit from protection, lies at the crux of the industrial policy debate. Those who caution against an over-reliance on tariff protection and industrial targeting point to countless examples of regimes that have wasted scarce resources. There is no doubt that some intervention in terms of encouraging industrial development is justified but this is a policy that must be tempered with caution. Former Governor of the Bank of Korea and Minister of Economic Planning Cho Soon notes that when Korea and Taiwan

pursued their development policy in conformity with the working of the market, they were able to exploit the principle of comparative advantage, and [their] economies performed well. But when the government directly intervened in the economy, the pattern of allocation was diverted significantly from comparative advantage, the economies suffered from great inflation, skewed industrial structure, and proliferation of bureaucratic control of the economy...[intervening] industrial policy tends, in the long run, to do more harm than good.¹

This suggests that more research is needed to understand why industrial policies succeed in some countries and fail so miserably elsewhere.

Finally, Chang turns to the vexatious issue of institutional development. He notes that the debate about the efficacy of the appropriate institutional framework for growth is based on the false argument that the developed countries had an array of democratic and market friendly institutions in place before rapid growth occurred. Indeed, Chang notes not only is there no agreement among development practitioners as to which institutions are necessary and/or viable, and under what conditions, but that the international financial institutions

do not have an official mandate to intervene in most of these “governance” issues ... [and that] the institutions of developed countries can be too demanding for developing countries in terms of their financial and human resource requirements (p. 70).

That is correct, yet Chang oversimplifies a complex issue when he relates the development of democratic institutions by the dates at which countries achieved universal suffrage or professionalized their civil service.

Chang’s book brings together admittedly fragmentary data on early trade policies in charges that historical references to the free-trade and free-market histories are in fact flawed and that the argument that advanced countries grew because they put the appropriate institutions in place is similarly flawed. Yet, he shows there is little historical evidence to support the contention that advanced countries adhered to the market friendly or market-supporting policies now put forward. As much as one

would like to have a general development theory, either based on a better understanding of the development history or by relying on sophisticated statistical analysis of various data sets, the economists' search for a unified theory of development may be as difficult as efforts by physicists to develop a unified field theory.

Notes

¹Cho Soon, "Government and Market in Economic Development," *Asian Development Review* 12, no. 2 (1994): 163.

A Review of *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War*

by Carl Mirra

The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War. By Andrew Bacevich. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 270 pp. \$28.00, hard bound. ISBN 0195173384.

Andrew Bacevich, a self-described "Catholic conservative" (p. xii) and West Point graduate, offers a provocative, insightful, and lively narrative into the growth of US militarism over the last thirty years. *The New American Militarism* "bears an unmistakably conservative stamp" as Bacevich sits "culturally on the right" (pp. xi-xii). He often relies on the vocabulary of the left, borrowing C. Wright Mills' description of the "military metaphysics" that underlies the country's identity. Some readers will also detect traces of the revisionist historian William Appleman Williams, who long ago complained that both liberals and conservatives shared a penchant for military adventurism and described these overlapping groups as bilateral imperialists. Bacevich, without mentioning Williams specifically, argues that militarism is a "bilateral project" that infects both Democrats and Republicans alike. According to Bacevich, the distinctive features of US militarism include the assumption that the US must maintain an unmatched military supremacy and view the armed services as the last vestige of civic virtue in American civilization. This blend of idealism and militarism culminated in the new image of war as high-tech, clean, and effective. This process was largely set in motion after the Vietnam War in response to the anti-military stance of New Left activists. For Bacevich, this rising tide of militarism coincides with the civilian takeover of military affairs.

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War seduces Americans with the feeling that it is a quick and neat solution to complex problems. In this light, Bacevich's discussion of Albert Wohlstetter, a civilian analyst at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s, is most illuminating. He gained influence during the Cold War with his theory that the US was vulnerable to Soviet attack. The best way to reduce this vulnerability, he suggested, was through building high-tech weapons, which would enable the US to move away from deterrence toward a more aggressive posture. Wohlstetter protégés include influential Bush administration neoconservatives such as Paul Wolfowitz. This connection has led to the popular charge that a neoconservative conspiracy is driving Bush's foreign policy. Consider that the Bush Doctrine is the "clearest articulation" (p. 147) of this militarism, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's revolution in military affairs mimics the early work of Wohlstetter.

Ironically, Bacevich points to a Democrat, Jimmy Carter, as the catalyst for the militarization of US policy towards the Middle East. The energy crisis of the 1970s initially led Carter to urge Americans to engage in self-sacrifice by limiting consumption. This vision clashed with American ideas about growth and prosperity. But, after the 1979 coup in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that same year, Carter's self-reliance surrendered to military power. In January 1980, he articulated what is known as the Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf...will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests on the [US], and...will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force" (p. 181). From 1945 to 1979, the US limited its military presence in the region, preferring covert operations. Following the Carter Doctrine, a "new pattern" (p. 183) emerged, one that gradually made the Middle East the central focus of US foreign policy. The new policy emphasized an active military engagement in the region. What started as the Carter Doctrine, Bacevich argues, eventually became the War on Terror. While these policies differ, both view American military might as the solution to the Middle East crisis.

While Bacevich goes to great lengths to avoid singling out the second Bush administration throughout the text, one cannot help but interpret the final chapter, "A Common Defense," as a critique of the Bush Doctrine. Bacevich reminds us that Bush administration neoconservatives are not alone in their penchant for militarism. They have done much to create a climate that accelerates militaristic attitudes, but they are hardly unique in their belief that using military power to deter threats is America's best option in international relations. In fact, Bacevich notes that his own views "have come to coincide with the critique long offered by the radical left: it is the mainstream itself, the professional liberals as well as the professional conservatives, who define the problem. Two parties monopolize and...trivialize national politics...each is seemingly obsessed with power for its own sake" (p. xi).

The final chapter also attempts to offer a constructive solution to this militarism. Bacevich outlines ten principles that purport to restore American security without resorting to aggressive military interventions. Here he harkens back to the preamble of the Constitution and urges readers to recall the original intent of a "common

defense” (p. 209). The crusader ideology that confuses and conflates the “common defense” with a global quest to save the world should be avoided. Instead of embracing fashionable concepts such as “global power projection,” the US should avoid unnecessary troop deployment, rethink the defense budget, use force only as a last resort, and enhance the instruments of diplomacy. These principles, combined with a few others, will cure the nation’s “addiction” to militarism (p. 226).

Sometimes vague and nostalgic, Bacevich’s principles are nonetheless a solid starting point for rethinking American preeminence. In this regard, *The New American Militarism* stands out as one of the most cogent and important texts among the recent proliferation of works on American power. Though primarily an academic discourse, this text has implications of which general readers should become aware.

Terrorism or Civil War?

by Carlos L. Yordán

Between Terrorism and Civil War: The Al-Aqsa Intifada. By Clive Jones and Amil Pedahzur, Editors New York: Routledge, 2005. 141 pp. \$104.00, hard bound. ISBN 0415348242.

The start of the Al-Aqsa intifida in September 2000 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the struggle for Palestinian statehood, which is one dimension of this conflict. During the Cold War, this broad conflict was often described as an interstate one, encouraged by the superpowers. During the 1990s the conflict was presented as a struggle for Palestine’s liberation. Today, the conflict tends to be interpreted through the prism of the War on Terror. Challenging this current interpretation, the volume’s editors, Clive Jones and Ami Pedahzur, argue that the intifida and Israel’s reactions mirror the dynamic of a civil war.

Jones reminds readers in chapter one that developments that led to the 1948 war and eventually to Israel’s independence were widely interpreted as a civil war by British scholars. Analyzing the conflict as a part of an ongoing civil war is useful for three reasons. First, it demonstrates that Israelis and Palestinians are locked in a struggle to redefine the political, socioeconomic, and territorial map of the land that comprises present day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Consequently, this claim not only challenges Israel’s policies to enhance its security, but it also questions the value of the different strategies Palestinians have adopted to pursue their interests.

Second, the theoretical framework is valuable because it presents a more

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complex conflict dynamic. The contributors to the volume show how the Israeli and Palestinian communities are divided along ideological lines and how these divisions often escalate the conflict dynamic and hinder peacemaking efforts. For instance, in chapter two, one of the volume's best chapters, Pedahzur and Arie Perliger explain how different vigilante groups in Israeli settlements have taken matters in their own hands, advancing their interests at the expense of Israel's policies and Palestinian demands for statehood. Many of these vigilante groups' members are Jewish extremists who want to make sure that all biblical lands are included in present day Israel. More importantly, they detest Israel's secular leaders and they want to establish a new Israel purely based on Jewish religious law.

Third, the framework explains that a civil war's escalation or settlement is dependent on the policies and interests of regional and international actors. Chapter four reviews the work of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), the first international mission authorized by the Israeli government to operate in the Occupied Territories. As a member of this mission, Karin Aggestam recounts the many challenges TIPH faced. Among these, the most important was Israeli settlers' hostility to the mission and Israeli Defense Forces' repeated efforts to undermine the TIPH's ability to monitor Israeli-Palestinian relations in the area and to prevent the conflict from escalating.

Despite the analytical value provided by the framework, one of this volume's biggest weaknesses is that it lacks an explanation of the divisions inherent in the Palestinian community. For instance, there could have been greater space dedicated to how Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, or the other secular organizations, such as the Tanzim or the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, have challenged the Palestinian National Authority's (PNA) strategy to settle the conflict and to create a Palestinian state. Chapter three, written by As Ad Ghanem and Aziz Khayed, indirectly addresses some of these issues. They challenge the public notion that calls to reform the PNA are only coming from Israel and the international community. Ghanem and Khayed show that many of these requests have surfaced within the PNA, expressing increasing Palestinian dissatisfaction with the PNA's leaders.

Several chapters are devoted to civil conflicts which not only affect the people involved in the fighting, but also threaten the stability of neighboring states. Chapter five, written by Joseph Nevo, explains how Jordanians interpret the outbreak of the Al Aqsa intifida and how it has affected the stability of Jordan's political system. Similarly, Hasan Barabi, in chapter six, explains the impact the intifida has had on Egyptian-Israeli relations and on Egypt's position as power broker in the region. Mats Wärn's chapter on Hizballah is an important chapter. While Hizballah leaders have been more interested in Lebanese politics, than in Palestinians' struggle, they believe that their violent campaign against Israel in southern Lebanon, which forced the withdrawal of Israeli troops in May 2000, serves as an example to Palestinian groups that are dedicated to push out the Israelis from the Occupied Territories. Wärn believes that Hizballah's example may further radicalize the conflict in Palestine.

Overall, the volume's chapters are well written and they support the main thesis. Nevertheless, the biggest weakness is what the volume lacks. Noting that several contributors raised concerns about the rise of a culture of "warlordism" in the Palestinian territories, a chapter on Hamas or Islamic Jihad should have been included. This analytical framework, however, allows scholars and foreign policy experts to see the conflict from a different perspective. It advocates civil war settlement strongly relies on the participation of third-party interveners to help the warring factions negotiate an end to the war. The editors' hope is that a new understanding will lead to new practices to settle the conflict and to establish the foundations of a self-sustaining peace.

Lost Control?

by Lee Jarvis

A War on Terror: Afghanistan and After. By Paul Rogers. London: Pluto Press, 2004. 210 pp. \$24.95, paper. ISBN 0745320864.

Paul Rogers' *A War on Terror* comprises seven chapters, containing nearly forty chronologically ordered articles written for the Open Democracy website between October 2001 and December 2002. The book focuses primarily on the unfolding military campaign within Afghanistan, contextualizing its significance and impact within the broader contours of regional and global security. This analysis is bound together with a critical evaluation of two related objects: contemporary US unilateralism and the militaristic security paradigm hitherto dominant post-September 11, 2001. Where Rogers had previously concluded that the trauma of September 11 could perhaps induce an increasingly cooperative approach to the root causes of political violence and insecurity, this optimism is almost entirely absent within *A War on Terror*.¹

A persistent theme running throughout Rogers' narrative concerns the War on Terror's likely impact in fostering support for al-Qaeda within the Islamic and Arab worlds. Al-Qaeda attacks in Casablanca, Riyadh, and Jakarta, for example, are all cited as evidence of the War on Terror's continuing failure to arrest the spread of global terrorism. More recent bombings in Madrid and London appear similarly to confirm both the prescience and reliability of Rogers' critique. If continuing paramilitary attacks provide a particularly vivid example of an ongoing challenge to this security paradigm, Rogers is less specific regarding the likely impact of public opinion away from the Islamic world. While highlighting a lack of support for the *benign imperium* worldview outside of the Atlantic community, further elaboration on

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the possible impact of this antithesis would have supplemented his analysis.² In addition, Rogers' depiction of post-conflict Afghanistan as a situation of "warlordism," "banditry," and "lawlessness" provides an almost romanticized view of the continuing violence occurring there. Such description, therefore, tends to simplify and decontextualize the problems of post-conflict reconstruction, simultaneously reinforcing the "civilization versus barbarism" narrative employed so promiscuously by members of the Bush administration and their British allies.

Although far from agnostic regarding the emergent humanitarian crisis within Afghanistan, *A War on Terror* lacks any explicitly normative justification for its critique. Just War Theory, for example, is conspicuously absent within Rogers' condemnation of the killing of civilians, while his criticism of the then impending invasion of Iraq is conducted largely within the confines of its potential consequences on domestic and international security. These absences may result, in part, from the public forum for which these articles were originally produced and the brevity of each essay. The consequence of this structure, however, is a primarily empirical, even descriptive, critique of particular or local developments, lacking any real theoretical matrix for evaluation. The provision of such a matrix would perhaps have enhanced the limited discussion within this book of alternative approaches to global security and counterterrorism.

Concluding that the security of the US itself remains far from assured within such a context, Rogers opens the space for an alternative approach towards achieving security while remaining uncommitted regarding the specifics such an approach might take.³ The "real time analysis" (p. 2) provided by the essays injects a refreshing immanence and proximity into his critique, while the factual accuracy within many of the more speculative passages further bolsters the authority of his claims. Although perhaps stronger in criticism than prescription, the timeliness and relevance of this book in challenging the pursuit of security through unilateralism and military force cannot be denied.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Paul Rogers, *Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century* (2nd Edition) (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

² For a more explicit account of the significance and impact of public opinion, see, for example, Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2003).

³ For a fuller elaboration of an alternative approach to global security please see Rogers, *Losing Control*, 132-150.

A Review of *Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects*

by Irina Del Genio

Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia: Legacies and Prospects. By Ben Eklof, Larry E. Holmes, and Vera Kaplan, Editors. New York: Taylor & Francis Ltd, Frank Cass Publishers, 2004. 350 pp. \$125.00, hard bound. ISBN 0714657050.

If the educational system is one of the most important indicators of a healthy society, then Russia's condition is certainly in question. *Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia* is a collection of fourteen essays that evaluates post-Soviet educational reform in Russia. The published work is mostly adapted from material originally presented at two conferences: a research workshop of the Israel Science Foundation entitled *Unraveling the Treads of Time: The Teaching of History in Contemporary Russia*, which took place at Tel Aviv University in December 1999; and *Post-Soviet Education...A Working Conference* held at Indiana University in June 2000. Since the time period covered by the research project is rather short—barely a decade—the essays explore the current *trends* in the educational reform process rather than the *results* and *outcomes* of this reform. Reflecting their diverse academic and cultural background—some are Russian educators who participated in the implementation of the educational reform—the authors together portray a painfully familiar portrait of a reforming society caught between economic decline and social turmoil.

Even opponents of the Communist government admit that the Russian-Soviet society had built an excellent education system. As the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved, however, new leaders took up various educational reforms. According to Ben Eklof, one of the volume's authors and editors, at very early stages in the educational reform process, attempts were made to bring the Soviet educational legacy into line with Western educational practices. The most notable was that of post-Soviet leader Boris Yeltsin, who proclaimed educational reform among the main concerns of the new government in his "Decree No.1: On Priority Measures to Promote Education." Other reformers looked back at the older Imperial Russian legacies for inspiration. Democratization of the classroom, decentralization and even privatization of education, and individual development became buzzwords. However, more than a decade after the reforms began, the educational system in post-Soviet Russia remains highly polarized in terms of the direction of reform and

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what are considered proper educational standards.

Elena Lisovskaya and Vyacheslav Karpov offer a comparative model of three case studies—the French Revolution of 1789–1814; the Communist Revolution in Russia/Soviet Union of 1917–1938, and the post-Soviet Russian revolution (1989 to the present)—to show that, despite the differences, there appears to be remarkably similar “Thermidorean” patterns of educational change. The authors’ use of “Thermidorean” means the second, “reactionary” stage of the educational reform, which bares resemblance to a partial restoration of pre-revolutionary norms and patterns of social life during the Thermidorean Republic in post-revolutionary France. Lisovskaya and Karpov predict that the “technocratic-conservative approach to modernizing post-Communist Russian schools is likely to result in partial re-introduction of Soviet-style centralization” (p. 48). This comparative approach allows many of the book’s contributors to see a number of patterns in educational change that routinely occur in the context of social revolution.

Ben Eklof and Scott Seregny then compare Russian teachers with their Western counterparts in their essay “Teachers in Russia.” Through analyzing the teachers’ interaction with the community and state, the authors seek to show that teaching is one of the least autonomous and most bureaucratized professions in modern Russia. Describing the coping and survival strategies the teachers of post-Soviet Russia were carrying as front-line “warriors” in dealing with the country’s social ills, the authors conclude that their Russian colleagues indeed constitute the most important part of the educational reform—human capital.

Alexander Shevyrev and Igor’ Ionov explore the trends in historical scholarship and the teaching of history in Russia’s schools. The discrediting of Communist ideology, opening of archives, rapid progress in social sciences, and the politics of glasnost all affected textbooks and programs employed in teaching history and social sciences. Shevyrev and Ionov stress that the trend of rewriting history on almost a yearly basis threatens social doubt on the ability of professional historians to accurately reconstruct the past. The authors are fully aware of this danger when they talk about changes in the presentation of historical material by Russian teachers.

Unfortunately, like many other promises made by post-Soviet reformers, the pledge to reform the Soviet educational system would be an empty one. *Educational Reform in Post-Soviet Russia* is a rare analysis of this pledge. Although written by various authors focusing on different aspects of reform, this volume does not give the impression of being a disaggregated collection of essays. The comparative approach allows many of the book’s contributors to see a number of distinct patterns in educational change that routinely occur in the context of social revolution. The authors do a good job of critically assessing and evaluating examples of some of the best and worst educational reforms in the country. Indeed, this book’s strength is that it draws upon first-hand resources like the weekly teachers’ newspapers *Uchitel’skaia Gazeta* and *Pervoe Sentiabria*. The authors (many of them teachers) consider themselves “survivors” of this reform period, and it is their remarkable resilience and talent that make things happen. For these reasons, the

text's relevance is not limited to Russia or post-Soviet independent republics. Educational policy researchers worldwide would benefit from this book's insightful analysis.

An Old Region in a New Century

by Stephen Bisogno

The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job. By Oded Shenkar. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Wharton School Publishing & Pearson Education, 2005. 176 pp. \$25.95, hard bound. ISBN 0131467484.

Very rarely is there a book comprehensive enough for an expert, yet concise enough for someone exploring a subject for the first time. Oded Shenkar performs this task in *The Chinese Century*. Through extensive coverage of China's economy, Shenkar argues that China's government has been building a strong economy with nationalist sentiment founded on historical events. In turn, this fervor has allowed China to attract capital and technological investment not only from foreign investors, but also from regional ethnic Chinese compatriots and the Chinese community worldwide. This spectacular economic flow is allowing China to leapfrog development stages and astound the world. Shenkar, a thirty-year China scholar, begins by laying out the current weaknesses in China's economy and the use of history by the government to build nationalistic support. He then contrasts the development of China with that of Japan, and by chapter eight—of nine—the reader is left understanding Shenkar's point that China's rise is fundamentally different from any other East Asian economy. In the final chapter, Shenkar addresses the omnipresent question of future US-China relations.

Chapters one and two explore the contemporary obstacles China encounters along its path towards modernization, including intellectual-property-right violations, conflicting bureaucratic competition, and attention given by Western human-rights advocates. Shenkar says China can overcome these difficulties, because it has an "unmatched breadth of resources [and] lofty aspirations" (p. 1). These resources include an educated and experienced diaspora (including compatriots and nationals from Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, and Taiwan, together known as "Greater China"), a vast amount of human and economic capital (from both internal and external sources), a dominant trade position (Hong Kong's port), and access to cutting-edge technology from Taiwan. In order to access these resources, the Chinese government has been projecting the importance of a shared ethnic identity

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and one or all of the following historical understandings throughout Greater China: China, the homeland, has been humiliated by the West; is culturally unique; and must foster economic and political independence. Together, these “understandings” have allowed relationship building and access to vital resources for industrial growth, which, according to Shenkar, are helping China successfully overcome the aforementioned difficulties.

In chapter three, Shenkar tells how China’s modernization is unlike that of other East Asian economies. In particular, he contrasts China’s experience in this regard to that of Japan. In Japan, for example, firms abandoned low-end manufacturing quickly, due to a small labor force and increasing competition from the rising Asian Tigers in the 1970s and 1980s. Conversely, China’s vast labor force will allow it to build high-tech products on the coast and maintain low-end manufacturing at its inland cities for decades to come. Second, China has benefited from a large inflow of foreign students, bringing with them great amounts of knowledge that have permeated quickly into the local youth. Japan, however, never became the educational destination China has. Finally, while Japan relied only on internal and volatile foreign investment, China’s overseas communities and nearby compatriots have provided a third source of investment, one which is more stable.

Shenkar’s belief in the Chinese government to generate and continue massive industrial growth is further evident in his exploration of technology and science in chapters four, five, and six. He begins by tracing the roots of China’s science deficiency to pre-1911 Imperial rule, pointing out that only since the beginning of the reform period (*Gaige Kaiifang*) in 1978, has this mistake been reversed by Communist party officials, who have emphasized hard-science education in elementary through university institutions. Once science programs are more fully developed, Shenkar contends, China will experience growth in high-tech industry along the coast and a migration of low-cost production to the undereducated rural areas. This will allow China to dominate both sectors.

For the author, China’s rise appears conspicuously similar to another country. Across the US, a general concern, even fear, of China has appeared. Shenkar explores this in the last three chapters. US politicians, he believes, are scared mostly because China’s rise is very similar to that of the US in the twentieth century. Both countries contain a vast internal hinterland of abundant natural resources, a large labor pool, and see themselves as natural regional leaders, respectively. US politicians understand that once their country reached a certain level of growth, it sought to be internationally influential. The fear is that China will soon seek such international influence through its military and diplomatic cores, thereby threatening US supply lines, global economic stability, and US global political power. Another fear, held by US laborers, is that manufacturing jobs are disappearing annually to China. In response, some US politicians and laborers have tried to control the “China effect” in the US. In refutation, Shenkar cites several statistics showing that it is a collectivization of global jobs into one country, and that in fact US manufacturing employment has remained steady since the 1970s.

He concludes it is not a question of *if*, but *how* the West will react, with either economic confrontation or comity, that will determine the future of world relations. By connecting the past with the anticipated future, *The Chinese Century* provides the reader with a strong understanding of China's economic strengths and weaknesses, most relevant for those conducting business in Asia. Despite its intended business audience, the book offers a wider understanding of China's development in relation to the US as a whole, a continuance of euphorically arduous Sino-West relations.

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